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INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS: AN




In March 1998, a white supremacist Web site began posting threats
against Bonnie Jouhari-a white woman, mother of a biracial child, and
employee of a fair housing organization.' The site included an animated
photographic image of Jouhari's workplace exploding into flames.2 Jou-
hari's picture appeared beneath the exploding image with a caption iden-
tifying her as a "race traitor" and warning that "[tiraitors like this should
beware, for in our day, they will be hung from the neck from the nearest
tree or lamp post."3 In the summer of 1998, the Web site was modified to
include comments attacking Jouhari's daughter, describing her as a
"1mongrel.' 4 The modification also included bomb-building instructions
directly beneath the image of Jouhari's exploding office. 5
The online threats led to offline harassment of Jouhari.6 Despite
moving several times, Jouhari and her daughter received harassing phone
calls and experienced frightening events that made them fear for their
t Assistant Professor, Thurgood Marshall School of Law, Texas Southern University; J.D.,
University of South Carolina. The author is a former two-year legal fellow at the Southern Poverty
Law Center. The author is indebted to Jane Aiken, the Honorable William M. Catoe, Jr., Jennifer
Holladay, Elizabeth Kleinberg, Sippie Smith Johnson, and Edieth Wu for their advice, comments,
and feedback on this article, but more importantly on life in general. The author thanks the Thurgood
Marshall School of Law for grant funds and Danielle Holland for her research assistance. This article
is dedicated in memory of the Honorable Henry A. Politz, Circuit Judge for the United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for twenty-three years.
1. Sec'y, United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Wilson, No. 03-98-0692-8, 2000
WL 988268 (H.U.D. A.L.J July 19, 2000).
2. Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *3.
3. Id.; Interview by HateWatch.org with Bonnie Jouhari (Jan. 17, 2000), at
http://hatewatch.org/research.php?op=readarticle&lid=8 [hereinafter Jouhari Interview]; Donna
Ladd, Living in Terror: Targets of Racist Web Sites Find Nowhere to Hide, THE VILLIAGE VOICE,
May 23, 2000, available at http://www.donnaladd.com/voice29.html.
4. Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *4.
5. Id.
6. Id. at *6-7.
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safety.7 Jouhari's efforts to obtain assistance from local, state, and federal
law enforcement and other agencies were futile.8
Jouhari eventually found an ally in the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") Secretary, Andrew Cuomo. 9
In January 2000, almost two years after the harassment began, HUD filed
a civil suit against the Web site operator, Ryan Wilson, and his organiza-
tion, ALPHA HQ, pursuant to the Fair Housing Act.' 0 In Secretary,
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development v. Wil-
son' 1 (hereinafter Wilson), Wilson failed to respond to the housing dis-
crimination charge, resulting in a default decision against him and
ALPHA HQ.12 On July 19, 2000, an administrative law judge concluded
that Wilson violated the Fair Housing Act by making public threats on the
Internet and implementing a "relentless campaign of domestic terrorism.'
' 3
The judge also concluded that Wilson intentionally inflicted emotional dis-
tress on Jouhari and her daughter, awarding them approximately $250,000
and $750,000 respectively.
14
Wilson exemplifies the marriage of one of humankind's oldest
forms of animus-hatred based on an individual's race, ethnicity, gender,
sexual orientation or religion-and one of its most recent innovations-
7. For an in-depth description of these events see infra Part lI1.C. and Part IV.C. 1.
8. Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *3 ("[Jouhari] was very concerned about the Web site and
contacted an Assistant United States Attorney, the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI'), the
Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, the State of Pennsylvania's Deputy Attorney General
.... "); Id. at *9 ("Despite calls to law enforcement agencies and the telephone company ... Ms.
Jouhari and her daughter continued to receive numerous 'harassing' telephone calls."); see also
Ladd, supra note 3 ("Now in hiding, [Jouhari] says she doesn't believe federal, state and local law
enforcement care enough about online threats to try and stop them.").
9. See Ladd, supra note 3.
10. See Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *1. Jouhari had previously filed complaints in August
1998 and October of 1999 against Wilson and others, pursuant to the Fair Housing Act. See id.
11. 2000WL 988268.
12. See id.
13. Id. at * 17. The relevant portion of the Fair Housing Act provides:
It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the
exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of
having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment, of any right
granted or protected by section 3603, 3604, 3605, or 3606 of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2002); see also 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c) (2002); Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *17
("The uncontested evidence demonstrates that Wilson intended the Web site to incite interference,
by violent or other means, with Ms. Jouhari's statutory right to aid and encourage others in the
exercise and enjoyment of their rights granted or protected under the Fair Housing Act.").
14. See Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *21, *24. The Act provides that upon a finding of a
discriminatory housing practice, the administrative law judge "shall promptly issue an order for such
relief as may be appropriate, which may include actual damages suffered by the aggrieved person
and injunctive or other equitable relief." 42 U.S.C. § 3612(g)(3) (2001). Actual damages includes
damages for emotional harm. See HUD v. Blackwell, 908 F.2d 864, 872-74 (1 1th Cir. 1990);
Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *21 ("Actual damages in housing discrimination cases may include
damages for intangible injuries such as embarrassment, humiliation, and emotional distress caused
by the discrimination.").
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the Internet. 5 While the harassment may have been conducted through a
virtual medium, the harm caused Jouhari was real. 16 Bonnie Jouhari and
her daughter were the victims of cyberassment-the harassment of an-
other person through or on the Internet.17
Cyberassment takes many forms.' 8 Tactics include hacking,' 9
webjacking,20 spoofing,2tcybersquatting, 22 denial of service attacks or e-
15. Id. at *4 ("The purpose of the Web site was to further the goals of the white supremacist
movement and to make known to anyone interested in the movement their ideals, as well as the
identities of those persons who were against them."). Although Bonnie Jouhari is white, Wilson
targeted her because of her civil rights activism for racial equality in housing and because she has a
biracial daughter. See id. at *1. The fact that she is white does not diminish the bias motivated
character of the harassment as a result of her activities associated with, and her relationship to,
African Americans. See, e.g., Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 1992). In a § 1981
action consistent with holdings in the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Eleventh Circuit Courts
of Appeals, the court held that a white person may have standing to sue for alleged discrimination
when the discrimination stems from associating with African Americans. See id.; see also Parr v.
Woodmen of the Worldwide Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11 th Cir. 1986). Under a Title VII claim,
the court stated "[wihere a [white] plaintiff claims discrimination based upon an interracial marriage
or association, he alleges, by definition, that he has been discriminated against because of his race."
Id. (emphasis added).
16. Alexander Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet, 38 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 817, 863-64 (2001) ("[T]he messages transmitted through that social space [the
Internet] have physical, psychological, and cultural effects on real places and real people.").
17. The author coined the term "cyberassment" and uses derivatives of it, such as "cyberass"
"cyberasser" and "cyberassed" throughout the article.
18. For an overview of the ways in which extremists harass and intimidate others on the
Internet, see HateWatch.org, Hacking and Hate: Virtual Attacks with Real Consequences, at
http://hatewatch.org/research.php?op=readarticle&lid=26 (last visited Oct. 4, 2002) [hereinafter
Hacking and Hate].
19. The term hacker can mean "a clever programmer," but most consider a hacker to be
"someone who attempts to break into computer systems and hacking to be "the act of doing it."
WHATIsCoM's ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TECHNOLOGY TERMs 305 (2002) [hereinafter WHATIS?COM'S
ENCYCLOPEDIA], available at http://searehsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/O,,sidl4__gci212220,0-
0.html. Hacking breaches the security of a computer system and permits the hacker to examine,
duplicate, alter and destroy information. See Hacking and Hate, supra note 18. The term
"hacktivism" means to break into a computer system for a "politically or socially motivated
purpose" in order to "disrupt services and bring attention" to the hacktivist's cause. Id.; see also Seth
Kreimer, Insurgent Social Movements and the First Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U.
PA. L. REV. 119, 157-58 (2001) (discussing a number of hacktivist activities). Hate groups post
hacking instructions and tools on their Web sites, encouraging hacking activities. See Hacking and
Hate, supra note 18. See generally Michael Edmund O'Neill, Old Crimes in New Bottles:
Sanctioning Cybercrime, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 232, 246 (2000) (defining and giving examples of
hate); Mary M. Calkins, Note, They Shoot Trojan Horses, Don't They? An Economic Analysis of
Anti-Hacking Regulatory Models, 89 GEO. L. J. 171 (2000) (discussing motivations behind hacking
and criminal prosecutions).
20. Webjacking is the redirection of a Web site's numeric Internet Protocol address or name
resolution to an illegitimate or fake address. See Hacking and Hate, supra note 18. In practical
terms, a person seeking to go to a specific Web site by typing in the domain name, ends up at a
different site. For example, the webjacking of a Ku Klux Klan Web site, http://www.kkk.com to
http://www.hatewatch.org, by unknown individuals shut down the Klan site for almost a week. See
id.
21. Spoofing means to "deceive for the purpose of gaining access" to the resources of another.
WHATISCOM ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 19, at 675, available at http://searchsecurity.tech-
targert.com/sDefinition/0,,sid 14_gci213039,00html. However, to spoof an e-mail includes forging an
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mail bombs,23 and sending viruses.24 However, the most common forms
of harassing activity on the Internet occur through Web sites, e-mails,
and message boards.25 Hate-mongers have been especially vigilant in
doling out racial epithets, libelous statements, offensive or sexually
graphic pictures, threats of violence, and personal information postings
26about their targets.
When the Internet is used for illegal aims or to exact harms upon
other individuals, the injured party will often seek a remedy. Victims
may seek redress through legal action, which in turn raises many ques-
tions. Should lawyers rely on traditional legal causes of action and con-
cepts to challenge Internet activity? What deficiencies will these tradi-
e-mail by taking on another's identity. Hacking and Hate, supra note 18. Therefore, a harasser can
send e-mail and post messages in their victim's name.
22. Cybersquatting is typically the purchase of an Internet domain name for the purpose of
selling it to the company that will eventually want to use the name. WHATISCOM'S ENCYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 19, at 163, available at http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0,,sid-
26_gci213900,00.html. Domain names are sold on a first come, first serve basis. Id. It is usually a
concern in the e-commerce area, but cybersquatting can be used for noncommercial gains as well.
See id. In 1998, for example, white supremacists "purchased 10 Internet domains with addresses that
sounded like mainstream newspapers" and directed "unsuspecting readers to the nation's oldest
white hate site, Stormfront." Ros Davidson, Web of Hate, SALON (Oct. 16, 1998), at
http://www.salon.com/news/1998/10/16newsa.htm. Likewise, Hatewatch.org, a leading online hate
watchdog group, has been targeted by anti-gay cybersquatters using the URLs hatewatch.com and
hatewatch.net. See Steve Silberman, Who Owns Hate on the Net?, WIRED (June 5, 1998), at
http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,12761,00.html. See generally John Mercer, Note,
Cybersquatting: Blackmail on the Information Superhighway, 6 B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 11 (2000)
(discussing the issues surrounding cybersquatting). For a legislative response to cybersquatting see
infra note 27.
23. A denial of service attack is an action that results in the loss of service of an online
resource. See WHATISCOM ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 19, at 181, available at http://search-
security.techtarget.com/sDefinition/O,,sidl4_gci213591,00.html. There are many different forms of
such attacks. See id. The most common form of denial of service is a Buffer Overflow Attack in
which multiple e-mails, requests for information, or some form of traffic is sent to the server or
network address in order to shut it down. See id.; Hacking and Hate, supra note 18. In November
2001, the FBI National Infrastructure Protection Center reported that extremist groups were adopting
the power of modem technology and concluded that although extremist groups' cyberattacks were
limited to unsophisticated e-mail bombs and threatening content, the increase in technical
competency could lead to network based attacks that included the nation's infrastructures. See
National Infrastructure Protection Center, Highlights, Issue 10-01 (Nov. 10, 2001), at
http://www.nipc.gov/publications/highlights/200l/highlight-01-IO.pdf; see also Brian McWilliams,
Internet An Ideal Tool for Extremists - FBI, NEWSBYTES, at 2001 WL 23420348.
24. See WHATIsCOM ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 19, at 771, available at
http:/searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/O,,sidl4_gci213306,00.htm ("A virus is a piece of
programming code usually disguised as something else that causes some unexpected and usually
undesirable event."); see also O'Neill, supra note 19, at 246.
25. See Andrew Backover, Hate Sets Up Shop on Internet: Groups Push E-extremism, DENV.
POST, Nov. 9, 1999, at El (e-mail is the most popular vehicle for "bigots") (citing David Goldman,
Executive Director of HateWatch.org).
26. See Anti Defamation League, Poisoning the Web: Hatred Online, at http://www.adl.org-
/poisoning-web/introduction.asp (last visited Oct. 4, 2002) [hereinafter Poisoning the Web];
Hacking and Hate, supra note 18.
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tional actions have in addressing such activity? Will new causes of action
develop as society identifies, defines, and quantifies what it considers
new harms evolving from interaction on the Intemet?27 Arguments on the
relationship between the Internet and law range from advocating abso-
lutely no legal regulation,28 to simply applying current laws, 29 to the de-
velopment of new laws to deal with the medium's unique characteris-
tics. 30 The legal rules that will impact this medium are nascent. 31 Until
27. Such developments are rapidly emerging. For example, the Anticybersquatting Consumer
Protection Act (ACPA) permits a private cause of action against a person who in bad faith with the
intent to profit uses a domain name that is identical or similar to a trademark owner's famous name
or distinctive mark. See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2000). Also, at least thirty-five states have a
cyberstalking statute. See David Crary, Computer Link: States Joining Forces to Throw Net Over
Cyberstalkers, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 17, 2001, at 5; see also Joseph C. Merschman,
Note, The Dark Side of the Web: Cyberstalking and the Need for Contemporary Legislation, 24
HARV. WOMEN's L. J. 255 (2001) (discussing why current stalking statutes do not address the
problem of cyberstalking). For suggestions for new laws, see Tsesis, supra note 16, at 868 (arguing
for criminal statutes punishing the dissemination of hate speech on the Internet).
28. See, e.g., Henry H. Peritt, Jr., Cyberspace Self-Government: Town Hall Democracy or
Rediscovered Royalism? 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 413, 419 (1997) ("self-governance is desirable for
electronic communities"); Llewellyn Joseph Gibbons, No Regulation, Government Regulation or
Self-Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace, 6
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 475, 543 (1997); L. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for
Cyberspace, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 993, 1029 (1994); John P. Barlow, A Declaration of the
Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 9, 1996), at http://www.eff.org/Publications/John_PerryBarlow-
/barlow_0296.declaration. ("Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and
steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past
to leave us alone.").
29. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHIC.
LEGAL F. 207, 207-16 (1996); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1199,
1201 (1998) (arguing that the application of traditional rules of jurisdiction and choice of laws can
be applied to cyberspace); State Sues Landlord for Specifying White Tenants, N.J. LAW., Aug. 7,
2000 (discussing state-filed complaint against landlord for advertising on his Web page the rental of
a three-bedroom apartment "for whites only").
30. See, e.g., David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN L. REV. 1367, 1367-1402 (1996) (discussing that cyberspace requires distinct
laws and rules from those that regulate other areas); Jonathan J. Rusch, Cyberspace and the "Devil's
Hatband," 24 SEATrLE U. L. REV. 577, 582-92 (2000) (advocating through an analogy to the
Devil's Hatband, what cowboys in the Old West called barbed wire that was used to both fence in
cattle and keep cattle out, that regulating the Internet may be beneficial); Tsesis, supra note 16, at
863-64 ("What is needed is a legal scheme to regulate the Internet because the messages transmitted
through that social space have physical, psychological, and cultural effects on real places and real
people.'!); Merschman, supra note 27, at 278-92 (analyzing potential legal solutions for
cyberstalking). For a general discussion of the arguments on legal regulation of the Internet, see
Sally Greenberg, Threats, Harassment, and Hate Online: Recent Developments, 6 B.U. PUB. INT.
L.J. 673, 694-95 (1997); Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, Impeach the Internet, 46 Loy. L. REV. 569,
570-77 (2000) (discussing pros and cons of applying laws to the Internet).
31. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998) ("Needless to say, the legal
rules that will govern this new medium are just beginning to take shape."). For an interesting
discussion on cyberspace law see Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might
Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501 (1999).
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new legal rules develop, lawyers will rely on traditional causes of action
and theories to challenge a broad range of activities on the Internet.
32
Although applying tort law to bias motivated conduct is not a new
concept, 33 as the forms of harassment and intimidation morph with their
application to the Internet medium, so too must the ways in which law-
yers challenge such transmutations. Significant discussion and litigation
is necessary to (1) determine exactly how tort law should be and will be
applied to the Internet, and (2) decide if it will be necessary to identify
new harms as society struggles to define what constitutes a legally cog-
nizable injury based on Internet activity. 34 The debate has just begun as
to how tort principles will impact human interaction on the Internet.35
One of the few cases applying the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress to online conduct is the Bonnie Jouhari case, Wilson.36 Al-
32. See Michele N. Breen, Comment, Personal Jurisdiction and the Internet: "Shoehorning"
Cyberspace Into International Shoe, 8 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 763, 777-79 (1998); Michael L.
Siegel, Comment, Hate Speech, Civil Rights, and the Internet: The Jurisdictional and Human Rights
Nightmare, 9 ALB. L J. SI. & TECH. 375 (1999). For an international perspective, see Daniel P.
Schafer, Canada's Approach to Jurisdiction Over Cybertorts: BrainTech v. Kostiuk, 23 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 1186 (2000); Tara Blake Garfinkel, Comment, Jurisdiction Over Communication Torts:
Can You Be Pulled Into Another Country's Courts System for Making a Defamatory Statement Over
the Internet? A Comparison of English and U.S. Law, 9 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 489 (1996).
33. See THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT LAW 29 (2001)
("In recent decades, the tort action for intentional infliction of emotional distress has evolved further
to punish racism, sexism, and bullying in the workplace."); see e.g., Cotton v. Duncan, No. 93 C
3875, 1993 WL 473622, at *5-6 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (rejecting defendant's request to dismiss plaintiff's
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim for attempting to burn a wooden cross inscribed
"KKK rules" on African American family's lawn); Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1113-
16, 1131 (D. Or. 2000) (upholding damages recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress,
tort of invasion, and public disclosure of private facts against defendant who mailed letters to lesbian
plaintiff thai used derogatory remarks, inflammatory language and death threats); see infra note 154
(enumerating Southern Poverty Law Center Cases).
34. "Each medium of expression may present its own problems." Southeastern Promotions,
Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) (dealing with the regulation of broadcast media).
35. See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999) ("With
the rise of the Internet has come the ability to commit certain tortious acts, such as defamation,
copyright infringement, and trademark infringement entirely online."); KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra
note 33, at 219 ("It is unclear how tort law will make the transition as the American economy is
transformed from a durable good-producing economy to one based upon intellectual property,
information, and services.").
36. See Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *18-19. But see, e.g., Lenhoff v. Getty, No. 97CIV.9458,
2000 WL 977900, at *8, 9 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (granting defendant summary judgment, because even if
true, the sending of unwanted junk e-mails to plaintiff and placement of an ad with the phone
number of plaintiff family's place of business is not sufficiently outrageous under New York law);
Lian v. Sedgwick James of N.Y., 992 F. Supp. 644, 646, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (granting summary
judgment to supervisor and former employer because the sending of an e-mail to plaintiff's co-
workers stating that supervisor and plaintiff had agreed that plaintiff would begin seeking other
employment did not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct); Rail v. Hellman, 726 N.Y.S.2d 629
(N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss because the alleged fabrication of an
e-mail disseminated in plaintiff's name that made him "appear as a rude, petty, self-absorbed
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though Internet conduct generally, and cyberassment in particular, may
be challenged with a variety of tort causes of action, 37 this article sug-
gests that, as in Wilson, lawyers should consider the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress to challenge and deter bias motivated
cyberassment.
38
Part I of this article briefly explains how hate permeates society in
the United States through multiple venues, like the heads of the Hydra of
ancient Greece. 39 Hate rhetoric that permeates society often shifts from
merely espousing views, to sponsoring bias motivated acts that ulti-
mately harm individuals and communities.4° In an attempt to diminish
the harmful effects of the Hate Hydra, society responds in a variety of
ways, including legal action.41 In turn, one method right-wing extremists
use to counter-respond is the organizational philosophy of "leaderless
resistance. ' 42 Part I concludes with a description of leaderless resistance
and the ways in which right-wing extremists have adopted this philoso-
phy to advance their many causes, including terrorism against peoples of
color, religious minorities, and others.43
Part II explores the Internet's role as the new head of the Hate Hy-
dra. It is the newest venue for white supremacists to disseminate their
writer/cartoonist" which insulted the New York City cartooning industry was not outrageous and
shocking to satisfy an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).
37. See Compuserve Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1019-26 (S.D. Oh. 1997)
(finding trespass to chattel cause of action and granting a preliminary injunction on behalf of the
private service provider being spammed by defendant). But see Marczeski v. Law, 122 F. Supp. 2d
315, 325 (D. Conn. 2000) ("A threat by telephone or on the Internet is not a civil assault."). For
arguments for the use of common law tort law in dealing with Internet activity, see Susan Lyman,
Comment, Civil Remedies for the Victims of Computer Viruses, 21 Sw. U. L. REV. 1169, 1170-71
(1992) (arguing the possible application of trespass to chattel, conversion, negligence, and
intentional interference with business relations for victims of computer viruses); Susan Ballantine,
Note, Computer Network Trespasses: Solving New Problems With Old Solutions, 57 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 209, 238-42 (2000) (proposing trespass to land, instead of trespass to chattel, as possible
remedy for private network providers bombarded with unsolicited bulk e-mail or spam).
38. This article focuses on online acts of harassment by individuals toward another based on
animus or hate, it does not address passive Web sites that merely advocate a particular viewpoint.
For discussions on the pros and cons of legal regulation of hate speech on the Web, see Tsesis, supra
note 16; Rachel Weintraub-Reiter, Note, Hate Speech Over the Internet. A Traditional
Constitutional Analysis or a New Cyber Constitution?, 8 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 145 (1998); Siegel,
supra note 32. See, e.g., Laura Leets, Responses to Internet Hate Sites: Is Speech Too Free in
Cyberspace?, 6 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 287 (2001); Paul Meller, Europe Moving Toward Ban on
Internet Hate Speech, N. Y. TIMEs, Nov. 10, 2001, at 3C.
39. See infra notes 51-63.
40. See infra notes 51, 59.
41. See infra note 63.
42. For a definition of leaderless resistance, see infra note 64.
43. See infra notes 66-74.
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viewpoints. 44 This part describes the proliferation of hate on the Inter-
net.4
Part IH outlines some of the medium-specific characteristics of the
Internet that should be considered in crafting a legal response to the cy-
ber-head of the Hate Hydra. Specifically, the Internet's role as a force
multiplier, the opportunity it offers for anonymous activity, and the slow
response of law enforcement in dealing with Internet interaction should
be factored into legal doctrines and future responses to online harass-
ment.
46
Part IV suggests that future litigants should consider the tort of in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress as a viable bow in the quiver to
attack the new head of the Hate Hydra. 4' Tort law is a logical way to
respond to online activities, considering its role in allocating responsibil-
ity for harms that arise from human activity, which apply to both on- and
offline harms. This part includes a history of the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress, provides an overview of its elements, and dis-
cusses why it is a viable cause of action to challenge cyberassment. Part
V concludes with an analysis of the elements of the tort as applied to the
specific facts of Wilson, with a particular focus on proving the element of
"extreme and outrageous conduct." 8 The analysis places emphasis on
this element's requirement that the court consider the context or situation
in which the conduct occurred, including the new challenges presented
by the Internet.
44. See BARBARA PERRY, IN THE NAME OF HATE: UNDERSTANDING HATE CRIMES 135, 174-
78(2001).
45. See infra Part II and notes 76-102.
46. See infra Part 11l and notes 103-147. This article does not specifically address the
continuum between ideologies of hate groups and more mainstream acts of discrimination and white
supremacy.
47. See infra Part IV and accompanying footnotes. Although this article suggests legal action,
it is not to say that litigation is the only way to address hate motivated acts that harm and intimidate
others. There must be a multifaceted attack on intolerance and there is a role for everyone interested
in this endeavor. See, e.g., Christopher Wolf, Anti Defamation League, Racists, Bigots, and the Law
on the Internet, at http://www.adl.org/internet/intemet law l.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2002). The ADL
worked with Yahoo to remove hate groups from "clubs" on Yahoo's server in compliance with
Yahoo's own service agreements which prohibited hate speech. Id. The ADL developed Hate Filter,
designed for use by parents to filter out some of the most offensive hate sites. Anti-Defamation
League, ADL Releases Free Filtering Software Designed to Keep Hate Out of Homes, at
http:llwww.adl.org/presrele/intemet%5F75/4054%5F75.asp (last visited Oct. 28, 2002); Steve
Silberman, Branding Bigotry, WIRED, at http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,13682,00.html
(last visited Oct. 6, 2002). For every $100 donation to the organization, HateWatch.org registered a
domain name that would be sought out by hate groups, such as swastika.com, thereby taking the
name out of circulation on the Internet. Id.; http://www.tolerance.org/hatejintemet/index.jsp (last
visited Oct. 26, 2002) (taking visitor on a hate tour of Web sites in order to educate the viewer on
what is on the Web). See additional responses to hate motivated acts and words infra note 63.
48. See infra Part I.C. and accompanying footnotes.
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Part V advocates that the First Amendment should not be invoked as
a shield to protect bias motivated cyberassment in cases like Wilson be-
cause such harassment amounts to a "true threat." This part discusses the
parameters of the true threats exception to the First Amendment, the
most recent Internet threats case, Planned Parenthood of Colum-
bia/Willamette, Inc. v. American Coalition of Life Activists,49 and the
Supreme Court's significant oversight in failing to discuss the unique
characteristics of the Internet that bolster a true threats analysis. Finally,
Part V concludes by arguing that employing the tort of intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress in cyberassment cases like Wilson is consistent
with the interests the First Amendment true threats 'exception seeks to
protect.
50
I. THE HATE HYDRA
Hate activity on the Internet cannot be taken out of the mainstream
social and political context. The Internet did not create the hate phe-
nomenon, but it serves as a new and unique venue through which bigots
can organize and propagate hatred. 51 To many Americans, the phenome-
non of hate is like the Hydra of ancient Greece-it is impossible to de-
stroy completely, for even when it is squelched or diminished in one
place, it reemerges in another, often with more virulence. 2
Hatred permeates our society and culture through multiple venues,
including: politics, 53 religious institutions,
54 public demonstrations, 5
5
49. 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002).
50. See infra Part V and accompanying footnotes.
51. For an overview of the different hate groups and ideologies see PERRY, supra note 44, at
135-78 (2001); Tolerance.org, U.S. Map of Hate Groups, at http://www.tolerance.org/maps/hate-
/index.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2002); ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, EXTREMISM IN AMERICA: A
GUIDE (2002) [hereinafter EXTREMISM IN AMERICA].
52. The Hydra was a serpent that lived in the swamps of Lema and terrorized the Greek
countryside. See DONNA ROSENBERG, WORLD MYTHOLOGY: AN ANTHOLOGY OF THE GREAT
MYTHS AND EPIcS 27 (2d ed. 1994). Lemeans believed that the Hydra was impossible to kill
because its central head was immortal and that, when one of its other eight heads was cut off, two
heads grew in its place. See id.; Hydra (mythology), MICROSOFT ENCARTA ONLINE ENCYCLOPEDIA
2002, at http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/refpages/RefArticle.aspx?refid=761562446; see also The
Lernean Hydra, at http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hercules/hydra.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2002).
Hercules destroyed the creature. See id. He lured it from the safety of the swamp by shooting
flaming arrows at it. Id. He then severed each head and had Iolas torch it with flames. See id. He
then chopped off the central head and buried it under a heavy rock. See ROSENBERG, supra. Today
the term hydra means a complex problem that continually causes compounding difficulties. See
Hydra (mythology), supra.
53. White supremacists hope to further their more extreme hate-based ideology by influencing
and gaining access to mainstream U.S. politics. For example, in 1999, the Intelligence Report
exposed the Council of Conservative Citizens (CCC), a mainstream organization on the political
right, as the literal "reincarnation of the racist White Citizens Councils (WCC) of the 1950s and
1960s." Sharks in the Mainstream, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 93, Winter 1999, at 21, available at
http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceproject/ip-4i5.htm. As the Intelligence Report showed, the
CCC had access to some of politics most influential leaders, including Senate Majority Leader Trent
Lott (R-Miss.), then Mississippi Gov. Fordice, and Rep. Bob Barr (R-Ga.) and counted more than
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thirty state legislators in Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi among its 5,000 members. Id.; Anti-
Defamation League, Council of Conservative Citizens: Promoting a Racist Agenda, at
http://www.adl.org/special-reports/ccc/ccc-intro.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2002). However, CCC is
not the only example of the extremist right shaping more widely accepted political parties and
officials. Larry Pratt, who runs the Gun Owners of America-which claims more than 150,000
members-served as the co-chairman of Pat Buchannan's 1996 presidential campaign. See Frederick
Clarkson, Anti-Abortion Extremism, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 91, Summer 1998, at 9, available at
http://www.splcenter.orglintelligenceprojectip-4gi.html; False Patriots, INTELLIGENCE REP., No.
102, Summer 2001, at 25, available at http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceproject/ip-4r2.html.
Alongside neo-Nazis and Klansman, Pratt attended a meeting on October 23, 1992, in Estes Park,
Colorado, which was organized by Pete Peters, a Christian Identity pastor, to develop a framework
for the militia movement. See False Patriots, supra. Watchdog groups later found that Pratt had also
provided editorial support to the anti-Semitic United Sovereigns of America and that the Gun
Owners of America had helped to fund a white supremacist legal aid organization. See id.; Bombs,
Bullets, Bodies, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 97, Winter 2000, at 15, available at http://www.spl-
center.org/intelligenceproject/ip-4ml.html; KENNETH STERN, A FORCE UPON THE PLAIN 117-18
(1996). Of course, some hate-mongers go beyond providing political support to mainstream
candidates and instead position themselves as contenders for political office. In 1989, David Duke,
former Imperial Wizard of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and founder of both the racist National
Association for the Advancement of White People and the White Youth Alliance, a group associated
with the National Socialist White People's Party, ran for and won a seat in the Louisiana House of
Representatives. See The Center for New Community, A Brief History of David Duke's White
Supremacist Career, at http://www.stopduke.org/history.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2002). In 1990,
Duke bid unsuccessfully for a U.S. Senate seat, but managed to gamer 60% of the white vote and the
support of 43.5% of the general populous. Id. Today, Duke continues his work as a politically active
"white racialist," serving as the chairman of the Republican Party Executive Committee (RPEC) in
St. Tammany Parish, Louisiana. See id.; see also JAMES RIDGEWAY, BLOOD IN THE FACE 164-74 (2d
ed. 1995); BILL STANTON, KLANWATCH: BRINGING THE Ku KLUX KLAN TO JUSTICE 85-86 (1991).
For an overview of Duke's views, see Anti-Defamation League, David Duke in His Own Words, at
http://www.adl.org/special-reports/duke-own-words/duke-intro.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
54. The following briefly summarizes two bigoted religious ideologies. Christian Identity
Theology-Christian Identity holds that whites, not Jews, are the chosen people favored by God and
casts Jews as biological descendants of Satan. Tolerance.org, U.S. Map of Hate Groups, Christian
Identity, at http://www.tolerance.org/maps/hate/group.jsp?map-data.type id=2 (last visited Oct. 1,
2002). People of color are identified as soulless "mud people." Id. In 2001, the Intelligence Project
tracked thirty-one Christian Identity churches in the United States. Odyssey of Hate, INTELLIGENCE
REP., No. 95, Summer 1999, at 42, available at http://www.splcenter.org/cgi-binlprintassist.pl?-
page=/intelligenceproject/ip-4k8.html.
Virulent Homophobia as Faith-The most notorious faction of gay-hating faith may well
heed from Topeka, Kansas. Tolerance.org, Bully Pulpit: Fred Phelps' Hold on Topeka, at
http://www.tolerance.org/news/article__hate.jsp?id=129 (last visited Oct. 1, 2002). Reverend Fred
Phelps of the Westboro Baptist Church runs the infamous "God Hates Fags" Web site and often
pickets funerals of gay hate murder victims and others whom the church perceives as being "fags"
and "fag-enablers." Id.; God Hates Fags: Love Crusades, at http://www.godhatesfags.com/main-
/index.html (last visited Oct. 5, 2002); THE TOPEKA-CAPITAL JOURNAL, Loving God's Hate: An In-
Depth Look at Reverend Fred Phelps and the Westboro Baptist Church, at
http://cjonline.com/webindepth/phelps/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
For discussions of hate and intolerance seeping into mainstream religions, see Confederates
in the Pulpit, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 101, Spring 2001, at 51-55, available at http://www.spl-
center.org/cgi-bin/printassistant.pl?page=/intelligenceproject/ip-4q5.htm. In Spring 2001, the
Intelligence Report found that the neo-Confederate hate group, the League of the South, was
positioning itself to take over the Presbyterian Church of America (PCA), "a conservative Southern
denomination founded in 1973 that has more than 300,000 North American members." Id. As to a
more controversial issue of hate and religion, both the Southern Poverty Law Center and the Anti-
Defamation League ("ADL") categorize the Nation of Islam ("NOT') as a separatist, anti-Semitic
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music, 56 talk radio,57 television, 58 and print media. 59 The values and mes-
sages of hate rhetoric emanating from these venues can, and do, inspire
religious group. See Joseph J. Levin, Jr., Southern Poverty Law Center, Farrakhan: A Long History
of Hate, at http://www.splcenter.org/cgi-bin/goframe.pl?refname=/centerinfo/ci-7.html (last visited
Oct. 1, 2002); Anti-Defamation League, Nation of Islam, at http://www.adl.org/main_islam.asp (last
visited Oct. 1, 2002). The ADL offers an extensive collection of anti-Semitic and anti-White quotes
from NOI's leader, Louis Farrakhan, as evidence that the religious organization is a purveyor of hate.
Anti-Defamation League, Minister Louis Farrakhan: In His Own Words, at http://www.adl.org-
/special-reports/farrakhanown-words/onjews.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2002); see also
Tolerance.org, U.S. Map of Hate Group: Black Separatists, at http://www.tolerance.org/maps/hate/-
group.jsp?map.data_type_id=l (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
55. Hate groups, like organizations involved in other social movements, use public
demonstrations and marches to help raise awareness about their cause and to recruit new members.
In summer 2001, Tolerance.org identified more than twenty-five white supremacist gatherings
scheduled across the country. See Tolerance.org, Hate in the News: Summer Schedule of Hate, at
http://www.tolerance.org/news/article-hate.jsp?id=232 (last visited Oct. 2, 2002). The ADL tracked
thirty-seven such events from April to August 2002. See Anti-Defamation League, Archive of
Extremist Events by State: 2000, at http://www.adl.org/learn/Events_2001/events-archive_2002-
_print.asp (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
56. Music has become one of the major communicators of white power ideology. The Center
for New Community, for example, tracks 123 domestic and 228 international white power bands.
Tolerance.org, Hate in the News: White Power Bands, at http://www.tolerance.org/news/-
article.hate.jsp?id=403 (last visited Oct. 1, 2002). These musical groups either "express white
supremacist ideas in their music or are involved with white supremacist organizations." Id. See also
Anti-Defamation League, Hate on Display: White Power Music, at http://www.adl.org/hate-
symbols/music.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2002). Of course, white power musicians do not have a
monopoly on hatred. Musicians in other genres also promote homophobia, racism or misogyny on
occasion. In 2001, for example, Grammy-award-winning artist Eminem came under heavy fire for
his homophobic and misogynist lyrics. See Scott Hirschfeld, Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education
Network, Do Words Hurt? (Feb. 14, 2001), at http://www.glsen.org/templates/resources/record-
.html?section=16&record=555.
57. Talk radio has become a significant venue for white supremacists. In the 1990s, anti-
government extremists and hate groups took hold of radio--AM, FM, shortwave and low-power
stations-as primary means of ideological distribution. Carla Brooks Johnston, Radical Radio
Redux, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 91, Summer 1998, at 17-18, available at http://splcenter.org/cgi-
bin/printassist.pl?page=/intelligenceproject/ip-4g5.html. In 1998, far right extremists broadcast on at
least 366 AM stations, forty FM stations and seven shortwave stations. Id. For example, William
Pierce, leader of the neo-Nazi National Alliance, currently transmits his half-hour radio program,
"American Dissident Voices," over nine AM or FM radio stations. See Anti-Defamation League,
The Growing Danger of the National Alliance, at http://www.adl.org/explosion%5Fof%5F-
hate/explosion of 7hate.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2002). Shortwave offers the messengers of hate the
broadest reach, with an estimated 2.5 billion people tuned in worldwide. James Latham, From
America, with Hate, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 103, Fall 2001, at 56, available at http://www.spl-
center.org/cgi-bin/printassist.pl?page=/intelligenceproject/ip-4s8.html. In 1990, shortwave offered
just five hours of hate broadcast weekly, but, by the new millennium, 275 hours of hate-filled shows
were available to listeners each week. International Center for Human Rights in Media, Radio for
Peace International, Background of Hate Speech on Short-wave Radio, available at http://www.rf-
pi.org/ichrm.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
58. Thanks in large part to the Cable Act of 1984, which forbids cable operators from
exercising editorial discretion in the selection of public access shows, white power advocates have
also moved toward cable programming as a means of getting their messages across. See Anti-
Defamation League, May Cable Television Stations Restrict or Regulate Extremists Who Want to
Appear on Public Access Programming?, at http://www.adl.org/20faq/answer20.asp (last visited
Mar. 21, 2002). Perhaps the first contemporary hate-based television program came from Tom
Metzger and the White Aryan Resistance (WAR). In 1984, Metzger began producing and televising
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individuals to harass, intimidate, and commit acts of violence against
others.6 ° Such hatred ultimately creates complex problems that harm
a half-hour program titled Race and Reason, which broadcast in major markets such as Los Angeles,
San Francisco, Atlanta, Memphis, and Phoenix. See Anti-Defamation League, Tom MetzgerlWhite
Aryan Resistance, at http://www.adl.org/leam/ext%5Fus/metzger.asp (last visited Oct. 1, 2002).
WAR claims the program eventually reached forty-nine markets in thirteen states. Id. Several white
supremacist outfits have followed Metzger's lead in recent years, including the Invisible Knights of
the Ku Klux Klan in Lafayette, Louisiana, the United Klans of America in Reading, Pennsylvania,
and a Canadian-based anti-Semitic Holocaust denial advocate. See Anti-Defamation League, Hate
Groups and Black Church Arsons-State by State (June 20, 1996), at http://www.adl.org-
lpresrele/DiRaB 41/2766_41.asp; Department of Housing and Urban Development, Cuomo
Announces Settlement with Chaplain to the Ku Klux Klan Accused of Housing Discrimination (May
I1, 2000), at http://www.hud.gov/local/okl/prsOO10O.html; Bob Aldrich, Public Station Channels
Messages of Hate, Los GATOS WEEKLY-TIMES (Jan. 24, 1996), available at http://www.svcn.com-
/archives/lgwt/01.24.96/public.station.html.
59. Hate groups do more than crank out flyers at the neighborhood Kinkos; many produce and
distribute glossy magazines, journals and newsletters. Among them is American Renaissance,
founded and edited by Jared Taylor. Academic in tone, its pages are dedicated to proving that
peoples of color are inferior to whites. See Anti-Defamation League, American Renaissance, at
http://www.adl.orgllearn[ExtUS/amren.asp?xpicked=5&item=amren (last visited Oct. 5, 2002); The
Annals of Hate, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 93, Winter 1999, at 49, available at http://www.spl-
center.org/cgi-bin/printassist.pl?page=/intelligenceproject/ip-4i8html. WAR, self-billed as "the most
racist newspaper on earth," is the print arm of the White Aryan Resistance and offers vulgar cartoons
and in-your-face racist and anti-Semitic text. Id. For more information on the White Aryan
Resistance, see also MORRIS DEES & STEVE FIFFER, HATE ON TRIAL (1993). The racist Council of
Conservative Citizens (CCC) publishes The Citizens Informer, which boasts circulation of 20,000.
See EXTREMISM IN AMERICA, supra note 51, at 253, available at http://adl.org/leam/-
ext-us/CCCitizens.asp?xpicked=3&itme=12 (last visited Oct. 1, 2002); Sharks in the Mainstream,
INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 93, Winter 1999, at 21, available at http://www.splcenter.org/cgi-
bin/printassist.pl?page=/intelligenceproject/ip-4i5html. The king of white power publication,
however, is the neo-Nazi National Alliance, which publishes Resistance magazine, National
Vanguard, the National Alliance Bulletin, a comic book series (New World Order Comix) and a
newsletter titled Free Speech. Anti-Defamation League, National Alliance, at http://www.adl.org-
/learn/ExtUS/NAlliance.asp?xpicked=3&item=16 (last visited Oct. 1, 2002). William Pierce, head
of the National Alliance, authored the most influential book on the white power scene, The Turner
Diaries, as well as its lesser-known sequel, Hunter. Id. The Turner Diaries is a fictional account of a
race war in the United States-a war fought by "white patriots" who massacre Jews, peoples of color
and "race traitors." See generally ANDREW MACDONALD, THE TURNER DIARIES (2d ed. 1980). The
book inspired the creation of a white supremacist cell called the Order, members of which shot and
killed Jewish radio host Allen Berg. See National Alliance, supra; Kenneth Stem, Hate and the
Internet, 1 J. OF HATE STUDIES 57, 68 (2001-02). The Turner Diaries also served as the blueprint for
the Oklahoma City bombing. National Alliance, supra. For in-depth information on ties between The
Turner Diaries and domestic terrorism see generally MORRIS DEES & JAMES CORCORAN,
GATHERING STORM: AMERICA'S MILITIA THREAT (1996); KEVIN FLYNN & GARY GERHARDT, THE
SILENT BROTHERHOOD (1989); STERN, A FORCE UPON THE PLAIN, supra note 53. William Pierce
died in July 2002. Facing the Future, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 107, Fall 2002, at 31. For a
discussion of how the Turner Diaries relate to the cyberassment of Bonnie Jouhari in Wilson, see
infra Part IV.C.2. and accompanying footnotes.
60. See Kay Lazar, Media-Savvy Group Spreads Hate to Massachusettes, B. HERALD, Sept. 9,
2001, at 1 (citing Jack Levin, director of the Brudnick Center on Violence at Northwester University
as saying that less than five percent of all hate crimes "are committed by members of organized
groups").
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individuals, families, and communities.6' Therefore, as messages of hate
and bias motivated activities emerge from these venues-much like
heads of the Hydra-individuals, communities, civil rights organizations,
and law enforcement agencies respond in attempts to diminish their
harmful effects on society.62 These responses include: creation of watch-
dog groups, counter-demonstrations, observation of groups by law en-
forcement, infiltration of groups by law enforcement, criminal prosecu-
tion for criminal acts, hate crime enhancement penalties, and civil law-
suits against extremist groups.63 These methods assume an identifiable
group that can be monitored or tracked.
The responses to hate by mainstream society have prompted
counter-responses by extremist groups to preserve their survival. Many
such groups employ the method of "leaderless resistance" as an organiz-
ing strategy against the government or an enemy.64 This strategy rejects
61. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993) (finding an enhancement
penalty for bias motivated crimes constitutional after accepting Wisconsin's argument that the
enhancement was not because of disagreement with the offenders views, but because it redresses a
"distinct emotional harm" and "incites community unrest"). For an expansive view of the harms of
hate crimes, see Lu-in Wang, The Complexities of Hate, 60 OHIO ST. L. J. 799 (1999).
62. See generally Bill Wassmuth & M.J. Bryant, Not in Our World: A Perspective of
Community Organizing Against Hate, I J. OF HATE STUDIES 109 (2001-02) (discussing a
community's response to an out-break of anti-Semitism).
63. Responses to hatred come in many forms. The Center for New Community, the Northwest
Coalition for Human Dignity and the Positive Youth Foundation, for example, launched the "Turn It
Down" campaign to counter the burgeoning white power music scene. See Turn It Down, at
http://www.tumitdown.com/about.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2002). Meanwhile, Tolerance.org offers
a guide for parents about how they can identify and discuss hatecore music with children. See
Tolerance.org, Hate Music Tutorial, at http://www.tolerance.org/tol-at-home/guide.jsp?ar=268 (last
visited Oct. 3, 2002). Other groups have countered the use of radio and television by hate-mongers.
In 1990, for example, Radio for Peace International founded the International Center for Human
Rights in Media (ICHRM), which monitors, chronicles, and archives hatred in media. See
International Center for Human Rights in Media, Radio for Peace International, at
http://www.rfpi.org/ichrm.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2002). At Deep Dish TV, a national satellite
network, producers chose to take hate use of cable access channels head-on with its 1991 program,
"Public Access: Spigot for Bigots or Channels for Change?" See Deep Dish TV, Public Access:
Spigot for Bigots or Channels for Change?, at http://www.igc.org/deepdish/aboutus/cat/catO5.html
(last visited Oct. 1, 2002). When hate groups come to town, there are two options: stay away or
confront them. The Southern Poverty Law Center encourages people to hold a unity rally elsewhere,
allowing the hate-mongers to walk down empty streets. Southern Poverty Law Center, Ten Ways to
Fight Hate, at http://www.splcenter.org/cgi-bin/printassist.pl?page=intelfigenceproject/twtfhindex-
.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2002). Anti-Racist Action, on the other hand, encourages community
members to counter-demonstrate when hate groups march, letting them know that their hateful views
are not welcomed. See Anti-Racist Action, 411 on ARA, at http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill-
/Lobby/2853/41 l.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2002). Civil law suits have also been successful as
responses to hate. See infra note 154.
64. Louis Beam, Leaderless Resistance, THE SEDrrIONIST (Feb. 1992), at http://www.louis-
beam.com/leaderless.htm.
A system of organization that is based upon the cell organization, but does not have any
central control or direction .... All individuals and groups operate independently of each
other, and never report to a central headquarters or single leader for direction or
instruction, as would those who belong to a typical pyramid organization.
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traditional hierarchical organizational structures, advocating instead the
creation of "phantom cells," a network of small groups and individuals
that operate independently of each other and have no central command.65
Although the more traditional hierarchical structure may be useful to
indoctrinate new members and to create propaganda to reach "freedom
fighters," such formal organization creates vulnerability when used to
perpetrate hate crimes or "resist state tyranny." 
66
Louis Beam, former Grand Dragon of the Texas Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan, is credited with introducing the concept of leaderless resis-
tance to the extremist right.67 Extremist groups are easily infiltrated by
government operatives and watchdog groups, often corrupted by weak
leadership, and subject to multi-million dollar civil suits, which can lead
to organizational bankruptcy.68 To withstand these threats, Beam argued
that such organizations should adopt a philosophy of leaderless resis-
tance. 69 Theoretically, the only tie that binds the "phantom cells" is a
shared ideological mission. Each cell is responsible for the manner in
which to achieve the mission, reacting to events with its own tactics of
resistance.7 °
Leaderless resistance has become one of the primary organizing
strategies for fringe movements, including right-wing extremist groups. 7'
A significant component of the strategy of right-wing extremists includes
violence and criminality against the government and individuals because
of race, ethnicity, gender, national origin, and religion. The individual
65. Beam, supra note 64; DEES & CORCORAN, supra note 59, at 206; PERRY, supra note 44, at
174; STERN, A FORCE UPON THE PLAIN, supra note 53, at 36; By Any Means Necessary,
INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 102, Summer 2001, at 65, available at http://www.splcenter.org/cgi-bin/-
printassist.pl?page=/intellegenceproject/ip-4r8.html.
66. Beam, supra note 64 ("Let the night be filled with a thousand points of resistance... like
the fog which forms when conditions are right and disappears when they are not, so must the
resistance to tyranny be.").
67. By Any Means Necessary, supra note 65, at 65; Beam, supra note 64; see also DEES &
CORCORAN, supra note 59, at 205. For a history of Louis Beam, see The Firebrand, INTELLIGENCE
REP., No. 106, Summer 2002, at 11-21, available at http://www.splcenter.org/cgi-bin/-
printassist.pl?page=intelligenceproject/ip-4v4.html.
68. See Beam, supra note 64; McWilliams, supra note 23 ("Extremist groups have adopted the
leaderless resistance model in part to 'limit damage from penetration by authorities' seeking
information about impending attacks."); Alex Curtis, Why Leaderless Resistance, at
ftp://ftp.nyct.net/pub/users/tallpaul/docs/fascist/fdl92.txt (last visited Oct. 5, 2002).
69. Beam, supra note 64. Beam credited Colonel Ulius Louis Amoss, an opponent of
Communism, with developing the theory of leaderless resistance. Id. For an explanation of leaderless
resistance in the militia movement, see R.J. Larizza, Paranoia, Patriotism, and the Citizen Militia
Movement: Constitutional Right or Criminal Conduct, 47 MERCER L. REV. 581, 588 (1996).
70. Beam, supra note 64.
71. See Hacking and Hate, supra note 18.
72. PERRY, supra note 44, at 174 ("[Beam] is very much in favor of a nationwide network of
invisible cells armed and ready to engage in an all-out assault against the 'menacing horde' of
minorities and against the state."). White supremacists are not the only advocates of leaderless
resistance. Groups on the far left have adopted it as well. See Leaderless Resistance, at
[Vol. 80: 1
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cell that perpetrates these violent acts is often referred to as the "lone
wolf."7 3 It has come as no surprise to organizations and individuals who
monitor extremist groups that the rise in leaderless resistance has paral-
leled the rising popularity of the Internet.74
How society responds to hate and extremism serves a critical role in
keeping in-check the changing dynamics of hatred in America. An effec-
tive response can reduce the harmful effects of hatred on individuals and
communities. But the Internet's arrival provides yet another venue
through which bigoted individuals and groups can disseminate their hate-
ful messages, engage in bias motivated activity, and fuel leaderless resis-
tance. The Internet has become the new head of the Hate Hydra.75
11. THE NEW HEAD OF THE HATE HYDRA-THE INTERNET
This part will demonstrate that the Internet is yet another venue for
hate-mongers. Like the Greek myth, this new venue, or head of the Hy-
dra, may be all the more virulent because it may circumvent the effective
tactics of traditional offline responses to hate-based conduct. Therefore,
responses to the new head of the Hate Hydra must consider the unique
challenges the medium presents as discussed in Part III.
The Internet is an offspring of the Advanced Research Project
Agency ("ARPANET"), a communication system initially created for
http://biblio.anarchy99.net/docs/anarchisme/leaderless.resistance.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2002)
(advocating violent leaderless resistance strategy for anarchist movement). The Earth Liberation
Front (ELF), a left-wing environmental organization advocates "leaderless resistance" to violently
attack structures and institutions. By Any Means Necessary, supra note 65, at 65. ELF disavows
harm to "any animal, human or non-human." Id.
73. See Hacking and Hate, supra note 18.
74. See EXTREMISM IN AMERICA, supra note 51, at 75. Alex Curtis has become a leading
proponent of "lone wolf' activism on the Internet. Id. ("Curtis encouraged fellow racists to act alone
in committing violent crimes so that they would not incriminate others. He called for the elimination
of nonwhites by "whatever means necessary" and promoted assassination, illegal drug sales, and
biological warfare as useful tactics."); Despite Tough Talk, Curtis Tells All, INTELLIGENCE REP., No.
102, Summer 2001, at 4, available at http://www.splcenter.org/cgi-bin/printassist.pl?page=/-
intelligenceproject/ip-4rl0.html. Curtis used his on-line newsletter to promote "lone wolf" violence
against the government. Id.
75. "[Tlhe main benefit of [the Internet] is a person can learn about our church without ever
ordering one of our books or seeing one of our members. They can just learn through the screen."
Interview by Hatewatch.org with Reverend Matt Hale, leader of the World Church of the Creator,
(Oct. 13, 1997), at http://hatewatch.org/research.php?op=readarticle&lid=15; see also Interview by
HateWatch.org with Reverend Fred Phelps (Sept. 29, 1997), at http://hatewatch.org/-
research.php?op=readarticle&lid=13 (explaining that.the sidewalks and the Internet are left for a
gospel preacher to spread his message because the media, entertainment industry, academia, and
most churches are controlled by the sodomite agenda and the control of courts, and political
institutions is not too far behind). For a summary of Reverend Phelps' public anti-gay
demonstrations, see supra note 54; Steve Dunne, Where the Hate Is: Steve Dunne Explores White
Supremacy on the Web, THE GUARDIAN, June 25, 2001, at 2001 WL 23244844 ("Whereas we
previously could only reach people with pamphlets, or by holding rallies with no more than a few
hundred people. .. now we can reach potentially millions of people." (quoting Don Black, founder
of Stormfront)).
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use by military personnel, defense contractors, and university research-
ers. 76 The system demonstrated that networks could link with each other,
enabling communication and information exchange across the globe."
Even at its inception, the Internet created a unique opportunity to develop
and build communities without geographical or physical limitations.78
The Internet unites people across the world at the intersection of time,
space, and communal interest.
79
Regardless of the source from which an individual obtains access to
the Internet, once accomplished, he or she may have access to a variety
of communication networks and information retrieval systems, including:
electronic mail (e-mail), list serves, newsgroups, chat rooms, bulletin
boards, and the World Wide Web. 80 These systems make up the medium
known as "cyberspace." 8' The Internet offers users an infinite number of
subject matters, activities, and interactive opportunities.
In March 1995, former Klansman Don Black established the first
hate Web site, Stormfront.org. 82 Today, the site receives anywhere from
76. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-50 (1997); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230(0(1) (2000) ("The
term 'Internet' means the international computer network of both Federal and non-Federal
interoperable packet switched data networks."); ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830 (E.D. Pa.
1996), affd 521 U.S. 844 (1997). The Internet is not physical or tangible, "but rather a giant network
which interconnects innumerable smaller groups of linked computer networks." Id.
77. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 850. Online access makes information, posted messages, and
activities on the Internet available to anyone in the world. Id. at 851; see also R. Timothy Muth, Old
Doctrines on a New Frontier: Defamation and Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 68 Wis. LAW. 11 (1995)
(discussing legal issues arising from the use of the Internet).
78. For more information on Internet history, see The Internet Society, A Brief History of the
Internet, at http://www.isoc.org/internetthistorylbrief.shtml (last visited Oct. 1, 2002); MATTHEW
COLLINS, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION AND THE INTERNET 7 (2001).
79. See HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY: HOMESTEADING ON THE
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER 5 (1993) ("Virtual communities are social aggregations that emerge from the
Net when enough people carry on those public discussions long enough, with sufficient human
feeling, to form webs of personal relationships in cyberspace."); WHATIS?COM'S ENCYCLOPEDIA,
supra note 19, at 766 ("A virtual community is a community of people sharing common interests,
ideas, and feelings over the Internet or other collaborative networks.").
80. See Reno, 521 U.S. at 851; Merschman, supra note 27, at 275. The Internet is an
immense global network that connects computers via telephone or cable lines to each other and a
plethora of electronically stored information. A user needs only a computer, a modem, a telephone or
cable line, and an Internet Service Provider (ISP) to communicate with, or access information from,
other computers all over the world. Id.
81. Reno, 521 U.S. at 851. Cyberspace is "located in no particular geographical location but
available to anyone, anywhere in the world with access to the Internet." Id. William Gibson is often
credited with creating the term "cyberspace" in his book Neuromancer. WHATIS?COM'S
ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 19, at 163; see also Muth, supra note 77, at 11 ("Cyberspace refers to
the interaction of people and business over computer networks, electronic bulletin boards, and
commercial online services. The largest and most visible manifestation of cyberspace is the
Internet.").
82. Hate on the Net: As New Sites Arise, So Do Legal Issues, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 93,
Winter 1999, at 46-47; see also Poisoning the Web, supra note 26. At the age of seventeen, Black
joined the Neo-Nazi National Socialist White People's Party and after graduating from college he
began organizing for David Duke. Id. In 1982, Black went to prison for plotting to violently
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2,000 hits a day to 20,000 a week83 and is described as a "supermarket of
online hate," offering a display of many forms of anti-Semitism and ra-
cism.84 The site also includes a section for children,85 which is main-
tained by Black's adolescent son. 86 Black also sells Web hosting services
through Stormfront.org, which houses other hate sites.87
88Black's site is not alone. Indeed, most major hate groups in the
United States have Web sites.8 9 The Southern Poverty Law Center's
Intelligence Project identified 405 domestic hate sites on the Internet in
2001, an estimate that does not include individual Web publishers front-
overthrow the government of Dominica, a Caribbean island he and other white supremacists
intended to make a "white state." Id.; see also Tara McKelvey, Father and Son Team on Hate Site,
USA TODAY.COM (Oct. 31, 2001), available at http://www.usatoday.com/life/2001-07-16-kid-hate-
sites.htm.
83. Poisoning the Web, supra note 26 (quoting Black as receiving 2000 hits a day); Dunne,
supra note 75 (quoting Black's estimate of 20,000 hits a week); McKelvey, supra note 82 (citing
more than 5,000 unduplicated visits daily to Stormfront.org).
84. Poisoning the Web, supra note 26.
85. Forty-five percent of American children, or more than thirty million persons under the age
of eighteen have access to the Internet. See Lee Raine & Dan Packel, The Pew Internet Project, More
Online, Doing More (Feb. 18, 2001), at http://www.pewintemet.org. Seventy-three percent of
persons between the ages of twelve and seventeen and twnenty-nine percent of persons under the age
of twelve have been online. Id.; see also McKelvey, supra note 82 (according to the Simon
Weisenthal Center, in 2000, there were approximately forty-four white extremist sites that targeted
children); see, e.g., Robert Ratish, Objectionable E-mail Sent to Girl Leads to Bias Report, THE
RECORD, July 10, 2001, at L3. A fourteen-year-old girl contacted police after receiving harassing e-
mail containing racial epithets against African-Americans, Jews, Hispanics, and homosexuals. Id.
The National Alliance offers kids the game "Ethnic Cleansing." Jeffrey L. Brown, Enabling Kids to
Play Dangerous Games, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 20, 2002, at A13. Set in an urban area, the
objective of the game is to kill Jews and people of color. Id. It emits monkey sounds or "Oy Vey"
when a black person or Jew is killed. Josh Plotnik, The Game that Goes Too Far, CORNELL DAILY
SUN, Mar. 26, 2002, available at http://www.comellsun.com/articles/5072//. Ethnic Cleansing can
be downloaded off the National Alliance Web site for $14.88. Id.
86. See http://www.kids.stormfront.org/default.shtml (last visited Oct. 2, 2002); McKelvey,
supra note 82 (citing approximately 344,00 visitors to the children's site in two years); see also
Richard Firstman, Hate Online America, Family PC from ZDWIRE (Apr. 16, 2001), at 2001 WL
7573054 ("Matt Hale's World Church of the Creator features a children's page with crossword
puzzles and games highlighting words that teach 'racial loyalty.' Words such as 'nigger' and
'kike.').
87. See Poisoning the Web, supra note 26; Keith Perine, The Trouble with Regulating Hate,
THE INDUSTRY STANDARD, July 24, 2000, at http//www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,16967-
2,00.html.
88. For a discussion of Black's site and other hate sites on the Internet, see PERRY, supra note
44, at 174-78; Stem, Hate and the Internet, supra note 59; MICHAEL WHINE, CYBERCRIME: LAW
ENFORCEMENT, SECURITY AND SURVEILLANCE IN THE INFORMATION AGE 234-50 (Douglas Thomas
& Brian D. Loader eds., 2000); Anti-Defamation League, Stop Hate, at http://www.adl.org- /hate-
patrol/hate-patrol-print.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2002); Active Hate Sites on the Internet in the Year
2001, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 105, Spring 2002, at 38-43.
89. See, e.g., http://www.Aryan-Nations.org; http://www.davidduke.com; http://www.bog-
ritz.com; http://www.creator.org; www.resist.com; http://www.scripturesforamerica.org;
http://www.natall.com; http://www.cofcc.org; http://www.kkkk.net; http://www.ameican-
knights.com.
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ing as legitimate groups. 90 The Simon Weisenthal Center monitors ap-
proximately 2,300 Web sites it considers "problematic." 9' Weisenthal's
figure includes 500 sites maintained by Europeans, but hosted by Ameri-
can servers to avoid European laws.92 Some Web sites advocate hatred of
gays and lesbians, such as Reverend Fred Phelp's site
www.godhatesfags.com, 93  and bigotry against Hispanics and other
groups perceived to be "non-white immigrants. 94
The Internet offers communities of hate, as it does all communities,
unlimited opportunities.95 These opportunities include the ability to do
the following: create a sense of community for participants, regardless of
location in the world;96 limit participation and interaction for members
only, in order to strategize about the mission without outside interfer-
90. Active Hate Sites on the Internet in the Year 2001, supra note 88, at 38-43. The number of
hate sites in 2000 was 366. Active Hate Sites on the Internet in the Year 2000, INTELLIGENCE REP.,
No. 101, Spring 2001, at 40-41. This listing includes Ku Klux Klan, Neo Nazi, Racist Skinhead,
Identity, Black Separatists, Neo-Confederate and others. Id. Hatewatch estimated that there were 500
hate sites. See Perine, supra note 87.
91. See Perine, supra note 87.
92. Id.; see also Kevin Boyle, Hate Speech - The United States Versus the Rest of the World,
53 ME. L. REV. 487 (2001).
93. See Hate, American Style, WIRED (July 2, 1997), at http://www.wired.com/news/-
culture/0,1284,4872,00.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
94. See http://www.americanimmigrationcontrol.com/index.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2002);
see also Blood on the Border, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 101, Spring 2001, at 8-15, available at
http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceproject/ip-4ql.html. In a posting to a neo-Nazi National
Alliance E-group in an attempt to spark a race war, a member wrote, "All it takes is for bodies to
show up, and for the Mexicans in L.A. to start reprisals against Whites in California. Many wars
have started over a single shot. I seriously urge any lone-wolf to leave a few bodies in the desert to
get things warmed up." Id. at 8. Other anti-immigration groups include the National Organization for
American European Rights, at http://www.duke.org (last visited Oct. 11, 2002), and The Social
Contract Press, at http:// www.thesocialcontract.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2002).
95. See Tsesis, supra note 16, at 832 ("One of the downsides of the Internet is that it provides
a global forum for the advocates of intolerance and inequality."); Leets, supra note 38, at 287 ("The
World Wide Web has allowed marginalized extremist groups with messages of hate to have a more
visible and accessible public platform."); Siegel, supra note 32, at 377 ("The Internet presents a
forum in which racists can take their messages and transmit them to individuals around the world
with little effort."); Greenberg, supra note 30, at 673 ("The Net's characteristics make it the ideal
tool for harassment, threats, and the dissemination of hateful messages."). But see Cyberhate
Revisited, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 101, Spring 2001, at 44, available at http://www.spl-
center.org/intelligeneproject/ip-4q7.html (reporting an interview with former director of HateWatch,
David Goldman, who says that Extremists are not as successful on the Web as those who track hate
groups expected).
96. See 163 and Counting... Hate Groups Find Home on the Net, INTELLIGENCE REP., No.
89, Winter 1998 at 24, available at http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceproject/ip-4e2.html;
Reevaluating the Net, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 102, Summer 2001, at 54, available at
http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceproject/ip-4r5.html (discussing a growing consensus among
experts who study hate on the Web that extremism and hate flourish in the e-mail, discussion groups
and chat rooms more so than on Web sites). See Reno, 521 U.S. at 870. The Internet "provides a
relatively unlimited, low-cost capacity for communication of all kinds." Id.
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ence; 97 recruit new members to the collective; 98 and market products.99
However, some enter cyberspace not simply to spread their message,
interact with other like-minded individuals, or sell goods, but to cyberass
those whom they perceive as the enemy.' ° As the law stands today,
white supremacist Web sites and their producers have a First Amend-
97. See Anti-Defamation League, The Consequences of Right-Wing Extremism on the
Internet: Coordinating Extremist Events, at http://www.adl.org/intemet/extremism-rw/cord.asp (last
visited Oct. 30, 2002); 163 and Counting ... Hate Groups Find Home on the Net, supra note 96, at
25. For a history of white supremacist activity on Bulletin Board Systems ("BBS") beginning as
early as 1983, see Hate and Ethnic Violence, Early Racist and Antisemitic Bulletin Board Systems
(BBS), at http://www.publiceye.org/hate/hate.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002); see also DEES &
CORCORAN, supra note 59, at 40 (crediting neo-Nazi Louis Beam with creating the bulletin board
system, Aryan Liberty Net, in 1984).
98. See Tsesis, supra note 16, at 832 ("Hate groups take advantage of this relatively
inexpensive medium for ideological distribution. They can spread pamphlets, letters, and images to
groups of users who can anonymously participate in racist meetings, think tanks, and planning
committees. One of the downsides of the Intemet is that it provides a global forum for the advocates
of intolerance and inequality.").
99. See Anti-Defamation League, The Consequences of Right-Wing Extremism on the
Internet: Making Money Online, at http://www.adl.org/internet/extremism_rw/e-commerce.asp (last
visited Oct. 9, 2002). The Intemet is playing a major role in the distribution of white power music.
See Kenneth Lovett, Kids Finding a Download of Trouble: Hate-Groups Music Abundant of the Net,
N.Y. POST, Apr. 25, 2001, at 6. In April 2001, for example, an investigation by the New York Post
found scores of hatecore titles available for free download on the Web. Id. Titles include "Kill all
them Jews" by Neo Hate and "Gook Ears" by Ian Stuart and the Klansmen. Id. In Midtown Boot
Boys' "Gays Gotta Go," lyrics encourage listeners to "Stop the threat of AIDS today; Cripple, maim
or kill a gay; We've got to take a stand today; We've got to wage a war on gays." Id. The leading
United States distributor of hatecore music is Resistance Records, currently owned and operated by
the National Alliance, the nation's most infamous neo-Nazi organization. See Anti-Defamation
League, Deafening Hate: The Revival of Resistance Records, at http://www.adl.org/-
resistancerecords/print.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2002); Tolerance.org, The Major Players, at
http://tolerance.org/news/article-hate.jsp?id=408 (last visited Oct. 9, 2002); Erik K. Ward et al.,
Sounds of Violence, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 96, Fall 1999, at 29-32, available at
http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceproject/ip-416.html. With more than 250 titles in its catalogue,
watchdog groups believe Resistance Records has the potential to generate millions of dollars of
profits for the National Alliance.
100. Sara Salzman, a Jewish woman, has been the subject of constant harassment through
message boards on the Intemet. Julie Jargon, P.S. I Hate You, WESTWORD.COM (Aug. 10, 2000), at
http://www.westword.com/issues/2000-08-10/features3.html/print.html. The alt.revisionism Usenet
site is a forum in which individuals who believe that the Holocaust never happened post messages
and dialogue with one another. Id. Salzman and other anti-revisionists post messages challenging or
disputing the beliefs of the revisionists with evidence that the Holocaust happened. Id. Shortly after
Salzman began participating in the alt.revisionism site, someone began to post offensive messages
about her to alt.revisionism and white power news groups. See id. Salzman received hundreds of e-
mail messages that had been posted about her, including those referring to her as a "dyke," and "a
dog fucking Jewish thing," accusing Salzman of child abuse and stating that she forced her daughter
to give men oral sex to support the Nizkor Project. Id. Other messages posted private facts about
Salzman, such as her address, including a map with directions to her house, personal details about
her family, and threats of violence. See id. For a discussion of the harms of hate speech and a
creative argument in defamation law to challenge such speech on the Intemet, see Victor Romero,
Restricting Hate Speech Against "Private Figures:" Lessons in Power-Based Censorship from
Defamation Law, 33 COLUMBIA HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1 (2001).
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ment right to advocate their viewpoints and to disseminate their hatred,
no matter how distasteful, crass, offensive, or hurtful to others.
101
In some situations, however, site operators go beyond mere ideo-
logical rhetoric, advocating strategies and tactics of cyberassment, blur-
ring the line between protected activities and legally actionable con-
duct. 10 2 Such conduct should be actionable, not because of the viewpoints
espoused, but because bigots cross the line from espousing views, to
exacting harm on others. When bias motivated cyberassers identify spe-
cific individuals, make serious threats of violence against them, create an
environment that perpetuates fear and terror in their victims, and cause
emotional harms, they cross the line. Responses to such cyberassment are
necessary, but traditional offline responses to bias motivated activity may
not be sufficient. With this new medium come new and unique chal-
lenges and dangers that warrant scrutiny through a different lens.
III. NEW CHALLENGES OF THE INTERNET
In developing responses to cyberassment and other activity on the
Internet, it is necessary to recognize that the Internet presents challenges
unique to the medium itself.10 3 This part will explain the challenges
101. See N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964). "It is firmly settled that under
our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be prohibited merely because the ideas are
themselves offensive to some of their hearers." Collins v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676, 690 (N.D. 111.
1978) (quoting Street v. N. Y., 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969)), aff d, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978). In
that case, the court struck down an ordinance used to prohibit neo-Nazis from marching in Skokie,
Illinois, a town with a large Jewish population. See id. at 680, 685-86. "It is better to allow those
who preach racial hate to expend their venom in rhetoric rather than to be panicked into embarking
on the dangerous course of permitting the government to decide what its citizens may say and hear."
Id. at 702. For proposals on regulating hate speech, see Charles R. Lawrence 1m, If He Hollers Let
Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L J. 431 (1990); Mar J. Matsuda, Public
Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH L. REV. 2320 (1989); John A.
Powell, As Justice Requires/Permits: The Delimitation of Harmful Speech in a Democratic Society,
16 LAw & INEQ. 97 (1998). But see Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A
Modest Proposal?, 1990 DUKE L.J. 484 (1990) (arguing that regulating racist speech on campus
violates First Amendment principles).
102. Gary Stephen Dellapenta posted messages under a woman's name in America Online
("AOL") chat rooms and on the Internet saying that she had an unfulfilled fantasy of being raped.
Cyberstalking Law Invoked, WIRED (Jan. 25, 1999), at http://www.wired.com/news/-
print/0,1294,17504,00.html. The posts included her name, address, phone number and instructions
for disarming her security system. Six men who read the postings showed up at her house, some in
the middle of the night. Id. She received dozens of calls from men leaving filthy messages. Id. The
woman placed notes on her front door explaining that the Internet ads were a hoax, but new
messages were posted on the Internet explaining that the notes were part of the fantasy and to
disregard them. Id. The woman was so disturbed that she lost her job and dropped from 130 pounds
to just ninety-five pounds. Id. Dellapenta was sentenced to six years imprisonment, the maximum
allowable under California's cyberstalking statute. See Press Release, L.A. County District
Attorney's Office Media Relations, Cyber-Stalker Sentenced to Six Years in State Prison (July 22,
1999), at http://da.co.la.ca.us/_text/mr/1999/072299a.htm.
103. See A Report of the President's Working Group on Unlawful Conduct on the Internet, The
Electronic Frontier: The Challenge of Unlawful Conduct Involving the Use of the Internet (Mar.
[Vol. 80:1
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unique to the medium that may be significant in crafting a legal response
to cyberassment. First, the Internet serves as a "force multiplier." 104 Sec-
ond, the Internet provides a veil of anonymity for harassers.10 5 Third,
because the Internet is a new medium, law enforcement has been slow to
respond to requests for assistance. 1°6 Advocates must take each of these
factors into consideration when addressing a tortious claim arising from
Web-generated conduct.
A. The Internet as a "Force Multiplier"
The Internet serves as a "force multiplier."'107 Unlike any other me-
dium, the Internet permits anyone with ideas, information, or a message to
reach vast numbers of people. 10 8 Additionally, it is relatively inexpen-
sive. 1°9 Before the Internet, the reach of a white supremacist's inflamma-
tory views was limited to pamphlets or flyers distributed to groups of
people within physical proximity."10 Furthermore, the costs to dissemi-
2000), at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/unlawful.htm [hereinafter The Electronic
Frontier] ("New technologies can, of course, create new forms of socially undesirable behavior.
More often they provide new ways of committing traditionally undesirable behavior."); see also
Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975). The Supreme Court in
addressing regulation of broadcast media stated: "Each medium of expression may present its own
problems." Id.
104. See The Electronic Frontier, supra note 103.
105. See infra Part III.B and accompanying footnotes.
106. See infra Part Ill.C and accompanying footnotes.
107. The Electronic Frontier, supra note 103 ("The potential to reach vast audiences easily
means that the scale of unlawful conduct involving the use of the Internet is often much wider than
the same conduct in the offline world. To borrow a military analogy, use of the Internet can be a
'force multiplier."'). The term "force multiplier" is a military term that means "any factor that
increases the combat power of a force." See ACADEMIC PRESS DICTIONARY OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, 865 (Christopher Morris ed., 1992).
108. The Supreme Court recognizes the Internet's capabilities. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S.
844, 870 (1997) ("Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town
crier with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web
pages, mail exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a pamphleteer."); CASS
SuNsTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 62 (2001) (finding in an informal survey that several hate groups had
well over a hundred thousand hits and at least one with over one million hits); see, e.g., Blakely v.
Continental Airlines, 730 A.2d 854, 863 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1999) ("While Internet
communications share some of the same features as print and television communications, some
features such as the virtually limitless accessibility of many Internet connections renders this
communication medium unique.").
109. Kreimer, supra note 19, at 124 ("Access to the Internet lowers the costs of producing and
disseminating information and argument, and hence the capital to enter public dialogue.").
110. See Dunne, supra note 75 (quoting Don Black, founder of Stormfront) ("Whereas we
previously could only reach people with pamphlets, or by holding rallies with no more than a few
hundred people ... now we can reach potentially millions of people."); Backover, supra note 25
(quoting Don Black).
As far as recruiting, its been the biggest breakthrough I've seen in the 30 years I have been
involved in this. Prior to the 'Net,' when we had to rely on printed literature and leaflets and
occasional public meeting, we were limited in the number of people we could reach. Now we
can reach potentially millions of people.
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nate the, message grew proportionally with the size of the audience. With
the advent of the Internet, the same message can be generated cheaply
and has an extensive reach, no longer hampered by physical or geo-
graphical limitations.'
Although the ability to reach large audiences with a message is gen-
erally a positive and welcomed feature of the Internet, it also has its
downside. The downside exists when organizations or social movements,
like right-wing extremists, advocate not simply their viewpoint or mes-
sage, but harassment, intimidation, and violence against others., 2 Access
to vast numbers of people makes it easier to disseminate a message, and
it also makes it easier to encourage third parties, in any location, to en-
gage in behavior that harms others. The ability to encourage third parties
is particularly dangerous when used by organizations that follow leader-
less resistance.
A variety of mediums are utilized to facilitate communications
among leaderless resistance cells, but the Internet makes it significantly
easier than other mediums for individuals or groups to encourage third
parties anywhere in the world, with whom they have no prior relation-
ship, to engage in illegal or violent acts. The Internet provides a powerful
and essential tool to implement an effective leaderless resistance cam-
paign. Recent incidents indicate not only that Web-based messages of
hate-centric leaderless resistance are revolutionizing the workings of the
white power movement, but also that they are taking root and resulting in
violence."13
On the weekend of July 4, 1999, for example, Benjamin Smith went
on a shooting spree in Illinois and Indiana, killing an African-American
man and an Asian postal worker and injuring at least eight others.,
4
111. At the end of 2000, more than 104 million American adults and thirty million children
under the age of eighteen had access to the Internet. See Raine & Packel, supra note 85. The number
of worldwide users is expected to reach more than 502 million by 2003. The Electronic Frontier,
supra note 103. The Internet makes it possible for interaction among individuals in the same
building, one block away, or 3000 miles away. See A Report from the Attorney General to the Vice
President, Cyberstalking: A New Challenge for Law Enforcement and Industry (Aug. 1999), at
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/cyberstalking.htm [hereinafter Cyberstalking Report].
112. Brian Levin, California State University law professor and director of the Center for the
Study of Hate and Extremism: "There is a difference between flying an airplane drunk and cycling
drunk. The omnipresence of the Web makes such things as threats a more potent social ill." Lakshmi
Chaudhry, Slo-Mo Justice Against Hate, WIRED (Jan. 18, 2001), at http://www.wired.com/news-
/print/0,1294,337 10,00.html.
113. The HBO film, Hate.com: Extremists on the Internet, exposed some of the most menacing
of hate sites and their creators-and revealed how site operators-via leaderless resistance-
deliberately inspired site visitors to commit hate crimes. Hate.com: Extremists on the Internet (HBO
television broadcast 2000), available at http:/Iwww.hbo.comlhate/about-film/index.shtml.
114. Abraham H. Foxman, Anti-Defamation League, Stopping Extremism Before the Crime, at
http://www.adl.org/terrorism%5Famerica/op%5Fed%5F053002.asp (last visited Oct. 31, 2002);
Anti-Defamation League, The Consequences of Right-Wing Extremism on the Internet, at
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Smith, a member of the neo-Nazi World Church of the Creator, fre-
quently visited the hate group's Web site-an Internet portal advocating
leaderless violence." 15 Shortly before the shooting spree, Smith told a
documentary filmmaker that, "It wasn't really 'til I got on the Internet,
read some literature of these groups, that . . . it really all came to-
gether."" 
6
In June 1999, two brothers, Matthew and Tyler Williams, were
charged with the murder of a gay couple in California and the arsons of
three synagogues." 7 Matthew Williams reportedly accepted the radical
right philosophies he read online and downloaded scores of printouts
from white power sites."18 Several weeks before their crime spree, phone
records indicated that a call was placed from the Williams' phone to a
telephone number assigned to Alex Curtis."19 Curtis, a former Ku Klux
Klansmen and ardent racist, provides an online incentive to adherents of
leaderless resistance, the "Lone Wolf point system," through which mur-
derers can "score" points toward the designation of "Aryan warrior.' 20
In April 2000, Richard Baumhammers killed five people-his Jew-
ish neighbor, two Asian Americans, a man of Indian descent, and an Af-
rican-American man.12' Baumhammers was a frequent visitor to white
supremacist Web sites and strongly anti-immigrant. 22 In fact, Baum-
hammers visited Tom Metzger's White Aryan Resistance (WAR) Web
site before going on the shooting spree. 123 Furthermore, not only wasBaumhammers a frequent guest to hate sites, but he had also launched a
http://adl.org/intemet/extremismrw/inspiring.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2002) [hereinafter The
Consequences of Right-Wing Extremism on the Internet]; see also Shooting Their Way into the New
Millennium, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 97, Winter 2000, at 29, available at http://www.spl-
center.org/intelligenceproject/ip-4ml.html.





120. Anti-Defamation League, Alex Curtis: 'By Whatever Means Necessary,' at
http://www.adl.org/curtis/by_whatevermeans.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2002) (explaining, for
example, "Policy Formulation and Decision Making Leaders of International Satanic anti-Christ
Conspiracy for Control of the World" are worth one point, members of Congress are worth one-fifth
of a point and a national leader of the NAACP is worth 1/12 of a point. One point eams the
designation of "Aryan Warrior."); Anti-Defamation League, Alex Curtis: Growing Influence, at
http://www.adl.org/curtis/growingminfluence.asp (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
121. Pennsylvania Rampage, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 98, Spring 2000, at 41, available at
http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceproject/ip-4n7.html.
122. The Consequences of Right-Wing Extremism on the Internet, supra note 114; see also
Pennsylvania Rampage, supra note 121, at 41.
123. The Consequences of Right-Wing Extremism on the Internet, supra, note 114.
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Web site of his own for his "Free Market Party," which was filled with
links to other "white rights" organizations. 1
24
In a November 2000 article about leaderless resistance and lone
wolves-individuals who independently carry out the ideology's call to
violence-Alex Curtis cited Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh,
Richard Baumhammers, Ben Smith, the Williams Brothers, and others as
"leaderless resistors" who "brought racial activism out of the right-wing
morass and into the embryonic stages of a resistance., 125 Benjamin
Smith, the Williams brothers, and Richard Baumhammers were "lone
wolves" who often visited white supremacist Web sites-Intemet portals
espousing racist and bigoted ideologies, violence against minorities, and
leaderless resistance. Indeed, their crimes make it clear that the Internet
is fueling hate-based violence. The cost and the likelihood of continued
Web-spawned leaderless resistance cannot be ignored.
The potential dangers of leaderless resistance on the Internet have
not gone unnoticed. In November 2001, the FBI National Infrastructure
Protection Center reported that extremists groups were adopting the
power of modem technology, particularly the Internet, to facilitate as-
pects of leaderless resistance. 126 The report recognized extremist groups'
violent capabilities, concluding that the use of leaderless resistance
makes it more difficult for law enforcement to foresee their actions.
127
If a single hate site advocating leaderless resistance welcomed one
million visitors-a very plausible reality considering that by 2003, more
than 500 million people will be on the Interet128-and if just one-tenth
of one percent of those visitors responded to calls for hate-based vio-
lence, 10,000 bias crimes would occur. The Internet's force multiplier
status, when coupled with bigotry and leaderless resistance, is a recipe
for disaster that must be recognized when assessing civil claims as a re-
sponse to bias motivated cyberassment.
124. Id.; see Pittsburgh Gunman 'Had Racial Motives,' BBC NEWS, at http://news.bbc.co.uk-
/2/hi/world/americas/732290.stm (last visited Oct. 9, 2002).
125. Alex Curtis, Why Leaderless Resistance?, at ftp://ftp.nyct.net/pub/users/tallpaul/-
docs/fascist/fd192.txt (last visited Oct. 9, 2002). For more information on Alex Curtis see ANTI-
DEFAMATION LEAGUE, Alex Curtis, in EXTREMISM IN AMERICA, supra note 51, at 75-82.
126. See National Infrastructure Protection Center, supra note 23; see also McWilliams, supra
note 23.
127. See McWilliams, supra note 23.
128. The Electronic Frontier, supra note 103.
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B. Anonymity
Another challenge presented by the Internet is that the new medium
allows its users to operate under a veil of anonymity. 129 This anonymity
exists in at least two forms: identity anonymity and access anonymity.
Many who surf the Internet, visiting Web sites, sending e-mails, and
participating in message boards or online chats, do so under pseudonyms
("identity anonymity"). Although Internet Service Providers ("ISPs")
require that users provide identifying information before accessing the
Internet, individuals can overcome such requirements and remain
anonymous by providing false personal information to the ISP.
130
Identity anonymity on the Internet is, in many ways, advantageous.
The ability to conceal one's identity online can be liberating, permitting
individuals to speak more freely, thereby fostering communication and
open debate.1 3' Some argue that, because a participant's age, education
level, race, gender, sexual orientation, or other distinguishing features
can be concealed online, one is freed from the effects of stereotypes or
prejudice that often pollute face-to-face communication.'
32
However, identity anonymity creates a significant hurdle for plain-
tiffs seeking redress from offensive or undesirable activity via e-mail,
message boards, and other Internet features. 33 Potential plaintiffs often
129. An interesting side note: the ability to remain anonymous on the Internet may create,
expand or alter the ways in which we think of bias motivated harassment or discrimination based on
perception. For example, a white person applies for a job a online, and, for whatever reason, due to
the online interview or interaction with the employer, the candidate is perceived to be African
American and is refused the position because of this perception or belief.
130. Merschman, supra note 27, at 276 (explaining that anonymity can be achieved through
Internet services such as Hotmail, that offer free e-mail accounts). ISPs can provide identifying
information if requested, or if the ISP is required to do so by a civil subpoena. Of course, there is no
guarantee that the information will be reliable. See Cyberstalking Report, supra note 11, at 4; Roger
Rosen & Charles B. Rosenberg, Suing Anonymous Defendants for Internet Defamation: Plaintiffs'
Council Can Utilize Specific Procedures to Unmask an Online Wrongdoer, L.A. LAW., Oct. 24,
2001, at 19; Greenberg, supra note 30, at 678; see also America Online, Civil Subpoena Policy, at
http://legal.web.aol.com/aol/aolpol/civilsubpoena.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2002).
131. See Columbia Ins. Co. v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Anne
Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in
Cyberspace, 104 YALE L. J. 1639, 1642 (1995).
132. See Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 I-ARv. L. REV. 1330 (2000) (suggesting that cyberspace
may change the manner in which race functions in America today because it enables racial
anonymity and racial pseudonymity).
133. "The tortfeasor can act pseudonymously or anonymously and may give fictitious or
incomplete identifying information. Parties who have been injured by these acts are likely to find
themselves chasing the tortfeasor from Internet Service Provider (ISP) to ISP, with little or no hope
of actually discovering the identity of the tortfeasor." Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 577-80
(balancing "the need to provide injured parties with a forum in which they may seek redress for
grievances... against the legitimate and valuable right to participate in online forums anonymously
and psuedonomously"). For an analysis of the use of defamation law suits as a way to identify and
silence detractors of major corporations who make their opinions known online, see Joshua R.
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have difficulty identifying whom to serve with papers or in what jurisdic-
tion to institute criminal or civil proceedings. 34 More troubling, perhaps,
is the impact identity anonymity of cyberassers can have on victims.
When cyberassers operate with shielded identities, their victims cannot
determine the identities of the persons involved, locate them, or assess
the seriousness of the threats.1 35 Indeed, cyberassers may engage in per-
sistent and outrageous conduct because they believe they cannot be iden-
tified. 136 Victims then face harassment and threats from unknown
sources, which can have an even more terrifying effect on the victims'
minds.
The Internet also creates "access anonymity" for its users, allowing
people to view information on public access sites, including hate-based
leaderless resistance portals, without being identified by the site's pro-
ducer, the ISP, or others.137 Unlike the publisher of an underground
Furman, Cybersmear or Cyber-SLAPP: Analyzing Defamation Suits Against Online John Does as
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, 25 SEAT'rLE U. L. REV. 213,233-49 (2001).
134. See Branscomb, supra note 131, at 1642-43; Kevin Whitelaw, Fear and Dread in
Cyberspace-Stalkers Go Online, Too. But They're Hard to Find, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Nov.
4, 1996, at 50.
135. Justin Myer Lichterman, Note, True Threats: Evolving Mens Rea Requirements for
Violations of 18 U.S.C. § 875(C), 22 CARDOzO L. REV. 1961, 1963 n.6 (2001) ("People's belief that
they can interact with one another anonymously affects their on-line conduct, demeanor, and activity
because they avoid, fear of embarrassment, humiliation, or punishment."); see, e.g., Greenberg, supra
note 30, at 674-75; Branscomb, supra note 131, at 1642-43; Jonathan I. Edelstein, Note, Anonymity
and International Law Enforcement in Cyberspace, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J.
231, 234-38 (1996); Andrew Jablon, Note, "God Mail:" Authentication and Admissibility of
Electronic Mail in Federal Courts, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1394-95 (1997).
136. Identity anonymity permits someone to say things she may not say otherwise, or engage in
a free exchange of ideas, and it also permits an individual to engage in offensive conduct he or she
otherwise would not do, if they were in a face-to-face confrontation. See, e.g., Merschman, supra
note 27, at 276 ("The Intemet also facilitates stalking because its perceived 'impersonal' nature may
make a person less apt to view his online behavior as stalking. Instead, he may view cyberstalking as
non-confrontational and less aggressive than telephoning a victim, sending her a letter or gift, or
spying on her in person, and therefore may be more inclined to commit the offense. The stalker may
express things to an individual over the Intemet that he would lack the courage to say if confronting
that individual in person."); see also Branscomb, supra note 131, at 1642-43 ("Disguising the
sources of messages or postings relieves their authors from responsibility for any harm that may
ensue. This often encourages outrageous behavior without any opportunity for recourse to the law
for redress of grievances.").
137. When individuals log onto the Web, the connections between their individual computers
and the World Wide Web is identifiable through an Internet protocol address, or "IP address," which
is assigned by ISPs. IP addresses can be used to track Web activity to an individual computer
through a comparison of ISP and Web site logs for a particular IP address. Individuals can create full
access anonymity online, however, simply by using computers in public libraries, schools or other
public venues. Further, several companies offer access anonymity software for purchase. The
Anonymizer, for example, offers encryption protection to shield Web activity from ISP tracking
systems and others who might want to cybersnoop. See Anonymizer.com, Threats of the Web, How
Anonymizer Protects Your Surfing, at http://www.anonymizer.com/threats.shtml (last visited Oct.
12, 2002); see also Somebody, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://somebody.net/faqs.html (last
visited Oct. 7, 2002).
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newspaper who holds a subscription list, a Web site operator has no easy
way of determining if a particular user is a 60-year-old man or a 12-year-
old child, much less where that user resides geographically.'38 In this
way, a Web surfer can attain a broad array of information without being
publicly identified with the materials in question; no one knows where
she has been or what she has seen. Indeed, the only freely accessible trail
of the surfer's online activity resides on her computer's hard drive, and
the specific computer may be located in a public library or school and
used by many people.
On the positive side, access anonymity allows an individual to in-
form herself about sensitive or personal information without fear or em-
barrassment. 39 For example, the Internet allows a teenager who is ques-
tioning her sexuality to access materials about homosexuality from lead-
ing medical practitioners like the American Psychological Association or
from gay and lesbian cultural and advocacy organizations. The Internet
enables the teen to access this information without fear of peers or family
members identifying her as homosexual or, in a homophobic setting,
labeling her as a "queer," "faggot," or "dyke."
However, access anonymity also provides substantial advantages for
online cyberassers. Just as the hypothetical gay teen above cannot be
identified as a "user" of online homosexual content, cyberassers also
reap the benefits of access anonymity. Bigoted adherents of leaderless
resistance, who find their "orders" online and then take action against
individuals or communities, can be tied to the organizational Web site
only if law enforcement first identifies them as suspects, and then con-
ducts a fruitful search of their computers' hard drives. 4° For the victim,
even if she knows where the online threat resides, the secret of her ha-
rassers' identities lie not at the Web site, but on unidentifiable hard
drives. As a result, every person she sees, and the millions she does not,
are her potential harassers and attackers.
The Internet provides both identity anonymity and access anonym-
ity, which, although generally beneficial to the millions of people on the
Web, exacerbate the victimization of persons targeted by cyberassers.
When combined with the dangers presented by bigotry, leaderless resis-
tance, and the force multiplier effect of the Internet, it is clear that the
impact of anonymity must also be recognized when assessing civil
claims related to cyberassment.
138. Of course, some Web sites require registration for use, but Web surfers can overcome
these requirements. See supra notes 131-134 and accompanying text.
139. Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 578.
140. See Cyberstalking Report, supra note 11, at 3 ("[Tlhe veil of anonymity might encourage
the perpetrator to continue ... acts" and "some perpetrators, armed with the knowledge that their
identity is unknown, might be more willing to pursue the victim at work or home, and the Internet
can provide substantial information to this end.").
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C. Slow Response by Law Enforcement
Not surprisingly, the response by law enforcement to cyberassment
and criminal activities on the Internet in general has been slow to evolve
because it is a new technology. 41 Even if an online activity is defined as
a crime under federal or state law, most law enforcement agencies lack
the resources to investigate online crime and the training to track and
expose it before offline harms occur. 142 These problems are compounded
by jurisdictional limitations of local law enforcement and by jurisdic-
tional conflicts among different agencies. 43 For example, an individual
living in Denver, Colorado might cyberass a victim who resides in Lub-
bock, Texas. The authorities in Texas may encounter challenges investi-
gating the individual in Colorado. Even if the Texas agency decides to
investigate the matter, it must have cooperation from Denver law en-
forcement agencies to do so.44 Individuals who seek to commit crimes,
cyberass, or intimidate others online appear to have free reign without
fear of criminal prosecution.145 Although changes are taking place within
law enforcement agencies, their ability to respond to illicit Internet activ-
ity remains limited and will take some time to get up to speed.1
46
When hate proponents shift from merely espousing their views to
engaging in cyberassment, those cyberassed must correspondingly seek
141. See Cyberstalking Report, supra note 111, at 5 ("Cyberstalking is a relatively new
challenge for most law enforcement agencies ... only a handful of agencies throughout the country
have focused attention or resources specifically on the cyberstalking problem."); The Electronic
Frontier, supra note 103, at 4 ("Despite the general adequacy of laws that define the substance of
criminal and other offenses, the Working Group finds that the Internet presents new and significant
investigatory challenges for law enforcement at all levels."). For a discussion of extremists
employed in fields of law enforcement, see Robin Barnes, Blue by Day and White by (K)night:
Regulating the Political Affiliations of Law Enforcement and Military Personnel, 81 IOWA L. REV.
1079, 1081-87 (1996).
142. See Cyberstalking Report, supra note 111, at 3; O'Neill, supra note 19, at 275.
143. See Cyberstalking Report, supra note I 11, at 3 (explaining the frustration of jurisdictional
limitations for local authority to investigate an Intemet harassment case); Catherine Therese Clarke,
From Criminet to Cyber-Perp: Toward an Inclusive Approach to Policing the Evolving Criminal
Mens Rea on the Internet, 75 OR. L. REV. 191, 200-01 (1996).
144. See Cyberstalking Report, supra note 111, at 6.
145. Branscomb, supra note 131, at 1642.
146. There have been some criminal prosecutions for threats and harassment over the Internet.
For example, in March 1998, more than sixty Latino students and employees of California State
University, Los Angeles, and other academic institutions received a threatening e-mail, which read
in part, "I'm going to come down and kill your wetback, affirmative action ass .... I hate
wetbacks!!! Kill all wetbacks!" See California State University, Center for the Study of Hate and
Extremism, Have There Been Hate-Related Prosecutions or Civil Cases Pursued for Online Legal
Violations?, at http://www.hatemonitor.org/faq.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2002.). Just over a year
later, Kingman Quon, a man of Asian descent, was sentenced to two years imprisonment for sending
the e-mails. See id.; see also United States v. Machado, 195 F.3d 454 (9th Cir. 1999) (upholding
defendant's conviction for interference with federally protected activity by sending racist e-mails
from a computer lab at the University of California, Irvine to sixty Asian-American students);
Cyberstalking Law Invoked, supra note 102.
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means in which to redress their harms. Just as offline responses to the
many offline heads of the Hate Hydra have developed, so too must the
responses to online tactics evolve. To challenge these tactics, legal advo-
cates should appreciate not just the similarities of on- and offline har-
assment, but also their differences, so that their response will meet the
objective of eliminating the harms of bias motivated conduct online.
Some conduct will invariably be actionable under traditional tort causes
of actions, while other conduct will test the parameters and limits of tort
law. In testing those parameters, this article suggests that an appropriate
response is the use of the intentional infliction of emotional distress as an
old arrow in the quiver to target the cyber-head of the Hate Hydra.
147
IV. A LEGAL RESPONSE: THE INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL
DISTRESS
This article has demonstrated how the Internet is the new head of
the Hate Hydra. The unique challenges this medium presents must be
considered in order to respond to bias motivated cyberassment and to
ensure that the harms that occur may be remedied. This part suggests that
litigants should consider the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress to challenge bias motivated cyberassment. 148 First, as a civil
remedy, this cause of action offers distinct advantages over criminal
prosecution. Second, as a tort, intentional infliction of emotional distress
serves to allocate responsibility for harms that arise from human activity.
More specifically, it permits a contextual analysis that is sufficiently
flexible to incorporate the new challenges presented by the Internet. Fi-
nally, this part concludes with a demonstration of the viability of the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress in the Internet arena by
analyzing the specific facts presented in Wilson.
A. The Advantages of Civil Litigation Over Criminal Prosecution
Hate motivated activity that causes injury to individuals and com-
munities may be challenged through both civil litigation and criminal
prosecution. However, civil remedies are often more advantageous in
litigating claims because litigants may avoid the cumbersome administra-
tive processes necessary to pursue criminal action, deter organized group
activity, and address political concerns. 49 Civil actions, unlike criminal
147. See KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 33, at 219 ("The amazing malleability of old torts
permits causes of action and remedies to evolve to counter new threats. In every historical epoch,
tort law has quickly adapted to new social and technological conditions.").
148. For a variety of ways to challenge hate on the Internet see Stem, Hate and the Internet,
supra note 59, at 59.
149. See David G. Braithwaite, Combating Hate Crimes: The Use of Civil Alternatives to
Criminal Prosecutions, 6 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 243, 245 (1996) ("the most effective and
comprehensive means of eliminating hate groups requires a combination of more effective data
compilation, legislation based on civil RICO, and the expansion of traditional tort doctrine"); see
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prosecutions, offer distinct advantages in litigating claims because they
have a lower burden of proof, permit recovery of compensatory damages,
including emotional distress damages, and allow recovery of punitive
damages if warranted. 50 Many legal experts also suggest that civil reme-
dies are more successful in addressing hate motivated conduct because
the administrative processes of the criminal justice system are either in-
adequate or slow in investigating such crimes or activities.151 Further-
more, when dealing with Internet activities, the inadequacies of criminal
prosecutions are compounded.'52
Civil actions seem to be more successful than criminal prosecutions
in curbing and deterring hate activity. 53 Many extremist organizations
have been forced into bankruptcy or obscurity after having large mone-
tary judgments entered against them. 54 From a political standpoint, the
also Parents vs. Hate, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 96, Fall 1999, at 40, available at
http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceprojectfip-index.html (questioning whether it is possible to use
criminal and civil law to prevent hate groups from recruiting minor children); Damon Henderson
Taylor, Civil Litigation Against Hate Groups Hitting the Wallets of the Nations Hate-Mongers, 18
BuFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 95, 103-04 (2000) (discussing use of civil conspiracy and aiding and abetting).
150. See Braithwaite, supra note 149, at 253-54; Kim Murphy, A Civil Action Becoming
Doctor's Defense Weapon, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1999, at Al ("After more than two decades of clinic
violence, the abortion-rights movement now is fighting its radical opponents in a way that law
enforcement hasn't been able to--by filing lawsuits that seek millions of dollars in damages, as well
as an end to veiled threats against abortion providers.").
151. See Taylor, supra note 149, at 104; Braithwaite, supra note 149, at 250-52; see also JACK
LEViN & JACK McDEVrrr, HATE CRIMES: THE RISING TIDE OF BIGOTRY AND BLOODSHED 195
(1993).
152. See supra section III.C.; KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 33, at 220 ("Tort law plays a key
role in punishing emergent forms of wrongdoing because criminal sanctions inevitably lag behind in
times of rapid technological change.").
153. See Braithwaite, supra note 149, at 251 ("One common problem is that some hate crime
statutes only make hate crimes misdemeanors, carrying little or no punishment, and thus containing
little or no deterrence value."). See generally Morris Dees & Ellen Bowden, Taking Hate Groups to
Court, 31 TRIAL 2, Feb. 1, 1995, at 20 ("In addition to helping to combat the 15 percent of hate
crimes for which these groups are directly responsible, these [civil] suits have an effect on the
remaining 85 percent by eliminating the poisonous impact hate groups have on the rest of society.").
154. Morris Dees and Southern Poverty Law Center ("Center") attorneys have litigated tort
claims in order to bankrupt hate groups and deter their bias motivated activities. Southern Poverty
Law Center, Center Battles White Supremacist Groups, LEGAL ACTION, at http://www.spl-
center.org/cgi-bin/printassist.pl?page=/legislation/la-2.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2002). In 1987, the
Center won a jury verdict for $7 million against United Klans of America for the lynching death of
Michael Donald. Id. In 1993, the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed a $12.5 million jury verdict in a
civil action brought against neo-Nazi Skinheads and White Aryan Resistance for the violent beating
death of an Ethiopian youth, Mulugeta Seraw. Id. Plaintiffs represented by the Center were awarded
a $1 million default judgment against the Church of the Creator for the death of Harold Mansfield, a
black sailor who served in the Gulf War. Id. The Center got a jury verdict of $37.5 million, reduced
by a judge to $21.8 million, against the Ku Klux Klan for burning a black Baptist church in South
Carolina. Id. In September 2000, a jury awarded a mother and son $6.3 million against the Aryan
Nation and its leader, Richard Butler. Id. Butler was forced to relinquish his twenty-acre Aryan
Nation compound to the plaintiffs, who had been shot at and chased by the compound's security
guards. Id. For other tort cases against hate groups involving substantial jury awards, see also
Marshall v. Bramer, 828 F.2d 355 (6th Cir. 1987) (civil action against Klan arson of plaintiff's
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savvy litigant may prefer a civil cause of action as well. In the plaintiff's
role as a private attorney general, she may bring into a public forum the
hateful acts that target private citizens, subjecting the defendant to public
scrutiny and criticism. 155 Also, the plaintiff may want to seek civil reme-
dies over criminal penalties because sending the defendant to jail often
results in the creation of a martyr for hate-mongers.
56
The optimal strategy is to use both the civil suit and criminal prose-
cution to ensure a comprehensive and multi-faceted response to hate mo-
tivated acts, sending a clear message that such conduct will not be toler-
ated. The two need not be dependent upon, nor mutually exclusive of,
each other.
157
B. Tort Law and Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Most legal commentators agree that tort law is an effective tool to
create and define the types of harms that should be recognized as legal
interests.158 Tort law allocates responsibility for harms that arise out of
human activities. It is a legal building block for community interaction
and civility. An individual may seek compensation for harm to her per-
son, property, or economic interest caused by conduct that defies a stan-
dard established for the benefit of individuals and the community.159 The
home); Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 518 F. Supp. 993 (S.D. Tex.
1981) (enjoining defendants from harassing Vietnamese fishermen in exercise of their legal rights to
fish in Galveston Bay); Brian Levin, The Vindication of Hate Violence Victims Via Criminal and
Civil Adjudications, 1 J. HATE STUDIES 133, 154-61 (2001-02).
155. KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 33, at 219.
156. See Claudia Kolker, 2nd Guilty Verdict Reached in Dragging Murder Trial: Jury Begins
to Consider Death Penalty for Lawrence Brewer, One of Three Whites Accused of Slaying of Black
Man, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1999, at A16 (quoting Bill Hale, Executive Director of the Texas
Commission on Human Rights, stating that Brewer, one of three men found guilty for the dragging
death of James Byrd, Jr., will be celebrated as a martyr to white supremacists); Todd Venezia, Killer
a Martyr to Some On Far Right, N.Y. POST, June 11, 2001, at 5 (explaining how Timothy McVeigh,
executed for killing 168 people in the bombing of federal building in Oklahoma City, is considered a
martyr by some white supremacists).
157. See Levin, supra note 154, at 158 ("Not only are existing civil and criminal laws being
enforced with renewed vigor, hate crime statutes and other new laws are providing additional
avenues for hate violence victims to seek justice against those who act against them and our
democratic ideals.").
158. The word "interest" means the "object of any human desire." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 1 (1964) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. A legally protected interest is a desire that society
recognizes as so legitimate that one who interferes with its realization may be civilly liable. See id. §
1, cmt. d. In determining which interests are actionable, courts must balance a number of factors,
including the plaintiffs claim of protection against an injury to a legal interest, the defendant's
freedom of action to achieve her objectives, and the interests of the community and society. See W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 6, (5th ed. 1984); id. at 16
("When the interest of the public is thrown into the scales and allowed to swing the balance for or
against the plaintiff, the result is a form of 'social engineering."'); see also KOENIG & RUSTAD,
supra note 33, at I ("Tort law inevitably involves balancing individual and social interests.").
159. "The purpose of the law of torts is to adjust [for] . . . losses, and to afford compensation
for injuries sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of another." KEETON ET AL., supra
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need to allocate responsibility for harms to individual and community
interests does not end where cyberspace begins. The values and objec-
tives of tort law, specifically the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress, may serve an important role for seeking recourse for injuries
caused by bias motivated cyberassment. 160
Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a tort that protects
mental tranquility and peace of mind.161 Prior to the 1930s, recovery for
emotional distress was "parasitic" to other independent torts such as as-
sault, battery, false imprisonment, trespass, or seduction. 162 The reasons
for limiting its recovery were based on the perceived difficulty in prov-
ing mental injury, the possibility of fictitious claims, and the fear of a
flood of litigation over trivial matters and bad manners. 163 In the 1930s,
as the resistance to addressing mental injuries lessened, the viability of
intentional infliction of emotional distress came to fruition, and it was
recognized as an independent tort. 64 In 1965, the Second Restatement of
Torts recognized the tort as imposing liability if the plaintiff could prove
note 158, § 1 at 6 (quoting Cecil A. Wright, Introduction to the Law of Torts, 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 238
(1944)); see also KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 33, at 29 ("The history of tort law demonstrates a
progressive recognition of societal as well as individual interests."). Legal scholars and
commentators cannot agree on a definition of tort law. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 158, § lat 1.
("Even though tort law is now recognized as a proper subject, a really satisfactory definition of a tort
is yet to be found.").
160. See generally KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 33, at 221 (discussing the role of tort law in
cyberspace).
161. See State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co v. Ramsey, 368 S.E.2d 477, 478 (S.C. Ct. App.
1988); St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. 1987); Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d
771 (Utah 1988).
162. KEETON ET AL., supra note 158, at 57 ("[lhf some independent tort... could be made out,
the cause of action served as a peg upon which to hang the mental damages, and recovery was freely
permitted."); see Jean C. Love, Discriminatory Speech and the Tort of Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 123, 126 (1990) ("Prior to the 1930s and 1940s, a
person could sue only for an insult to personal dignity by bringing an action for assault, battery,
trespass, or defamation.").
163. KEETON ET AL., supra note 158, at 54-55; see also Sammes v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 345-
48 (Utah 1961) ("Due to the highly subjective and volatile nature of emotional distress and the
variability of its causations, the courts have historically been wary of dangers in opening the door to
recovery therefore.").
164. William L. Prosser, Insult and Outrage, 44 CAL. L. REV. 40, 41 (1956). The earlier cases
that recognized the tort as a separate cause of action were situations in which passengers were
insulted by common carrers. See KEETON Er AL., supra note 158, at 57. In 1948, the Restatement of
Torts adopted intentional infliction of emotional distress as an independent cause of action in Section
46: "One who, without a privilege to do so, intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another
is liable (a) for such emotional distress and (b) for bodily harm resulting from it." RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS § 46 (Supp. 1948). Even today, this tort is at a crossroad. Just as the Restatement (Second)
established its prominence, the Restatement (Third) may be minimizing it. See Martha Chamallas,
Removing Emotional Harm From the Core of Tort Law, 54 VAND. L. REV. 751 (2001) (discussing
changes in the Restatement (Third) that remove recovery for emotional harm in important areas).
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that the defendant: 1) by extreme and outrageous conduct; 2) intentionally
or recklessly; 3) caused; 4) the plaintiff severe emotional distress.
65
Intentional infliction of emotional distress is a viable tool to challenge
cyberassment, particularly when it is bias motivated. 66 First, the tort is still
developing and is sufficiently flexible to address new situations that evolve
from Internet activity. 167 Second, the central component of the tort, de-
termining whether the defendant's conduct is extreme and outrageous,
requires a contextual analysis. This contextual component empowers
courts with the flexibility to consider the nature of the Internet and its
unique characteristics today and as it evolves over time.
168
Finally, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress fills the
gap by addressing harms from Internet activity that would not be actionable
under other torts. 169 Emotional harms like those suffered in Wilson would
165. RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, § 46(1) ("One who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress .... ); see Daniel Givelber, The Right to Minimum Social Decency and the Limits
of Evenhandedness: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress by Outrageous Conduct, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 42, 46 (1982) (explaining that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress contains
four elements: "(1) The defendant must act intentionally or recklessly, (2) the conduct must be
extreme and outrageous, (3) it must be the cause, (4) of severe emotional distress"). Negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims are independently actionable as well in most jurisdictions, but
are usually limited to persons in the physical zone of danger or to family members who experience
the serious injury or death of a loved one through some sensory observation. See KEETON ET AL.,
supra note 158, § 54 at 362-67.
166. See KOENIG & RUSTAD, supra note 33, at 29 ("In recent decades, the tort action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress has evolved further to punish racism, sexism, and bullying
in the workplace.").
167. See, e.g., Bartanus v. Lis, 480 A.2d 1178 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) ("[T]he intentional
infliction of emotional distress is an evolving tort and its scope has not yet been clearly defined."
(citing Papieves v. Lawrence, 263 A.2d 118, 121 (Pa. 1970))); RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, § 46
cmt. c ("The law is still in a stage of development.... This section states the extent of the liability
thus far accepted generally by the courts. The Caveat is intended to leave fully open the possibility
of further development of the law, and the recognition of other situations in which liability may be
imposed."); KEETON ET AL., supra note 158, at 55 ("[T]he law is clearly in a process of growth, the
ultimate limit of which cannot yet be determined.").
168. For a historical development of emotional distress claims, see Martha Chamallas & Diane
Kerber, Women, Mothers and the Law of Fright: A History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814 (1990); William
Prosser, Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering: A New Tort, 37 MICH. L. REV. 874 (1939);
Zalvert Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1033
(1936). See also Payton v. Abbott Labs, 437 N.E.2d 171, 176-78 (Mass. 1982) (providing history of
infliction of emotional distress); Sammes v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 345-46 (Utah 1961) (providing
history of intentional infliction of emotional distress); Contreras v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 565
P.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Wash. 1977) (providing history of tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress).
169. The tort is slowly being recognized as a viable cause of action for different emotional
harms. See Regina Austin, Employer Abuse, Worker Resistance, and the Tort of Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1, 51 (1988) (recognizing intentional infliction of
emotional distress to challenge employee abuse by employer); Eric S. Fisher, Potter v. Firestone and
the Infliction of Emotional Distress, 30 TORT & INS. L. J. 1071 (1995) (explaining the California
Supreme Court's decision to permit intentional infliction of emotional distress damages in fear of
cancer cases); Aaron Goldstein, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress: Another Attempt at
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not be actionable under assault, defamation, or the privacy torts. Assault
requires the apparent ability and opportunity of the defendant to carry out
a threat immediately, a requirement that would materialize only under
the rarest of circumstances from Internet threats. 170 Web site postings
that include racial slurs, epithets, or rhetorical hyperbole would be diffi-
cult to prove true or false for a defamation claim."'1 There would also be
no claim under the privacy torts because the information disclosed is
obtained legitimately, is available to the public, and does not appropriate
a person's name or likeness. 72 Thus, the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress serves to protect exactly what Ryan Wilson and the
white supremacists harassing Bonnie Jouhari sought to destroy through
terror and the power of fear-her mental tranquility and peace of
mind.
173
Eliminating Native American Mascots, 3 J. GENDER, RACE & JUSTICE 689 (2000) (advocating the
use of intentional infliction of emotional distress to eliminate Native American mascots of sports
teams); Mary Kate Kearney, Child Witnesses of Domestic Violence: Third Party Recovery for
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 47 LOYOLA L. REV. 283 (2001) (arguing that intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim is the best way for the courts to recognize a child's injury and
send a message to abusers); Richard R. Orsinger, Asserting Claims for Intentionally or Recklessly
Causing Severe Emotional Distress in Connection with Divorce, 25 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1253 (1994)
(discussing the Texas Supreme Court's decision to permit intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims in divorce cases); Dean Richardson, Racism: A Tort of Outrage, 61 OR. L. REV. 267 (1982)
(suggesting intentional infliction of emotional distress to challenge racist conduct); Benson A.
Wolman, Verbal Sexual Harassment on the Job as Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 17
CAPITAL U. L. REV. 245 (1988) (suggesting that sexual insults will be challenged with the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims). But see Paul T. Hayden, Religiously Motivated
"Outrageous" Conduct: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as a Weapon Against "Other
People's Faiths," 34 WM & MARY L. REV. 579 (1993) (advocating a restriction on the tort in order
to afford greater protections to religious freedoms).
170. See Marczeski v. Law, 122 F. Supp. 2d 315, 325 (D. Conn. 2000) ("A threat by telephone
or on the Internet is not a civil assault." (citing DOUGLASS B. WRIGHT ET AL., CONNECTICUT LAW
OF TORTS § 8 (3d ed. 1991))); see also KEETON ET AL., supra note 158, at 44-45.
171. See Randy Smolla, Rethinking First Amendment Assumptions About Racist and Sexist
Speech, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 171, 179 (1990) ("[A] factual statement is actionable and an
expression of opinion is not .... The consequence of thinking of speech in the bipolar terms of fact
and opinion for the purposes of the problem of racist and sexist attacks is that the attacks will be
classified as opinion, and thus deemed absolutely protected under the first amendment."); see
generally Raible v. Newsweek, 341 F. Supp. 804, 808-09 (W.D. Pa. 1972) (dismissing a libel action
in which plaintiff was called a "bigot," stating, "Americans have been hurling epithets at each other
for generations. From charging 'Copperhead' during the Civil War, we have come down to 'Racist,'
'Pig,' 'Fascist,' 'Red,' 'Pinko,' 'Nigger Lover,' 'Uncle Tom' and such. Certainly such name calling,
either express or implied, does not always give rise to an action for libel.").
172. Intrusion is the intentional intrusion on the solitude of another that would affect a
reasonable person. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 158, at 854-56. False light privacy and public
disclosure of private facts require disclosure of private information. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652D (1977) (publicizing details of private life of another is actionable if it would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person and had not legitimate public concern). Appropriation is the use of
another's likeness for one's own benefit. See Zacchini v. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co., 433
U.S. 562, 565 (1977).
173. See Tompkins v. Cyr, 995 F. Supp. 664, 677 (N.D. Tex. 1998) ("[Clitizens have a right to
be protected from the kind of 'abuse' that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress
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C. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress as the Arrow in the
Quiver
1. The Cyberassment of Bonnie Jouhari
Ryan Wilson, a well-known neo-Nazi, founded ALPHA HQ to fur-
ther the goals of the white supremacist movement. 74 At the time of the
events at issue, the organization had approximately 80 members. 75 Wil-
son designed the ALPHA HQ Web site to further the goals of the move-
ment and to publicly identify persons who were against hate groups.176
The site contained bomb-making recipes from popular white supremacist
literature and highlighted the bomb recipe used by Timothy McVeigh in
Oklahoma City.1 77 The site also listed various types of guns, including
their advantages, disadvantages, and information on how to obtain them,
as well as a support list for incarcerated individuals who had committed
racist crimes in a section titled "prisoners of war. ' 78 In a three-year time
period, 97,157 individuals visited the site.1
79
Bonnie Jouhari "worked as a fair housing specialist at the Reading-
Berks Human Relations Council ("HRC") in Reading, Pennsylvania
from August 23, 1995, until November 20, 1998. ''l s° Jouhari's responsi-
bilities included investigating discrimination complaints, outreach, and
educating on fair housing issues.18' Jouhari, a white woman, whose
daughter is white and African-American, was recognized in the commu-
nity as an advocate for civil rights. 8 2 In 1997, Jouhari suspected that a
heavy Ku Klux Klan presence in the county surrounding Reading was
deterring blacks from buying affordable, better-quality housing outside
the city limits. 3 In her official capacities as a fair housing specialist and
proscribes."); Taylor v. State, 617 So. 2d 1198, 1204 (La. App. 1993) ("We recognize a legally
protected right to be free from serious, intentional invasions of mental and emotional tranquility.");
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 368 S.E.2d 477, 478 (S.C. App. 1988) ("The modem
trend recognizes that emotional tranquility is an interest worthy of protection."); St. Elizabeth Hosp.
v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 653 (Tex. 1987) ("[F]reedom from severe emotional distress is an
interest which the law should serve to protect."); Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 779 (Utah 1988)
("Virtually all jurisdictions in the United States now recognize a broad protected interest in mental
tranquility ... ").
174. Sec'y, United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Wilson, No. 03-98-0692-8, 2000
WL 988268, at *4 (H.U.D.A.L.J. July 19, 2000).
175. Id.
176. Id. at *4. See generally Nancy Ritter, Gauging Cyber Venom: Free Speech or
Provocation?, N.J. LAW., Nov. 16, 1998, at col.1 (illustrating pro and con arguments for
Pennsylvania's decision to seek a civil injunction).
177. Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *5.
178. Id.
179. Id. at *4.
180. Id. at*l.
181. Id.
182. Id. at *2-3.
183. Ladd, supra note 3.
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the chairwoman of the local hate crimes task force, Jouhari requested that
local police take action against white supremacist activities in the area.
184
As a result of her actions, Jouhari received racist flyers in the mail, was
followed by strange men, and was threatened repeatedly. 85 However,
Jouhari persisted in her efforts to challenge the white supremacist pres-
ence in the area.
86
Perhaps frustrated by her unwillingness to cave in to the more tradi-
tional methods of harassment, the white supremacists turned to the Inter-
net to get their message across to Jouhari and the hundreds of millions of
people with access to the Internet worldwide. 87 In March 1998, Jouhari's
picture appeared on the ALPHA HQ Web site.'88 The first posting on the
site was a photograph of Jouhari holding a flyer that depicted a hooded
Klansman with a noose and read "Race Traitor Beware." 189 Taken from
a television interview in which Jouhari described receiving such flyers
and other threats, the photograph was captioned: "This 'woman' works at
the Reading-Berks Human Relations Council and has received warnings
in the mail that she is a race traitor and should beware. Traitors like this
should beware, for in our day, they will be hung from the neck from the
nearest lamp post."'190 Immediately above Jouhari's picture was an ani-
mated photographic image of her workplace exploding into flames, with
a caption reading: "The Reading-Berks Human Relations Council. This
is the office where plans for additional race-mixing and 'integration' are
planned."'t 9t
In the summer of 1998, Wilson made changes to the ALPHA HQ
Web site. 19 He described Jouhari's daughter as a "mongrel" and posted
instructions on how to make a bomb directly under the picture of Jou-
hari's office. 193 Wilson also "placed Ms. Jouhari's photograph and the
184. Id.
185. Id.; Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *3-4, *8.
186. See generally Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *6-8 (demonstrating Jouhari's efforts in
continuing her work at the Council while being exposed to continued harassment).
187. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (explaining how the Internet has enabled
tens of millions of people to communicate with each other, as well as provide access to vast amounts
of information around the world); see also Muth, supra note 77, at 11 ("The largest and most visible
manifestation of cyberspace is the Intemet-a worldwide network of networks electronically
connecting millions of computers and computer users."); The Electronic Frontier, supra note 103
("the number of Internet users worldwide is estimated to reach 502 million by 2003").




192. Id. at *4.
193. Id. at *4-5. Wilson added the following disclaimer on the site:
This organization does not wish to imply that the individuals mentioned in the above article or
in any location throughout this Web site be harassed or injured in any way. For legal reasons
we must make this statement. If those people are still alive when the political tide swings back
to the right... they will find our wrath something to be dealt with.
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image of her office blowing up in the main frame on the second page of
the website. ' 94 Visitors to the site had to pass through that frame in or-
der to explore the rest of it.'95
Immediately after the Web posting, the offline harassment of Jou-
hari escalated and intensified.1 96 Jouhari and her daughter began to re-
ceive harassing phone calls, which continued despite their efforts to
change their number to an unlisted one. 97 From March 1998 until Octo-
ber 1998, when the Jouharis moved in with a friend, they received as
many as 30 harassing phone calls a day. 198 Jouhari also received harass-
ing phone calls at work. 99 Even Jouhari's co-workers felt threatened by
the harassment; they closed window blinds while at work, and some staff
members refused to come to the office on weekends or after regular work
hours.20
Jouhari ultimately left Reading, her hometown, for fear of threats to
both her daughter's and her own safety.20' In October 1998, Jouhari and
her daughter moved to Washington State, taking only what they could
carry in their car.202 Following advice from the FBI, when they arrived in
Seattle, they did not open a bank account, get drivers licenses, register to
vote, or put their names on any documents.20 3 They curtailed their travel,
and Jouhari paid the family's bills by traveler checks or money order.2°
Although Jouhari rented an apartment in her name, she obtained an
unlisted phone number, a caller identification system, and call block fea-
tures.
205
Within a month after arriving in Washington, Jouhari and her
daughter began receiving harassing phone calls again. 206 They also ob-
served a van circling their apartment for hours at a time.20 In May 1999,
a pounding on the door in the middle of the night woke them up.2 08 They
Id. at *4.
194. Id. at *5.
195. Id.
196. See id. at *6-7.
197. Id. at *7.
198. Id. at *8.
199. Id. at *7.
200. Id.
201. Id. at *8 ("I didn't want to leave the only place I ever knew. I didn't want to leave my job
and the benefits. I was holding out hope that something would happen to make this better.").
202. Id. at *11.
203. Id. at *12.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. ld. at *13.
207. Id.
208. Id.
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could not see anyone through the peephole and no one would respond to
their call of "who's there?
' 2°9
Although nothing happened to them that evening, Jouhari and her
daughter stayed awake the entire night in fear.210 The family subse-
quently moved in with their pastor, but the phone calls began again, up to
20 a day, when they left his home and moved to an apartment in Kent,
Washington. 21  An unknown perpetrator also broke into their apart-
ment.2 12 Jouhari and her daughter remained in the apartment from Sep-
tember 1999 until February 2000, when Jouhari received a phone call
from David Goldman of HateWatch, who described another serious
threat of unknown origin on the Internet directed at Jouhari and her
daughter. 213 Jouhari contacted the FBI and informed them of the harass-
ing phone calls, the break-in, and the new Web site references .2 4 At the
advice of the FBI, Jouhari and her daughter stayed in a hotel room that
night and left Kent the next day, leaving behind all furniture and personal
215items. Jouhari and her daughter moved three times while in Washing-
ton in an attempt to escape the madness. 216 The United States Depart-
ment of Housing and Urban Development eventually filed suit on Jou-
hari's behalf.217
In Secretary, United States Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment v. Wilson,218 the administrative law judge decided that Wil-
son's conduct of posting Jouhari's photographs on the Web site, posting
images of Jouhari's office bursting into flames, making threats against
Jouhari's life, and referring to Jouhari's daughter as a "mongrel" fell
within the parameters of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
219
The judge conducted a detailed factual finding and briefly summarized
the elements of intentional infliction of emotional distress and the dispo-
209. Id.
210. See id.
211. Id. at *13-15.
212. Seeid. at*15.
213. Id. at *16. HateWatch.org. was founded by David Goldman and is a Web site dedicated to
combating online bigotry. See http://www.HateWatch.org (last visited Oct. 4, 2002).
214. Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at * 16.
215. Id.
216. See id. at *11-16.
217. See id. at * 1.
218. 2000 WL 988268.
219. Id. at *18. This article focuses on the intentional infliction of emotional distress upon
Bonnie Jouhari. However, Ryan Wilson intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Bonnie
Jouhari's daughter as a result of Jouhari's relationship with her daughter. See id. ("Where [extreme
and outrageous] conduct is directed at a third person, the actor is subject to liability if he intentionally or
recklessly causes severe emotional distress, (a) to a member of such person's immediate family who is
present at the time, whether or not such distress results in bodily harm." (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra
note 158, § 46)). See generally Keamey, supra note 169 (discussing the right of a third party to recover
from emotional distress relating to conduct directed at a family member).
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sitive issues that led to his conclusion. 220 However, for illustrative pur-
poses, this article will engage in an independent analysis to demonstrate
the strength and flexibility of the tort of intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress as a tool to combat bias motivated cyberassment.
To prove intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must
establish that the defendant: 1) by extreme and outrageous conduct; 2)
intentionally or recklessly; 3) caused; 4) the plaintiff severe emotional dis-
tress .2  The following part will begin with the most difficult hurdle in prov-
ing this tort, demonstrating that Wilson's conduct was extreme and outra-
geous.222
2. The Extreme and Outrageous Conduct of Ryan Wilson
The extreme and outrageous nature of a defendant's conduct is
shown only when the conduct at issue is so outrageous in character and
extreme in degree that it goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and
is regarded as utterly intolerable in a civilized community.223 In address-
ing this element, the court first determines if the defendant's conduct
may reasonably be considered extreme and outrageous.224 If reasonable
persons may differ, the jury determines whether the conduct was suffi-
225ciently outrageous.
Insults, threats, and annoyances are not extreme and outrageous
conduct when they are not coupled with other aggravating circum-
220. See Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *17-19.
221. RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, § 46 ("One who by extreme and outrageous conduct
intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such
emotional distress.").
222. Diane L. Borden, Invisible Plaintiffs: A Feminist Critique on the Rights of Private
Individuals in the Wake of Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 35 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 306 (1999-2000)
("In practice, however, lawsuits tend to focus on just one of the elements - outrageousness of the
defendant's conduct - since proof of that element often indicates evidence of the other three.");
Givelber, supra note 165, at 46 ("The extraordinary feature of the tort, however, is its insistence
upon 'extreme and outrageous conduct.' In fact, this element is, in large respect, the entire tort.");
Goldstein, supra note 169, at 703 (identifying other factors used to determine extreme and
outrageous conduct); Love, supra note 162, at 147 ("The critical issue in a cause of action brought
under Section 46 is whether the defendant has engaged in 'extreme and outrageous conduct."').
223. RES'ATEMENT, supra note 158, § 46 cmt. d. In Wilson, the judge found Wilson's conduct
sufficiently extreme and outrageous based on the following: 1) Wilson was a well-known leader of the
white supremacist movement who ran a white supremacist Web site; 2) Wilson made specific violent
threats against Jouhari; 3) Wilson used leaderless resistance as an integral feature of his threats, coupled
with the tendency of white supremacists to take violent or harassing acts against targeted persons; and 4)
Wilson's timing of his acts of intimidation and harassment directed at Jouhari. See Wilson, 2000 WL
988268; at * 19.
224. RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, § 46 cmt. h ("It is for the court to determine, in the first
instance, whether the defendant's conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous
as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so.").
225. Id. ("Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the
court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and
outrageous to result in liability.").
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stances. 26 Therefore, merely identifying Bonnie Jouhari as a "race trai-
tor" and labeling her daughter a "mongrel" would probably not rise to the
level of extreme and outrageous conduct.227 However, aggravating cir-
cumstances existed in this case that satisfy a finding of extreme and out-
rageous conduct.
228
First, the use of racial slurs, coupled with threats of offline violence,
may be sufficient aggravating circumstances to support an intentional
infliction of emotional distress claim in some jurisdictions.229 Jouhari
226. See Magruder, supra note 168, at 1035 ("Against a large part of the frictions and irritations
and clashing of temperaments incident to participation in a community life, a certain toughening of
the mental hide is a better protection than the law could ever be."); RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, §
46 cmt. d ("The rough edges of our society are still in need of a good deal of filing down, and in the
meantime plaintiffs must necessarily be expected and required to be hardened to a certain amount of
rough language, and to occasional acts that are definitely inconsiderate and unkind."). But see
Gorwara v. AEL Indus., Inc., No. CIV.A.89-6401, 1990 WL 44702, at *7 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(discussing cases that recognize changing notions in society where racial slurs are no longer mere
insults).
227. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania dismissed an intentional infliction of emotional
distress claim based on an isolated slur that did not involve continuous malicious action, a special
relationship between the parties, or knowledge by the actor of victim's susceptibility to emotional
distress. Dawson v. Zayre Dep't Stores, 499 A.2d 648, 650 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) ("The law does not
invoke liability in a situation where, without aggravating circumstances, one hurls an epithet at
another during the course of a disagreement."). See Lay v. Roux Lab., Inc., 379 So. 2d 451,452 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that although racial epithets and references to plaintiff as "nigger" is
reprehensible conduct, it is insufficient to reach the threshold of outrageous and atrocious conduct);
Bradshaw v. Swagerty, 563 P.2d 511,514 (Kan. Ct. App. 1977) (holding that a debt collector calling
plaintiff a "nigger," "bastard," and "knot-headed boy" are insults and insufficient to reach the
threshold of outrageousness and atrociousness); Irving v. J.L. Marsh, Inc. 360 N.E.2d 983, 986 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1977) (holding that an employee of a retail store referring to plaintiff as "arrogant nigger"
was insufficient as a basis for a cause of action for intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress). But see generally Richard Delgado, Words that Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults,
Epithets, and Name Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982) (advocating a tort cause of
action for racial insults); John T. Nockleby, Hate Speech in Context: The Case of Verbal Threats, 42
BUFF. L. REV. 653 (1994) (analyzing racially motivated threats of violence and proposing tort of
racial intimidation); Smolla, supra note 171 (analyzing the debates over controlling racist and sexist
speech).
228. See Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *19.
229. See Bernard v. Doskocil Cos., 861 F. Supp. 1006, 1014-15 (D. Kan. 1994) (holding that
when reviewing the facts as a whole there is enough evidence to support a determination of extreme
and outrageous conduct where there are racial slurs of "black boy," or "nigger rig;" racist jokes not
directed at plaintiff or told in his presence; isolated pranks of plaintiff's co-workers; and threats of
fire); Gomez v. Hug, 645 P.2d 916, 919-20 (Kan. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that plaintiff's claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress survives summary judgment where plaintiff was subjected
to racial slurs and offensive insults, such as "fucking spic," "fucking Mexican Greaser," and "pile of
shit," as well as threats of violence, all of which resulted in serious medical problems); Ruiz v.
Bertolotti, 236 N.Y.S.2d 854, 855-56 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1962) (holding that a statement to a third party
expressing anger and threatening bodily harm to "colored persons" moving into a neighborhood was
sufficient to survive motion to dismiss in an action for malicious tort with purpose to frighten). But
see Bowers v. Estep, 420 S.E.2d 336, 338 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992) (finding that supervisor who
threatened, intimidated and humiliated employee did not engage in outrageous behavior). See
generally Nockleby, supra note 227, at 696-99 (discussing reasons why threats of racial violence
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was identified on the ALPHA HQ Web site as a "race traitor" because of
her efforts to assist African-Americans in obtaining housing and because
she has a biracial daughter.230 The term race traitor is a bias motivated
slur because it connotes association with African-Americans to be wrong
231or a negative association.
Furthermore, the language posted on the Web site included "code
words" from The Turner Diaries,232 a white supremacist book that de-
picts a fictional race war where white supremacists take over a region of
California.233 One passage describes the "Day of the Rope," which is the
day that white supremacist troops hang white people who have betrayed
their race, including white women who were married to, or lived with,
men of color or Jewish men.234 White women and men were taken from
their homes and hung, with signs placed around their necks that stated "I
defiled my race" or "I betrayed my race.,, 235 The author described that
"from tens of thousands of lampposts, power poles, and trees throughout
this vast metropolitan area the grisly forms hang. 236
The slurs contained in the Web posting, coupled with the threats of
violence depicted in the hanging of Jouhari and images of her exploding
office, could qualify as outrageous conduct.237 As demonstrated by the
administrative law judge's findings, the facts of Wilson were sufficiently
extreme and outrageous, even absent a consideration of the unique char-
acteristics of the Internet. But the analysis for such activity should not
end there. Courts should fully integrate the unique features of the Internet
should satisfy the "outrageousness" element but concluding the tort would not be effective in
situations in which a single, racially motivated threat is made).
230. Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *5.
231. In a 42 U.S.C. § 1981 action, the Tenth Circuit held that white persons may have standing
to sue for alleged discrimination against them for associations with black persons. Patrick v. Miller,
953 F.2d 1240, 1249-50 (10th Cir. 1992); see supra note 15 and accompanying text.
232. ANDREW MACDONALD, THE TURNER DIARIES (2d ed. 1980).
233. Id. at 160-69. Andrew MacDonald is the pen name for William Pierce, the leader of a neo-
Nazi organization, the National Alliance. The Alliance and its Allies, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 93,
Winter 1999, at 10, available at http://www.splcenter.org/intelligenceproject/ip-4i3.html. THE
TURNER DIARIES is considered the blueprint for Timothy McVeigh's bombing of the Alfred P.
Murrah Federal building that killed 168 people in Oklahoma City. Id. at 12. See generally Barnes,
supra note 140, at 1105-08 (describing information contained in THE TURNER DIARIES).
234. MACDONALD, supra note 232, at 160-69.
235. Id. at 160-61.
236. Id.at 160.
237. An argument can be made that the constant posting of her name, picture and place of work
on an Internet site satisfied the aggravating circumstance of repeated harassment. Boyle v. Wenk,
392 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Mass. 1979) ("Repeated harassment... may compound the outrageousness
of incidents which, taken individually, might not be sufficiently extreme to warrant liability for
infliction of emotional distress."); Sammes v. Eccles, 358 P.2d 344, 345, 347 (Utah 1961) (holding
that aggravated circumstances existed for a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
where the defendant repeatedly called a married woman on the phone and solicited sex, came to her
residence and made indecent exposure of his person). See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 158,
at 54-66 (discussing general requirements for infliction of emotional distress).
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into their analyses so that the totality of the circumstances may be fully
appreciated.
A significant factor in Wilson and most cyberassment cases is the
conduct at issue, which must be considered in the context or the situation
of the parties.238 The creation of new laws or tests for Internet activity
may not be warranted, at least for intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, if courts consider the context in which the conduct occurred and
the unique characteristics of the Internet. To date, courts confronted with
challenges in tort to Internet activities have engaged in analyses devoid
of discussion, or even mention, that the medium may create new or dif-
ferent dangers that warrant scrutiny.239 This article advocates that courts
should consider the unique characteristics of the Internet in determining
if the conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous. In Wilson, the
Internet, acting as a force multiplier and tool of anonymity, coupled with
the inadequacies of law enforcement to confront the online conduct, con-
tributed to Ryan Wilson's ability to intentionally inflict emotional harm
on Jouhari, and served to heighten Jouhari's level of terror. These con-
siderations should not be overlooked; they must be analyzed to determine
if an average citizen, after viewing it in this context, would look at such
conduct and say, "Outrageous!"
a. ALPHA HQ Web Site as a Force Multiplier
As discussed in Part LII.C. of this article, Ryan Wilson created the
ALPHA HQ Web site to further the goals of the white supremacist
movement and to publicly identify persons who were against its goals.240
The site contained bomb-building instructions, listed various types of
guns, and posted a support list for "prisoners of war," i.e., those incarcer-
238. See King v. Kidd, 640 A.2d 656, 668 (D.C. 1994); Johnson v. Lakewood Hosp., Nos.
70943, 71257, 1997 WL 547968, at *11 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) ("The conduct must also be viewed in
context to determine what is 'beyond all possible bounds of decency ... and utterly intolerable in a
civilized community."' (quoting Stepien v. Franklin, 528 N.E.2d 1324, 1330 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988)));
Givelber, supra note 164, at 75 ("Although there is little evidence that this tort will ever provide the
basis for principled adjudication, it has provided and probably will continue to provide the basis for
achieving situational justice.").
239. See Lenhoff v. Getty, No. 97CIV. 9458, 2000 WL 977900, at *8-9 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(granting defendant's summary judgment; sending unwanted junk e-mails to plaintiff and placement
of an ad with the phone number of plaintiff family's place of business is not sufficiently outrageous
under New York law); Lian v. Sedgwick James of N.Y., Inc., 992 F. Supp. 644, 647, 651 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (granting summary judgment; the sending of e-mail to plaintiff's co-workers stating that
supervisor and plaintiff had agreed that plaintiff would begin seeking other employment did not
constitute extreme and outrageous conduct); Rail v. Hellman, 726 N.Y.S.2d 629, 631-33 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2001) (granting defendant's motion to dismiss; the alleged fabrication of an e-mail
disseminated in plaintiff's name that made the plaintiff "appear as a rude, petty, self-absorbed
writer/cartoonist," who sought to insult the New York City cartooning industry, was not outrageous
and shocking to satisfy an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim).
240. Wilson, 2000 V/L 988268, at *4.
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ated for committing racist crimes. 241 To ensure that anyone visiting the
Web site got the clear message that Jouhari was a target, Wilson placed
Jouhari's photograph and images of her office exploding in the main frame
of the second page of the site; therefore, visitors could not explore the
ALPHA HQ Web site without seeing the postings.
242
Ryan Wilson's site received over 97,000 visitors in a three year time
period, quite an accomplishment for someone who, in 1993, managed to get
only 80 racists to attend a rally near New Hope, Pennsylvania.243 The force
that such a rally could generate pales in comparison to the force Wilson
could call to arms on the Internet. Through the Internet, Wilson was capable
of reaching not only his white supremacist brothers and sisters within a
particular geographical location, but those anywhere in the world.2" Thus,
it is no surprise that the harassment of Jouhari continued even after she
moved from Pennsylvania to Washington State, over 3000 miles away from
the initial source of her troubles.245 Jouhari had become readily identifiable
by racists over a wide geographic area.
Although some of the individuals who visited the ALPHA HQ Web
site may have been repeat visitors or may not have been white supremacists
committed to the mission of ALPHA HQ, it is hard to dispute that the
threats against Jouhari, her identity, and the location of her place of work
were seen by tens of thousands of people who had some interest in white
supremacy. Jouhari did not know whether each viewer's interest was a
passing interest in white supremacy or a dogmatic adherence to it. But Jou-
hari's fears and terror were caught up in exactly that-what she did not
know.
Exacerbating Jouhari's fear of the force multiplier effect was the white
supremacist organizational strategy, leaderless resistance. Floyd Cochran, a
former recruiter for the Aryan Nations who now combats hate and intoler-
ance, and David Goldman, then Executive Director of Hatewatch.org, a
Web based organization that monitors hate activity on the Internet, testified
as experts in the Wilson case.246 Cochran testified that Jouhari was targeted
241. Id. at*5.
242. Id.
243. Id. at *4-5. Wilson organized the rally to speak out against New Hope's liberal attitude for
gay rights. See Mark A. Waligore, A Day of Hate: Thank God It's All Over, THE TRENTONIAN, Nov.
7, 1993, at 2. The rally attracted over 200 counter-protesters and had more than 300 police officers
on hand. Mark Davis & Christine Schiavo, Neo-Nazis Hold Rally at State Park, PHILA. INQUIRER,
Nov. 7, 1993, at B1.
244. Bonnie Jouhari was certainly aware of this, stating, "the thought of [the statements on the
Web site] circulating all over the world with people wanting to do me harm made me feel terrible."
Andrea Fine, When Web Words Threaten, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Nov. 24, 1998, at 3.
245. See Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *13. Even if Wilson knew individuals in Washington
State, without the Intemet, he would have had to have their address, phone number, or contact
information to reach them.
246. Id. at *4.
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as an enemy of the white race because she had engaged in sexual relations
with an African-American man and because, as a fair housing advocate, she
promoted integration.247 The messages about Jouhari on the ALPHA HQ
Web site were disseminated with the hope and expectation that anonymous
white supremacists, in the spirit of leaderless resistance, would take harmful
and intimidating action against the identified target, Bonnie Jouhari.248
Finally, although the postings in Wilson occurred before the events of
September 11, 2001, the tragic events of that day have changed American's
threshold for what is possible in the name of extreme political resistance.
Prior to September 11 th, such violence may not have been a reality to the
average American. Today, however, an exploding image of Bonnie Jou-
hari's office, as a call to violence to hundreds or even thousands of un-
known individuals who visit the Web site, will not rest in the minds of
American citizens as mere folly.
b. The "Access Anonymity" of Jouhari's Harassers
As explained in Part Il.B. of this article, Internet anonymity exists in
at least two forms: identity anonymity and access anonymity. Although
Jouhari knew the identity of the Web site provider, Ryan Wilson, she
was terrorized by unknown persons, who, whether intentionally or by hap-
penstance, visited Ryan Wilson's ALPHA HQ Web site and took offline
action in the spirit of leaderless resistance.249 Furthermore, Jouhari's fears
were not based on mere speculation that someone would act pursuant to
Wilson's violent messages. As soon as the messages were posted, Jouhari
was terrorized,za even when she moved from one coast of the United States
to another. 25 Jouhari knew the source of the online threats, but, because
of access anonymity, there was no trail available to track down the iden-
tity of her harassers. As a result, every person she saw, and the millions
she did not, were her potential harassers and attackers. 52 A Web site,
after all, can be viewed by anyone, anywhere in the world. Not only was
Jouhari unaware of the identity of her harassers, it is highly possible that
247. Id. at *5.
248. Id.
249. Wilson's Web site was known in the region for its embrace of leaderless resistance. See
Tom Burghardt, Solidarity with Pennsylvania Anti-Racists!, ANTIFA INFO-BULLETIN, at
http://www.web.apc.org/-ara/documents/news/support.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2002) ("Wilson ...
runs the 'ALPHA, HQ' [Web site], a sophisticated multimedia operation which encourages like-
minded fascists to conduct 'leaderless resistance operations' against opponents. . . . Among the
material on Wilson's page is a disgusting article that celebrates a series of racist attacks on a black
Philadelphia family last Fall by lynch-rope specialists. The family was eventually driven from their
home due to escalating attacks and death threats against their children.").
250. Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *6-7.
251. Id. at 13.
252. See Post-Hearing Brief at 49, Sec'y, United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v.
Wilson, No. 03-98-0692-8, 2000 WL 988268 (H.U.D.A.L.J. July 19, 2000) ("[Jouhari and her
daughter] fear that every hang-up phone call or knock at the door is from a white supremacist.").
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Ryan Wilson did not know their identities either. David Goldman testi-
fied that Wilson used the Web site to incite other white supremacists to
action in the name of leaderless resistance. 53
c. Inadequate Response from Law Enforcement
There are few outlets that provide individuals who have undergone
online harassment with assistance diminishing their fears and reducing
their anxieties-including law enforcement. This problem should also be
considered in determining extreme and outrageous conduct. Generally,
the response by law enforcement has been, "turn off your computer;"
Jouhari's experience was no exception.254 Throughout her ordeal, Jouhari
contacted an Assistant United States Attorney, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI"), the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission,
and the Deputy Attorney General for the State of Pennsylvania without
much success in obtaining assistance. As a result, Jouhari found no
support and received no assurances from the criminal justice system.
256
Taking the facts presented in Wilson as a whole-racial slurs coupled
with threats of violence, Wilson's adherence to leaderless resistance, and
the unique features of the Internet that facilitated Wilson's objectives-a
jury could certainly find that Wilson's conduct was sufficiently extreme
and outrageous to constitute intentional infliction of emotional distress., 57
3. Severe Emotional Distress
Although some emotional distress is expected as the price for living
in the world, the law intervenes when the distress is so severe, no reason-
able person could be expected to endure it.a58 "The intensity and the du-
253. Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *6. Goldman explained that leaderless resistance was a
"philosophy of armed struggle" and "it says that rather than taking action as a group, as an
organization such as the Ku Klux Klan, individuals, without having direction from a leader, should
take hostile or harassing action against victims or potential victims in order to give deniability to the
organization, but also at the behest of the greater white revolution." Id.; see also id. (explaining that
any white supremacist who wants to be considered a "warrior" in the movement will take violent or
harassing action against a targeted person).
254. Jouhari Interview, supra note 3; Cyberstalking Report, supra note 111 ("In several
instances, victims have been told by law enforcement simply to turn off their computers.").
255. Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *4, *9 ("Despite calls to law enforcement agencies and the
telephone company . . . Ms. Jouhari and her daughter continued to receive numerous 'harassing'
telephone calls."); see Ladd, supra note 3 ("Now in hiding, [Jouhari] says she doesn't believe
federal, state and local law enforcement care enough about online threats to try and stop them.").
256. Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *7. Jouhari stated that law enforcement she contacted "think
it is a joke." Ladd, supra note 3.
257. Sanmes, 358 P.2d at 347 ("That some claims may be spurious should not compel those
who administer justice to shut their eyes to serious wrongs and let them go without being brought to
account. It is the function of courts and juries to determine whether claims are valid or false. This
responsibility should not be shunned merely because the task may be difficult to perform.").
258. RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, § 46 cmt. j ("The distress must be reasonable and justified
under the circumstances, and there is no liability where the plaintiff has suffered exaggerated and
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ration of the distress [should] be considered in determining its sever-
ity. '259 In this case, the constant harassment changed Jouhari's life. Be-
fore Jouhari became a target of the ALPHA HQ Web site, she was
happy, a hard worker, committed to her job, and a "pretty laid back" per-
son.2 60 However, after the cyberassment began, Jouhari became stressed
out, high-strung, cautious, anxious, worried, upset, and preoccupied.26'
She began to have headaches, neck and knee pain, and stomach prob-
lems. 26 Jouhari was prescribed muscle relaxants and anxiety medica-
tion.263
The threats and intimidation did not merely cause concern, but led
264Jouhari to take action. She became extremely aware of her daily activi-
ties, obtained a license to carry a weapon, and purchased a nine-
265 266millimeter handgun. Jouhari eventually left her job and her home.
She moved more than four times in order to seek some peace of mind
and safety-to no avail.267 She and her daughter were forced to live as
fugitives, all the while struggling financially because the constant moves
and harassment precluded steady employment.268 Even today, Jouhari
269and her daughter live in an undisclosed location.
4. Intent and Causation
The issues of intent and causation are significant factors, but should
not be difficult to demonstrate in this case. To prove that the defendant
intentionally caused severe emotional distress, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant acted with the desire to cause such distress or knew
270that such distress was substantially certain to result. Wilson's desire
unreasonable emotional distress, unless it results from a peculiar susceptibility to such distress of
which the actor has knowledge.").
259. See id.





265. Id. at *8.
266. Id. Moving from Reading "was leaving everything [sihe worked for." Id. at *8-9.
267. Id. at*8-16.
268. Id. at *16. Jouhari stated that "The career I'm really good at doing is over, I think, if I
want to end this madness, I don't have a home .... If I want any peace, I'm going to have to change
my name and let everything I ever worked for, my education, my work, my awards, throw it all
down the drain." Id.; see also id. at *8 ("I didn't want to leave the only place I ever knew. I didn't
want to leave my job and benefits. I was holding out hope that something would happen to make this
better.").
269. Jouhari Interview, supra note 3.
270. RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, § 8A, § 46 cmt. i; see also Delgado, supra note 227, at 145;
Love, supra note 162, at 151; RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, § 46 cmt. i (applying the tort also when the
defendant has acted recklessly, in deliberate disregard of a high degree of probability that emotional
distress will occur).
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was to cause emotional injury to Jouhari and that was, in fact, the re-
sult.271 Wilson's purpose for the Web site was to further the goals of the
white supremacist movement, which included hanging "race traitors.
272
Wilson also wanted Jouhari to stop her activities as a fair housing advo-
cate and utilized fear and intimidation to bring about that end.273 It is also
substantially certain that such actions would result in fear and distress for
a civil rights activist with a biracial daughter.
Causation has been met if the defendant acts with intent to cause the
harm, and the intended harm results from his acts.274 Wilson intended to
inflict emotional harm on Jouhari by intimidating her into ceasing her
civil rights activism and threatening her for having a biracial daughter,
both of which further the goals of white supremacy. As a result, Jouhari
suffered severe emotional distress.
Although it was not proven in Wilson that Ryan Wilson himself en-
gaged in the offline harassment of Bonnie Jouhari, it is important to
make the distinction between the offline harassment and the online har-
assment. The central issue is not whether Ryan Wilson caused the offline
harassment, but rather whether Ryan Wilson intended for his Web post-
ings to cause Jouhari severe emotional harm.275 Even if the offline har-
assment by unknown individuals had not occurred, Jouhari should have
been able to recover for her emotional harms because the racial slurs and
online threats alone would cause the result that Wilson intended-to
frighten and terrorize Jouhari .276 The moment Jouhari became aware that
271. Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *5-6.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, § 435A ("A person who commits a tort against another for
the purpose of causing a particular harm to the other is liable for such harm if it results, whether or
not it is expectable, except where the harm results from an outside force the risk of which is not
increased by the defendant's act."). See Meyers v. Hot Bagels Factory, Inc., 721 N.E.2d 1068, 1075
(Ohio App. 1999) (explaining in some jurisdictions, the outrageousness of the defendant's conduct
itself can demonstrate his intent to cause emotional distress).
275. "Whether a white supremacist is responsible for every hang up or annoying phone call... is
not the issue. What does matter is that Ryan Wilson and ALPHA HQ has put Ms. Jouhari and [Ms.
Jouhari's daughter] in a heightened state of fear and vigilance." Sudarsan Raghavan, Woman Threatened
by White Supremacist Group Takes Her Plight to Court, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 19, 2000, available at
http:l/www.phillynews.comiquirert2OOO/Apr/19/pa.west/SHATEt9.html (quoting HUD lawyer
Patricia McGarvey Knebels); Post-Hearing Brief at 49, Wilson, No. 03-98-0692-8, 2000 WL 988268
(H.U.D. A.L.J. July 19, 2000) ("[Thel ALPHA HQ Web site put [Jouhari and her daughter] in a
heightened state of fear and hyper-vigilance, causing them to continually uproot their lives in search of
seemingly illusive [sic] safety and peace.").
276. Such recovery is similar to the arguments justifying liability for intentional infliction of
emotional distress in fear of cancer cases. See Potter v. Firestone, 863 P.2d 795, 808, 810 (Cal. 1993)
(finding that defendant company polluted a community's water supply with toxic waste known to cause
cancer, the court permitted recovery for intentional infliction of emotional distress. The emotional distress
recovery was permitted, even though the plaintiff had not presented any physical manifestations of
cancer.). The recovery is for the plaintiff's anxiety about getting the disease, which is a separate legally
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her name, picture, and work place, coupled with racial epithets and vio-
lent threats, were being displayed on a white supremacist Web site, she
reasonably feared for both her and her daughter's safety and did what
was necessary to protect their lives.
The fact that Wilson adhered to leaderless resistance and that offline
harassment actually occurred made the causal connection between Wil-
son's Web postings and the severe emotional harm even stronger. A per-
son who commits an intentional tort is liable whether the harm is ex-
pected or not, unless the harm is from "an outside force the risk of which
is not increased by the defendant's acts., 277 Wilson was not only aware
of a risk to Jouhari of offline harassment, but also increased the risk by
identifying Jouhari as the enemy in a call to anonymous lone wolves to
act, and act they did. 78
V. THE INTERNET AND THE TRUE THREATS DOCTRINE OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
To serve as an arrow in the quiver to challenge bias motivated cy-
berassment, the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress must be
able to withstand First Amendment scrutiny.279 However, hate-mongers
who cloak their activity in First Amendment armor will find no solace
when the cyberassment, like in Wilson, rises to the level of a "true
threat.
, 28 °
cognizable injury than that of the individual who actually gets the disease. Id.; see also id. at 821
(requiring a showing of severe emotional harm to avoid spurious claims).
277. RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, § 435A; see id. at cmt. a (stating "thus where a person
pursues another, threatening and attempting to kill him, and the other is struck by lightning during
the pursuit, the first is not responsible for the harm thus caused unless the risk of being struck by
lightning was increased by the pursuit"); see Kimberlin v. Delong, 637 N.E.2d 121, 129 (Ind. 1994)
(permitting wrongful death action against defendant who injured decedent in a bombing, leading to
decedent's suicide years later, because the intentional tort was a substantial factor in bringing about
suicide).
278. Beam, supra note 64 ("Organs of information distribution such as newspapers, leaflets,
computers, etc., which are widely available to all, keep each person informed of events, allowing for
a planned response that will take many variations. No one need issue an order to anyone. Those
idealist truly committed to the cause of freedom will act when they feel the time is ripe, or will take
their cue from those who precede them,").
279. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (stating that there is "no basis for qualifying
the level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to [the Intemet]"). A civil action,
enforceable through the power of the court, may constitute "state action" for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment and therefore triggers First Amendment protections. See Cohen v. Cowles Media
Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991) (holding that a private cause of action for promissory estoppel triggers
First Amendment protections because the application of state law is sufficient "state action"); see also
NAACP v. Claibome Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 n.51 (1982) ("Although this is a civil lawsuit
between private parties, the application of state rules of law by the Mississippi state court in a manner
alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes 'state action' under the Fourteenth
Amendment." (citing N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,265 (1964))).
280. At first glance, some commentators may argue that the viability of intentional infliction of
emotional distress is limited by the holding in Hustler v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988). In Hustler,
2002] TARGETING THE NEW HEAD OF THE HATE HYDRA 49
A. The True Threats Doctrine
The central tenant of the First Amendment is that the government
cannot limit expression because of the message, ideas, or subject matter
espoused.281 Most Americans respect the notion that even the person
whose views are extremely offensive has the right to espouse those views
without censorship.282 However, the right to free speech is not abso-
lute.283 Similar to obscenity, "fighting words," and defamation, true
Jerry Falwell sued Hustler Magazine for libel, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress for a parody it ran in its magazine that implied, in a bogus interview with Falwell,
that his "first time" was during a drunken fling with his mother in an outhouse. Id. at 47-48.
Although Falwell's privacy and libel claims were unsuccessful, the jury awarded him compensatory
and punitive damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 49. The Supreme Court
reversed, finding that the State's interest in protecting its citizens from emotional harm did not
outweigh the press' First Amendment rights. Id. at 50-51. The Court held that a public figure may
not recover intentional infliction of emotional distress damages based on a publication, without
showing that it contained a false statement of fact that was made with actual malice. Id. at 56; see
Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671 (distinguishing promissory estoppel claim from Hustler which "held that the
constitutional libel standards apply to a claim alleging that the publication of a parody was a state-
law tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress"). A plaintiff cannot circumvent the First
Amendment requirements of a defamation claim by filing an intentional infliction of emotional
distress cause of action. See, e.g., id. ("Nor is Cohen attempting to use a promissory estoppel cause
of action to avoid the strict requirements for establishing a libel or defamation claim."); Tech Plus,
Inc. v. Ansel, No. Civ.A.96-01668-B, 1999 WL 482329, at *12 (Mass. Super. Mar. 22, 1999) (A
plaintiff cannot "end run the First Amendment protection of [opinion speech] by bringing an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim" based on the same speech.) The Jouhari case is not
a defamation case in disguise. Jouhari did not seek reputational damages disguised in an intentional
infliction of emotional distress framework. She sought emotional harm damages based on her fear of
serious bodily harm. To require all intentional infliction of emotional distress cases, regardless of
their factual underpinnings, to meet the requirements of a defamation case is paramount to making
the tort, once again, parasitic to another tort cause of action.
281. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.");
see Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n., 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994) ("At the
heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for himself or herself
the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adherence. Our political system and
cultural life rest upon this ideal. Government action that stifles speech on account of its message, or
that requires the utterance of a particular message favored by the Government, contravenes this
essential right."); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381-82 (1992) (striking down prosecution of
white teen for burning a cross in a black family's yard because the ordinance, even though it criminalized
unprotected speech, did so based on its content or viewpoint stating that "[the First Amendment
generally prevents government from proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct because of
disapproval of the ideas expressed."); id. at 386 ("The government may not regulate [speech] based
on hostility--or favoritism-towards the underlying message expressed."); Police Dept. of Chicago
v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) ("[Albove all else, the First Amendment means that government
has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its
content.").
282. See Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95-96 ("To permit the continued building of our politics and
culture, and to assure self-fulfillment for each individual, our people are guaranteed the right to
express any thought, free from government censorship."). Even Bonnie Jouhari, despite all that she
had been through stated "free speech is a wonderful thing. [White supremacists] have the right to
espouse their view." Jouhari Interview, supra note 3.
283. See, e.g., RAY., 505 U.S. at 382-85 (permitting restrictions on speech in certain limited areas
such as obscenity, fighting words, and defamation); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v.
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threats are not protected speech.284 Under the true threats doctrine, the
First Amendment right of an individual to articulate a message free of
government regulation must yield to competing interests of "protecting
individuals [and society] from [threats] of violence, from the disruption
that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence
will occur."285
The designation of true threats as a form of unprotected speech
originated in Watts v. United States.286 At a public rally on the grounds of
the Washington Monument, Robert Watts told the crowd that he was not
going to participate in the draft, stating, "If they ever make me carry a
rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is L.B.J., 287 Watts was con-
victed of violating a statute that criminalized a threat to kill or seriously
injure the President of the United States.2 88 The court of appeals affirmed
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 664-65 (1989) (defamation); Jenkins v. Ga., 418 U.S 153, 155-58
(1974) (obscenity); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (fighting words).
284. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 705 (1969) (holding the statute at issue, which
made a threat against the President of the United States a criminal offense held that what constituted
a "threat" had to be "distinguished from.., constitutionally protected speech"); Planned Parenthood
of Columbia/Willamette, Inc v. Am. Coalition of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1072 (9th Cir. 2002)
("distinguish[ing] between political hyperbole, which is protected, and true threats, which are not");
Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 267 F.3d 687, 702 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. granted in part by
Scheidler v. Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc., 122 S.Ct. 1604 (2002), and cert. granted in part by
Operation Rescue v. Nat'l Org. for Women, 122 S.Ct. 1605 (2002) (holding that the lower court
correctly concluded that the statements "were not protected political speech but constituted true
threats outside the protection of the First Amendment"); United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486,
1492-93 (1st Cir. 1997) ("[A] true threat is unprotected by the First Amendment."); United States v.
Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1505 (6th Cir. 1997) ("[O]nly communications which convey 'true
threats' . . . are 'threats' outside the embrace of the First Amendment's guarantees."); United States
v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996) ("The First Amendment... requires a court... to
differeniiate between 'true threats' and protected speech."); Am. Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d
642, 648 (4th Cir. 1995) ("True threats of force.., lie outside the First Amendment.").
285. RAY., 505 U.S. at 388; see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487-88 (1993)
(enhancing penalty for bias-inspired crime upheld on the basis that it was not over and above
disagreement with offenders' beliefs or biases, but because it redressed perceived harms - inflicting
individual and societal harms). The Supreme Court has yet to provide a clear definition for the term
"true threat." See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1071 (providing benchmarks, but no definition,
for a true threat); United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d 120, 123 (2d Cir. 1999) ("Watts did not fashion
a bright-line test for distinguishing a true threat from protected speech."); see also United States v.
Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375, 1385 (E.D. Mich. 1995) (ruling a communication containing an alleged
non-coercive threat may be regulated), affd sub nom United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th
Cir. 1997).
286. 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
287. Watts, 394 U.S. at 705-06.
288. Id. at 706. The statute at issue provided:
Whoever knowingly and willfully deposits for conveyance in the mail or for a delivery from
any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing, print, missive, or document
containing any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the
United States, the President-elect, or knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such threat
against the President, President-elect, Vice President or other officer next in the order of
succession to the office of President, or Vice President-elect, shall be fined not more than
$1,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
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Watts' conviction. 289 The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and
held that, although the statute was constitutional, the government failed
to prove that Watts' statement was a threat, as opposed to constitution-
ally protected speech.2 90 After a review of the context of the statement,
its conditional nature, and the reaction of the listeners, the Court found
that the statement was not a threat, but merely political hyperbole.29'
Shortly after Watts, the Supreme Court decided Brandenburg v.
Ohio.292 The defendant in Brandenburg, a leader of a Ku Klux Klan or-
ganization, was convicted under an Ohio statute that prohibited advocat-
293ing violence. The defendant stated at a Klan rally, "We're not a reven-
gent organization but if our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court,
continues to suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there
might have to be some revengeance taken., 294 The Supreme Court re-
versed the defendant's conviction and struck down the statute because
the First Amendment protects speech that advocates the use of force or
violations of laws, as long as it is not "directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is [not] likely to incite or produce such ac-
,,295296tion. 295 This language is known as the Brandenburg exception.
The Supreme Court has yet to establish a standard for determining
when speech or expressive activity rises to the level of a "true threat.,
297
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1966)).
289. Id.
290. Id. at 707-08 (finding the statute constitutional because of the Nation's "valid, even ...
overwhelming, interest in protecting the Chief Executive and in allowing him to perform his duties
without interference from threats of physical violence" (citing H.R. REP. No. 652, 64th Cong., (1st
Sess. (1916)))).
291. Id. at 708; see Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Wilamette, Inc. v. Am. Coalition of Life
Activists, 244 F.3d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000) ("We call statements 'true threats' to distinguish them
from statements that are threatening on their face but could only be understood, under the circumstances,
as hyperbole or jokes."), opinion vacated for en banc consideration, 268 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1026 (2nd Cir. 1976) ("[T]he [Watts] Court construed the word 'threat'
to exclude statements which are, when taken in context, not 'true threats' because they are conditional
and made in jest.").
292. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
293. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 444-45.
294. Id. at 446-47.
295. Id. at 447-48 ("[T]he mere abstract teaching of the moral propriety or even moral necessity
for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling
it to such action." (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961))).
296. See generally Leigh Noffsinger, Wanted Posters, Bulletproof Vests, and The First
Amendment: Distinguishing True Threats from Coercive Political Advocacy, 74 WASH. L. REV.
1209, 1215 (1999) (explaining that the Court in Brandenburg held that abstract advocacy of violence
deserves First Amendment protection).
297. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1074 ("Apart from holding that Watts's crack about LBJ
was not a true threat, the Court set out no standard for determining when a statement is a true threat
that is unprotected speech under the First Amendment."); see also United States v. Francis, 164 F.3d
120, 122 (2d Cir. 1999); Noffsinger, supra note 296, at 1216 ("Because the [Watts] opinion included
no explicit test or criteria broadly applicable to other cases, the lower courts have adopted a
patchwork of tests for assessing whether speech constitutes a threat.").
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Although Watts and Brandenburg are often cited as two different excep-
tions to the First Amendment prohibition on regulating speech, the two
cases have provided "benchmarks" for the parameters of violent
speech.298 Advocating violence is protected speech, while a true threat of
violence is not.299 Federal and state courts have developed differing tests
of analysis to distinguish between a true threat and protected speech. 3°
The true threats doctrine has been analyzed in the context of threats made
via public speeches, mail correspondence, the telephone, and radio and
television broadcasts. Today, the same analyses are shifting to threats
made over the Internet.
298. See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1071 ("The Supreme Court has provided
benchmarks, but no definition," in defining a true threat.); Noffsinger, supra note 296, at 1215
("Most subsequent lower court decisions have evaluated potentially threatening speech either under
Watts-when the challenged speech resembles a 'true threat'-or under Brandenburg-when the speech
appears to incite others to take some unlawful action-but rarely under both cases.").
299. See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1072 ("[W]hile advocating violence is protected,
threatening a person with violence is not."); Roberts v. United States, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984)
("[V]iolence or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms distinct
from their communicative impact... are entitled to no constitutional protections.").
300. For a discussion of the different tests, see State v. Perkins, 626 N.W.2d 762, 767-71 (Wis.
2001). The tests can be placed in the following categories:
Unequivocal and Unconditional: Kelner v. United States, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976)
(a true threat is "on its face and in the circumstances in which it is made so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of
execution"); see also United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 831-32 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding a true
threat "according to language and context conveyed a gravity of purpose and likelihood of execution
so as to constitute speech beyond the pale of protected 'vehement, caustic ... unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials' (quoting Kelner, 534 F.2d at 1026)).
Objective Reasonableness Standard from the Speaker's Perspective: "Whether a particular
statement may properly be considered to be a threat is governed by an objective standard - whether a
reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the
maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault." Planned
Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1074 (quoting United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th
Cir. 1990)); United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997) (finding standard from
perspective of the speaker to avoid conviction based on ambiguous statements that a listener may
find threatening due to events of which the speaker is unaware); United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d
703, 707 (7th Cir. 1986) (asking whether "a reasonable person would foresee that the statement
would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious
expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or take the life of [another]").
Objective Reasonableness Standard from the Listener's Perspective: Some jurisdictions view
the statement from the listener's perspective. See United States. v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1071 (8th
Cir. 2000), cert. denied by Hart v. United States, 531 U.S. 1114 (2001) ("[A] court must ...
determine whether the recipient of the alleged threat could reasonably conclude that it expresses a
determination or intent to injure presently or in the future."); United States v. Viefhaus, 168 F.3d
392, 396 (10th Cir. 1999) ("The question is whether those who hear or read the threat reasonably
consider that an actual threat has been made.").
Objective Reasonableness-Hybrid: At least one federal jurisdiction adheres to a hybrid test,
considering the threat from the perspective of both the speaker and listener. United States v. Miller,
115 F.3d 361, 363 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating a true threat exists when "a reasonable person would
foresee that an objective rational recipient of the statement would interpret its language to constitute
a serious expression of intent to harm"); see Perkins, 626 N.W.2d at 770 (adopting the hybrid test).
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B. True Threats Over the Internet
The most significant case to date that discusses true threats on the
Internet is Planned Parenthood of Columbia!Willamette, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Coalition of Life Activists.3°' In Planned Parenthood, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, consistent with other
courts that have discussed threats over the Internet, applied the tradi-
tional true threats test established through its jurisprudence. °2 However,
the Ninth Circuit did not discuss any of the unique characteristics or fea-
tures of the Internet that might impact the gravity of the threat, a signifi-
cant oversight considering the new medium's role as a force multiplier
and tool of anonymity.3 °3
In 1994, based on differing opinions about the escalating violence in
the pro-life community, a number of activists formed a splinter group
from the pro-life organization Operation Rescue, named the American
Coalition of Life Activists ("ACLA"). 304 ACLA supported the use of
force to oppose abortion services, even though doctors David Gunn,
George Patterson, and John Bayard Britton were shot and killed the pre-
vious year following the release and publication of wanted-style posters
by pro-life activists that identified the doctors as abortionists and in-
cluded their names, photographs, and addresses.3°5
Undeterred by the deaths of these three people in 1995, ACLA re-
leased the "Deadly Dozen" poster. Designed in a wanted-style format
with "GUILTY" captioned at the top, the poster included the names and
addresses of thirteen doctors, including doctors Warren Hem, Elizabeth
Newhall, James Newhall, and George Kabacy, a doctor who worked for
the Planned Parenthood of Columbia/Willamette ("PPCW") clinic.
306
ACLA issued different variations of the wanted-style posters, including
301. 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (petition for certiorari filed, 71 USLW 3292 Oct. 8,
2002)(No. 02-563).
302. See id. at 1085.
303. See id. at 1075; United States v. Kammersell, 7 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1201-02 (D. Utah 1998)
(holding that an e-mail message threatening to injure someone with a bomb was a true threat);
United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492, 1496 (6th Cir. 1997) (concluding that e-mails exchanged
with an unknown e-mail pal that included discussions of abduction and rape of teenage girls and
killing of a Korean woman, defendant's classmate, did not constitute a true threat); United States v.
Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995), affd sub nom. For a critical race feminist analysis of
the three Internet threat cases, including the Baker (Alkhabaz) case, see Margaret Chon, Erasing
Race?: A Critical Race Feminist View of Internet Identity Shifting, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 439,
463-72 (2000).
304. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1064.
305. Id. at 1063-64. Dr. Gunn was killed in March 1993; Dr. Patterson was killed in August
1993; Dr. Britton was killed in July 1994. Id. at 1064. One of ACLA's founding members stated, "If
someone was to condemn any violence against abortion, they probably wouldn't have felt
comfortable working with us." Id.
306. Id. at 1064-65 ("The day after the Deadly Dozen poster was released, the FBI offered
protection to doctors identified on it and advised them to wear bulletproof vests and take other
security precautions, which they did.").
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one dedicated to Dr. Robert Crist, as well as others that displayed the
names of various reproductive health care clinics.30 7 In 1997, a pro-life
activist affiliated with ACLA posted a list called the "Nuremberg Files"
on a Web site, identifying over 200 individuals, including, once again,
Crist, Hem, and the Newhalls. 30 8 The Nuremberg Files provided the
names of doctors, abortion clinic employees, politicians, and judges iden-
tified as "abortionists. ' '309 The Web site also indicated doctors who con-
tinued to perform abortions, as well as recognizing individuals who had
been "victimized by anti-abortion terrorists" by striking through the
names of persons killed and "graying out the names of the wounded.,
31 0
Fearing that their lives were in danger, doctors Crist, Hem, the
Newhalls, and a number of the abortion providers, including PPCW,
sued the ACLA and twelve anti-abortion activists for violations of state
and federal law. Finding violations of the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act of 1994 (FACE)31' and the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
312rupt Organizations Act (RICO), a jury awarded the plaintiffs "$107
million in actual and punitive damages. 3 13 The district court issued a
permanent injunction prohibiting the distribution of similar content on
posters or Web sites.314
A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit vacated and remanded the jury verdict, struck the injunc-
tion, and awarded judgment to the defendants.31 5 The panel found that
307. Id. at 1064-66.
308. The Nuremburg Files can be found at http://www.ChristianGaIlery.com/atrocity (last
visited Oct. 30, 2002).
309. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1065; see Planned Parenthood, 244 F.3d at 1012-13.
310. Planned Parenthood, 244 F.3d at 1012-13; Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1065 (stating
that the "abortionist" section "bears the legend: 'Black font (working); Greyed-out Name
(wounded); Strikethrough (fatality)' and had "the names of Gunn, Patterson and Britton" struck
through).
311. The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Prohibited activities. Whoever - (1) by force or threat of force or by physical
obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure,
intimidate or interfere with any person because that person is or has been, or in order to
intimidate such person or any other person or any class of persons form, obtaining or
providing reproductive health services.
18 U.S.C. § 248(a) (2000); see United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 919-25 (8th Cir. 1996)
(upholding the constitutionality of FACE as within the commerce power of Congress and consistent
with First Amendment).
312. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a
pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (2000).
313. Planned Parenthood, 244 F.3d at 1013. A state tort claim for intentional infliction of
emotional distress was abandoned before trial. Id. at 1013 n.3.
314. Seeid. at 1013.
315. See id. at 1020.
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the content of the posters and Web site did not amount to true threats, but
instead was protected speech under the First Amendment.3 16 Further-
more, the panel found that the defendants had not authorized, ratified, or
directly threatened acts of violence and therefore could not be held li-
able.317 Essentially, two things were required before the defendants could
have been found liable. First, the plaintiff abortion providers must have
"understood the content on the posters and Web site to be veiled threats
that defendant ACLA members (or others working with ACLA) would
inflict bodily harm on [them] unless they stopped performing abor-
tions.,, 318 Second, the defendant anti-abortion activists "should have fore-
seen that the" abortion providers "would take the threats seriously."
319
However, liability could not rest on the jury's belief, as it did, that "it
understood the statements as merely encouraging or making it more
likely that others would" assault the abortion providers.320 Finding liabil-
ity based on the publication of the doctors' names, making it more likely
that unrelated third parties might harm them, was an impermissible con-
sideration under the First Amendment.
32 1
In a rehearing en banc, the Ninth Circuit, in a 6-5 decision, dis-
agreed with the three-judge panel decision and upheld ACLA's liability,
finding that the content on the posters and Web site constituted "true
threats" and was not protected speech.322 The Ninth Circuit concluded
316. Seeid. at 1014-15.
317. See id. at 1014-17 (quoting NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 929 (1982)
(holding that although Evers's statements could be construed as "intending to create a fear of
violence whether or not improper discipline was specifically intended," the statements were
nevertheless protected because "there [wals no evidence-apart from the speeches themselves-that
Evers authorized, ratified, or directly threatened acts of violence").
318. Id. at 1015. The court continued, "[S]o interpreted, the statements are unprotected by the
First Amendment, regardless of whether the activists had the means or intent to carry out the
threats." (citing United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1266 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990)).
319. See id. "The [jury] instruction provided that [a] statement is a 'true threat' when a
reasonable person making the statement would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by
those to whom it is communicated as a serious expression of an intent to bodily harm or assault." Id.
at 1016.
320. Id. ("And by publishing the doctors' addresses, ACLA made it easier for any would-be
terrorists to carry out their gruesome mission. From the doctors' point of view, such speech may be
just as frightening as a direct threat, but it remains protected under Claiborne Hardware." (citing
NAACP, 458 U.S. at 929)).
321. See id. at 1014-15. The Ninth Circuit panel decision was vacated for en banc consideration of
the case. See Planned Parenthood, 268 F.3d 908 (9th Cir. 2001). Some lawyers take note that it is
possible that the September 11 terrorist attacks may have influenced the decision to hear the case en
banc. See Hit List or Free Speech, INTELLIGENCE REP., No. 105, Spring 2002, at 61, 62, available at
http://www.splcenter.org/cgi-bin/goframe.pl?refname=/intelligenceproject/ip-4.html ("The rehearing
order came more than six months after the original decision, but a mere three weeks after the Sept.
11 attacks-and that timing may not have been coincidental... In the wake of Sept. 11, courts may
be less inclined to afford First Amendment protection to speech that intentionally 'encourage[s]
unrelated terrorists,' or makes 'it easier for any would-be terrorist to carry out their gruesome
mission."' (quoting Planned Parenthood, 244 F.3d at 1016)).
322. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1063. The court remanded "for consideration of the
whether the punitive damages award comports with due process." Id. at 1063.
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that ACLA's liability was consistent with the First Amendment jurispru-
dence of the circuit, 323 which is that a true threat is a statement made
when a "reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be
interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a
serious expression of intent to harm.
324
After an analysis of the facts and circumstances of the case, the
Ninth Circuit concluded that it was reasonable for ACLA members to
foresee that the plaintiffs would interpret the posters as a serious expres-
sion of ACLA members' intent to harm them.3 25 Although the posters did
not contain explicit language threatening to kill the doctors, the context
in which the posters and Web site were displayed was sufficient to lead
the plaintiffs to believe that their lives were in danger.
326
The Ninth Circuit explained that a historical context of violence ex-
isted regarding the posters. The dissemination of posters in a wanted-
style format, with identifying information on specific abortion doctors,
was previously followed by murders of three of those identified and the
shooting injury of a fourth.327 The court compared the posters to Ryder
trucks and burning crosses, images that do not literally mean death or
serious injury, but when placed in a particular historical, social, or politi-
323. See id. The court first defined the term "threat" under the purposes of the FACE statute to
ensure that it comported with the First Amendment's true threats doctrine essentially collapsing both
into a single analysis. See id. "The task in this case [of determining if a true threat exists] does not
seem dramatically different from determining that the issue should have gone to the jury and that the
jury was properly instructed under FACE." Id. at 1085. Regardless of which test is used, courts
consider a wide range of factors, including: (1) the political dimensions which the statement is made, (2)
the context in which the statement is made, (3) the specificity of the statement, (4) whether the threat was
communicated directly to its victim, (5) whether the statement was unconditional and immediate, (6)
whether the message conveyed a gravity of purpose, (7) how the recipient and other listeners reacted to
the threat, and (8) whether the victim had reason to believe that the maker of the threat had a propensity to
engage in violence. See generally Noffsinger, supra note 296, at 1218-28 ("Courts' evaluation of
threatening speech often includes evaluation of the speech's content and context, the audience, and
the speaker's intent, yet the analysis varies widely."); Nadine E. McSpadden, Slow and Steady Does
Not Always Win the Race: The Nuremberg Files Web Site and What It Should Teach Us About
Incitement and the Internet, 76 IND. L. J. 485, 496 (2001) ("[l]n determining whether particular
speech constitutes a true threat" a court considers the speaker's intent, the immediacy of the speaker's
purpose, whether the speech is political, whether the speech is intertwined with violence, the content,
context, specificity of target, and "the audience to which the speech is directed.").
324. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1074, 1088.
325. See id. at 1078-82. The defendant also advanced a subjective intent argument that the court
rejected. Id. at 1080. In Watts v. United States, the determination of whether a statement constitutes a
"true threat" is distinct from the question of the defendant's intent. Watts, 394 U.S. at 707
("[W]hatever the 'willfulness' requirement implies, the statute initially requires the Government to
prove a 'true threat."'). Part of the state of mind of defendant does interject itself by virtue of
determining, for example, whether a statement is in jest.
326. See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1086.
327. See id. at 1085-86.
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328cal context, send a message. Just as two Ryder trucks parked in the
driveway of an abortion clinic by a known anti-abortion activist would
constitute a threat, so did the "wanted" posters. 329 The court explained
that the Ryder trucks in the abstract were not themselves threats, but
placed in context, that a Ryder truck was used in the Oklahoma City
Bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, the threatening mes-
sage was clear.330 Both the person making the threats and the employees
who worked at the clinic would understand the significance of the Ryder
trucks.331 Similarly, the "wanted" posters constituted true threats because
they sent a message to specific doctors that they were "wanted" and
should be killed.332 The "scorecard" in the Nuremberg Files, indicating
333those who had been killed and injured, reinforced the message. As a
result of the posters, the physicians took extreme security measures to
protect themselves and their families, including wearing bullet-proof
vests.334 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the statements on the posters
and Web site constituted unprotected speech under the First Amendment
because they were true threats.
C. Application of the True Threats Doctrine to Wilson
The cyberassment of Jouhari warranted recovery for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress.335 In Jouhari's case, the First Amendment
did not protect Wilson's conduct because his conduct constituted a true
threat.336 First, Wilson posted an image of Jouhari's office exploding into
flames and included bomb-building instructions under her picture on the
ALPHA HQ Web site.337 The site also stated that Jouhari "should be-
328. See id. at 1078-79, 1085-86 (citing United States v. Hart, 212 F.3d 1067, 1072 (8th Cir.
2000)); see also United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1250 (7th Cit. 1993) (expressing that in a
conviction for cross burning under civil rights statutes, "[s]ome would certainly view a burning cross
as 'a precursor to physical violence and abuse against African-Americans and ... an unmistakable
symbol of hatred and violence based on virulent notions of racial supremacy' (quoting Charles H.
Jones, Proscribing Hate: Distinctions Between Criminal Harm and Protected Expression, 18 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 935, 948 (1992))).
329. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1078-79, 1085-86 (citing Hart, 212 F.3d at 1072).
330. See id. at 1079 (citing Hart, 212 F.3d at 1072).
331. See id.
332. See id. at 1085-86.
333. See id.
334. See id.
335. See Sec'y, United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v Wilson, No. 03-98-0692-8, 2000
WL 988268, at *18 (H.U.D.A.L.J. July 19, 2000).
336. See id. at *18. The facts of Jouhari's case probably make it easier to show a true threat
than the facts in Planned Parenthood. See United States v. Gilbert, 884 F.2d 454, 456-57 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding that a letter and posters, mailed to employee of adoption agency "that placed
minority children with white families," condemning employee's actions and warning that "[w]hite
persons consorting with blacks will be . . . punished by Death, Automatic by Public Hanging," and
other slurs constituted a true threat and was actionable under the Fair Housing Act).
337. Wilson, 2000 WL 988268; at *34. For a discussion on creating a new category of "harm
advocacy speech" that may be regulated by the government without violating on the First
Amendment, see S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibrating the Cost
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ware, for in our day, they will be hung from the neck from the nearest
tree or lamppost." 338 Taken in context, these statements would certainly
lead a reasonable person to foresee that the statements would be inter-
preted by Jouhari as a serious expression of intent to harm her and her
daughter, considering the history of violence by white supremacists and
their use of leaderless resistance. 339 Even more convincing is the fact that
these were code words from the Turner Diaries. Second, the offline har-
assment of Jouhari began almost immediately after the first posting on
the ALPHA HQ Web site, and persisted relentlessly for close to two
years.340 Third, Jouhari's reaction, as well as those around her, to the
Web postings indicated that she was terrified.3 4'
In an attempt to distinguish the Jouhari case from Planned Parent-
hood, it may be argued that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional
distress presents too great a chance of censoring unpopular ideas.34 2 Be-
cause extreme and outrageous language will often be associated with
unpopular ideas, it would be too difficult to discern if the trier of fact
disapproves of the language rather than the message.343 However, such
claims fall flat when addressing threats of violence. The tort of inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress serves to protect a person's mental
of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1159, 1189-92, 1196-
97, 1214-30, 1238-43 (2000).
338. Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *3. "A threat may be inferred from [its] context... [and when]
the speaker expressly mentions future violence, context can make it clear that it is the speaker himself
who means to carry out the threat." Planned Parenthood, 244 F.3d at 1017-18; see also Simpson v.
Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1129-31 (finding comments to be "true threats," the court upheld
punitive damages recovery against defendant for mailing letters to lesbian plaintiff that included
derogatory remarks, inflammatory language and death threats, such as "JUNE LEFr[,]NOW IT'S
YOUR TURN TO GO[,] HEAD FIRST OR FEET FIRST").
339. Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *17-19. The Third Circuit, which includes Jouhari's home
state of Pennsylvania, uses the "objective, reasonable person test" that is followed by the Ninth
Circuit. See United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 557 (3d Cir. 1991) (stating that the test "requires
that the defendant intentionally make a statement, written or oral, in a context or under such
circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted by
those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression of an intention to
inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life of the President" (quoting Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d
874, 877 (9th Cir. 1969))).
340. Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *19-20.
341. Id. at *20; see Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1086; see also United States v. Hoffman,
806 F.2d 703, 712 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that a letter mailed to the White House threatening the
President constituted a true threat; "The immediate response of the mail-room employee and the
Secret Service to the content of the letter is clear evidence of the seriousness the recipients of
Hoffman's letter attached to the expression of the intent to harm the President.").
342. Richard D. Bemstein, Note, First Amendment Limits on Tort Liability for Words Intended
to Inflict Severe Emotional Distress, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1758-59 (1985) ("The tort of
intentional .. . infliction of severe emotional distress ...presents too great an opportunity for
censorship of unpopular ideas for the utterances made the object of liability under the tort to be
completely outside the first amendment's coverage.").
343. Id.
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tranquility and interest in peace of mind.344 The use of this tort to chal-
lenge violent threats on the Internet is wholly consistent with the ration-
ales underlying the First Amendment exception for true threats, which
serves to protect individuals and society from threats of violence, from
the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the
threatened violence will occur.
34 5
D. Unique Features of the Internet May Bolster a True Threats Analysis
While the Planned Parenthood Court's analysis is persuasive in
terms of establishing a standard for determining what constitutes a true
threat, this article advocates that courts should recognize and take into
account the significance of the Internet medium when it is used as a ve-
hicle for issuing violent threats.346 In Planned Parenthood, the Ninth
Circuit, sitting en banc, made it clear that the factual context and "all of
the circumstances" of the case should be considered in determining if a
344. See Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1079 ("[l~t is making a threat to intimidate that makes
ACLA's conduct unlawful, not its viewpoint."); Tompkins v. Cyr, 995 F. Supp. 664, 677 (N.D. Tex.
1998) ("[Clitizens have the right to be protected from the kind of 'abuse' that the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress proscribes."); Taylor v. State, 617 So. 2d 1198, 1204 (La. App. 1993)
("We recognize a legally protected right to be free from serious, intentional invasions of mental and
emotional tranquility."); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 368 S.E.2d 477, 477 (S.C. App.
1988) ("The modem trend recognizes that emotional tranquility is an interest worthy of
protection."); St. Elizabeth Hosp. v. Garrard, 730 S.W.2d 649, 652 (Tex. 1987) ("[Flreedom from
severe emotional distress is an interest which the law should serve to protect."); Johnson v. Rogers,
763 P.2d 771, 779 (Utah 1988) ("Virtually all jurisdictions in the United States now recognize a
broad protected interest in-mental tranquility .... "); RESTATEMENT, supra note 158, § 46 cmt. j
("Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, mental anguish, mental
or nervous shock, or the like ... [and] includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright,
horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and
nausea.").
345. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1075-76. "Violence is not a protected value." Id. at
1086; see also United States v. Hayward, 6 F.3d 1241, 1250 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Cloaking an act that
portends violence with the guise of protected expression is nothing more than claiming that the First
Amendment protects fighting words." (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2545
(1992))). In an amicus brief submitted to the Ninth Circuit panel in the Planned Parenthood case on
behalf of the ADL, The American Jewish Committee and Hadassah, amici stated:
Threats directed against places of worship, religious groups, and individuals significantly
interfere with constitutionally protected freedoms of religion, speech and assembly.
People understandably will refrain from activities that they reasonably will fear will put
their lives and the lives of their children in jeopardy. People acting under the cloud of
threats experience enormous distress. The law should not tolerate such interference with
people's lives. True threats, as determined under this Court's well established definition,
serve no desirable purpose and inflict great harms.
Brief of Amici Curiae Anti-Defamation League et al. in Support of Plaintiffs at 14, Planned
Parenthood, 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001) (No. 95-1671-JO).
346. See Lawrence Lessig, The Path of Cyberlaw, 104 YALE L.J. 1743, 1750-52 (1995).
Lawrence Lessig proposes that the Supreme Court should not develop First Amendment law as it
applies to the Intemet, not "just now." Id. at 1052. The Court should refrain from deciding conflicts
until the "nature of these conflicts is well mapped, well constructed, well understood." Id. He
believes that the Supreme Court should let the lower courts wrestle with the issues before it
determines how to regulate the Intemet. Id.
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statement is a true threat. 347 However, the Ninth Circuit failed to focus on
a contextual component of great significance-the pro-life activists' use
348of the Internet as the medium to disseminate their violent message. As
discussed above in Part III, the Internet serves as a significant force mul-
tiplier, permits anonymity, and Web-based activities receive slow re-
sponses from law enforcement agencies. 34 9 These features, or new chal-
lenges, may warrant separate or collective consideration in determining if
statements constitute true threats.35°
At least two features of the Internet, its role as a force multiplier and
tool of anonymity, may have played a significant role in fueling the fear
of the plaintiffs in Planned Parenthood.5 Similar to the ALPHA HQ
Web site in Wilson, the Nuremberg Files Web site was accessed by an
incredible number of visitors, approximately 200,000 hits a month be-
tween 1995 and 1998,352 despite the organization's small numbers off-
line. Furthermore, reproductive rights advocates were cognizant of its
347. Planned Parenthood, 290 F.3d at 1078 (citing United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 462
(9th Cir. 1984)). "Indeed, context is critical in a true threats case and history can give meaning to the
medium." Id.
348. See Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1792
(1995). The use of this contextual analysis lends itself to consideration of the Internet as a new
medium within the confines of the current true threats jurisprudence. See id. ("Certainly it is likely
that new and unanticipated problems will arise and a degree of judicial caution is therefore desirable
in invoking the First Amendment. But it is by no means clear that the basic principles will
themselves have to be much changed.").
349. See supra footnotes accompanying Part III.
350. See Elizabeth Phillips Marsh, Purveyors of Hate on the Internet: Are We Ready for Hate
Spam, 17 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 379, 407 (2000) ("When purveyors of hate use the Internet to send e-
mail threats, distribute hate spam, or establish hate motivated Web sites, these insidious
communications are magnified in a way that deserves heightened governmental response."); Glen 0.
Robinson, The Electronic First Amendment: An Essay for the New Age, 47 DUKE L.J. 899, 901-10,
942-46,965-69 (1998) ("new deployment of information technology seems to generate some kind of
regulation designed to guide and constrain it. This in turn prompts a First Amendment challenge
designed to guide and constrain the regulation."); Jason Schlosberg, Judgment on "Nuremberg": An
Analysis of Free Speech and Anti-Abortion Threats Made on the Internet, 7 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
52, 56-60, 65-70, 75-78 (2001) ("As the communications occurred in a unique medium, the elements
of that medium must also be integrated into the analysis of determining whether the communications
are 'true threats."'); Rodney A. Smolla, Will Tabloid Journalism Ruin the First Amendment for the
Rest of Us?, 9 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 1, 14-19, 33-34 (1998) (concluding that the
increasing practice associated with tabloids merging into mainstream press will produce diminished
First Amendment rights which "will come less in the alteration of formal doctrines than in the actual
outcome of verdicts and damages awards"); Sunstein, supra note 348, at 1792-1804 (discussing
whether different features or characteristics of different media should affect First Amendment
analysis).
351. See Kim Murphy, A Civil Action Becoming Doctor's Defense Weapon, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
13, 1999, at Al. Unlike Jouhari and her daughter, the plaintiffs in Planned Parenthood were offered
protection. See id.
352. From the shooting death of Dr. Bamett Slepian in New York in October, 1998, to January,
1999, Neil Horsely, the operator of anti-abortion Web site ChristianGallery.com, claimed that he had
over "2 million people and 12 million hits" by January, 1999. Diane Lore, Abortion Foe Vows Web
site Will Grow, ATLANTA J. & CONSTITUTION, Feb. 4, 1999, at A01.
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broad reach to unknown individuals. 353 The plaintiffs discovered the
identity of the Web operator, but access anonymity of the Web site itself
may have created more apprehension than the offline posters. Priscilla
Smith of the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy stated that the
Internet posting, "in and of itself," made "doctors feel more vulnerable"
because the information could "get to somebody in the woods of North
Carolina or on the Canadian border in two seconds. 354 A reasonable
person making the threats would certainly be aware that advocating seri-
ous injury or death of abortion providers to millions of anonymous indi-
viduals via the Internet, after three killings had already taken place,
would cause the victims of their threats to interpret the threats as a seri-
ous expression of intent to harm.
CONCLUSION
Bias motivated activities on the Internet need a legal response that
considers the medium's unique features: its effect as a force multiplier,
its viability as a tool of anonymity, and the inadequate response of law
enforcement. These factors contribute to the legal harms of individuals
and communities. This article advocates that lawyers should use the tort
of intentional infliction of emotional distress as an arrow in the quiver to
target the cyber-head of the Hate Hydra. The tort permits a contextual
analysis that encompasses the online medium's unique challenges, par-
ticularly in those instances in which specific individuals are identified
and threatened with violence, directly or through code words. In situa-
tions where fear and intimidation are at the heart of the case, the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress does not infringe on a hate-
monger's First Amendment right to espouse his or her views. Protecting
a person's right to mental tranquility, which includes freedom from fear
of serious injury or death, is consistent with the First Amendment's true
threats exception, an exception created to protect individuals, like Bonnie
Jouhari, and society in general, from threats of violence, from the disruption
that fear engenders, and from the possibility that the threatened violence
will occur. Victims like Jouhari should turn to civil remedies as a means
to counter bias motivated attacks against them. In so doing, the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress will rise to the challenge, pre-
senting a formidable foe to those who would advocate hate and violence
in cyberspace.
353. See Wilson, 2000 WL 988268, at *27.
354. Murphy, supra note 351.
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INTRODUCTION
The screen flickers. At first the defendant stares, confused; he stares
at an image of himself-staring back. As he moves, the image moves.
Six small circles appear in the lower left comer of the screen, three over
three. A hand, like the second hand of a watch, appears in each clock-like
circle. One by one the hands begin rotating in a clockwise direction. Af-
ter each has made a complete revolution, a new image appears on the
screen. The defendant now peers, through the eyes of the monitor, into
the courtroom or a conference room in the judge's chambers.
The defendant has seen the judge's picture in the local newspaper.
He would recognize her if he passed her on the street. But now, seeing
her through the eyes of the monitor, she looks quite different. There is a
slight tremor in the picture; the image is fuzzy; the judge appears to have
aged considerably. The time delay associated with each word spoken, as
well as the screen blur accompanying each movement, is more acute and
disorienting than the delays accompanying the speech and movements of
television personalities reporting from Afghanistan on the War Against
Terrorism.
There is little mystery surrounding the motives driving the increased
use of video teleconferencing in court proceedings.1 Video teleconferenc-
ing saves time and money.2 It reduces the amount of travel required by
1. Patricia Rabum-Remfry, Due Process Concerns in Video Production of Defendants, 23
STETSON L. REV. 805, 811 (1994) (focusing on the use of video conferencing to conduct
arraignments and initial appearances); see also Fredric 1. Lederer, The Randolph W. Thrower
Symposium: Changing Litigation with Science and Technology: Technology Comes to the
Courtroom, and . . .. 43 EMORY L.J. 1095, 1102 (1994) (describing the general process of
conducting an arraignment or initial appearance by video teleconference: "[riemote arraignments
leave the defendant at the jail, ordinarily in a special room designated for the purpose. The judge and
prosecution are in the courtroom; depending on the jurisdiction and counsel's personal choice,
defense counsel may either be in the courtroom or at the jail with the client. The arraignment is
accomplished by live two-way television. The television can be as basic as a two-camera system,
with one camera at each location, or as sophisticated as ... [a] six-camera system, which shows the
defendant every aspect of the courtroom.").
2. See Courts Use Video To Conduct Hearing, FED. CT. MGMT. REP. (Admin. Office of the
U.S. Courts, Office of Pub. Affairs, Wash., D.C.), Apr. 2000, at 5-6. Some states have experienced
cost savings associated with increased use of video conferencing. See, e.g., Honerable Ronald T.Y.
Moon, 1995 State of the Judiciary Address, HAw. B.J. 25, Jan. 1996, at 28 (discussing the
implementation of a video teleconferencing program in the First Circuit of Hawaii where "case
processing time [was] reduced by at least 50 percent, and because of decreased staff demands on the
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judges in large districts. 3 For attorneys and witnesses, video teleconfer-
encing reduces the inconvenience associated with appearing in the court-
room. The use of video teleconferencing often means fewer annoyances
for clerks.4 In short, the use of video proceedings in the federal court-
room can increase judicial efficiency.
Criminal defendants also may benefit. Few defense attorneys argue
that their clients are served by overloaded court dockets and overworked
judges. The more time attorneys have to investigate and prepare for trial,
the more thorough their representation. As judges have more time to ana-
lyze complex questions of law, their legal reasoning becomes more
acute.
Although defendants often benefit from increased judicial effi-
ciency, the benefits must be weighed against the costs associated with the
tools used to effectuate this increased efficiency. To take an extreme
example, judicial efficiency would be greatly increased by eliminating
juries. Without juries, there would be no need for voir dire or preliminary
and final jury instructions. There would be no evidentiary objections, no
need for conferences at sidebar, and, of course, no jury deliberations.
Although defendants might obtain some benefit from the increased effi-
ciency achieved by eliminating juries, it would be trivial compared to the
benefits to the government and the cost to defendants of not being tried
by their peers. Thus, the costs associated with increased reliance on
video technology in the courtroom must be considered in light of the
recent amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permit-
ting the use of video proceedings in federal court.
I. BENEFITS AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH VIDEO PROCEEDINGS
A. Potential Increases in Institutional Economy, Safety, and Conven-
ience
The competing sides of the dilemma are not hard to identify. Video
teleconferencing has been used in many types of federal court proceed-
ings, including witness appearances in trials, arraignments, bankruptcy
hearings, Spears hearings,5 sentencings, settlement conferences, and
various other civil and criminal proceedings.6 Court clerks from large




5. A Spears hearing is a preliminary judicial hearing used to evaluate an inmate's claim and
determine whether legal proceedings should move forward. See Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179
(5th Cir. 1985).
6. Videoconferencing in Courts Shows Potential and Possible Problems, 33 THE THIRD
BRANCH 12 (2001), at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/dec01ttb/videoconferencing.html [hereinafter
Videoconferencing].
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judicial districts argue that the use of video teleconferencing strengthens
their courts because they are able to handle prisoner civil rights and
criminal proceedings more efficiently, without transporting the prisoners
involved in each hearing to the courthouse.7
Prisoner civil rights cases are often tried using video technology.
For example, in 2001, Judge Edward Nottingham (D. Colo.) used video
teleconferencing technology to try a civil rights case in which the pris-
oner plaintiff was incarcerated at a location 800 miles from the court-
house.8 Use of video technology in prisoner civil rights cases, authorized
by the Prison Litigation Reform Act,9 avoids the expense and safety con-
cerns associated with transporting prisoners to the courthouse for trial.
Because a person's liberty is often at risk in a criminal trial, the use
of video teleconferencing in criminal trials is more controversial than its
use in civil trials. Despite this controversy, Magistrate Judge Lorenzo F.
Garcia (D.N.M.) argues that the use of video teleconferencing for ar-
raignments avoids unnecessary costs associated with transporting prison-
ers to court.'0 Although Judge Judith Guthrie (E.D. Tex.) prefers con-
ducting hearings "face to face," she notes that, because video teleconfer-
encing saves prisons time preparing a prisoner for transport, reduces
safety concerns, and decreases costs, she uses video technology exten-
sively for Spears hearings. 1 Judge Guthrie also handles some other as-
pects of criminal cases by video to reduce transportation costs.'
2
B. Sparing Defendants the "Convenience of the Guillotine" 13
The use of video proceedings can increase judicial economy, safety,
and convenience. However, "[w]hile court procedures must be expedited
to keep pace with rising arrests, something more than mere administra-
tive convenience . . . must be demonstrated before the mass installation
of video production equipment in the courts of the United States will
satisfy constitutional guarantees of due process.' 4 Federal court proce-
dures employed to insure that every criminal defendant receives a fair
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1997(f) (2000).
10. Videoconferencing, supra note 6.
11. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
12. Videoconferencing, supra note 6.
13. The phrase "convenience of the guillotine" was first used by Judge Joseph R. Goodwin to
describe the use of video proceedings in federal criminal trials. Letter from Judge Joseph R.
Goodwin, District Court Judge for the Southern District of West Virginia, to Judge Robin J.
Cauthron, Chair, Defender Services Committee (Sept. 6, 2001) (arguing that the federal judicial
system must "carefully segregate those inefficiencies that are mere products of time and place-
which we would be foolish to retain-from those that are deliberately built into our system to spare a
free people the convenience of the guillotine") (on file with authors) [hereinafter Goodwin Letter].
14. Rabum-Remfry, supra note 1, at 827.
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trial should not be sacrificed on the altar of expedience and convenience.
As noted by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia, "the rights of
man are to be determined by the law itself, and not by the let or leave
of administrative officers or bureaus. This principle ought not to be sur-
rendered for convenience or in effect nullified for the sake of expedi-
ency." 15
Concerns raised regarding the fairness of conducting video proceed-
ings in federal court include (1) accurately assessing the credibility of a
witness who appears via video; (2) undermining the solemnity of court
proceedings, inducing the defendant to underestimate their importance;
and (3) forcing a defense attorney to decide between being in court with
the judge and prosecutor or in jail with the defendant during a video pro-
ceeding.
The Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules recommended, and the
Supreme Court and Congress approved, amending Rules 5 and 10 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to expressly allow the use of video
teleconferencing for initial appearances and arraignments. 16 The Com-
mittee, however, noted that the suggested changes "could be viewed as
an erosion of an important element of the judicial process," and listed
three potential concerns regarding conducting arraignments by video.1
7
First, conducting an arraignment by video may lessen the "impact of
reading of the charge."' 8 Second, the court may need "to personally see
and speak with the defendant [during] the arraignment" to insure that the
defendant adequately understands the gravity of the charge. 19 Finally, the
ability of counsel to communicate with the defendant may be impaired if
the defense attorney is physically present in court, while the defendant
appears by video.2 ) Despite these concerns, the Committee concluded
that "the benefits of using video teleconferencing outweighed the
costs, ' '21 and that "in appropriate circumstances the court, and the defen-
dant, should have the option of conducting the arraignment" by video
teleconference.22
15. Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 584 (Va. 1930).
16. See FED. R. CrM. P. 5 (2002 amendment); FED. R. CRIM. P. 10 (2002 amendment).





22. Id. Although the Advisory Committee drafted alternative versions of Rules 5 and 10 that
did not require the defendant's consent to conduct the proceeding by video teleconference, the
Judicial Conference passed the version of the amendment of both Rules requiring the defendant's
consent. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 advisory committee's note (2002) (Alternative Version for Video
Teleconferencing - Defendant's Consent Required, p. 146-47); FED. R. CRIM. P. 10 advisory
committee's note (2002) (Alternative Version for Video Teleconferencing - Defendant's Consent
Required, p. 163-64).
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As predicted by the Committee, many judges have expressed con-
cern that the use of video teleconferencing in federal court will cause
defendants to underestimate the importance of the proceedings. In ex-
pressing his concerns regarding the use of video proceedings in federal
court, Judge Joseph R. Goodwin (S.D. W. Va.) noted:
No video monitor can exert the same psychological pressures as a
physical presence in the courtroom. The judge in robes, the raised
bench, witnesses, lawyers, worried family, flags, seals, armed mar-
shals - these elements invest the occasion with the seriousness it war-
rants, and they surely impel even those bent on deception to reflect on
the advisability of their plans. These are far more than empty trap-
pings. Form and process are the pillars that support the structure of
our justice system just as ceremony and ritual reinforce the solemnity
of religious practice. All human societies have icons and rituals be-
cause we think them important. Surely their universality reflects their
totemic power and not just a craving for empty embellishment.
23
Judge Goodwin's concerns are not limited to the potential impact video
proceedings may have on the defendant's perception of the seriousness
of the proceeding. He also argues that conducting proceedings by video
teleconference may tarnish the defendant's, the defendant's family, and
the general public's view of the integrity of the judicial process. Specifi-
cally, Judge Goodwin asks:
Does the prisoner thrust into a cinder block chamber with his face
stuck in a camera and told to speak to a man in a glass box feel he has
been dealt with equitably? Can the public feel confident he has re-
ceived a fair hearing? Do families, friends, neighbors, or the press
feel they have witnessed the fair administration of justice? All of
these participants should have the opportunity to take in the entirety
of the courtroom to see and hear and feel what is going on. A court's
moral authority rests on the perception that its proceedings are fair
and just. Public confidence in the judicial system depends on this per-
ception. The remarkable resiliency of this confidence is something we
ought not take for granted, and we should eschew any practice that
threatens to demean the dignity of or reduce respect for the courts.
2 4
These potential costs so eloquently expressed by Judge Goodwin
warrant careful consideration in light of the recent move to expand the
use of video proceedings in federal court. When considering the appro-
priate use of video teleconferencing, the federal judicial system must
"carefully segregate those inefficiencies that are mere products of time
and place-which we would be foolish to retain-from those that are
23. See Goodwin Letter, supra note 13.
24. Id.
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deliberately built into our system to spare a free people the convenience
of the guillotine. ' 5
When considering the potential impacts that the expanded use of
video proceedings will have in federal court, emotion must be tempered
with reason. In his dissent in United States v. Baker,26 Judge Widener
noted that the controversy surrounding the use of video teleconferencing
in federal court is as "old as the trial of Walter Raleigh, who begged the
court in vain to bring Lord Cobham from the tower. Sending the tele-
vised image of a witness from Butner to the City of Raleigh is no differ-
ent than sending Cobham's writings from the Tower of Winchester.
27
While this is an oft-quoted passage by members of the judiciary that op-
pose expanding the use of video teleconferencing in federal court pro-
ceedings, there is something both qualitatively and intuitively different
between a writing and an interactive image of a defendant or witness on
a video teleconferencing monitor. Intangible, but real, costs are associ-
ated with electronically producing a defendant before the court. And
video "presence" is not an adequate substitute for physical presence in a
federal courtroom in all circumstances or for all proceedings. However,
transmitting a defendant's image into the courtroom in a format that al-
lows the defendant to interact with the courtroom environment certainly
differs from interacting with a defendant through writings.
This is the dilemma. Producing a defendant electronically is qualita-
tively different from requiring the defendant's physical presence in the
courtroom. A video presence is something less than physical presence.
However, producing a defendant electronically also is qualitatively dif-
ferent from dispensing with his appearance altogether. Simply stated, the
common (and probably accurate) perception is that attending a proceed-
ing by video is better than not attending the proceeding at all, but it is not
as good as being physically present in the courtroom. To accurately as-
sess the costs associated with the use of video teleconferencing in federal
court, video presence must be considered as a class unto itself, independ-
ent from physical presence or complete absence.
II. "PRESENCE" UNDER RULE 43 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment, and the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure each require a defendant's presence in the federal courtroom dur-
ing certain judicial proceedings. 28 Federal courts have held that "a defen-
25. Id.
26. 45 F.3d 837 (4th Cir. 1995).
27. Baker, 45 F.3d at 850-51.
28. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI; FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 (addressing when
a defendant's presence is required during initial appearances); FED. R. CRIM. P. 10 (addressing when
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
dant's presence [at trial] is fundamental to the basic legitimacy of the
criminal process, '29 and that a "leading principle [pervading] the entire
law of criminal procedure is that, after indictment .... nothing shall be
lawfully done in the absence of the prisoner." 30 Although the Constitu-
tion and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure command the presence
of the defendant in the courtroom during certain proceedings, the deci-
sions in Smith v. Mann3' and Cuoco v. United States32 indicate that the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require the presence of the defen-
dant in federal court under a broader range of circumstances than does
the Constitution.33
In Smith v. Mann,34 the defendant, Smith, was indicted for allegedly
possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute.35 Smith failed to appear
for his trial.36 After determining that Smith knew the time and place of
the trial, the court determined that by his absence, Smith voluntarily
waived his Sixth Amendment right to be present at trial.37 The court con-
ducted the trial and Smith was convicted in absentia.38 The court then
sentenced Smith to serve a term of imprisonment of 25 years to life on
the charge of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the first
degree.
39
In Cuoco v. United States,40 the defendant, Cuoco, was indicted on
four counts of robbing offices of the United States Postal Service.4'
When the marshals attempted to bring Cuoco to court for his trial, he
refused.42 At defense counsel's request, the marshals brought Cuoco to
court forcibly.43 The judge then informed Cuoco that he would not be
brought to court during the trial if he continued to refuse to cooperate.44
a defendant's presence is required during arraignments); FED. R. CRM. P. 43 (stating the general
"presence requirement").
29. United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
30. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892).
31. 173 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1999).
32. 208 F.3d 27 (2d Cir. 2000).
33. See Smith, 173 F.3d at 76; Cuoco, 208 F.3d at 30-31; see also United States v. Gordon,
829 F.2d 119, 123 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing the broad scope of Rule 43).
34. 173 F.3d73.
35. Id. at 75.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 76-77.
38. Id. at 75.
39. Id.
40. 208 F.3d 27.
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Cuoco stated that he would "rather not be present. ''4 Like Smith, Cuoco
46was convicted in absentia.
The defendants in Smith and Cuoco collaterally attacked their con-
victions, arguing that their due process rights and the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment were violated when the court conducted
portions of their trials in absentia.a7 In both cases, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's rul-
ing-upholding the convictions.48 The Second Circuit concluded that
holding the trials in absentia did not violate the Constitution because the
defendants had waived their constitutional rights to be present at trial.49
The Second Circuit, however, noted that Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure might have been violated.50 Nonetheless, the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure were not applicable to Smith's state convic-
tion,5' and, although Cuoco involved a federal prosecution, Cuoco's
counsel failed to raise a rule violation claim.52 Because the provisions of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requiring a defendant's pres-
ence in federal court appear to be broader than their Constitutional coun-
terparts, which are deemed waived under some circumstances, we focus
on the evolution of the "presence requirement" under the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure.
The basic provision of Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure defines when a defendant is required to be present in federal
court and when a defendant may waive his right to be present. Under
Rule 43(a), a defendant is required to be "present at the arraignment, at
the time of the plea, at every stage of the trial including the impaneling
of the jury and the return of the verdict, and at the imposition of sen-
tence, except as otherwise provided by this rule.
' 53
Rules 43(b) and (c) specify when a defendant is not required to be
present.54 Rule 43(b) essentially embodies the Supreme Court's decisions
in Illinois v. Allen55 and Taylor v. United States,56 which read together
hold that a defendant waives his right to be present at trial if, after being
45. Id.
46. Id. at 29-30.
47. Smith, 173 F.3d at 75; Cuoco, 208 F.3d at 29.
48. Smith, 173 F.3d at 77; Cuoco, 208 F.3d at 32.
49. Smith, 173 F.3d at 76 (holding that "nothing in the Constitution prohibits a trial from being
commenced in the defendant's absence so long as the defendant knowing and voluntarily waives his
right to be present"); Cuoco, 208 F.3d at 30.
50. Smith, 173 F.3d at 76; Cuoco, 208 F.3d at 30-32.
51. Smith, 173 F.3d at 77.
52. Cuoco, 208 F.3d at 30.
53. FED. R. CRtM. P. 43(a).
54. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b), (c).
55. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
56. 414 U.S. 17 (1973).
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present at commencement of the trial, the defendant is voluntarily absent
from the trial,57 or, after being warned by the court, the defendant en-
gages in disruptive conduct that justifies his removal.58 Furthermore,
Rule 43(c) states that presence is not required when the defendant is an
organization represented by counsel;59 in a misdemeanor case at ar-
raignment, plea, trial, and imposition of sentence when the defendant
provides written consent; 6° at a conference or hearing involving a ques-
tion of law;6' or at a proceeding involving a reduction or correction of a
sentence.62
Although sections of rules regarding initial appearances (Fed. R.
Crim. P. 5), arraignments (Fed. R. Crim. P. 10), and pleas (Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11) include language that could be construed as requiring the defen-
dant's presence in court during these specific proceedings,6 Rule 43 is
the rule that specifically addresses the "presence requirement" under the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because Rule 43 is the "umbrella
rule" regarding the necessity of the defendant's presence under these
rules, the evolution of the "presence requirement" has revolved around
Rule 43.
The definition of the word "presence" in Rule 43 is of paramount
importance to the issue of when video proceedings can be employed in
federal court. One of the definitions of "presence" in Black's Law Dic-
tionary is "within sight or call." 4 If the judiciary defined presence as
"within sight or call," a defendant would be present in the courtroom
whenever he appeared by video teleconference, and the use of video pro-
ceedings in federal court would be almost unlimited.65 Wisely, federal
courts have unanimously rejected this definition. 66
57. See Taylor, 414 U.S. at 20.
58. See Allen, 397 U.S. at 342-43.
59. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c)(1).
60. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c)(2).
61. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c)(3).
62. FED. R. CRim. P. 43(c)(4).
63. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 5, 10, 11.
64. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 820 (6th ed. 1991).
65. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 561.031 (West 2002) (allowing for most physical
appearances by a defendant in court to be made by means of closed circuit television, but also noting
that these appearances "shall not prohibit other appearances via closed circuit television upon waiver
of any right such persons held in custody or confinement might have to be physically present").
66. See United States v. Lawrence, 248 F.3d 300, 304 (4th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1999); Valenzuela-Gonzalez v. United States Dist. Court, 915
F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1990).
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A. The effect of Valenzuela-Gonzalez v. United States District Court,67
68 69United States v. Navarro, and United States v. Lawrence on Video
Proceedings in Federal Prosecutions
The Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have defined "presence" under
Rule 43 to mean physical presence. 70 The Fourth and Fifth Circuit cases
dealt with the defendant's presence during sentencing; 7' the Ninth Circuit
case dealt with the defendant's presence during arraignment.72 In each
case, the court of appeals held that "presence" under Rule 43 meant
physical presence, and thus conducting the proceeding using video tele-
conferencing violated the rule.73
Black's Law Dictionary defines presence as an "[a]ct, fact, or state
of being in a certain place and not elsewhere, or within sight or call, at
hand, or in some place that is being thought of."'74 In United States v.
Navarro,75 the dissent noted that, if presence were defined as "within
sight or call," a person involved in a video teleconference would be pre-
sent.76 However, the majority in Navarro, as well as the courts in United
States v. Lawrence77 and Valenzuela-Gonzalez v. United States District
Court,78 held that the overall definition of presence in Black's Law Dic-
tionary, along with the "bare meaning" and "common-sense understand-
ing" of the term, indicated that to be present, the defendant had to be
physically present in the courtroom.79
There are indications that the drafters of Rule 43 were speaking of
physical presence. As noted in Bailey v. United States, 80 "[t]he meaning
of statutory language ... depends on context., 8 1 Rule 43 states that a
defendant, initially present at trial, can waive his right to continued pres-
ence at trial through conduct that would justify his exclusion from the
courtroom. 82 The word presence in this section of the rule clearly antici-
67. 915 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990).
68. 169 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 1999).
69. 248 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2001).
70. Lawrence, 248 F.3d at 304; Navarro, 169 F.3d at 236; Valenzuela-Gonzalez, 915 F.2d at
1280.
71. Lawrence, 248 F.3d at 301; Navarro, 169 F.3d at 235.
72. Valenzuela-Gonzalez, 915 F.2d at 1279-81.
73. Lawrence, 248 F.3d at 302; Navarro, 169 F.3d at 237; Valenzuela-Gonzalez, 915 F.2d at
1281.
74. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 820 (6th ed. 1991).
75. 169 F.3d 228.
76. Id. at 241-42 (Politz, J., dissenting).
77. 248 F.3d 300.
78. 915 F.2d 1276.
79. Lawrence, 248 F.3d at 304; Navarro, 169 F.3d at 236; Valenzuela-Gonzalez, 915 F.2d at
1281.
80. 516 U.S. 137 (1995).
81. Bailey, 516U.S. at 145.
82. FED. R. CRIMR. P 43(c)(1)(C) (2002 amendment).
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pates that the defendant would be physically present; a contortion of lan-
guage is necessary to imagine excluding a defendant from the courtroom
who is not physically present at trial.
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 43 indicate that there is an
express provision allowing a misdemeanant to waive his right to be pre-
sent at trial. 83 A policy consideration behind this provision was the reali-
zation that, with misdemeanors, the expense associated with traveling
great distances to attend trial may not be "commensurate with the gravity
of the charge." 84 Because of this, Rule 43 was drafted so that the court
could permit defendants charged with misdemeanors to waive their right
to attend trial if the defendant felt that the costs associated with attending
the trial were not justified. The inclusion of a specific provision allowing
misdemeanants to avoid costs associated with traveling to trial by waiv-
ing their right to attend trial, and the absence of such a provision for de-
fendants charged with felonies, indicates that the drafters of Rule 43 did
not intend to permit defendants charged with felonies to waive their right
to physically attend trial.
85
Additionally, there is an express provision in Rule 43 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure permitting testimony "by contemporaneous
transmission from a different location." 86 The existence of a provision
expressly permitting the use of video teleconferencing in Rule 43 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure indicates the drafters were aware of the
availability of video teleconferencing technology for use in trials. The
express provision for the use of video teleconferencing technology in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, along with the lack of a reference to
video technology in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, suggests
that the omission was not inadvertent; rather, the drafters specifically
avoided referring to video teleconferencing in the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure because they did not intend video teleconferences to
be substituted for physical presence in criminal proceedings. Thus, the
"presence" analyses in Navarro, Lawrence, and Valenzuela-Gonzalez
appear to be correct. "Presence" under Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, therefore, requires physical presence, and video
proceedings generally cannot be used.
83. FED. R. CRM. P. 43 advisory committee's note 3 (1944) (2002 amendment).
84. Id.
85. Numerous cases consider the advisory committee's notes included with the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure as authoritative evidence of the drafters' intent. See, e.g., Williamson v.
United States, 512 U.S. 594, 614-15 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a).
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B. The Move to Amend the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to Ex-
pressly Allow Video Proceedings
In response to the Ninth Circuit's holding in Valenzuela-Gonzalez in
1990, the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules proposed an amend-
ment to Rule 10 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to permit
video teleconferencing of arraignments with the defendant's consent.
87
After the amendment was proposed, the Committee on Defender Ser-
vices requested that the Advisory Committee withdraw the proposed
amendment until a pilot video teleconferencing project could be con-
ducted.88 The Advisory Committee agreed, but when one of the public
defenders involved in the pilot project refused to participate, the project
collapsed.89
Nonetheless, several recent events prompted the Advisory Commit-
tee to reconsider amendments expressly allowing initial appearances and
arraignments to be conducted by video teleconference. First, state courts
increasingly conduct initial proceedings by video teleconference. 90 Sec-
ond, the Judicial Conference supports the use of video teleconferencing
to conduct some procedures in federal court.9 Third, Senator Strom
Thurmond recently introduced legislation in Congress that would allow
federal courts to conduct initial appearances and arraignments by video
teleconference without defendants' consent.92 Finally, the rapid im-
provement in the quality of video teleconferencing technology enables
video presence to more closely approximate physical presence in the
courtroom.
In response to their perpetually increasing caseloads, judges con-
tinually strive to increase the efficiency with which they handle their
judicial proceedings. 93 Allowing judges to conduct summary pre-trial
87. FED. R. CRtM. P. 10 advisory committee's note (2002 amendment).
88. FED. R. CRIM. P 10 advisory committee's note (2002) (Alternative Version for Video
Teleconferencing - Defendant's Consent Required, p. 163).
89. Id.
90. FED. R. CRIAv. P. 5 advisory committee's note (2002 amendment) ("The major substantive
change is in new Rule 5(f), which permits video teleconferencing for an appearance under this rule,
if the defendant consents. This change reflects the growing practice among state courts to use video
teleconferencing to conduct initial proceedings.") (emphasis added).
91. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1997 LONG RANGE PLAN FOR
AUTOMATION IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, at 10 (Mar. 1997) (encouraging federal courts to "use
video telecommunications technologies to facilitate more efficient . . . judicial proceedings");
LEONIDAS R. MECHAM, DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
COURTS, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE OPTtMAL UTILIZATION OF JUDICIAL RESOURCES, at 9 (Feb.
2000), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/optimal00/optimal2000.pdf (noting that "technology in
the courtroom can facilitate case management and decision making, reduce trial time and litigation
costs, and improve the quality of evidence presentation, fact-finding, jury attentiveness, and
understanding, and access to court proceedings").
92. S. 791, 107th Cong. (2001).
93. In the mid- 1990s, judges in Florida's Fifth, Ninth, Thirteenth, Seventeenth, and Nineteenth
Judicial Circuits petitioned the Supreme Court of Florida to amend Rule 8.100(a) of the Florida
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proceedings by video teleconference may enhance flexibility in schedul-
ing. In an attempt to increase judicial efficiency, an ever-growing num-
ber of states permit criminal proceedings to be conducted using video
technology.94 Over half of the states currently permit certain types of
criminal proceedings to be conducted by video teleconference.95
The Judicial Conference recently encouraged federal courts to "use
video telecommunications technologies to facilitate more efficient...
judicial proceedings. 96 Video technology has proven beneficial in vari-
ous criminal proceedings, including sentencings and arraignments. The
Director of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts Febru-
ary 2000 report on Optimal Utilization of Judicial Resources stated that
videoconferencing "can facilitate case management and decision making,
reduce trial time and litigation costs, and improve . . . access to court
proceedings."97
The support for increased use of video proceedings in federal court
was further bolstered in 2001, when Senator Strom Thurmond (R-SC)
introduced legislation to amend the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
so that initial appearances and arraignments could be conducted by video
teleconference without a defendant's consent. 98 Senator Thurmond ar-
gued that increased use of video teleconferencing would increase court
safety and permit federal courts to "operate more efficiently and at lower
costs, while maintaining many of the benefits of communicating in per-
son.
99
Many teleconferencing systems employed by courts in the 1980s
and 1990s relied on low quality monitors, and the pronounced time delay
associated with these systems made communicating difficult. Recently
developed video teleconferencing equipment has almost eliminated time
delays, and the monitors used in these newly developed systems have
large screens with excellent picture quality.
Based on these factors, on October 1, 2001, the Judicial Conference
of the United States passed proposed amendments to Rules 5 and 10 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, expressly allowing federal
courts to conduct initial appearances and arraignments by video telecon-
Rules of Juvenile Procedure to allow juveniles to attend detention hearings via audio-video device.
See Amendment to Fla. Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(a), 753 So. 2d 541, 542 (Fla. 1999)
[herinafter Fla. Amendment 1999].
94. See infra note 107 and accompanying text.
95. Id. Arraignments and initial appearances are the proceedings most commonly permitted to
be conducted by video teleconference. Id.
96. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1997 LONG RANGE PLAN FOR
AUTOMATION IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, at 10 (Mar. 1997).
97. MECHAM, supra note 91, at 9.
98. S.791,107th Cong. (2001).
99. 147 CONG. REC. S4,007 (daily ed. Apr. 26, 2001) (statement of Sen. Thurmond).
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ference with the defendant's consent. 00 On May 1, 2002, the Supreme
Court approved these proposed amendments,°10 sending them on to Con-
gress. l°Although past proposals allowing the use of video proceedings
in federal criminal trials failed to receive the support necessary for their
approval, the recent increase in the use of video technology by state
courts, the general "pro-technology" policy of the Judicial Conference,
and legislation recently introduced in Congress suggested that the
amendments allowing the use of video proceedings to conduct initial
appearances and arraignments might now have the support necessary to
receive congressional approval. On November 20, 2002, the United
States Senate adjourned sine die for the 2nd Session of the 107th Con-
gress, 10 3 followed by the United States House of Representative's sine
die adjournment on November 22, 2002.1°4 Because Congress did not act
upon the proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure forwarded by the Supreme Court, the proposed amendments to
Rules 5, 10, and 43 went into effect on December 1, 2002.105
100. The Judicial Conference approved proposed amendments to Rules 5 and 10 on October 1,
2001. See Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, Doc. No. 1276, Dec. 12, 2001.
101. Recent orders and the journal of the Unites States Supreme Court can be viewed at
http://www.supremecourtus.gov. For information concerning the Supreme Court's approval of the
proposed amendments to Rules 5, 10, and 43, navigate to "Orders and Journal," then to "Journal."
Information concerning amendments to Rule 5, 10, and 43 may be viewed on page 836 of the
Journal. Alternatively, this information may be viewed by navigating to "Orders and Journal," then
to "Orders of the Court, October Term 2001," then to "Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure" on
April 29, 2002.
102. The following steps are involved in amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
First, the Judicial Conference appoints an Advisory Committee on the Criminal Rules and a
Standing Committee on the Rules of Practice and Procedure. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., CASES
AND MATERIALS: PLEADING AND PROCEDURE: STATE AND FEDERAL 27-29 (8th ed. 1999). Members
of both committees "are composed of federal Court of Appeal and District Judges, and members of
the practicing bar." Id. The Advisory Committee drafts proposed amendments and publishes them
for public comment. Id. After incorporating the necessary changes suggested by the public, the
Advisory Committee forwards the proposed amendments to the Standing Committee. Id. The
Standing Committee may accept, reject, or modify the proposed amendments. Id. If the Standing
Committee accepts the proposed amendments, it forwards them to the Judicial Conference. Id. Like
the Standing Committee, the Judicial Conference has the option of accepting, rejecting, or modifying
the proposed amendments. Id. If the Judicial Conference accepts the amendments, or after it has
made all modifications it deems necessary, the Judicial Conference forwards the proposed
amendments to the Supreme Court. Id. If the Supreme Court accepts the proposed amendments, it
must forward them to "Congress by May I of the year they are to take effect." Congressional
approval is the final step in the rule amendment process. Id. "If Congress does nothing with the rules
forwarded by the Supreme Court, they automatically become law on December 1 of the year in
which they are forwarded." Id.
103. 148 CONG. REC. S 11,801 (daily ed. Nov. 20, 2002).
104. 148 CONG. REC. H9,126 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 2002).
105. See HAZARD, supra note 102.
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III. USE OF VIDEO TECHNOLOGY IN STATE COURTS
Several states have enacted legislation expressly permitting courts
to conduct criminal proceedings by video teleconference.106 The types of
proceedings that can be conducted by video teleconference, the type of
waiver required by the defendant to conduct the proceeding by video
teleconference, and the standardization of video teleconferencing equip-
ment varies greatly among states permitting the use of video proceedings
in criminal trials.107 For example, under a California statute, only initial
106. Rabum-Remfry, supra note 1, at 805.
107. For an excellent overview of the use of video teleconferencing in state court criminal
proceedings, see LIS, Inc., Use of Interactive Video for Court Proceedings: Legal Status and Use
Nationwide, Report prepared under U.S. Dep't of Justice contract J100C00l7DQ9 (1995), at
http://www.nicic.org/pubs/titles.htm (click on the title of the article under "U"). Data presented in
this report were obtained through a survey sent to the attorneys general in the fifty states and the
District of Columbia. Id. The purpose of the survey was to "examine the legal status of interactive
video technology as a means of providing a live linkage between arrestees/defendants in jails with
the courts." Id.
No information was obtained for Mississippi or New York. Id. Information received from the
other jurisdictions indicated that video teleconferencing was used for some criminal proceedings in
twenty-nine of the forty-nine jurisdictions. Id. Half of the states using video teleconferencing to
conduct criminal proceedings reported the existence of no legislation, rules, or case law authorizing
its use. Id. Eight states reported the existence of legislation authorizing video teleconferencing in
criminal proceedings. Id. Ten states reported that court administrative rules authorized the use of
video teleconferencing, and five states reported that case law from their state supported the use of
video teleconferencing in criminal proceedings. Id.
Arraignments and initial appearances are the proceedings most commonly permitted to be
conducted by video teleconference. Id. However, Colorado allows defendants to appear by video for
any proceeding other than trial, and Missouri allows any pre-trial or post-trial proceeding where the
cross-examination of witnesses is not allowed to be conducted by video teleconference. Id. In all
states, video teleconferencing is used at the judges' discretion. Id. In six states the defendant's
consent is required prior to conducting his proceeding by video teleconference, Id. These states
include California, Florida, Hawaii, Missouri, South Carolina, and Wisconsin. Id. Wisconsin takes a
unique position with regard to consent. Id. In Wisconsin, defendants who object to conducting their
criminal proceeding in a video teleconference must show good cause why the proceeding should not
be conducted by video. Id. States permitting the use of video teleconferencing to conduct
arraignments (abbreviated A) or initial appearances (abbreviated LA) include Alaska (IA, A),
Arizona (A), California (IA, A), Colorado (IA, A), Delaware (IA, A), Florida (IA, A), Hawaii (A),
Idaho (IA, A), Kansas (IA), Louisiana (IA, A), Maine (IA, A), Massachusetts (IA, A), Michigan (A),
Missouri (IA, A), Montana (IA, A), Nevada (A), New Jersey (IA), Ohio (A), Oklahoma (A),
Pennsylvania (A), South Carolina (IA), Utah (A), Wisconsin (IA, A), Wyoming (IA). Id. (Table 1 of
the report gives a description of the types of video proceedings allowed in the five jurisdictions that
do not permit either initial appearances or arraignments to be conducted by video teleconference.).
A 1997 survey of the use of video technology in state courts indicated eight additional states
permit the use of video teleconferencing for arraignments. John M. Greacen, Session No. 106: Court
Rules and Technology, Fifth National Court Technology Conference (CTC5), National Center for
State Courts (1997), at http://www.ncsc.dni.us/NCSC/TIS/ctc5/106.htm. These states included
Arkansas, Indiana, Kentucky, New Mexico, New York, Tennessee, Virginia, and Washington. Id.
In addition to the states listed above, Illinois, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1060-1 (2001), New
Hampshire, see LaRose v. Superintendent, Hillsborough County Corr. Admin., 702 N.H. 364 (1997),
and some jurisdictions in Oregon, Oregon Umatill and Morrow Cir. SLR 7.020 (2002), permit
arraignments to be conducted by video teleconference.
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appearances and arraignments may be conducted via video.1°8 In con-
trast, a Missouri statute permits the use of video teleconferences for ini-
tial appearances, waiver of preliminary hearings, arraignment on an in-
formation or indictment where a plea of not guilty is entered, any pre-
trial or post-trial proceeding that does not permit the cross-examination
of witnesses, and sentencing after a plea of guilty.'t 9 Under the Califor-
nia statute, defendants must execute a written waiver before they can
make their initial appearance or be arraigned by video teleconference.,10
In Missouri, waiver is required only for arraignments where the defen-
dant will enter a plea of guilty and sentencings following a conviction at
trial; the defendant's consent is not required for all other video proceed-
ings authorized under the Missouri statute."' In Florida, the law regard-
ing video proceedings is more restrictive than in California with respect
to the procedures that can be conducted by video, limiting the use of
video proceedings to arraignments," 2 but the law is less restrictive with
respect to the consent required of the defendant.'
13
The success of the infusion of video proceedings into state criminal
justice systems also has varied. A comparison of the video procedure
programs employed by Florida in its juvenile detention program and by
Missouri in its criminal justice program illustrate both ends of the spec-
trum with regard to the extensiveness of the use of video teleconferenc-
ing in state courts and the success of video teleconferencing programs." 
14
A. The Failed Amendment to the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure
In 1999, judges from the Fifth, Ninth, Thirteenth, Seventeenth, and
Nineteenth Judicial Circuits of Florida petitioned the Florida Supreme
Court to amend Rule 8.100(a) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Proce-
dure. ' 5 The proposed amendment allowed juvenile detention hearings to
be held by video teleconference.'16 Judges arguing for the amendment
noted that: (1) under the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, adults
could appear at initial appearances and arraignments by video teleconfer-
ence; (2) allowing juveniles to attend detention hearings by video tele-
conference would reduce transportation time, giving juveniles more time
to attend counseling sessions and classes; and (3) producing juveniles by
108. CAL. PENAL CODE § 977 (West 2001).
109. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 561.031 (West 2001).
110. CAL. PENAL CODE § 977 (West 2001).
111. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 561.031 (West 2001).
112. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.160(a) (2001) (limiting the use of video proceedings to arraignments).
113. Id. (leaving the use of video proceedings to the discretion of the court).
114. See Rabum-Remfry, supra note 1 (detailing the significant variations among states in the
types of teleconferencing equipment used and procedures applied in regulating this equipment). Of
the three states mentioned in the text, only Missouri prescribes minimal procedures that must be
followed when conducting video proceedings. See Mo. ANN. STAT. §561.031 (West 2001).
115. Fla. Amendment 1999, 753 So. 2d 541.
116. Id.at541.
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video would eliminate the need to transport them to the courthouse,
eliminating fights that commonly occur during transportation and in the
courthouse.
117
Several groups opposed the amendment, including individual public
defenders, the Juvenile Court Rules Committee of the Florida Bar, and
the Juvenile Justice Committee of the Florida Public Defenders Associa-
tion.' 18 Opponents of the amendment argued that: (1) detention hearings
are not analogous to initial appearances or arraignments because deten-
tion hearings, unlike initial appearances or arraignments, are "evidentiary
and adversarial in nature, often requiring witness confrontation, challeng-
ing of evidence, and review of records and documents;" (2) conducting
detention hearings by video would give prosecutors unequal footing be-
cause the prosecutor would be present in the courtroom during the hear-
ing, while the defense attorney would be with the defendant; and (3)
conducting detention hearings by video might prevent juvenile defen-
dants from having meaningful contact with their parents or guardians
during the proceeding."19
After reviewing the arguments regarding the proposed amendment,
the Florida Supreme Court examined reports concerning the results of a
pilot project designed to assess the possibility of conducting video deten-
tion hearings in Florida. 120 In explaining the results of the pilot project,
Chief Judge Alvarez noted that approximately 2,900 children attended
video detention hearings during the pilot project. 12 1 The results of the
pilot project indicated that video detention hearings provide numerous
benefits. 122 Judge Alvarez reported that with video detention hearings,
juveniles "no longer have to be transported in crowded vans through rush
hour traffic and then spend several hours sitting in the holding cells at the
courthouse. The juveniles are no longer humiliated by being paraded
through the courthouse in handcuffs and shackles," and, if the judge or-
ders that they be released, they can be "released in a more timely fashion
since they are already at the detention center.' ' 123 In addition, Judge Alva-
rez noted that conducting detention hearings via video results in the ju-
veniles spending "less time away from their classes, groups, and ap-
pointments.',
24
117. Id. at 542.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Amendment to Fla. Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(a), 667 So. 2d 195, 197 (Fla.
1996) (detailing the pilot program) [hereinafter Fla. Amendment 1996].
121. Fla. Amendment 1999, 753 So. 2d at 544.
122. Id. at 543.
123. Id. at 544.
124. Id.
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Based on the judges' petitions and the positive results of the pilot
project, the Florida Supreme Court adopted an amendment to Florida
Rule of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(a) on an interim basis.1 25 The amend-
ment expressly allowed juveniles to attend detention hearings via video
teleconference. 2 6 The Court held that, "while every ... citizen is entitled
to due process of law in any legal proceeding where his or her personal
freedom is directly in issue, his right is not vitiated by technological
changes in court procedure;" furthermore, the Court noted that it "en-
dorse[d] technological improvements in courtroom procedure.
1 27
In 2001, the Florida Supreme Court revisited the use of video tech-
nology in conducting juvenile detention hearings.128 The Court noted
several specific shortfalls associated with this practice, including (1) ju-
veniles were not provided an opportunity to have meaningful, private
communication with their parents or guardians; (2) in many circum-
stances, juveniles did not understand what occurred during the proceed-
ing and, upon completion of the hearing, had to ask the public defender if
they were being released; and (3) video teleconference "hearings totally
lacked the dignity, decorum, and respect one would anticipate in a per-
sonal appearance before the court.' 29 In reviewing the use of such hear-
ings, the Court concluded that the system, imposed on a temporary basis,
elevated "process above substance.,,' 30 Although conducting detention
hearings by video was much more efficient and less costly than requiring
juveniles to make personal appearances, the Court felt that Florida's
"youth must never take a second position to institutional convenience
and economy," and declined to adopt the interim amendment on a per-
manent basis.'
3'
In retrospect, perhaps the Florida Supreme Court overstated the is-
sue when it passed the amendment to section 8.100(a) in 1999; perhaps a
more accurate statement would have been: "While every ... citizen is
entitled to due process of law in any legal proceeding where his or her
personal freedom is directly in issue, his right is not vitiated by [all]
technological changes in court procedure.' 32 Clearly, two years after
implementing the amendment, the Court concluded that some techno-
logical changes in court procedure vitiate a defendant's due process
rights.
125. Id. at 545.
126. Id. at 542.
127. Id. at 543.
128. See Amendment to Fla. Rule of Juvenile Procedure, 796 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 2001)
[hereinafter Fla. Amendment 2001].
129. See Fla. Amendment 2001, 796 So. 2d at 473.
130. Id. at 474.
131. Id.
132. Fla. Amendment 1999, 753 So. 2d at 543 (emphasis and emphasized section added).
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A brief review of some of the problems associated with Florida's
video detention hearings illustrates potential difficulties that might arise
in federal court. For example, the Florida Supreme Court noted that the
use of video teleconferences hampered communication between juve-
niles and their parents or their guardians, as well as between the parents
or guardians and the public defender.133 Florida's experience suggests
that conducting proceedings by video may impair a defendant's ability to
communicate with his lawyer.
The Florida experience also indicates that defendants often have dif-
ficultly comprehending what is transpiring during a video proceeding.
134
The Florida Supreme Court found that several parties often spoke simul-
taneously during video detention hearings, adding to the confusion of the
proceeding. 135 In many circumstances, the juveniles' understanding of
the proceeding was so incomplete that, upon completion of the proceed-
ing, they were forced to ask the public defender if they were being re-
leased or detained. 136 Many opponents of conducting video proceedings
in federal court argue that it is more difficult for defendants to under-
stand and follow proceedings when they are conducted by video.' 37 Flor-
ida's experience with video detention hearings suggests these concerns
may be warranted.
Finally, Florida's experience suggests that it is difficult for a video
teleconference to portray the decorum and maintain the dignity befitting
a courtroom. The Florida Supreme Court found that video hearings "to-
tally lacked the dignity, decorum, and respect [anticipated] in a personal
appearance before the court."' 138 The Court noted that changes could have
been made to the video detention hearing procedures to more closely
assimilate the decorum of a courtroom. 13 9 However, the Court found that
the costs associated with insuring that video proceedings portrayed the
decorum of a courtroom outweighed the benefits of conducting detention
hearings by video teleconference. 4° Opponents of the use of video tele-
conferencing in federal court note that the "courtroom in Anglo-




137. See Goodwin Letter, supra note 13; see also Fla. Amendment 1999, 753 So. 2d at 546
(Lewis, J., dissenting) (stating that "this procedure which substitutes a T.V. chamber with glass faces
and sound system voices for human contact is an Orwellian prophecy fulfilled, merely substituting
one evil for another in the name of technological advancement," and "[i]f fights, disruptions, and the
spectacle of parades in handcuffs and shackles are the ills to be corrected, then we should correct and
change these disgraceful problems rather than avoiding correction by attempting to implement
robotic justice").
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American jurisprudence is more than a location with seats.., the setting
that the courtroom provides is itself an important element in the constitu-
tional conception of a trial, contributing a dignity essential to the integ-
rity of the trial process.''
What is the predictive value of the failure of Florida's video deten-
tion hearing program for the potential success of video proceedings in
federal court? Although Florida's use of video teleconferencing to con-
duct detention hearings failed, Florida continues to use video teleconfer-
encing to conduct arraignments, and other states use video teleconferenc-
ing to conduct many pre- and post-trial proceedings.14
2
Factors specific to juvenile detention hearings may have been
responsible for the failure of Florida's video detention program. The age
of the defendants involved in the video proceedings is one obvious factor
differentiating juvenile detention hearings from other criminal proceed-
ings. The young age of those in the juvenile system may have contrib-
uted to their inability to follow the video proceedings. Because of their
age, most juvenile defendants are relatively unsophisticated. Lack of life
experience may impede their ability to communicate with public defend-
ers. This factor may be partly responsible for the failure of Florida's
video detention hearing program, and may limit the predictive value of
Florida's experiment with regard to the likely success of video proceed-
ings in federal court.
A second factor distinguishing juvenile detention hearings from
other criminal proceedings is that juveniles in detention hearings must be
able to communicate with their parents or guardians during the proceed-
ing. The Florida Supreme Court noted that a primary negative impact of
conducting detention hearings by video was that defendants had a diffi-
cult time communicating confidentially with their parents or guardi-
ans. 143 Because communication between defendants and their parents is
not a concern in most proceedings in federal court, this failure of Flor-
ida's program may not be predictive of the potential success of video
proceedings in federal court. However, communication difficulties be-
tween defendants and their parents suggest that defendants in federal
court may have greater difficulty communicating with their attorneys
141. Goodwin Letter, supra note 13 (quoting Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 561 (1965)
(Warren, C.J., concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. See FLA. R. CRI4. P. 3.160(a); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 561.031 (West 2001); see also
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 1997 LONG RANGE PLAN FOR AUTOMATION IN THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, at 10 (Mar. 1997) (encouraging federal courts to "use video
telecommunications technologies to facilitate more efficient... judicial proceedings").
143. Fla. Amendment 2001, 796 So. 2d at 473.
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when proceedings are conducted by video, than when the defendants are
physically present in the courtroom.44
The specific shortcomings noted by the Florida Supreme Court in
implementing Florida's video detention hearing program should be care-
fully examined in light of the recent amendments to the Federal Rules
permitting the use of video teleconferencing in federal criminal proceed-
ings. However, unique issues particular to juvenile detention hearings-
including the age and inexperience of the defendants, as well as the de-
fendants' need to communicate with their parents or guardians-make it
difficult to evaluate the predictive value of Florida's experience on the
potential success of video proceedings in federal court.
B. Expansive Use of Video Technology by Missouri State Courts
In 1987, in State v. Kinder,145 the Missouri Supreme Court consid-
ered the ability of Missouri courts to conduct video proceedings in
criminal cases, specifically addressing taking guilty pleas and conducting
preliminary examinations via video hookup. In Kinder, the defendants
objected to conducting their proceedings, which involved the entering of
guilty pleas, through a video connection. Each defendant requested to be
physically present in the courtroom. 146 The circuit court denied the de-
fendants' requests and forced each of them to conduct their proceeding
by video teleconference.1 47 The issue before the Missouri Supreme Court
centered on the interpretation of the presence requirements in the rele-
vant sections of the Missouri Annotated Statutes.
148
The Missouri Supreme Court began its analysis by acknowledging
that the state statutes dealing with preliminary examinations and guilty
pleas were drafted before video teleconferencing was contemplated;
therefore, the Court could not discern the intent of the legislature by ex-
amining the text of the relevant statutes. 149 Because the state statutes
were silent on the subject, the Court held that presence meant physical
presence and that video presence did not satisfy the mandates of the
"presence requirements" under the governing rules and statutes.150
Justice Blackmar, concurring in part and dissenting in part, noted
that although he was "inclined to accept the State's argument that the use
of [video proceedings] satisfies requirements of 'presence' and 'open
144. This, of course, depends where the defense attorney is situated-whether she is in the
courtroom with the judge or physically present with her client.
145. 740 S.W.2d 654 (Mo. 1987) (en banc) (superceded by statute).
146. See Kinder, 740 S.W.2d at 655.
147. Id.
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court' as used in the governing statutes and rules," he was reluctant to
decide the case based on those terms.15' Specifically, Justice Blackmar
was concerned that a holding equating video presence with physical
presence could result in defendants being denied the opportunity to be
physically present in court when a personal exchange between the defen-
dant and the judge, of a quality not obtainable by video teleconference,
was required. 5 2 He noted that he did not have "similar qualms regarding
arraignment and the entry of a plea of not guilty" and that, in his opinion,
arraignments and the entry of not guilty pleas could be conducted in a
video teleconference.
153
Although Justice Blackmar concurred with the majority's holding,
he noted some interesting advantages video proceedings might provide
towards increasing public confidence in the integrity of the judicial sys-
tem. 54 Section 544.275 of the Missouri Annotated Statutes expressly
allowed preliminary hearings and pre-trial proceedings to be conducted
in a conference room in the penitentiary or in a courtroom at the court-
house. 155 Justice Blackmar noted that these pre-trial proceedings were
commonly held at the penitentiary and that "few members of the general
pubic [found] their way to the penitentiary" to view these proceedings.1
6
Conducting the proceedings by video, with the defendant in the confer-
ence room and the judge in the courtroom, as opposed to conducting the
proceeding with both the judge and the defendant in the penitentiary con-
ference room, would allow members of the public, who were not willing
or permitted to travel to the penitentiary to view the proceedings, to
watch on monitors in the courthouse. Thus, because the courthouse is the
"most public of places," Justice Blackmar suggested that video proceed-
ings would allow greater public access to hearings.
57
In his dissent in Kinder, Justice Welliver argued that he "would
quash the writs as to guilty pleas, as to preliminary hearings, and as to
arraignments and not guilty pleas," and would expressly allow these pro-
ceedings to be conducted by video teleconference. 158 In support of his
pro-video proceedings stance, Justice Welliver stated that "split screen
video appears to be an acceptable means of conducting the commercial
business of the world, of conducting affairs between nations, of conduct-
ing political debate, of conducting the process of education, of communi-
cating all forms of artistic pursuit, and for communicating ... the news
151. Id, (Blackmar, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
152. See id. at 657.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 656.
156. Id. at 657.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 658 (Welliver, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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of the world."'159 He noted that the Missouri Supreme Court commonly
"excused deviation from long established trial procedures" so long as the
deviation did not prejudice the defendant.' 6° Justice Welliver found "no
prejudice to the defendant" associated with conducting certain proceed-
ings in state court by video.
161
The Missouri Legislature's response to Kinder was swift. On March
1, 1988, the General Assembly passed section 561.031 of the Missouri
Annotated Statutes. 62 This statute effectively overruled Kinder and
greatly expanded the use of video proceedings in Missouri. In pertinent
part, section 561.031 states that, "when the physical appearance in per-
son in court is required ... such personal appearance may be made by
means of closed circuit television ... between the court and the place of
custody or confinement .... ,,163 Specifically, section 561.031 permits
state courts to force defendants to proceed via video teleconference in a
wide array of proceedings, including (1) initial appearances, (2) waiver
of preliminary hearings, (3) arraignments, (4) any pre-trial or post-trial
criminal proceedings not allowing the cross-examination of witnesses,
(5) sentencings after conviction at trial, and (6) sentencings after entry of
a plea. 164 In addition, the above list does "not prohibit other appearances
via closed circuit television upon waiver of any right such persons held
in custody or confinement might have to be physically present."
165
Shortly after the General Assembly's passage of section 561.031, a
defendant in Missouri appealed the use of closed circuit television in a
post-conviction hearing. 166 The defendant argued that conducting the
proceeding by audio/visual two-way hookup violated his right to con-
frontation, equal protection, due process, and effective representation.
167
Justice Welliver, the author of the dissent in Kinder, wrote the opinion.
After reviewing the tape of the proceeding, the Missouri Supreme
Court noted:
[T]he defendant was able to confer privately with his counsel, the
cameras used provided a clear picture of the witnesses, examiners,








166. See Guinan v. State, 769 S.W.2d 427, 429-30 (Mo. 1989).
167. Guinan, 769 S.W.2d at 430.
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and effectively conveyed both the text and the content of the testi-
mony and the demeanor of the persons testifying. 16
8
In ruling against the defendant, the Court concluded, "[w]e find no dimi-
nution of our traditional standards of fair trial resulting from injecting the
video cameras into the proceeding."
169
The Missouri statute represents one end of the spectrum regarding
the use of video proceedings in state courts. 70 Under section 561.031,
video presence can be substituted for physical presence in most pre- and
post-trial criminal proceedings, as well as all civil proceedings excluding
a jury trial.' 7' Although many argue that the greatly expanded use of
video proceedings in Missouri under section 561.031 provides courts
with too much latitude to substitute video presence for physical pres-
ence, 1 72 Judge Welliver's dissent in Kinder illustrates that some members
of the judiciary support further expansion of the use of video proceed-
ings. 73 Judge Welliver virtually equates video presence with physical
presence, making the use of video proceedings in Missouri courts almost
unlimited.
74
Analyzing Florida and Missouri's use of video teleconferencing in
the criminal justice system provides insight into the use of video tech-
nology in the courtroom and the potential problems associated with its
use.175 The successes and failures of these state programs should serve as
beacons to guide the development and use of video proceedings in fed-
eral court.
IV. EFFECT OF THE AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
The amendments to Rules 5, 10, and 43 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure significantly expand the types of proceedings that
can be conducted by video teleconference, including initial appearances
and arraignments. 76 The Advisory Committee originally drafted two
alternative versions of Rule 5(f).177 Under the first version, "[v]ideo tele-
168. Id. at 431.
169. Id.
170. See generally Rabum-Remfry, supra note 1 (comparing video use in jurisdictions within
California, Florida, and Missouri).
171. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 561.031 (West 2001).
172. See Kinder, 740 S.W.2d at 655-56 (discussing video teleconferencing under Missouri
statute).
173. Id. at 658-60.
174. Id.
175. Rabum-Remfry, supra note 1, at 810-12, 835-36.
176. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(f) (2002 amendment); FED. R. CRIM. P. 10(c) (2002 amendment); FED.
R. CRIM. P. 43(a) (2002 amendment).
177. See Memorandum from the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
W. Eugene Davis, Chair, to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Honerable
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conferencing [could] be used to conduct an appearance... if the defen-
dant waive[d] the right to be present."'178 The only difference between the
first and second versions was that the first version required the defen-
dant's consent prior to conducting the initial appearance in a video pro-
ceeding. 179  In addition, Rule 10 had two alternative versions, distin-
guished only by the consent of the defendant. 180 Under the first version
of Rule 10, "[v]ideo teleconferencing [could] be used to arraign a defen-
dant if the defendant waive[d] the right to be arraigned in open court."'
181
The alternative version allowed the use of video teleconferencing at ar-
raignments without the defendant's consent.
182
The Advisory Committee noted that it preferred the second version
because pilot studies indicated defendants rarely waived their rights to
appear in person. 183 The Advisory Committee published both versions of
the proposed amendments for Rules 5 and 10 for public comment.
184
However, the negative response received about the non-consent provi-
185
sions prompted the Committee to withdraw those versions.
Amended Rule 43(a) states that "[u]nless this rule, Rule 5, or Rule
10, provides otherwise, the defendant must be present . ... 186 This
change continues to require physical presence under the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, limiting the use of video proceedings to initial ap-
pearances and arraignments. 87 The Committee noted that these changes:
could be viewed as an erosion of an important element of the judicial
process. First, it may be important for a defendant to see and experi-
ence first-hand the formal impact of the reading of the charge. Sec-
ond, it may be necessary for the court to personally see and speak
with the defendant at the arraignment, especially when there is a real
question whether the defendant actually understands the gravity of the
proceedings. And third, there may be difficulties in providing the de-
Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, 5 (May 10, 2001), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/new-
rules6.html [hereinafter Memorandum].
178. See Memorandum from the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,
W. Eugene Davis, Chair, to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Honorable
Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, 143 (May 8, 2001), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/new-
rules6.html [hereinafter Memorandum I1].
179. Id. at 146.
180. Memorandum, supra note 177, at 10.
181. Memorandum H, supra note 178, at 160.
182. Id. at 161.
183. Id. at 165.
184. Memorandum, supra note 177, at 5, 10; Memorandum H, supra note 178, at 148, 166.
185. Memorandum, supra note 177, at 6, 11.
186. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a) (2002 amendment) (emphasis added).
187. Id. Under the amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, only Rules 5 and
10 expressly allow the use of video teleconferencing.
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fendant with effective and confidential assistance of counsel if coun-
sel, but not the defendant, appears at the arraignment.188
After noting these concerns, however, the Committee indicated it "be-
lieved that the benefits of using video teleconferencing outweighed the
costs of doing so."' 89
Although the Advisory Committee, in response to negative public
comment, withdrew the versions of the proposed amendments allowing
federal courts to conduct video proceedings without a defendant's con-
sent, the Committee originally believed that "the beneficial use of video
teleconferenced arraignments would be lost if the defendant's consent
was required" because defendants would rarely consent.1 90 Although the
"consent required" amendments were subject to less criticism, the
amendments to Rules 5 and 10 that survived public review, and that were
subsequently passed by the Judicial Conference, Supreme Court, and
Congress, may have an insignificant practical effect on the functioning of
federal courts.' 9' This would be true under either of two scenarios. First,
if defendants refuse to consent, these proceedings will have to be con-
ducted with the defendants physically present in the courtroom. Second,
for those districts currently conducting video proceedings with defen-
dants' consent, the new rules add nothing. 192
A. The Need to Standardize Video Teleconferencing Equipment and
Procedures
Despite potential quality variations between video teleconferencing
equipment available, there are no plans currently to standardize the type
and quality of video teleconferencing equipment used in federal courts.
The Committee Notes following the amendment to Rule 5 state that the
amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not "specify
any particular technical requirements regarding the [video teleconferenc-
ing] system to be used.' ' 193 The Committee Notes following the amend-
ment to Rule 10 explain that the "amendment leaves to the courts ... the
procedures to be used" when conducting arraignments by video telecon-
ference. 194 In comparison, state courts conducting video proceedings use
a variety of camera systems, from simple two camera systems to com-
plex six camera systems that give the defendant multiple views of the
188. Memorandum H, supra note 178, at 161-62.
189. Id. at 163.
190. Id. at 165. The Advisory Committee noted that data from pilot programs suggests
defendants rarely consent to the use of video teleconferencing. Id.
191. Seeid. at 163.
192. See infra note 249 and accompanying text. In this second category, however, at least the
practice will be made uniform among districts.
193. Memorandum H, supra note 178, at 147.
194. Id. at 165.
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courtroom, 195 and a variety of monitor sizes, from 45 inches to "as small
as nine inches."
1 96
It is impossible to predict how federal court proceedings will be
affected by the lack of standardization in the quality and use of video
technology. However, past use of video technology in state courts indi-
cates that, without rules standardizing the quality and use of video
equipment in the federal judicial system, the type of equipment, and
therefore the quality of the resulting video proceeding, may vary dra-
matically among courts.
197
The amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure also
fail to standardize the spatial location of the judge, prosecutor, and de-
fense attorney during video proceedings. 98 In addition to standardizing
the quality of the video teleconferencing equipment employed by federal
courts, rules should be promulgated standardizing the physical location
of the defense attorney and prosecutor during video proceedings. For
example, in most state courts, the prosecutor and judge are located in the
courtroom during video proceedings. 199 The location of the defense at-
torney varies depending on the rules of the state or the discretion of the
attomey.2°° In most states, the attorney has the option of either attending




The physical location of the prosecutor and defense attorney may
affect the fairness of the proceeding, or at least the appearance of judicial
impartiality. °2 If the prosecutor is physically present in the courtroom
during the video proceeding, the defense attorney, who is with the defen-
dant appearing by video, may be unable to communicate with the judge
195. Lederer, supra note 1, at 1102.
196. Ronnie Thaxton, Note, Injustice Telecast: The Illegal Use of Closed-Circuit Television
Arraignments and Bail Bond Hearings in Federal Court, 79 IOWA L. REv. 175, 181 (1993).
197. See generally Rabum-Remfry, supra note 1 (showing disparity in quality of video
production from state to state and arguing for uniform standards in order to protect due process
rights of defendants).
198. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(f) (2002 amendment); FED. R. CRIM. P. 10(c) (2002 amendment);
FED. R. CRiM. P. 43(a) (2002 amendment). None of these amendments specifically refer to the
spatial location of any of the parties during video proceedings.
199. Lederer, supra note 1, at 1102.
200. Id. at 1102, 1106; see also Thaxton, supra note 196, at 181.
201. Lederer, supra note 1, at 1102.
202. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, SPECIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
§ 6-1.8(d) (3d ed. 2000) (addressing this concern). The standard addressing video proceedings
"cautions the trial judge to avoid electronic procedures where only one of the parties is physically
represented before the judge.... If defense counsel is not physically present in the courtroom due to
the use of electronic transmission procedures, the prosecutor should not be permitted to be
physically present. Instead, where feasible, the prosecutor should appear before the court in the same
fashion as defense counsel, that is, through electronic means." Id.
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as effectively as the prosecutor. °3 However, in order to be physically
present in court, the defense attorney must abandon her client and forfeit
face-to-face communication with the client during the proceeding.20
4
Without rules regulating the spatial location of prosecutors and defense
attorneys during video proceedings, the physical location of the attorneys
may cause the quality of video proceedings to vary dramatically among
federal courts. Standardization will assist the appearance of judicial im-
partiality and promote fairness within the criminal system. Standardiza-
tion should include rules concerning the type of video equipment to be
employed by the courts, as well as assigning spatial positions for both the
prosecutor and the defense attorney.
1. Equalizing Teleconferencing Systems Technology
Although appearing before the court on a video monitor is better
than not appearing at all, it is not a perfect substitute for physical pres-
ence. Arguments concerning how much information must be obtained in
a video teleconference to allow it to substitute for physical presence in-
volve implicit assumptions about both the importance of physical pres-
ence and how closely video presence simulates physical presence.20 5
Therefore, the amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
expressly permitting the substitution of video presence for physical pres-
ence necessarily assume that the quality of the video presence will meet
206certain minimums. Conducting federal criminal proceedings by video
would probably receive more enthusiastic support if defendants could
appear before the court as life-size, interactive holograms, rather than
blurry, monochromatic images on a small monitor.20 7 Although this
203. Rabum-Remfry, supra note 1, at 829; Thaxton, supra note 196, at 192, 200.
204. See Lederer, supra note 1, at 1106; Thaxton, supra note 196, at 191-92.
205. See Rabum-Remfry, supra note 1, at 837 (arguing for the promulgation of uniform
standards of video production by both the courts and professional legal organizations, and urging
U.S. Supreme Court review of such standards).
206. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 (2002 amendment); FED. R. CRtM. P. 10 (2002 amendment); FED.
R. CRIM. P. 43 (2002 amendment) (The amendments are silent concerning the standards and criteria
regulating the use of video teleconferencing equipment in federal court.); see also Fla. Amendment
1999, 753 So. 2d at 546 (Lewis, J., dissenting) (arguing in his dissent from the Supreme Court of
Florida's decision to implement the use of video conferencing to conduct juvenile detention hearings
that "not only are standards and criteria for the equipment to be utilized missing, the provision we
approve today is also deceptively silent on its face as to the practical operation of the procedures
followed").
207. Standardization efforts should address the size of viewing screens and the number of
cameras that must be in the courtroom and remote location. However, the focus of these efforts
should also be to establish minimum transmission rates. Video signals may be transmitted between
locations as either analog or digital signals. John T. Matthias & James C. Twedt, Session No. 208:
TeleJustice - Videoconferencing for the 21' Century, Fifth National Court Technology Conference
(CTC5), National Center for State Courts (1997), at http://www.ncsc.dni.us/NCSCITIS/CTC5/-
208.htm. The quality of video transmission signals is controlled by the bandwidth capacity of the
transmission media. Id. Examples of analog video signals include television broadcasts (excluding
situations where the reporter is reporting from a remote location and the transmission is beamed over
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digital satellites) and the closed-circuit television systems typically employed in security systems. Id.
The use of analog signals produces high quality video. Id. However, a large amount of bandwidth is
required to transmit analog signals. Id. Because of bandwidth requirements, analog signals typically
are transmitted over coaxial cable, fiber-optic cable, or by microwave; they cannot be transmitted by
digital satellite or over the Interet. Id. Analog transmission commonly produces the highest quality,
least expensive video transmission for locations connected by coaxial or fiber-optic cables. Id.
However, because the number of locations connected over the Intemet greatly exceeds the number
that are connected by coaxial or fiber-optic cable, video teleconferencing systems that depend on the
transmission of digital, rather than analog video signals, allow users greater access to the global
teleconferencing network. Id. On a more local scale, the technology required to transmit digital
video signals between local courthouses and prisons is already installed, greatly reducing the start-up
costs associated with installing digital teleconferencing systems. Id. The key advantage of
transmitting digital rather than analog signals is that the capability to compress digital signals makes
it possible to transmit digital video images by satellite or over the existing public telephone network.
Id.
Digital signals may be transmitted over a smaller bandwidth than analog signals because
digital signals can be compressed prior to transmission. John Voelker, Bridging the Distance:
Implementing Videoconferencing in Wisconsin, Report to the Planning and Policy Advisory
Committee, Wisconsin Counties Association (1999), at http://www.courts.state.wi.us/circuit/pdf/-
vcman.pdf. Signals are compressed by an instrument termed a codec (coder/decoder). Id. The codec
also reconstructs or expands compressed signals as they are received at the other teleconferencing
site. Id. Because of the greater versatility, more expansive existing network, lower start-up time, and
reduced cost associated with digital video transmission systems, most state courts employ the use of
digital transmission teleconferencing systems. Id.
Many different methods can be used to transmit compressed digital signals including an
Integrated Services Digital Network (ISDN), Switched 56 system, or T-I line. Id. Digital, single-line
systems have a bandwidth of 33.6-56.0 Kbps. Id. These sorts of systems involve transmitting
information through a modem and are the standard method currently used to connect to the Intemet.
Id. A 33.6-56.0 bandwidth produces fuzzy, stop-frame action that is unsuitable for use in the judicial
system. Matthias & Twedt, supra.
By relying on ISDN for communication, teleconferencing systems achieve much greater
transmission rates, while maintaining the versatility of single-line systems. Voelker, supra. Because
ISDN service is available in most countries, teleconferencing systems that rely on the ISDN can
connect to other teleconferencing systems across the globe. Id. There are two types of ISDN lines:
basic rate interface (BRI) and primary rate interface (PRI). Id. One BRI is the equivalent of two
ordinary phone lines. Id. Although images transmitted at 128 Kbps over a BRI are clearer than
images transmitted over a single-line system, they remain jerky and somewhat fuzzy. Matthias &
Twedt, supra. Participants of video teleconferences in the Australian judicial system were "generally
satisfied" with the 128 Kb transmission system Australia used during the last decade. Martin E.
Gruen & Tom Wetter, Session No. 303: Courtroom Audio, Video, and Videoconferencing, Fifth
National Court Technology Conference (CTC5), National Center for State Courts (1997), at
http://www.ncsc.dni.us/NCSCITIS/ctc5/303.htm. However, most video teleconferencing specialists
agree that a transmission bandwidth of 384 Kbps is required for "court quality" video
teleconferencing applications. Id.; Matthias & Twedt, supra; Voelker, supra; Court Technology and
Advisory Committee, Report on the Application of Video Technology in the California Courts,
Judicial Council of Califomia (1997), at http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/reference/documents/video-
report.pdf [hereinafter Report]. There are several ways to transmit 384 Kbps including
simultaneously using six phone lines with a Switched 56 system, simultaneously using 3 BRI, using
one PRI, or using a T-1 line. Report, supra. A T-1 line consists of 24, 64 Kbps channels, for a
combined capacity of 1.544 Mbps. Id. The cost associated with use of T-I lines commonly makes
this option prohibitively expensive and T-1 systems cannot connect to all ISDN-based systems. Id.
The use of three BRI is less expensive than the use of a PRI system and the benefits associated with
the use of a PRI may not justify its additional cost. Id. Television quality video consists of a
transmission rate of thirty frames per second. Id. Three BRI can transmit 384 Kbps, which is
approximately twenty to thirty frames per second. Id. This transmission rate is near television
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"minimum quality assumption" is implicit in the promulgation of any
rule expressly permitting a defendant to attend proceedings by video
teleconference, as noted previously, the amendments to the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure do not include such minimum standards.2 °8 Like-
wise, most state courts and legislatures have failed to promulgate mini-
mal technical requirements for video proceedings.2° California and Wis-
consin, however, have established minimum technical requirements for
video teleconferencing systems used in their respective state judicial
systems.210 The federal judicial system should follow the lead of Califor-
nia and Wisconsin in establishing minimal technical requirements for
teleconferencing systems used in federal courts.
When standardizing the use of video technology in federal criminal
proceedings, the suggestions of New Jersey's Supreme Court Committee
on Court Reporting should be considered.2 1 Before implementing its
video arraignment program, the Chief Judge in New Jersey requested
that the Supreme Court Committee on Court Reporting suggest ways of
quality. Because transmission costs increase exponentially as frame-rate increases, and because the
improvement in picture quality is slight with frame-rate increases beyond twenty-two to twenty-three
frames per second, the federal standards should require that all video teleconferencing systems used
in the federal judicial system have a minimum transmission rate or bandwidth of 384 Kbps. Id.
Having the capability to connect over three BRI simultaneously is not enough. The requirements
should mandate that unless a connection can be established over all three, the video proceeding
cannot proceed.
Analizing the hypothetical at the beginning of this article's introduction, experiences like that
described can occur with state-of-the-art teleconferencing systems. See supra text at beginning of
Introduction. The six clock-like circles described appear during the connection phase of a
teleconference. Each circle represents one 64 Kbps line and displays the connection status of that
line. As a connection is established over each line, the hand makes one complete clockwise
revolution and the clock-like circle turns green. Technical problems may prevent a connection over
all six lines. If the system is set for a minimum transmission rate of 384 Kbps, the system will not
allow the video teleconference to begin. Under these circumstances, it is possible for the
teleconferencing system administrator to reset the connection parameters so that the video
teleconference may be conducted at a transmission rate of less than 384 Kbps. This results in the
transmission of delayed audio and fuzzy, jerky video.
Not only should the federal standards require that federal video teleconferencing systems
have the capability of transmitting 384 Kbps, but they should also require that a transmission rate of
384 Kbps be achieved during the video proceeding.
208. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 (2002 amendment); FED. R. CRIM. P. 10 (2002 amendment); FED. R.
CRIM. P. 43 (2002 amendment). But see Standing Order Implementing Videoconferencing, United
States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia (requiring that "[tihe judge must be
able to view fully the out of court party and counsel" and that the "out of court party ... must be
able to view fully the judge and all attorneys present in the courtroom... The court and remote
location must have the capacity for the "contemporaneous transmission of documents and exhibits,"
the monitor screens must be "no smaller than twenty-five (25) inches," and the images must be in
color.).
209. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 561.031 (West 2001).
210. Voelker, supra note 207; Report, supra note 207.
211. Committee on Court Reporting (Stenographic & Electronic), Supreme Court of the State
of N. J., Final Report (1991), cited in Raburn-Remfry, supra note 1, at 832-33.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
avoiding problems associated with variation in video technology among
state courts.212 The Committee recommended that:
1) all counties should have a courtroom with video recording equip-
ment of . . . [a standardized] quality; 2) each of these courtrooms
should be provided with sufficient audio and video backup to ensure
that the court proceedings [could] continue with a minimum of inter-
ruption in the event of equipment failure; 3) the role of the audio-
video operators should be professionalized by expanding the current
training program and creating a certification program; 4) the judiciary
should initiate a required orientation program on the in-court steps
necessary to ensure an accurate record; 5) written instructions should
be provided to attorneys prior to video proceedings on attorney con-
duct which facilitates a clear record; [and] 6) trained audio-visual co-
ordinators should be hired who are directly responsible to the assign-
ment judge and appellate division's court reporting services .... 213
The simple step of adopting minimum requirements regarding the quality
and use of video technology for conducting remote criminal proceedings
would eliminate many potential due process concerns resulting from
discrepancies between federal courts in the quality of video presence.21 4
2. Maintaining the Appearance of Impartiality: Standardizing the
Physical Location of Defense Counsel and the Prosecutor Dur-
ing Video Proceedings
During their criminal proceedings, many defendants do not feel that
they are active participants in the criminal justice system.215 They often
216
feel like outsiders and distrust the process. 6 Conducting proceedings by
video may exacerbate these feelings of disengagement. When courts
conduct criminal proceedings by video, the defense attorney must decide
if she will attend the proceeding via video from her client's side, or if she
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. The type of standardization argued for here and in footnotes 204 and 207 should not be
confused with the teleconferencing standards promulgated by the International Multimedia
Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. (IMTC). See IMTC Standards (Mar. 1993), at
http://www.imtc.org/standards.htm (listing several promugated standards). The IMTC standards
maintain compatibility among international teleconferencing systems; they do not set minimum
standards for transmission bandwidths. IMTC Standard T.120, Overview (Mar. 1993), at
http://www.imtc.org/t12O.htm. However, some of the IMTC standards should also be adopted by the
federal judiciary. For example, adoption of Standard H.320 (IMCT Standard H.320 (Mar. 1993), at
http://www.imtc.org/h320.htm) would insure the compatibility of all teleconferencing systems in the
federal judiciary and adoption of 1MTC's picture quality standard (IMCT Standard H.261 (Mar.
1993) at http://www.itu.int/rec/recommendation.asp?type=products&parent=T-REC-h) would insure
all video conferencing systems used by the federal judiciary exceed a minimum that can be
quantified in terms of number of luminance lines and pixels. All IMTC standards can be viewed at
http://www.itu.intlrec/recommendation.asp?type=products&parent=T-REC-h.
215. Thaxton, supra note 196, at 197.
216. d.
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will be physically present in the courtroom with the judge (and prosecu-
217tor). Disadvantages accompany either choice. If the attorney decides to
attend the proceeding via video from her client's side, the ability to con-
fidentially communicate with her client would be improved; however,
the ability of the attorney to effectively communicate with the judge
would simultaneously be weakened z.2 8 The opposite would be true if the
attorney chose to remain in the courtroom. Research indicates that non-
verbal behavior may account for over fifty percent of a message's im-
pact.219 Although, to some extent, a defense attorney can communicate
non-verbally in a video teleconference, until video technology approxi-
mates actual presence, some non-verbal signals will be lost in video
transfer.220 Perhaps more importantly, if a defense attorney attends the
proceeding from the side of her incarcerated client, while the prosecutor
is physically present in the courtroom only a few yards from the judge,
this may support the defendant's belief that his attorney is isolated from
the system, that prosecutors are insiders, and that the judge is not a fair
221and impartial adjudicator of his case.
To avoid these problems, a defense attorney could decide to be
physically present in the courtroom, leaving her client to proceed as the
sole video participant in the proceeding. Although the physical presence
of defense and prosecuting attorneys in the courtroom reduces the ap-
pearance of impropriety and partiality, it often leaves defendants feeling
deserted and alienated.222 Defense attorneys should not have to choose.
Standardized procedures regarding the location of defendants, defense
attorneys, and prosecutors during video proceedings should be promul-
gated.
Standardization has been suggested by the American Bar Associa-
tion ("ABA"). 223 The ABA suggests that if a single attorney represents a
defendant, the attorney should be required to attend the proceeding by
217. It should be noted that generally neither the government nor the defendant is represented
by counsel at the initial appearance held pursuant to Rule 5, which in the federal system customarily
takes place within six hours following arrest. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) (2000). An indigent defendant
will not, as yet, have a lawyer assigned. Id.
218. W. Clinton Terry III & Ray Surette, Video in the Misdemeanor Court: The South Florida
Experience, 69 JUDICATURE 13, 18 (1985) (noting that eighty-six percent of public defenders in
Miami felt that the use of video proceedings impaired their representation of their clients).
219. LAWRENCE J. SMITH & LORETTA A. MALANDRO, COURTROOM COMMUNICATION
STRATEGIES 5 (1985) (citing RAY L. BIRDWHISTLE, KINESICS AND CONTEXT (Barton Jones ed.,
Univ. of Pennsylvania Press 1970)).
220. See W. Clinton Terry III & Ray Surette, Media Technology and the Courts: The Case of
Closed Circuit Video Arraignments in Miami, Florida, 11 CRIM. JUST. REv. 33-34 (1986) (stating
public defenders' concerns about difficulties communicating between themselves, the judge, the
prosecutor, the defendant, and the defendant's family).
221. Id. at 199.
222. Id.
223. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROCEEDINGS IN AND OUTSIDE THE
COURTROOM § 6-1.8(d) (3d ed. 1999).
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video from her client's side. 2 In addition, the prosecutor also should be
required to attend the proceeding by video, either from a third location
(e.g., the U.S. Attorney's office) or from the same conference room used
by the defendant and defense attorney. 225 This spatial arrangement is the
only arrangement that simultaneously maximizes the ability of the de-
fense attorney to communicate with her client, minimizes feelings of
alienation, maintains the appearance of propriety, and imposes all handi-
caps associated with the use of video proceedings equally on all sides.
If multiple attorneys represent the defendant, the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure could allow a spatial arrangement mirroring that
used by Dade County, Florida in misdemeanor pre-trial proceedings.226
During video proceedings in Dade County, one public defender remains
with the defendant in a conference room of the jail, while a second public
22defender physically attends the proceeding. 27 The public defender in the
conference room advises the defendant, while the public defender in the
courtroom communicates with the judge and prosecutor.228 The public
defenders can communicate with each other confidentially over a secure
phone line between the courtroom and the conference room.229 Because
this spatial arrangement requires multiple defense counsel, most video
proceedings in federal court probably should be conducted with both the
defense attorney and prosecutor appearing via video.23°
B. Consent and Waiver
Any analysis of video teleconferencing is incomplete without ad-
dressing the ability of defendants to waive their right to be present at
certain court proceedings. If a defendant can waive his right to be present
at a proceeding, he should be able to engage in the lesser relinquishment
of his right associated with conducting the proceeding by video. T3
Federal courts have stated that a defendant's presence at trial is es-
sential to "the basic legitimacy of the criminal process. ''232 Early on, the
United States Supreme Court stated that, at least in cases involving fel-
ony charges, "it is not in the power of the prisoner... to waive the right
224. See id.
225. Id.
226. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.160.
227. Rabum-Remfry, supra note 1, at 818.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Multiple representation of a defendant and dual presence are more likely when the
defendant is represented by the federal public defender's office.
231. A defendant's ability to waive his right to be present a sentencing or the commencement
of trial under Rule 43 remains unresolved. See United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 235-37 (5th
Cir. 1999).
232. United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 497 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
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to be personally present. ' 33 In Hopt v. Utah,234 the Court held that it is
"not within the power of the accused or his counsel to dispense with
statutory requirement as to his personal presence at the trial.... The pub-
lic has an interest in his life and liberty." 235 The argument that the pris-
oner "alone is concerned as to the mode by which he may be deprived of
his life or liberty.. . is a mistaken view.
2 36
Nevertheless, in later cases, the Supreme Court held that a defendant
could forfeit his constitutional right to be present at trial under certain
circumstances. In Illinois v. Allen,237 the Court held that a defendant's
right to be present could be lost by his disruptive behavior.238 In Taylor v.
United States,239 the Court held that a defendant also could lose his right
to be present by voluntarily absenting himself after the commencement
of the trial.2 40 Taylor relied upon Diaz v. United States,24 ' a case,. which
although factually similar to Taylor, gave rise to the proposition that a
defendant who fled prior to trial could not be tried in absentia.242 Lower
courts, nevertheless, have held that a defendant can waive his right to be
243
present at the commencement of trail by his failure to attend . How-
ever, even if starting a trial without the defendant does not offend the
Constitution, the Supreme Court recently held in Crosby v. United
States,244 that the "language, history and logic of Rule 43 support a
straightforward interpretation that prohibits the trial in absentia of a de-
fendant who is not present at the beginning of trial. '245 Rule 43 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure incorporates the rulings in Allen
and Taylor, permitting trial in absentia in the case of disruption or ab-
sence following commencement of trial 4. 6
In the alternative, courts have not addressed the ability of a defen-
dant to waive his right to be physically present in the courtroom after the
233. Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892).
234. 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
235. Hopt, 110 U.S. at 579 (interpreting and applying an early version of the Criminal Code of
Procedure of Utah § 218).
236. Lewis, 146 U.S. at 374; Bustamante v. Eyman, 456 F.2d 269, 271-73 (9th Cir. 1972).
237. 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
238. Allen, 397 U.S. at 343 (later codified in FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(3)).
239. 414 U.S. 17 (1973).
240. Taylor, 414 U.S. at 20 (later codified in FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(1)).
241. 223 U.S. 442 (1912).
242. Diaz, 223 U.S. at 462.
243. Smith v. Mann, 173 F.3d 73, 76 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202,
1208 (2d Cir. 1972); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.2(d) (3d ed. 2000).
244. 506 U.S. 255 (1993).
245. Crosby, 506 U.S. at 262. The Court stated, "If a clear line is to be drawn marking the point
at which the costs of delay are likely to outweigh the interests of the defendant and society in having
the defendant present, the commencement of trial is at least a plausible place at which to draw that
line." Id. at 261.
246. See Allen, 397 U.S. at 343 (later codified in FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(3)); Taylor, 414 U.S.
at 20 (later codified in FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(b)(1)).
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commencement of the trial, and, instead of continuing in absentia, to
choose to attend the remainder of the trial by video teleconference.247
The ability to waive the right to be present at trial by being voluntarily
absent from the courtroom after commencement of the trial would sug-
gest that a defendant could engage in the lesser relinquishment of his
right by deciding, after the commencement of the trial, to attend the trial
248 thsiby video teleconference. In reality, this issue is unlikely to arise. Both
the precedent of the cases mentioned above, as well Rule 43(b), deny a
defendant the opportunity to purposefully disrupt or delay his trial-
either by engaging in disruptive conduct during the trial or by voluntarily
absenting himself from the courtroom. The trial can simply proceed
without him. Furthermore, defendants interested in proceeding legiti-
mately through the trial process are not likely to voluntarily waive their
right to physically attend their trial and appear instead by video telecon-
ference. In the case of disruptive defendants, however, courts would
seem to have the option of continuing court proceedings by video tele-
conferencing instead of continuing trials in absentia.
A defendant's willingness to waive his right to be present at pre-
and post-trial stages of the judicial process and appear by video is of
great practical concern. Some defendants have waived their right to be
present at these proceedings, and the courts have upheld the waivers.249
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that constitu-
tional and statutory rights, including the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, are subject to waiver. Nevertheless, in United States v. Mez-
zanatto,250 the Court stated that "the provisions of those Rules are pre-
sumptively waivable, though an express waiver clause may suggest that
Congress intended to occupy the field and to preclude waiver under
other, unstated circumstances., 251 Therefore, the fact that Rule 43(c) con-
tains a provision not requiring presence in certain circumstances, i.e.,
252waiver, suggests that presence cannot be waived for other proceedings,
247. See supra notes 232-46 and accompanying text.
248. See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
249. See Navarro, 169 F.3d at 235-39 (The court did not to directly address the issue of the
validity of waiver, but did allow the sentence of defendant Navarro, who had consented to being
sentenced by video, to stand, while invalidating the sentence of defendant Edmonson, who had
objected to the video sentencing.); Cambell v. Blodgett, 978 F.2d 1502, 1511 (9th Cir. 1992)
(defendant requested to be absent during jury selection).
250. 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
251. Mezzanano, 513 U.S. at 201.
252. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c). These circumstances include an organizational defendant
represented by counsel, misdemeanor cases with the defendant's written consent, a conference or
hearing upon a question of law, and a proceeding involving a reduction or correction of sentence. Id.
The written consent requirement to dispense with presence in misdemeanor cases strengthens the
argument that the rule does not provide for waiver of presence by the defendant in felony
proceedings. See Crosby, 506 U.S. at 262 (Rule 43 prevents a trial in absentia of a defendant who is
voluntarily absent at the beginning of the trial.).
[Vol. 80: 1
2002] VIDEO PROCEEDINGS IN FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS 99
including all those in Rule 43(a) not covered by the express waiver rule
and not permitted to be conducted by video teleconference.253
Assuming the right to presence legitimately can be waived, the issue
under Rule 43 focuses on the interpretation of the word "presence" in the
Rule in cases-other than those permitted to be conducted by video tele-
conference under Rule 43(a), i.e., initial appearances and arraignments-
where the defendant objects to conducting the proceeding by video tele-
conference. 54 All circuits considering the issue have concluded that
when a defendant refuses to consent to a video teleconference, presence
means physical presence, and video teleconferencing cannot be used in
pre- and post-trial proceedings when presence is required.255 At the least,
this applies to entering of pleas and every stage of a trial, including the
impaneling of the jury, the return of verdict, and the imposition of sen-
tence.256 Under Rule 43(c), however, these proceedings presumably
could be conducted by video teleconference when presence is not re-
quired.257
The issue regarding the amendments to Rules 5, 10, and 43 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure-permitting the initial appearance
and arraignment by video teleconferencing upon consent-is the wisdom
of this policy. In the Notes accompanying the amendment to Rule 10, the
Committee noted that it proposed amending the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, so that initial appearances and arraignments could be con-
ducted by video teleconference, because "some districts deal with a very
high volume of arraignments of defendants who are in custody. '25' The
Advisory Committee noted that many defendants "must be transported
long distances" for their arraignment, creating potential "security risks to
law enforcement and court personnel. '"259 The Committee also noted that
it feared "the beneficial use of video teleconferenced arraignments would
be lost if the defendant's consent was required" because pilot programs
253. See supra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
254. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a).
255. See United States v. Lawrence, 248 F.3d 300, 302 (4th Cir. 2001) (concluding that "the
plain text of Rule 43 mandates that a defendant be physically present at sentencing except when the
rule specifically provides otherwise"); Navarro, 169 F.3d at 237 (stating that "[t]he context of the
rest of Rule 43 supports the interpretation that 'presence' means a defendant's physical presence in
court"); Valenzuela-Gonzalez v. United States, 915 F.2d 1276, 1280 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that
"there is no provision for arraignment by closed circuit television," and that "[u]nder Rule 43, the
defendant must be present at arraignment").
256. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a).
257. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(c) (allowing defendant's absence: (1) when defendant is a corporation
represented by counsel; (2) in misdemeanor cases with the written consent of the defendant; (3)
when only a question of law needs resolution; and (4) when a proceeding only involves a reduction
or correction of sentence).
258. Memorandum, supra note 177, at 10.
259. Id.
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indicated defendants would not voluntarily forgo an opportunity to be
physically present at arraignment.
260
Nevertheless, the use of video teleconferencing in federal criminal
proceedings receives much wider support when consent requirements
accompany each rule permitting video proceedings.261 The Advisory
Committee's alternative amendments, which allowed proceedings to be
conducted by video teleconference without the defendant's consent, were
subject to scathing criticism from public defenders and the Defender
Services Committee. 262 In response, the Advisory Committee withdrew
the "no-consent amendments," noting that it believed requiring consent
satisfied many of the remaining concerns raised regarding video proceed-
ings.263 This decision seems to ignore the results of the pilot study re-
viewed by the Advisory Committee on Criminal Rules, which suggested
that because defendants rarely waive their right to physically attend pre-
trial proceedings, consent requirements might eliminate most of the
benefits associated with video proceedings.2 6 In addition, some courts
allowed proceedings to be conducted by video teleconference prior to the
implementation of the amended Rules, which specifically permit video
teleconferencing, when consent of the defendant could be obtained.265
The amendments to Rules 5 and 10 will have little practical effect on the
functioning of these courts, except to make the practice uniform
throughout the federal system.
266
If it is determined that the consent requirements emasculate the
amendments, because defendants will rarely consent, Congress appears
to have two viable choices. First, if, in the future, Congress concludes
that defendants generally are unwilling to consent, or that some feel so
pressured or compelled to waive their rights that consent requirements
are not effective in regulating the use of video proceedings, as some crit-
260. Memorandum II, supra note 178, at 165. The criminal pilot program was funded by the
Bureau of Prisons and the U.S. Marshals Service. Minutes of the Advisory Committee on Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure (Oct. 7-8, 1999), at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/newrules6.html
[hereinafter Minutes]. The studies were conducted in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and Puerto
Rico. Id. The pilot projects were established to determine if many pre-trial procedures could be
effectively conducted by video teleconference. Id. A paucity of data was collected in each study
because, under the advice of counsel, most defendants refused to consent to conduct their
proceedings by video teleconference. Id.
261. The general preference of a "consent required" amendment over a "no consent required"
version is evidenced by the Judicial Conference's rejection of the "no consent required" amendments
to Rules 5 and 10 and simultaneous adoption of identical "consent required" alternatives. Compare
FED. R. GRIM. P. 5 (2002 amendment), and FED. R. CRIM. P. 10 (2002 amendment), with
Memorandum H, supra note 178, at 143, 161.
262. See Memorandum, supra note 177, at 6.
263. See id. at 36.
264. Compare Memorandum, supra note 177, at 36, with Minutes, supra note 260, at 3.
265. See FED. R. CR'.. P. 5 advisory committee's notes (2002 amendment).
266. See FED. R. CRtM. P. 5 (2002 amendment); FED. R. CRIM. P. 10 (2002 amendment).
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ics contend,267 the amended language permitting the use of video telecon-
ferencing should be stricken. Otherwise, the federal system will leave the
security of the current rules, and incur expenses associated with purchas-
ing video conferencing equipment, without obtaining the increased effi-
ciency and safety from conducting criminal proceedings by video. After
incurring the expense of this technology, defendants may face increased
pressure to waive their rights under a consent regime. Furthermore,
abandoning the consent amendments would demonstrate support for the
arguments made by critics of using video proceedings in the criminal
process.
268
Additionally, the desire for efficiency that video technology pro-
vides has largely been created by the increase in federal criminal prose-
cutions brought about by the war on drugs and the federalization of
crime.269 Cutbacks in these areas may prove equally salutary.
Second, Congress alternatively could eliminate the consent re-
quirements. To do so, Congress would have to be unconvinced by the
arguments promulgated by critics of video teleconferencing in criminal
proceedings.270 Congress would have to be absolutely satisfied both that
the use of video teleconferences for initial appearances and arraignments
would afford defendants sufficient due process, and that the use of video
teleconferences would not undermine the public's perception of the fair-
ness of the proceedings. This choice would facilitate the efficiency that
video conferencing provides, as well as foster experimentation with
video technology in federal criminal proceedings-both of which were
largely sacrificed with the adoption of the consent requirements.
V. OTHER USES OF VIDEO PROCEEDINGS IN FEDERAL COURT?
As the quality of video teleconferencing technology continues to
improve, courts will face increasing pressure to rely more heavily on
video teleconferencing to conduct their daily activities.271 Past efforts to
deal with "video presence" attempted to categorize it as either being
267. Rabum-Remfry, supra note 1, at 833 (stating that "the use of adversarial counsel, or
jailhouse guards, to distribute and explain [a waiver of the defendant's right to appear before the
court in person] is both highly inappropriate and unduly coercive" and that "the physical and
psychological atmosphere of a jail, as opposed to the atmosphere of a courtroom, is so inherently
coercive that the jail itself prevents detainees from objectively assessing their situation").
268. Rabum-Remfry, supra note 1, at 814-18 (discussing the disadvantages of video
conferencing).
269. See generally TASK FORCE ON THE FEDRERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, ABA
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SECTION, THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW (1998); Gerald G. Ashdown,
Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 W. VA. L. REv. 789 (1996); Kathleen F.
Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Federalization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135
(1995).
270. See, e.g., Rabum-Remfry, supra note 1.
271. Id. at 812 (stating that "[t]he use of video for court production in the foreseeable future
will rapidly accelerate because of the need for cost controls in criminal courts").
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"physically present" or "not physically present., 272 This assumes that the
concept of presence does not exist along a gradient; an object is either
physically present or it is not. However, the focus on physical presence
overlooks the "within sight or call" element of presence.273 Limiting
presence to one of two categories, physical presence or absence, may be
counterproductive and signals a refusal to recognize the possibility that
the "presence" concept exists along a gradient.
Justice William 0. Douglas once observed that "[c]ommon sense
often makes good law." 274 Common sense suggests that while interacting
with a court through a 45-inch color monitor is something less than
physical presence, it provides greater due process and confrontation than
being altogether excluded from the courtroom. It may be more useful and
productive to view video presence, for the purpose of conducting judicial
proceedings, as existing in a category independent of physical presence
or absence.
In a letter to Judge Robin J. Cauthron, the Chair of the Defender
Services Committee, Judge Joseph R. Goodwin noted that:
[The] unacceptable risk of judicial degeneration [resulting from con-
ducting judicial proceedings in video teleconferences] is not rendered
acceptable by relegating video proceedings to "minor" or "unimpor-
tant" stages of the process. There are no such stages. Every step in a
criminal prosecution exists for a reason, and citizens have been freed
at each of them. If there be a step that is not important enough to do
formally and properly, then it should not be done at all.
2 75
Each stage in a criminal prosecution must be done "formally and prop-
erly. 27 6 Thus, the issue becomes whether, in order to do it "formally and
properly," the same elements of presence, or the same "quality of pres-
ence," must exist at each stage of a criminal prosecution.
277
When the amendments to Rules 5, 10, and 43 of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure were before the Judicial Conference, the Defender
Services Committee opposed the use of video teleconferencing to con-
duct initial appearances and arraignments, even with the defendant's
consent.278 Despite this opposition, the Advisory Committee, Standing
Committee, Judicial Conference, Supreme Court, and Congress approved
272. See supra notes 70-86 and accompanying text.
273. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1183 (6th ed. 1990).
274. Peak v. United States, 353 U.S. 43, 46 (1957).
275. Goodwin Letter, supra note 13.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Memorandum, supra note 177, at 6.
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the amendments.279 While the amendments limit the use of video telecon-
ferencing to initial appearances and arraignments,2 "video presence"
cannot be substituted for "physical presence" in other criminal proceed-
ings. The Judicial Conference's decision to allow the use of video tele-
conferencing in initial appearances and arraignments indicates that most
members of the Committee believed that these proceedings could be con-
ducted "formally and properly" 281 with fewer "presence elements" or a
lower quality of presence than could other stages of the criminal proc-
ess.282 In passing the amendments to Rules 5, 10, and 43, the Judicial
Conference impliedly recognized that presence exists along a gradient,
that while "video presence" cannot be equated with physical presence, it
is something more than absence, and that the quality of presence required
to conduct criminal proceedings "formally and properly" varies among
different stages of a criminal prosecution.283
The Judicial Conference's decision to pass the amendments to Rules
5, 10, and 43 raises an important question regarding the expanded use of
video teleconferencing in criminal prosecutions.2 4 Should judges have
more discretion in deciding when various stages of a criminal prosecu-
tion can be conducted by video teleconference? Obviously, under the
amendments, judges are not obligated to conduct all initial appearances
or arraignments by video teleconference.285 If the judge decides that,
based on the circumstances of the case, a quality of presence not obtain-
able in a video teleconference is needed for an initial appearance or ar-
raignment, the judge can conduct the proceeding with the defendant
physically present. This latitude was established because the Judicial
Conference recognized that the quality of presence required varies, not
only among the different stages of a criminal prosecution, but also
among cases in regard to a particular stage of the prosecution. 28 Possi-
bly, judges should be allowed the discretion, under some circumstances,
to conduct other stages in the process by video teleconference. An anec-
dote will help illustrate.
On July 11, 2001, a defendant in the Northern District of West Vir-
ginia was indicted for knowingly and willfully making a threat against
the President-elect of the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C § 871(a),
279. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 (2002 amendment); FED. R. CRIM. P. 10 (2002 amendment); FED.
R. CRIM. P. 43 (2002 amendment).
280. Id.
281. Goodwin Letter, supra note 13.
282. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 (2002 amendment); FED. R. CRIM. P. 10 (2002 amendment).
283. Goodwin Letter, supra note 13.
284. See FED. R. CRM. P. 5 (2002 amendment); FED. R. CRIM. P. 10 (2002 amendment); FED.
R. CRIM. P. 43 (2002 amendment).
285. Id.
286. The amendments for Rules 5(f) and 10(c) utilize the "may be used" terminology. FED. R.
CRIM. P. 5 (2002 amendment); FED. R. CRIM. P. 10 (2002 amendment).
287. Id.
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and transmitting a threat in interstate commerce in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c). 2 88 Between the date of the indictment and his initial appear-
ance, the defendant moved to Everett, Washington.2 9 In an effort to
avoid the expense associated with traveling from Washington to West
Virginia for each stage of the criminal prosecution, the defendant moved
the district court for a change of venue, arguing that a transfer to the
Northern District of California would serve the convenience of the par-
ties and/or witnesses.290 Because the witnesses involved in the case re-
sided in West Virginia, District Judge Irene Keeley denied the defen-
dant's motion. 9
In January 2002, the district court was advised that the defendant
entered into a plea agreement with the government.292 After the district
court scheduled the plea hearing, the defendant filed a motion requesting
to appear at the hearing by video teleconference so that he could avoid
the expense associated with traveling from his home in Washington to
West Virginia. 93 The defendant signed a waiver relinquishing his right
to be present "personally" and "in open court," and stating that he agreed
that his appearance by video teleconference would meet the "presence"
294requirement for the hearing.
Under Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a
defendant "shall be present ... at the time of the plea., 295 In determining
if the defendant could appear at his plea hearing by video teleconference,
Judge Keeley first examined the Fourth Circuit's stance on substituting
physical presence with video presence. 296 In United States v. Law-
rence,297 the Fourth Circuit expressly rejected the argument that video
presence could be substituted for physical presence. 298 The Fourth Circuit
stated "that virtual reality is rarely a substitute for actual presence and
that, even in an age of advancing technology, watching an event on the
screen remains less than the complete equivalent of actually attending
it.
, 299
The district court next addressed whether a defendant could avoid a
perceived unnecessary expense associated with traveling across country
288. United States v. Starfield, No. 1:01CR22 (N.D. W. Va. filed Jan. 17, 2002).






295. FED. R. CRIM. P. 43(a).
296. Starfield, No. 1:01CR22.
297. 248 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2001).
298. See Lawrence, 248 F.3d at 304.
299. Id. at 304.
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to enter his plea by waiving his right to be physically present and attend-
ing the plea hearing by video teleconference. 300 Judge Keeley concluded
that, without an express provision allowing a defendant to waive his right
to be present at his plea hearing, waiver in this circumstance could not be
allowed. 30' The district court relied on the Supreme Court's statement in
United States v. Mezzanatto,302 that although the "provisions of [the Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure] . . . are presumptively waivable.... an
express waiver clause may suggest that Congress intended to occupy the
field and to preclude waiver under other, unstated circumstances." 30 3 The
district court held that Rule 43 contained such express waiver provisions
in subsections (b)["Continued Presence Not Required"] and
(c)["Presence Not Required"]. 3°
Because the Fourth Circuit, like other circuits, had held that video
presence could not be substituted for physical presence, and because
Rule 43 does not expressly allow a defendant to waive the right to be
present at a plea hearing, 30 5 the district court denied the defendant's mo-
tion to appear at his plea hearing by video teleconference.3 °6 The decision
forced the defendant, against his wishes, to travel more than 2,000 miles
to attend the plea hearing, which lasted approximately 45 minutes.30 7
Perhaps the Advisory Committee, the Supreme Court, and Congress
should recognize that "presence" exists along a gradient and that, irre-
spective of, or as a future substitute for, the amendments permitting ini-
tial appearances and arraignments by video,308 a general rule is needed
permitting video teleconferencing for most non-trial proceedings
"[wihenever due to exceptional circumstances of the case it is in the in-
terest of justice. ' ,3°9 Such a rule would avoid labels such as "presence"
and "absence," and the confusion surrounding whether presence can be
waived in non-trial proceedings. 310 This rule would permit a video plea
hearing in cases like the one discussed above and would authorize other
proceedings by video teleconference when warranted by "exceptional
circumstances," such as safety concerns.31' Additionally, the "excep-
300. Starfield, No. 1:01CR22.
301. Id.
302. 513 U.S. 196 (1995).
303. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. at 201; see also Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255, 259 (1993);
Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 9 (1959).
304. Starfield, No. 1:01CR22.
305. See Lawrence, 248 F.3d at 304.
306. Starfield, No. 1:01CR22.
307. Id.
308. See FED. R. CRiM. P. 5 (2002 amendment); FED. R. CRIM. P. 10 (2002 amendment).
309. See FED. R. CRim. P. 15 (authorizing the taking of depositions under the "exceptional
circumstance" standard).
310. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 43 (2002 amendment).
311. See Lawrence, 248 F.3d at 305 (allowing the re-sentencing of unruly and abusive
defendant by video, with warning).
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tional circumstances" requirement 312 could displace the need for the de-
fendant's consent, eliminating some of the concerns about the practical-
ity of the "consent required" amendments to Rules 5 and 10.313 A general
"exceptional circumstances" provision authorizing the substitution of
video presence for physical presence in special cases has much to offer
over blanket, "consent required" or "consent not required" amendments.
CONCLUSION
There are advantages to using video teleconferencing to conduct
certain stages of federal prosecutions. Use of video teleconferencing re-
duces the amount of travel required by judges in large districts, increases
judicial efficiency, and reduces safety concerns associated with trans-
porting defendants to the courthouse for each stage of a criminal prose-
cution. For each advantage associated with video teleconferencing there
is an associated disadvantage. If a court conducts a proceeding by video
teleconference, a judge may have a difficult time insuring that a defen-
dant understands the importance of a criminal proceeding or the gravity
of the charge against him; the lines of communication between defense
attorneys and their clients may be impaired; video teleconferencing may
limit public access to federal criminal proceedings; and proceedings con-
ducted by video may not reflect the solemnity and decorum befitting a
proceeding in federal court. These costs and benefits associated with
conducting criminal proceedings by video teleconferencing should be
carefully considered by the federal courts in their discretion to use of
video teleconferencing under the newly amended Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
The Due Process Clause, the Confrontation Clause, and the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure each require a defendant's presence during
certain stages of a criminal prosecution. The "presence requirements" are
most restrictive under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, so analy-
sis of the "presence requirement" necessarily focuses on Rule 43. If
video presence could be substituted for physical presence under Rule 43,
the use of video teleconferencing in federal courts would be almost
unlimited. Wisely, federal appellate courts have refused to recognize
video presence as a substitute for physical presence, and have defined
presence under Rule 43 to mean physical presence. Therefore, under the
former version of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the use of
video proceedings in federal court was limited. Initial appearances, ar-
raignments, trials, plea hearings, and sentencings could not be conducted
312. The Advisory Committee notes to such a rule would have to make clear that "exceptional
circumstances" did not amount to mere judicial efficiency and convenience, and there would have to
be real evidence of safety concerns before the standard would be satisfied.
313. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5 (2002 amendment); FED. R. CRM. P. 10 (2002 amendment).
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by video teleconference over the defendant's objection, and it was un-
clear whether a defendant could validly consent to conduct these pro-
ceedings by video teleconference.314
After federal appellate courts held that "presence" under Rule 43
meant "physical presence," the drive for increased use of video telecon-
ferencing in federal courts gained momentum. This drive was fueled by
recent increases in the use of video teleconferencing to conduct certain
stages of criminal trials in state courts, the Judicial Conference's pro-
video teleconferencing policy, pro-video teleconferencing legislation
introduced in Congress by an influential senator, and rapid improvements
in the quality of video teleconferencing technology. As a result of this
drive, the Advisory Committee proposed amendments to Rules 5, 10, and
43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly allowing federal
courts to conduct initial appearances and arraignments by video telecon-
ference.
Several states now rely on video teleconferencing to conduct vari-
ous stages of criminal prosecutions. These state video-teleconferencing
programs have met with mixed success. Under current Missouri law,
most pre- and post-trial proceedings can be conducted by video telecon-
ference. In the late 1990s, Florida initiated a program to conduct juvenile
detention hearings by video teleconference. However, the Florida deten-
tion-hearing program failed. The value of these state programs in predict-
ing the future success of video teleconferencing in federal courts is un-
known, an the existence of this practice at the state level does not neces-
sarily justify its use in federal courts.315
The Advisory Committee originally drafted two alternative sets of
revisions for Rules 5 and 10. One set of revisions required a defendant's
consent before conducting his proceeding by video teleconference; the
other set did not. The Advisory Committee, however, withdrew the "no
consent" alternatives in response to negative public comment about these
proposed amendments. Although the remaining "consent required"
amendments received less criticism, and were subsequently approved by
the Judicial Conference, Supreme Court, and Congress, data from pilot
projects indicates that, because defendants rarely waive their right to
physically attend court, these amendments probably will have little prac-
tical effect.
There are two major shortfalls of the amendments. First, the
amendments do not provide minimal technical standards for the quality
of video teleconferencing equipment employed by federal courts. Be-
cause the quality of "video presence" differs significantly among video
314. See supra notes 249-57 and accompanying text.
315. See Rabum-Remfry, supra note 1, at 817-27.
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teleconferencing systems, and because variance in the quality of judicial
proceedings among federal courts should be minimized, rules should be
promulgated to standardize the quality of the video technology em-
ployed. Second, the amendments do not standardize the physical location
of the prosecutor and defense attorney with respect to the judge. Allow-
ing the prosecutor to physically attend a hearing, while the defense attor-
ney appears with the client by video, gives the prosecutor an unfair ad-
vantage and destroys the appearance of judicial impartiality. The rules
should require that both the defense attorney and the prosecutor appear
by video in a video proceeding.
The principal debate surrounding the amendments to Rules 5 and 10
centers on the consent requirements. If, in fact, few defendants will
waive their right to be physically present in court, little will be gained by
the amendments. In addition, nothing will be gained in those courts that
already permit defendants to waive the presence requirement under Rule
43 and appear by video. In the alternative, elimination of the consent
requirements could garner severe criticism based on due process con-
cerns.
Perhaps a better alternative would be for the Supreme Court and
Congress to adopt a general amendment to the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to permit video proceedings "[wihenever due to exceptional
circumstances of the case it is in the interest of justice." Such a rule
would enable initial appearances and arraignments to be conducted by
video, but only under readily identifiable, exceptional circumstances.
Furthermore, such an approach would authorize the use of video telecon-
ferencing in unusual cases for other non-trial proceedings, simultane-
ously promoting efficiency and avoiding additional defendant hardship.
It also would avoid most of the criticism aimed at blanket rules permit-
ting video proceedings for certain stages of the process in all cases.
Viewing "presence" dichotomously, as either physically present or
absent, is counterproductive. Envisioning the concept of presence as ex-
isting along a gradient may provide a better analytical framework for
determining the future of video teleconferencing in the federal court-
room. Lord Cobham is not physically present in the courtroom if only his
writings are transported from the tower to the trial. Similarly, Lord Cob-
ham is not physically present in the courtroom if he remains in the tower,
while his interactive image is beamed into the courtroom on a 45-inch
color monitor. However, on the monitor, Lord Cobham is within sight
and call, he can interact with the court, and the court can interact with
him. Common sense suggests that on the 45-inch monitor, Lord Cobham
is more present than if he appeared only through his writings, and is less
present than if he physically appeared in court.
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It is impossible to predict what the future of video or virtual pres-
ence holds. The line between physical and virtual presence becomes in-
creasingly blurred with new advancements in video technology. What is
needed is an analytical framework that prepares the federal courts to ad-
dress the challenges and reap the benefits accompanying these advance-
ments-permitting increased judicial efficiency, while maintaining judi-
cial integrity.
If presence exists along a gradient, the quality of presence required
may vary among criminal cases and among the various stages of a crimi-
nal prosecution. If the quality of presence required demands physical
presence, there is little room for the use of video teleconferencing in fed-
eral court. However, in passing the amendments to Rules 5 and 10 of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Judicial Conference, Supreme
Court, and Congress implicitly assumed that either video presence is
equal to physical presence, or that the quality of presence required to
conduct a proceeding varies among stages of a criminal prosecution.
Because appellate courts have universally rejected the former, the latter
assumption seems most probable. The question then becomes whether
the essential functions of the stages in the criminal process can be main-
tained through video proceedings, whether due process and the appear-
ance of fairness can be protected, and whether consent requirements will
vitiate the practicability of the new rules. If any of these questions is an-
swered in the negative, then we should spare criminal defendants "the
convenience of the guillotine," and discourage the use of video telecon-
ferencing in the criminal justice system. Nevertheless, for cases like that
in the Northern District of West Virginia, there should be a clear, general
safety valve provision permitting video appearances when special cir-
cumstances exist and the interests of justice warrant.

INTERNET GAMBLING AND THE DESTABILIZATION OF
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIES: TIME FOR A
COMPREHENSIVE BAN ON GAMBLING OVER THE WORLD
WIDE WEB
JOHN WARREN KINDT t & STEPHEN W. JoY"
INTRODUCTION
As the Internet rapidly gained popularity in the late 1990s, gambling
Web sites began to take root, causing numerous social, financial, and
political costs. These costs-including the creation of new gambling
addicts, bankruptcies, and crime--directly resulted from the widespread
proliferation and accessibility of gambling sites on the Internet. Policy-
makers worldwide generally failed to identify the large socio-economic
costs associated with Internet gambling, as well as the ability of Internet
gambling and other forms of cyberspace gambling to destabilize local,
national, and even international economies by disrupting financial insti-
tutions.
At the turn of the 21st century, Internet gambling exemplified gam-
bling in all cyberspace venues. At that time, Internet gambling promoters
claimed that the federal "Wire Act,"' which prohibits gambling by wire,
did not apply to cyberspace gambling. 2 Simultaneously, Internet gam-
bling operators argued that, as a practical matter, cyberspace gambling
could not be "banned."'3 Taken together, these arguments implied that
cyberspace gambling could not be practically or functionally regulated.
t Professor, University of Illinois; B.A., College of William and Mary; J.D., M.B.A.,
University of Georgia; L.L.M., S.J.D., University of Virginia.
tt Dobbins, Fraker, Tennant, Joy, and Perlstein. John K. Palchak, Aron Carnahan, and John
D. Bucciarelli provided valuable assistance in editing and cite-checking this analysis. Due to the
rapidly developing issues, current periodicals were necessarily utilized. The authors attempted to
delete the publications which were too influenced by the gambling industry.
1. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000). This federal statute prohibits one "engaged in the business of
betting or wagering [from] knowingly us[ing] a wire communication facility for the transmission in
interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the plac[ement] of bets
or wagers on any sporting event or contest." Id. § 1084(a).
2. See generally NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, FINAL REPORT 5-6 to -10 (June
1999), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/fullrpt.html [hereinafter NGISC
FINAL REPORT].
3. Id.
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Legal scholars, however, almost universally agreed with the U.S. De-
partment of Justice that Internet gambling violated the Wire Act.4
Utilizing the basic meta-language model of the McDougal/Lasswell
methodology of policy-oriented jurisprudence, 5 this analysis confirmed
the policy recommendation that all cyberspace and Internet gambling
needed to be banned domestically in the United States and prohibited
internationally by a United Nations multinational treaty because of their
potential to destabilize regional, national, and global economies.
I. DELIMITATION OF PROBLEMS
A. The Strategic Problems Associated with Gambling Issues
After the legalization of casinos and gambling in New Jersey in the
late 1970s, the amount of licensed gambling activity conducted within
the United States grew exponentially.6 For decades, however, the Wire
Act specifically prohibited the transmission of wagers by wire in either
"interstate or foreign commerce." 7 In 1995, some enterprising gambling
proponents claimed this statute did not apply to the Internet because of
its virtually wireless nature.8 The U.S. Justice Department disagreed and
maintained that "cyberspace casinos [in particular were] illegal."9
4. Id.at5-9to-12.
5. This particular article is summary in scope, but the authors conceived it within the
penumbra of the McDougal/Lasswell model for decision-making. In the areas of legal and
government policy, which subsume strategic socio-economic and business concerns, post-legal
realists formulated the classic decision-making models. In particular, Professor Myres McDougal
and Professor Harold Lasswell postulated a conceptual framework for legal decision-making in a
landmark article directed toward legal educators and law professors. Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S.
McDougal, Legal Education and Public Policy: Professional Training in the Public Interest, 52
YALE L.J. 203 (1943); see also John W. Kindt, An Analysis of Legal Education and Business
Education Within the Context of a J.D./MBA Program, 31 J. LEGAL EDUC. 512, 517-18 (1981-82)
(examining the legal realist movement); John W. Kindt, An Analysis of Legal Education and
Business Education Within the Context of a J.D./MBA Programme, 13 LAW TEACHER 12, 14-16
(1979); Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Criteria for a Theory About Law, 44 S. CAL. L.
REV. 362 (1971) (providing comprehensive goal criteria for a new theory about law); Myres S.
McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society, 1 GA. L. REV. 1 (1966) (examining interrelationships
of law and public policy). The decision-making concepts introduced by Professors McDougal and
Lasswell were later expanded to include international law and U.S. domestic law, as these areas
interfaced with "policy-oriented jurisprudence." See John N. Moore, Prolegomenon to the
Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 VA. L. REV. 662 (1968); Frederick
Tipson, The Lasswell-McDougal Enterprise: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, 14
VA. J. INT'L L. 535 (1973-74).
6. See NAT'L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM'N, EXEC. SUMMARY 2 (June 1999),
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/reports/fullrpt.html (stating that the U.S. gambling
industry grew "tenfold" since 1975) [hereinafter NGISC EXEC. SUMMARY].
7. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2000).
8. See, e.g., NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-4, 5-6 to -7.
9. William M. Bulkeley, New On-Line Casinos May Thwart U.S. Laws, WALL ST. J., May
10, 1995, at B1, available at 1995 WL-WSJ8710212.
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In addition, some promoters of Internet gambling began to try to
skirt federal laws by establishing online casinos in remote offshore loca-
tions, primarily in the Caribbean. 10 By 2000, at least twenty-five foreign
jurisdictions had granted Internet gambling licenses." A Canadian man
best exemplified this type of Internet gambling promoter when he prom-
ised in 1995 to build a "virtual strip" of casinos, available to Internet
users merely at the touch of a button.' 2 If left unregulated, analysts ex-
pected these casinos-the future "Virtual Vegas"--to rapidly develop
into a $10 billion per year industry.'
3
During the late 1990s, experts, as well as sectors of the general pub-
lic, became concerned with the possible social, economic, and political
ramifications that could result from these technological developments,
including the marked potential for an increase in the number of patho-
logical (addicted) gamblers.' 4 In addition to socio-economic ramifica-
tions, Internet gambling raised legal and regulatory issues that interfaced
with the notions of freedom of speech, freedom of the Internet, and an
individual's freedom of choice. Practical issues of taxation, regulation,
and competitive fairness further complicated these issues.
Experts refer to the strategic problems associated with gambling ac-
tivities, particularly government-sanctioned gambling activities, as the
ABCs of gambling, specifically:
(1) New pathological (Addicted) gamblers,
(2) New Bankruptcies, and
(3) New Crime and Corruption.
15
By 2001, the potential existed for these costs of Internet gambling ulti-
mately to compound each other, leading to devastating results.
10. Id.
11. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-1, -3. These jurisdictions included: "five
territories within Australia, Antigua and Barbuda, Austria, Belgium, Cook Islands, Costa Rica,
Curacao, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Finland, Germany, Grand Turk, Grenada, Honduras, the
territory of Kalmykia in Russia, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent, South
Africa, Trinidad, Turks and Caicos Islands, four territories in the United Kingdom, Vanatu, and
Venezuela." Id.
12. See Joshua Quittner, Betting on Virtual Vegas: To Get Around U.S. Gambling Laws, the
First Online Casinos are Setting Up Their Card Tables Offshore, TiME, June 12, 1995, at 64,
available at 1995 WL 9021026.
13. Id.
14. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-4, -5.
15. See John Warren Kindt, U.S. and International Concerns over the Socio-Economic Costs
of Legalized Gambling: Greater than the Illegal Drug Problem?, Statement to the National Gambling
Impact Study Commission 2 (May 21, 1998), available at http://www.library.ucla.edu/libraries/-
mgi/campaign/1998gen/props/prop5/website-no2/statements/johnkindt_ 1998_may_21 .html
[hereinafter U.S. and International Costs].
2002]
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In 1996, the U.S. press reported the viewpoint that de jure or de
facto Internet "gambling [was] the fastest way to destroy the credibility
of the Internet system."' 6 Additionally, the press summarized one au-
thor's opinion: "If you lose, you'll lose, and if you win, you could lose
because there's no way to collect from these offshore operations. ' 7 Fur-
thermore, the pervasiveness of personal computers at every workstation,
in every school, and in every living room maximized the accessibility
and acceptability of Internet gambling-negatively impacting work pro-
ductivity and financial systems. The online casinos became devastating
enticements for the constantly growing numbers of pathological and
problem gamblers in the United States and worldwide. "People will be
trapped," one author concluded.18 "They won't be able to get away from
it.,
,1
1. Costs of Addictions
"America is addicted to gambling - and doesn't even know," stated
Bernie Horn, the 1996 political director of the National Coalition Against
Legalized Gambling ("NCALG"),2 0 a nonprofit watchdog organization
similar to Mothers Against Drunk Driving. In support of this statement,
Horn pointed to studies indicating that legalized gambling led to an in-
creased problem of pathological gambling. 21 For example, a 1995 study
in Iowa determined that "after the state legalized casinos, 5.4% of the
state's adults, or 110,000 people, became pathological[, addicted, or
problem] gamblers," which represented a 200% increase.22 Before Iowa
legalized riverboat casinos, only 1.7% of Iowans constituted pathological
or problem gamblers.23 The criteria for diagnosing a pathological gam-
bling disorder was first enumerated by the American Psychiatric Asso-
ciation in 1980, and thereafter listed in subsequent editions of the Diag-
nostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV).24
16. James Stemgold, A One-Armed Bandit Makes a House Calls [sic]; Virtual Casino is
Coming, but Regulation is Still a Big Question, N.Y. TiMES, Oct. 28, 1996, at DI (quoting John W.
Kindt).
17. Id. (quoting John W. Kindt).
18. Id. (quoting John W. Kindt).
19. Id. (quoting John W. Kindt).
20. Melissa Weinstein Kaye, Smooth Sailing is Expected for Gambling Commission, CONG.
Q., July 20, 1996, at 2053.
21. See Melissa Weinstein Kaye, Gambling: Across the Country ... Most Popular Game in
Town, CONG. Q., July 20, 1996, at 2055.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS § 312.31, at 615-18 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. The DSM-1V
delimits pathological gambling as follows:




To further compound the problems associated with widespread
gambling on the Internet, experts discovered that the dangers of elec-
tronic gambling far exceed those of traditional "real-world" forms of
wagering for the 1% to 3% of the public most vulnerable to gambling
addictions.25 Howard Shaffer, Director of Harvard Medical School's Di-
vision on Addictions, determined that the use of "[e]lectronics as a vehi-
cle of administration for gambling activities changes the experience to
make it more dependence producing., 6 Shaffer noted: "As smoking
crack cocaine changed the cocaine experience, I think electronics is go-
ing to change the way gambling is experienced., 27 For students and the
digital generation in particular, this incarnation of gambling has "all the
makings of a disaster," as summarized by one Gamblers Anonymous
("GA") member.28 GA members warned that "Internet gambling [wa]s a
solitary addiction," noting that "[e]ven in action-filled casinos, [ad-
dicted/pathological] gamblers [tended to] isolate themselves from their
surroundings., 29 "Online gambling [wals a further extension of this [iso-
lation].... It [constituted] a way not to have to deal with any people, and
it could be very secretive. 30
(1) [I]s preoccupied with gambling (e.g., preoccupied with reliving past gambling
experiences, handicapping or planning the next venture, or thinking of ways to get
money with which to gamble)
(2) [N]eeds to gamble with increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the
desired excitement
(3) [H]as repeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back, or stop gambling
(4) [Ils restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop gambling
(5) [G]ambles as a way of escaping from problems or of relieving a dysphoric mood
(e.g., feelings of helplessness, guilt, anxiety, depression)
(6) [A]fter losing money gambling, often returns another day to get even ("chasing"
one's losses).
(7) [L]ies to family members, therapist, or others to conceal the extent of
involvement with gambling
(8) [H]as committed illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft, or embezzlement to
finance gambling
(9) [H]as jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or educational or career
opportunity because of gambling
(10) [Rjelies on others to provide money to relieve a desperate financial situation
caused by gambling
B. The gambling behavior is not better accounted for by a Manic Episode.
Id. at 618.
25. William H. Bulkeley, Feeling Lucky? Electronics is Bringing Gambling into Homes,
Restaurants and Planes, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1995, at Al, available at 1995 WL-WSJ 9896153.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Gabriella Spinnato, Online Gambling: Legal, Enticing to College Students, DALLY FREE
PRESS (Boston), Nov. 6, 2000, available at www.dailyfreepress.com/main.cfm?include=detail&-
storyid=8076. Gamblers Anonymous programs parallel Alcoholics Anonymous programs and utilize
a similar 12-step procedure. See Henry R. Lesieur, Socioeconomic Impacts and Public Policy: Costs
and Treatment of Pathological Gambling, 556 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 153, 158
(1998).
29. Spinnato, supra note 28.
30. Id. (quoting a GA member) (alteration in original).
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As the 20th century ended, the Internet quickly evolved into an om-
nipresent factor around the world. In this context, psychiatrists and psy-
chologists discovered a new obsession-"nternet Addiction."'" As re-
ported in 2000, Dr. Kimberly Young, the executive director at the Center
for On-Line Addiction, studied "496 heavy Internet users and compared
their behavior to the clinical criteria used to classify gambling. 32 Young
concluded that people with "'Internet Addiction' met four or more of the
established criteria and found college students to be particularly at
risk., 3 3 Apparently aware of this phenomenon, elements of the Internet
gambling industry actively and blatantly looked to exploit it in order to
maximize profits. For example, one popular 1995 Internet gambling site,
called the Cozino, offered visitors the opportunity to play various games
of chance online, and reportedly had arguably unethical plans to add self-
acknowledged "addictive" entertainment in the future.34 An onscreen
message stated: "If you are addicted to a particular casino game and
would like to see (and play) it in the Cozino, please E-mail to the address
below. 35
2. Costs of Bankruptcies
Presumably, the stereotypical gambling debt enforcer did not imme-
diately concern online gamblers because when a player incurred losses
online, those debts accrued on credit. 36 Some sites even allowed gam-
blers to wager their house mortgages,37 highlighting that some industry
elements obviously marketed to pathological (addicted) gamblers, as
well as the extensive and pervasive nature of potential losses. These po-
tentially extensive losses would adversely impact not only the gamblers
who incurred them, but also their related financial institutions. Viewed
strategically, these economic impacts could destabilize financial infra-
structures, particularly in developing economies with less stable financial
systems.
In addition to the personal bankruptcies made possible by Internet
gambling, businesses also faced significant economic losses due to the
presence and accessibility of Internet gambling in the workplace. In the
1990s, businesses with Internet access started experiencing problems as
31. Alex Weininger, Doctors Disagree About Existence of Disorder Termed 'Internet
Addiction,' DIGITAL COLLEGIAN (Penn.) (Oct. 11, 2000), at http://www.collegian.psu.edu/archive/-
2000/10/10-11 -00tdc/l 0-11 -O0dnews-8.asp.
32. Id. Gambling represented "the closest type of addiction to online addiction because it
involve[d] failed impulse control without involving an intoxicant." Id.
33. Id.
34. See Quittner, supra note 12.
35. Id. (emphasis added).




their employees lost productive job time while "surfing the Net.''38 As
workers began to engage in Internet gambling activities, the businesses
lost not only productive labor time, but also company assets, as employ-
ees became hooked and started to steal from their employers to fund their
addictions.39
Sociologists almost uniformly reported that legalizing more forms
of gambling (known as the "acceptability factor") and making more
forms of gambling available (known as the "accessibility factor") lead to
the creation of new pathological gamblers in the workforce, who en-
gaged in "addictive behavior" pursuant to the DSM-IV.4° In one 1987
survey, even before widespread Internet use, pathological gamblers in
Gamblers Anonymous were already reporting that 44% had stolen from
their employers to gamble, 34% had been fired from work or had quit,
21% had filed for bankruptcy, and 18% had gambling-related arrests.41
Legalized gambling activities on the Internet would maximize both
the acceptability factor and the accessibility factor, creating new patho-
logical gamblers by placing gambling activities in every household,
proximate to children in schools, and at every employee's work station-
theoretically. This would create major numbers of new pathological
38. See, e.g., Lisa Guernsey, The Web: New Ticket to a Pink Slip, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1999,
at GI (stating that dozens of employees are fired for surfing pornography and gambling sites); see
Henry R. Lesieur, Experience of Employee Assistance Programs with Pathological Gamblers, 19 J.
DRUG IssuEs 425, 427 (1989).
39. For two examples of how employee theft resulted in significant losses in the financial
industry see Laura Proctor, The Barings Collapse: A Regulatory Failure or a Failure of
Supervision?, 22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 735, 741 (1997), examining the 1995 collapse of Barings Bank
following a $1 billion loss from an employee's unauthorized use of company funds, and Andrew
Pollack, U.S. Holds Trader in Bank's Big Loss, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1995, at Al, discussing Daiwa
Bank's $1.1 billion loss from an employee's unauthorized trading.
40. See supra note 24 and accompanying text; see also Brett Pulley, Compulsive Gambling
Spreads, Largely Due to Legality, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1997, at Al ; see generally Howard J. Shaffer
et al., Estimating the Prevalence of Disordered Gambling Behavior in the United States and
Canada: A Meta-analysis, Harvard Medical School, Div. on Addictions, Dec. 15, 1997, at 107,
app. 2; Press Release, Harvard Medical School, Harvard Medical School Researchers Map
Prevalence of Gambling Disorders in North America: Research Shows that Gambling Disorders
Affect a Growing Number of Adults (Dec. 4, 1997), at http://www.hms.harvard.edu/news/releases/-
1297gambling.html (Based on studies conducted between 1977 and 1993, 0.84 percent of adults
were affected by a gambling disorder. But "the prevalence rate from 1994-1997 grew to 1.29 percent
of the adult population."). For a summary of the acceptability factor and the accessibility factor, see
John W. Kindt, U.S. National Security and the Strategic Economic Base: The Business/Economic
Impacts of the Legalization of Gambling Activities, 39 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 567, 581 (1995).
41. John W. Kindt, The Costs of Addicted Gamblers: Should the States Initiate Mega-Lawsuits
Similar to the Tobacco Cases?, 22 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 17, tbls.A4, A8 &
accompanying footnotes [hereinafter Mega-Lawsuits]; see also Henry R. Lesieur, Compulsive
Gambling, SOCIETY, May-June 1992, at 43; Henry R. Lesieur, Pathological Gambling, Work, and
Employee Assistance, 1 J. EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE RES. 32, 32, 42-45 (1992); Henry R. Lesieur,
Measuring the Costs of Pathological Gambling: Saying Too Much With Too Little, Address at the
Nat'l Conf. on Gambling Behavior of the Nat'l Council on Problem Gambling (Sept. 1996).
42. U.S. and International Costs, supra note 15, at 3, 18-19.
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
gamblers, at an annual cost to society of $10,000 to $52,000 per patho-
logical gambler.43 Sociologists indicated that the best blue-collar and
white-collar employees, the Type-A personalities, were the most likely to
become pathological gamblers, and most pathological gamblers engaged
in property crimes, including embezzlement and fraud, to finance their
gambling.44 Before the widespread use of the Internet, reports in 1987
already confirmed that pathological gambling accounted for 33% of all
insurance fraud, or $1.3 billion.45 The advent of Internet gambling cre-
ated new technologies and new opportunities for gambling-related
fraud.46
One pathological employee gambler in a million-dollar company
could easily bankrupt that business. 47 Reports confirmed substantial in-
creases in the numbers of pathological gamblers and concomitant per-
sonal, professional, and business bankruptcies in those states and coun-
ties that, during the 1990s, allowed casinos and video gambling machines
("VGMs"). For example, a 1997 report sponsored by the American bank-
ing industry concluded that counties with accessibility to casino and
video machine gambling had between 18% to 71% more business bank-
ruptcies and personal bankruptcies than the national average-attributing
these bankruptcies to gambling losses.48 The use of VGMs and other
electronic gambling devices ("EGDs") represented a substantial step
toward Internet gambling.
3. Costs of Crime
While Hollywood often romanticizes gambling and its association
with crime as something glamorous or socially acceptable, the real link
between gambling and criminal activity deviates quite far from this in-
nocuous portrayal. "Within three years after [casino] gambling was in-
troduced to Atlantic City, the city experienced a tripling of total crime,
rocketing from 50th to 1st in crime rate per capita. ' 49 Similarly, in a "be-
fore gambling" vis-A-vis "after gambling" example:
43. See id. at 11-12, 16. These cost estimates were not adjusted to current year dollars.
44. See id. at 10, 17; see also Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 41, at 47 tbl.A8 and accompanying
footnotes.
45. Henry R. Lesieur & Kenneth Puig, Insurance Problems and Pathological Gambling, 3 J.
GAMBLING BEHAV. 123, 134 (1987).
46. See Unregistered Advisers Barred from 'Net, NEws-GAzETtE (Champaign, Il.), Sept. 5,
1996, at C8 [hereinafter Unregistered Advisers].
47. See Proctor, supra note 39, at 737-41, 750-52 & n.155; see also supra text accompanying
note 39.
48. SMR RESEARCH CORP., THE PERSONAL BANKRUPTCY CRISIS, 1997: DEMOGRAPHICS,
CAUSES, IMPLICATIONS, & SOLUTIONS 119-23 (1997).
49. Cynthia R. Janower, Gambling on the Internet, 2 J. CoMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 1
(1996), available at http://jcmc.huji.ac.il/vol2fissue2/anower.html (citing Robin Widgery, Warning:
[Vol. 80:1
INTERNET GAMBLING
[T]he state attorney's office in Deadwood, South Dakota indicated
that within two years after legalizing casino gambling, child abuse
cases increased approximately 42%, domestic violence increased
80%, and burglaries and the writing of bad checks increased; overall,
the town experienced a 50% increase in felonies and an 80-100% in-
crease in law enforcement and police costs.
50
In addition to increases in specific categories of crime, an increased risk
of white-collar crime also existed, predicated upon the ease with which
gambling facilities laundered money. 5' This factor, coupled with the
anonymity of the Internet and lax supervision by government officials in
certain countries hosting online casinos, resulted in a strong likelihood of
52criminal behavior eventually occurring.
As the explosion in the number of Internet casinos developed, U.S.
law enforcement agencies, as well as the U.S. State Department, con-
cluded that countries combining lax Internet casino regulations with sub-
stantial privacy laws created a recipe for disaster.53 These factors theo-
retically allowed organized crime rings and drug cartels a safe haven to
launder billions of dollars in illegal profits through the Antiguan offshore
gambling establishments. 54 "Antigua's offshore banking [business] --
established in the mid-1980s with only limited regulation -- expanded
rapidly in recent years . . . .Unfortunately, inadequate regulation and
vetting led to a surge in questionable banking operations -- a number
with alleged links to Russian criminal elements, ' '55 declared a 1997 U.S.
State Department report on international money-laundering and narcotics
organizations. "The growing potential for money laundering has been an
increasing concern of both the U.S. and Antiguan governments, 56 the
report concluded.
Evidence of the direct relationship between gambling and crime also
appeared in the United States. For instance, "[t]he former manager of
[Virginia]'s third-largest charitable gambling [organization] pleaded
Legal Gambling is a Costly Game, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 23, 1994, available at 1994 WL
8794061).
50. Id.
51. See Internet Casinos Find a Haven in the Caribbean Islands, LAS VEGAS REV-J., Nov. 10,
1997, available at 1997 WL 4557597 [hereinafter Casinos Find a Haven].
52. See id. (discussing Internet casinos based in Antigua and Barbuda).
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. Id. (omission in original).
56. Id. For a report by the U.S. General Accounting Office on the problems of gambling and
money laundering (requested by U.S. Senator Sam Nunn), see U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
MONEY LAUNDERING-RAPID GROWTH OF CASINOS MAKES THEM VULNERABLE, REP. No.
GAO/GGD-96-28 (1996).
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guilty to nine counts of embezzlement. 57 This case paralleled other
charitable bingo corruption cases in Virginia, which resulted in embez-
zlement-related indictments against two former workers and guilty pleas
or convictions on fraud-related charges for four others.58 Virginia's
charitable gambling operations experienced corruption so widespread
that "four of the state's 33 [most popular] games [suffered] from either
criminal indictments and/or convictions against their officials." 
59
Another case involved "[a] veteran FBI agent who supervised an or-
ganized crime squad and placed substantial bets on sporting events with
[the] people he was investigating. '60 He became hooked on gambling and
eventually pled guilty to embezzling $400,000.61
"My client had a gambling problem," said Mark Schnapp, attor-
ney for [the agent] Jerome R. Sullivan.
Court documents show [the FBI agent] took kickbacks from in-
formants [to finance his pathological gambling]. Those documents
also show that [the agent] received death threats from an associate of
the Lucchese crime family .... when he amassed $100,000 in gam-
bling debts.
According to agents who questioned Sullivan, the former agent
said he first started placing $100 bets with people he was investigat-
ing while on an undercover organized crime assignment in Fort
Lauderdale.
[Thereafter, h]e increased his bets to "several thousands of dol-
lars" over time.
62
This scenario demonstrated a classic pattern of gambling into addiction
and highlighted that anyone, even a trained professional, was vulnerable
to the lure of pathological gambling.
Gambling-related crime affected many people besides simply the
criminal and the victim. Sociologists indicated that each pathological
57. Matthew Dolan, Ex-Manager of Bingo Outfit Pleads Guilty to Embezzling the Case
Involved the State's Third-Largest Group, Which Pulls Down $2 Million a Year, VIRGINIAN-PILOT
AND LEDGER-STAR, Jan. 27, 1998, available at 1998 WL 5534827.
58. Id.
59. Id.






gambler affected at least seven, and up to seventeen, other people.63 The
direct link between pathological gambling and the lives of other people
may result in tragedy, such as in the case of the Michigan man who re-
turned from Las Vegas "distraught over gambling debts" and killed his
pregnant wife, his three children, and then himself.64
Pathological gamblers burdened society in a variety of respects. A
compulsive gambler's mean gambling debt can range anywhere from
$52,000 to $92,000.65 Some economists argued that these "sterile trans-
fers of money" simply resulted in expenditures elsewhere in the economy
and did not constitute losses to the overall economy. 66 Other economists,
however, categorized these gambling debts as losses to the "productive"
and high-multiplier-effect economy, as they involve transfers into the
non-productive or less productive "gambling economy" with its con-
comitant social costs. 6 7 A survey of Gambler's Anonymous members
revealed that approximately 47% had committed insurance-related fraud
or thefts in which insurance companies were obligated to pay the vic-
tims.
68
4. Additional Social Costs
Areas debating whether to legalize gambling should consider what
these statistics suggest for the future. 69 Robert Goodman wrote in his
book, The Luck Business, that gambling's total social cost, calculated by
combining the values of bankruptcies, crime, broken families, and treat-
ment, totaled approximately $29 billion annually.70 By his accounting,
these costs totaled twice the amount of the tax revenues generated annu-
63. Janower, supra note 49 (citing John W. Kindt, The Economic Impacts of Legalized
Gambling Activities, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 51, 61 (1994) [hereinafter Economic Impacts]).
64. Jim Suhr, Farmington Hills Man Kills Family, Himself Over Gambling Debt, DETROIT
NEWS, Nov. 21, 2000, available at http://detnews.com/2000/metro/001 1/21/-151774.htm; see also
Sandra Blakeslee, Suicide Rate Is Higher In 3 Gambling Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1997, at A10
(comparing suicide rates in Atlantic City, Las Vegas, and Reno to other cities where gambling is
illegal); Larry Fruhling, Addiction Leads to Tragic End, DES MOINES REG., Mar. 25, 1997, at Ml,
M2 (reporting that a college student killed himself over gambling debts; two and a half years later
his stepfather killed himself out of grief); Cam Simpson, Baby Death Plot Told. Suburb Mom
Indicted in Insurance Scheme, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Mar. 7, 1998, at 1 (reporting that a mother addicted
to gambling allegedly killed one and perhaps two of her children in separate instances to collect
insurance money in order to continue to gamble).
65. Janower, supra note 49 (citing Widgery, supra note 49).
66. PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 425 (J.S. Dietrich et al. eds., 10th ed. 1976). Paul
Samuelson won the Nobel Prize in Economic Science in 1970.
67. For a summary, see John W. Kindt, The Business-Economic Impacts of Licensed Casino
Gambling in West Virginia: Short-Term Gain but Long-Term Pain, 13 W. VA. PUB. AFF. REP. 22,
24-25 (1996) [hereinafter Business-Economic Impacts of Gambling].
68. Lesieur & Puig, supra note 45, at 123.
69. Tomorrow Never Dies; Future Costs of Gambling Outweigh Revenue Gains, PHILA.
ONLINE, Jan. 28, 1998, at A14 [hereinafter Tomorrow Never Dies].
70. Id.; see ROBERT GOODMAN, THE LUCK BUSINESS ch. 3 (1995). For a table of costs, see
Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 41, at tbl.A3 and accompanying footnotes.
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ally from gambling, and other studies have reported even greater propor-
tional losses.7'
"The law must keep [pace] with technology," demanded U.S. Sena-
tor Jon Kyl at the initial 1997 hearing involving Internet gambling issues
before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology, Terror-
ism, and Government Information. 72 As Chairman of the Subcommittee,
Senator Kyl summarized that:
[g]ambling is either heavily regulated or expressly prohibited in the
states. On the Internet, it is neither. Given the tremendous potential
for abuse, addiction, and access by minors, online gambling should be
prohibited. My bill will protect children from logging on to the family
computer, "borrowing" the family credit card, and losing the family
home, all before their parents get home from work. And for those
people with a gambling problem, my bill will make it harder to gam-
ble away the family paycheck.
... Gambling erodes values of hard work, sacrifice, and per-
sonal responsibility. Although the social costs of gambling are diffi-
cult to quantify, research indicates they are potentially staggering.
Gambling is a growing industry in the United States, with [wagering]
approaching $550 billion last year [1996] - three times the revenues
of General Motors Corp. In 1993, more Americans visited casinos
than attended a major league baseball game.73
The erosion of hard work that Senator Kyl referenced was traceable to
the fact that an increase in gambling-oriented Internet sites could nega-
tively impact the workplace in many U.S. corporations.74 Employee
gambling on the Internet represented a serious corporate problem for the
21st century according to Dr. David Greenfield of the Center for Internet
Studies and the author of Virtual Addiction.75 "Companies that provide
Internet access to gambling sites may incur substantial employee produc-
tivity losses . . . .In extreme cases, this may increase the potential for
liability from the negative consequences an employee may incur -- in-
71. Id. For a summary of costs versus benefits, see Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 41, at 38 n. 136.
72. Press Release, Sen. Jon Kyl, Chair, U.S. Sen. Subcomm. on Technology, Terrorism, &
Gov't. Info., Kyl Introduces Bill Outlawing Gambling On The Internet (Mar. 19, 1997), available at
1997 WL 4430799.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
75. See Online Gambling a Losing Battle in the Workplace; Sites Show a 209 Percent




cluding compulsive [pathological] gambling problems and financial
losses. 76
An increase in gambling addictions could also impact health care
costs, since pathological gamblers are more likely to have problems with
alcohol77 and also evidence a suicide rate that is five to ten times higher
than that of the national average. 78 If society decided to rehabilitate gam-
bling addicts, the total cost would range between $17,000 and $42,000
per person (in 1993 dollars).79 The national cost of pathological gambling
80
in 1996 was therefore estimated to be $56 billion per year.
B. The Proliferation of the Internet and Online Gambling
In 1999, the United Nations Development Programme's ("UNDP")
Human Development Report catalogued the rapid spread of Internet us-
age, establishing the United States as the leading country with 88.9
Internet hosts per 1000 people according to 1998 data.8' Other leading
countries included: Norway, 71.8; Australia, 42.7; Switzerland, 27.9; and
the United Kingdom 23.3 (1995 U.K. data).82
Between August 1995 and April 1999, Internet usage in North
83
America grew from 18 million to 92 million users. In 1994, an amazing
30% of U.S. public elementary schools and 49% of secondary schools
already had access to the Internet.84 Only 5 years later in 1999, the total
rose to 95% overall, with 94% of elementary schools and 98% of secon-
85dary schools having Internet access.
Financial experts estimated that electronic technology would lead to
increases in overall gambling revenues, which had already increased
significantly from the 1980s to the 1990s. By 1995, "John Malone, presi-
dent of cable-television [company] Tele-Communications, Inc.... called
gambling one of the 'killer applications' for interactive networks," 86 and
he implied that gambling partially justified the cost of developing the
76. Id.
77. Janower, supra note 49 (citing Economic Impacts, supra note 63, at 63).
78. Id. (citing Widgery, supra note 49).
79. See, e.g., VALERIE C. LORENZ, ET AL., FINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON GAMBLING
ADDICTION IN MARYLAND (1990), available at http://www.nyu.edu/its/socsci/Docs/taskforce_4.-
html; see also Economic Impacts, supra note 63, at 65; Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 41, at 44 tbl.A3.
80. Janower, supra note 49 (citing Widgery, supra note 49).
81. U.N. DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 53 tbl.A1.3 (1999),
available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1999/en/.
82. Id.
83. See http://www.nua.ie/surveys/how-manyonline/namerica.htm (last visited Sept. 21,
2002) (listing data from Commerce Net/Nielsen Media Research).
84. ANNE CATFAGNI & ELIZABETH FARRIS, NATIONAL CENTER FOR EDUCATION STATISTICS,
INTERNET ACCESS IN U.S. PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND CLASSROOMS: 1994-2000 2 tbl.1 (May 9, 2001),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubsinfo.asp?pubid=2001071.
85. Id.
86. Bulkeley, supra note 25.
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information highway. "Though still in its infancy, [by 1997, online gam-
bling constituted] a $200-million-a-year business,"87 available on ap-
proximately 36 Internet sites. Considering that the annual amount gam-
bled in America already totaled $550 billion, the growth potential be-
came "obvious for virtual casinos and Internet sports betting ' 88 (the
"gateway" gambling venue considered especially tempting to teens).89
Gambling online quickly became one of the most rapidly growing indus-
tries of the Internet, boasting annual revenues of $1.2 billion in 1999, an
increase of 80% from 1998.90 By 2002, it had the possibility of becoming
a $3 billion industry, according to the international investment bank,
Bear Stearns. 91
By 2000, nearly 700 Web sites offered online gambling to users, an
industry anticipated "to grow from $1.1-billion in 1999 to $3-billion in
2002, ' '92 according to conservative estimates by the online gambling in-
dustry. In 2000, a survey of Internet users showed that "I-million Ameri-
cans gamble online each day, and that 4.5-million Americans-about 5%
of those with access to the Internet-have gambled online." 93 According
to Websense Inc., a computer company that instructs corporations on
how to manage their employees' Internet usage, the number of gambling-
oriented sites jumped "from 6,992 in August 1999 to more than 21,651
as of August 2000." 94 This constituted a 209% increase through the
course of one year, increasing 136% alone from February 2000 until Au-
gust 2000.95 An Internet search in November 2000 on the search engine
Google.com yielded approximately 2.4 million sites matching the term
"gambling," and approximately 43,800 sites matching the phrase "inter-
net gambling. 96 In September 2001, less than one year later, there were
still about 2.4 million sites matching the term "gambling" on
Google.com, but the number matching "Internet gambling" had jumped
to 522,000.
97
Jerry Fiddler, a University of Illinois alumnus and a co-founder of
the Wind River Systems software company, addressed University of Illi-
87. Trying to Outlaw Internet Gambling, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Aug. 27, 1997, at
A10, available at 1997 WL 7303150 [hereinafter Trying to Outlaw Internet Gambling].
88. Id.
89. Joseph G. LaTessa, Internet Gambling and the Regulation of the Internet, ARK. Bus. &
ECON. REV., Mar. 1, 1996, at 11, available at 1996 WL 13731939.
90. Online Gambling in Workplace, supra note 75.
91. Id.
92. House Nixes Ban on Net Gambling (July 18, 2000), at http://news.cnet.comlnews/0-1005-
200-2279682.htrnl [hereinafter House Nixes Ban]; Internet Gambling Gets Reprieve in House, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, July 18, 2000, at 1A, available at 2000 WL 5624442.
93. Id.
94. Online Gambling in Workplace, supra note 75.
95. Id.




nois students at the Sixth Annual Student Computing Conference.
"'What's the Internet going to look like in 10 years? I guarantee it won't
look like it does today,' Fiddler told the audience. 98 He predicted that by
2010, one trillion devices would be connected to the Intemet.
99
Gambling used to involve secretive dealings with unscrupulous
bookmakers, or concerted trips to the dog or horse track, or to Atlantic
City or Las Vegas.'00 By 1995, however, the Internet broadened access to
gambling, making it almost ubiquitous. Speculators used modem com-
puters to extend the reach of gambling-often frustrating regulators.'0 1
Technology's biggest impact on the gambling industry could be inviting
gambling into the home-which International Gaming and Wagering
Business, a gambling industry trade publication, referred to as "gaming's
new frontier., 10 2 Libertarians sometimes argued that if Internet users
chose to risk their money on unregulated Internet gambling with strang-
ers in a foreign land, they got what they deserved when cheated. 103 Inter-
net gambling, however, had another insidious aspect. "Unchecked, it
ha[d] the [very real] potential to turn every family room[, office, and
school] in America with a ... computer into an unregulated casino,''t4
according to former Minnesota Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey,
III. Thereby, Internet gambling could send billions of U.S. dollars to
dubious foreign jurisdictions (including terrorist organizations), poten-
tially making Internet gambling a national security issue.
II. CLARIFICATION OF GOALS
A. Overall Goals in Legalized Gambling Issues
In gambling issues, the overall strategic goals for government
should be to conform to the common-law principle of maximizing the
public health, safety, and welfare. In this context, the major goals for
governmental authorities and decision-makers should be as follows:
(1) minimize the social impacts of pathological (addicted) gam-
blers;
98. Sarah Schlitz, Conference Focuses on Computer Security: Speaker Comes to Town with
News of Hackers, New Technology, Dangers, DAILY ILLINI (Champaign, 111.), Oct. 9, 2000,
available at http://www.dailyillini.com/oct00/oct09/news/news07.shtm.
99. Id.




104. Hubert H. Humphrey IH, Editorial, Internet as a Gambling Casino, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH, Nov. 25, 1996, available at 1996 WL 2805789.
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(2) improve the public's overall economic well-being (particularly
the poor, the elderly and the disadvantaged), and encourage
business/economic development;
(3) repress and punish criminal activities;
(4) promote ethical governmental practices in decision-making;
(5) foster a first-rate education system and an educated public; and
(6) maximize societal quality-of-life.
In 2000, it appeared that eliminating illegal gambling on the Internet
could prove impossible, but there existed mechanisms by which it could
be legally discouraged and diminished-if existing criminal justice au-
thorities chose to exercise their police discretion and take action. Some
postulated that criminal justice authorities could and should initiate
"sting" operations, whereby undercover police agents establish accounts
with Internet gambling operations (i.e., to "follow the money"), and then
get federal indictments against Internet gambling providers.,0 5 The chill-
ing effect on Internet gambling would be dramatic, and even offshore
companies would be severely limited by a federal indictment. Further-
more, since U.S. federal statutes apply to international communications,
afortiori the legal impact would be substantial. 10 6 As a practical matter, a
sting operation is relatively easy and inexpensive to institute. Police
agents simply log on to various gambling Web sites, establish customer
gambling accounts, and then gamble illegally. 0 7 In the United States,
Missouri Attorney General Jeremiah "Jay" Nixon used this procedure to
support a lawsuit seeking to prohibit illegal Internet gambling from the
Coeur d'Alene Native American reservation in Idaho. °8
From a social perspective, the accessibility of gambling on the
Internet placed an addictive behavior in the hands of millions of previ-
ously unexposed people, including adolescents and impressionable chil-
dren. A majority of the money generated by Internet casinos went un-
taxed, created more untaxable money flow, and reduced taxable eco-
nomic activities.1°9 Concomitantly, the potential social damages of
"maximized accessibility" via in-home gambling alarmed sociologists,
criminologists, and even the pre-existing U.S. gambling industry." 0
105. See, e.g., Tom Grey & Bernie Horn, Legalized Gambling--Current Politics & Policy: A
Presentation to the National Association of Attorneys General, Mar. 25, 1996, at 3, available via the
National Information Center, 1-800-664-2680.
106. Id. at 3-4.
107. Id.; Bill Lambrecht, Missouri Fights to Pull Plug on Internet Lottery, ST. Louis POST-
DISPATCH, June 8, 1997, at Al, available at 1997 WL 3346723.
108. Lambrecht, supra note 107, at Al.




Some experts also argued that the Internet was incompatible with
censorship and could not be regulated."' They noted that its users
"fiercely protect[ed] their freedom and [would] sabotage any efforts at
censorship. '12 The Internet, however, like any other highway, needed
limits. Since the system failed to discipline itself, it appeared destined for
government regulation or prohibition.
B. Secondary Goals in Legalized Gambling Issues
The secondary goals involved in legalized gambling issues and of
importance to governmental authorities could be categorized as follows:
(1) taxes-minimize the taxes necessary to achieve societal-
governmental goals;
(2) jobs--create new jobs and economic wealth throughout the
economy; and
(3) economic development-foster net new regional and/or strate-
gic economic activity and not just a "sterile transfer of
money."' 13
Internet gambling challenged the promotion of these goals by allowing
the potentially rapid transfer of wealth from pre-existing productive
economies with high-multiplier effects into non-productive or less-
productive gambling venues. Additional challenges resulted from the
ability of Internet gambling activities to transfer billions of dollars to
overseas jurisdictions-including illegal international organizations.
C. Regulation of Internet Gambling
"The Internet has taken the gambling world by storm," testified
Wisconsin Assistant Attorney General Alan Kesner, before the National
Gambling Impact Study Commission ("1999 Gambling Commis-
sion").1 14 "One of the most heavily regulated industries in the world has
crashed with full force into one of the most unregulated, and inherently
unregulatable, phenomenon of modem times," concluded Kesner.1
5
Montana Attorney General Joe Mazurek further noted that "[w]e have
been cautious in our approach to gambling, but [Internet gambling] turns
it all upside down .... Our policy concern is that we lose control. We
111. See Arun Mehta, Radio Free Usenet. Avoid High Costs and Thwart Censorship: Post it on
the Airways, BYTE MAG., July 1, 1995, available at 1995 WL 7911050.
112. Id.
113. SAMUELSON, supra note 66, at 425.
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have no ability to protect our citizens or the existing businesses that have
operated by our rules."' 
16
Furthermore, serious concerns surfaced in the specific area of sports
gambling on the Internet, particularly as the "gateway" gambling venue
for teens and preteens. Representing the National Collegiate Athletic
Association ("NCAA") before a hearing convened by the Senate Judici-
ary Subcommittee on Technology, Terrorism, and Government Informa-
tion, Bill Saum endorsed the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999,
stating, "As the number of online sports-betting sites continues to grow
abroad, it is essential that the United States send a clear message that...
it will be a violation of federal law to accept bets over the Internet."
'" 7
From the international perspective, in 1999 an Australian parliamen-
tary committee recommended several measures to make online gambling
less accessible, addressing the Prime Minister's concern that pathological
and problem gambling ills could destroy thousands of Australian lives.
118
The parliamentary committee initiated the inquiry when an official report
confirmed that "Australia had one of the world's highest rates of gam-
bling and found that 300,000 of its 19 million people had [gambling
problems].""19 The Australian national government, expressing concern
about problem gambling, announced plans to enact legislation "to stop
the nation's six states and two territories from issuing any more [gam-
bling] licenses for a year while it [considered] the social and economic
costs of [Internet] gambling."' 20 The announcement spurred "a rush by
defiant states and Australia's richest man Kerry Packer' '121 to get Internet
gambling operations up faster, resulting in the issuance of seven licenses
in the week after the proposal. Emulating a common gambling industry
scare tactic utilizing economic arguments without basis, Steve Tone-
guzzo, chairman of the Internet Industry Association online gambling
taskforce, publicly stated that "[i]f Australia was to ban Internet gam-
bling, those looking to establish in Australia would simply move off-
shore, taking jobs and the potential of US$9 billion by 2003 in export
dollars.'
22
116. Associated Press, Montana Wary of Net Gambling, USA TODAY, Jan. 26, 1999, available
at http://www.usatoday.comlife/cyber/tech/ctb856.htm.
117. Associated Press, Modified Net-Gambling Bill Wouldn't Go After Bettors, WALL ST. J.
INTERACTIVE EDITION (Mar. 23, 1999), at http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB92-
2218140651488078.djm [hereinafter Modified Net-Gambling].
118. Australian Web Gambling Faces Controls (Mar. 17, 1999), at http://gamingmagazine.-
com/managearticle.asp?c=500&a=60.
119. Id.






D. The Promised Economic "Benefits" of Typical Gambling Establish-
ments and Their Absence from Internet Gambling Operations
"Too often, public officials view gambling as a quick and easy way
to raise revenues, without focusing on gambling's hidden social, eco-
nomic, and political costs,' 123 President Clinton wrote to U.S. Senator
Paul Simon in a 1995 letter endorsing his legislation to establish the Na-
tional Gambling Impact Study Commission to study the various impacts
of widespread legalized gambling. However, the claimed "new revenues"
from gambling operations did not materialize when the operation in-
volved Internet gambling.124 Online casinos cost almost nothing to build
or maintain when compared to their brick-and-mortar counterparts. In
addition, Internet gambling operations neither employed the numbers of
people employed by conventional casinos, nor paid regular taxes.
One Web site that featured a NCAA tournament betting pool cost
only $225,000 to create and earned its money through advertising. 125 The
Internet's first virtual casino, Internet Casinos, Inc. ("ICI"), reportedly
opened for business on August 18, 1995, and offered 18 different casino
games, plus online participation in the National Indian Lottery, as well as
the planned development of an Internet sports book. 26 While it generally
might cost $300 million or more to build a totally new resort-style casino
employing thousands, ICI developed its online casino for only $1.5 mil-
lion and created only 17 new jobs. 27 ICI's founder, Warren B. Eugene,
stated that his "house" cut usually averaged around 24%, compared to
"the typical U.S. casino house take," which fluctuated between 8% and
16% of every dollar wagered. 28 National Coalition Against Legalized
Gambling ("NCALG") political director Bernie Horn summarized,
"There are virtually no jobs created and there's no tax revenue de-
rived."' 29 He added that cyberspace gambling, exemplified by Internet
,, 130gambling, "creates kind of a black hole for people's money.
Under legislation passed in 1997, Antigua and Barbuda began
charging just $100,000 a year for an Internet casino license, or $75,000
for telephone gambling operations.' 3' Antigua and Barbuda thereby
123. Letter from President William J. Clinton to Senator Paul Simon (Oct. 31, 1995) (on file
with author).
124. See generally NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-7 to -10, -12.
125. See Michael E. Ruane, Enjoying a Touch of Madness; NCAA Pools Make Splash on the
Web, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 1999, at BI, available at 1999 WL 2204949.
126. Janower, supra note 49.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Mary Ann Akers, Bill Would Make Gambling on Internet a Federal Crime, WASH. TIMES
(D.C.), Jan. 27, 1998, at A8, available at 1998 WL 3438467.
130. Id.
131. Brett Pulley, With Technology, Island Bookies Skirt U.S. Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1998,
at Al, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
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guaranteed minimum governmental regulation and interference, maxi-
mum anonymity, as well as a totally tax-free profit. 32 Antigua and Bar-
buda also had no capital gains taxes or income taxes.133 This government
discouraged outside scrutiny, even when coming from its own citizens.
34
Throughout the 1990s, the Antiguan and Barbudan government "licensed
at least 57 offshore banks and at least two major sports-[gambling busi-
nesses], and only [the government knew] the names and assets of their
owners."'
135
Similar to certain other forms of gambling, Internet casinos pro-
vided comparatively little revenue for their host jurisdictions, disappoint-
ing local residents with false hopes and broken promises of a rejuvenated
economy. For example, while there were over 200 Indian casinos in the
United States in 1997, apparently 40% of all Indian gambling revenues
went to only eight casinos.
136
E. Goals Recommended by the 1999 National Gambling Impact Study
Commission
In 1999, the National Gambling Impact Study Commission recom-
mended four different methods to prevent the proliferation of, and dis-
courage participation in, illegal Internet gambling in the United States.'37
First, the 1999 Gambling Commission recommended that the fed-
eral government, through the actions of the President, Congress, and the
Department of Justice, should prohibit "Internet gambling not already
authorized [in 1999] within the United States or among parties in the
United States and any foreign jurisdiction,"'' 38 without permitting new
exemptions or the extension of current federal exemptions to other
jurisdictions.
Second, the 1999 Gambling Commission recommended legislation
to prohibit wire transfers to recognized Internet gambling sites, or to the
offshore banks that represent them. 39 Additionally, the Commission rec-
ommended legislation to render any credit card debts generated by Inter-
net gambling unenforceable and unrecoverable to the credit lending
companies.140




136. Tribes Finding it Hard to Reap Windfall from Internet Gaming, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Dec.
1, 1997, at D4, available at 1997 WL 4557597.






Third, the 1999 Gambling Commission highlighted that the Inter-
net's ubiquitous nature and widespread accessibility from schools,
homes, and offices allowed gambling without requiring the participant's
physical presence in a casino. 141 Acknowledging a shortage of conclusive
evidence proving the social costs of this new form of gambling, the
Commission recommended that the states not allow the expansion of
gambling into schools, offices, and homes through the use of newly de-
veloped technology and the practice of account wagering. 142
Finally, the 1999 Gambling Commission concluded that since the
majority of Internet gambling proliferated most rapidly in and from for-
eign "host" countries, the federal government should begin encouraging
or enabling those offshore governments not to promote or harbor Internet
gambling operations that made their services available to U.S. citizens.1
43
Ill. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. The Strategic Historical Implications of Legalized Gambling Activi-
ties
While individualized gambling activities existed throughout the his-
tory of mankind, government-sanctioned gambling activities historically
resulted in negative socio-economic conditions, far outweighed by any
positive results. 44 Furthermore, gambling activities essentially consti-
tuted a "sterile transfer of wealth," which not only replaced, but actually
hindered, genuine economic growth. 45 The opportunity cost to those
governments that legalized gambling activities consisted, in part, of lost
"consumer dollars.' ' 146 While the introduction of gambling-oriented dol-
lars into a local economy arguably had a multiplier effect, by the 1990s a
growing body of evidence existed showing that in most economic scenar-
ios the multiplier associated with consumer dollars lost by redirection to
gambling activities exceeded the gambling multiplier.1
47
Accordingly, governments experimented with legalized gambling
activities throughout history, sometimes referred to as "waves" of gam-




144. For a summary of these issues, see John W. Kindt, Follow the Money: Gambling, Ethics,
and Subpoenas, 556 ANNALS AM. ACADEMY POL. & Soc. ScI. 85, 91-92 (1998) [hereinafter Follow
the Money]. See also Mega-Lawsuits, supra note 41, at 38 n.136.
145. See, e.g., SAMUELSON, supra note 66, at 425.
146. For a summary of these issues, see John W. Kindt, Legalized Gambling Activities: The
Issues Involving Market Saturation, 15 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 271, 273 (1995). See also John W. Kindt,
Legalized Gambling Activities As Subsidized By Taxpayers, 48 ARK. L. REV. 889, 899 (1995)
[hereinafter Gambling Subsidized].
147. See Business-Economic Impacts of Gambling, supra note 67, at 24-25 and accompanying
footnotes.
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tives, governments invariably re-criminalized and suppressed gambling
activities. 148 Sometimes social movements, including but not exclusively
involving ethical and religious support from Judeo-Christian and Muslim
elements, supported governmental activities to recriminalize gambling.
149
Unlike most governmental authorities, these ethical religious elements
often had extensive historical records and traditions highlighting the folly
of gambling activities-particularly government-sanctioned gambling. 1
50
With shorter institutional memories, misguided governmental or-
ganizations periodically sanctioned various forms of gambling--often
prompted by the lure of "painless" governmental revenues without addi-
tional taxation. 151 However, within a period of years, governmental au-
thorities usually relearned the painful socio-economic lessons already
ingrained with economic historians. In this context, modern economists
often paraphrase Georg Hegel: "Those who forget the economic lessons
of history, are condemned to relive them.
1 52
B. The 1990s Proliferation of Offshore Online Casinos
Internet Casinos, Inc. ("I0"), the world's first online casino,
opened for business on August 18, 1995, with a total of 18 different ca-
sino-style games and also provided Internet access to the National Indian
Lottery.'53 In 1998, two primary types of Internet gambling Web sites
existed. 154 One type required the user to download special software to
play, while the other allowed immediate online gambling using games
created with the Java computer language. 155 These Web sites required
users to create accounts either by providing credit card information 156 or
by actually opening an offshore bank account.1 57 Additionally, the Web
sites required users to pick a user name and password. 158 During the
148. Id. at 24.
149. Follow the Money, supra note 144, at 93.
150. Id. For examples of historical opposition to government-sanctioned gambling by a
representative denomination, see UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, THE 1996 BOOK OF DISCIPLINE,
para. 67, G, 72 (1996); UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, THE 1996 BOOK OF RESOLUTIONS 444 (1996).
151. See, e.g., Business-Economic Impacts of Gambling, supra note 67, at 23; see also
Gambling Subsidized, supra note 146, at 892.
152. J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 507 (14th ed. 1968); see also The National Impact
of Casino Gambling Proliferation: Hearing Before the House Comm. on Small Business, 103d Cong.
77, 81 (1994) (statement of Prof. John W. Kindt).
153. Janower, supra note 49.
154. Chauncey Hollingsworth, Loaded dice? Odds are Regulators Can't Stem Tide of Internet
Gambling, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 4, 1998, § 5, at 1, available at 1998 WL 2922631.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See Janower, supra note 49.
158. Hollingsworth, supra note 154.
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1990s, most Internet gambling sites had a minimum transaction amount
ranging anywhere between $20 and $500."9
While casino-style gambling initially favored a medium like the
Internet, in 2000, the horse racing industry prepared to test market a
means of gambling that merged "television, telephones and the Inter-
net."'16 Executives in the horse racing industry argued that merging these
technologies would cultivate "a new generation of fans," watching races
from their living rooms on their television sets while using the Internet to
gather information on horses and to place their bets.'61
With developing Internet technology spreading across the globe, the
gravitation of Internet gambling Web sites to the Caribbean and Central
American countries resulted in part from (1) the relatively minimal fees
that those countries charged to establish such operations; (2) the fact that
those countries legalized Internet gambling; and (3) the largely unregu-
lated atmosphere perpetuated by those governments.' 62 "Everyone says
it's a banana republic over there, and no one will regulate, ' , 63 summa-
rized Kerry Rogers, who ran an offshore operation known as WagerNet.
Another Internet gambling site operator, Bob Ermian, who reportedly
worked as a Boston bookie for 11 years prior to moving to the West In-
dies, explained, "The reason I'm here in this country is because I can't
do what I want to do in the U.S ..... It feels great. I don't have to worry
about the police coming and breaking the door down."'
64
Warren Eugene, a citizen of Canada who operated an Internet gam-
bling site out of the Caribbean, claimed that he felt secure from prosecu-
tion by any U.S. agencies. 65 However, his Web site, ICI, warned Ameri-
cans:
At this time you may not be legally able to gamble at this casino site.
Call your local authorities and check to see if you can enjoy our ca-
sino. If not, call and complain to your senators, congressmen, and at-
tomey generals! Democracy does exist in America. Do not let your
first amendmant [sic] and constitutional rights be taken away from
you! Act Now!166
Images representing American democratic ideals followed this dis-
claimer, as did additional pleadings to help change U.S. law. 67 This site
159. Id.
160. See Thomas E. Weber, Click, Place or Show: Playing the Ponies in Your Jockey Shorts,
WALL ST. J., May 1, 2000, atBl.
161. Id.
162. See Quittner, supra note 12.
163. Id. (referring to Belize).
164. Pulley, supra note 131.
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only allowed U.S. residents to use the site if they agreed to establish an
offshore bank account, which then qualified them as "no longer Ameri-
cans," according to Eugene and his attorneys. 68 However, many users of
gambling Web sites played for fun without wagering any money, making
it difficult for authorities to enforce U.S. laws.
1 69
C. Unfair Odds and Other Potential Frauds at Internet Gambling Sites
Internet and cyberspace gambling presented obstacles, not only be-
cause of their accessibility and wide ranging acceptability, but also be-
cause of their "virtual" nature, especially when combined with an off-
shore location. 70 Offshore virtual casinos had no significant incentive to
refrain from manipulating the odds in their favor because they operated
without any regulatory supervision.' 7' Although computerized gambling
could technically generate more random play and therefore be less sus-
ceptible to forms of cheating like card counting, player protection re-
quired that the software used in Internet gambling also be secure from
potential alteration. 172 Steve Bourie, a former gambling industry execu-
tive for over twenty-five years, warned gamblers that a casino operator
only had to remove a few 10-value cards from any standard deck to dra-
matically increase the house's advantage over a player. 73 "Since players
don't get to examine the deck how do they know all 52 cards are there?"
he queried. 174 Quasi-government authorities supposedly regulated video
gambling machines used in real (as distinguished from "virtual") casinos,
insuring that the machines generate the established odds (but not neces-
sarily "fair odds") by limiting access to the machines, monitoring ac-
counting and revenues generated by the machines, and keeping the elec-
tronic specifications tightly regulated. 
175
Despite questions concerning the states' ability to maintain the effi-
cacy rand integrity of state-sanctioned gambling activities and regulations
(as well as who determined what was "fair" as states changed the odds
more in the owners' favor), generally states authorizing such activities
tried to provide standards and concomitant regulation. 76 The gambling
industry euphemistically termed this process as "maintaining the integ-
168. Id.
169. See Bulkeley, supra note 9.
170. Janower, supra note 49.
171. See id.
172. Id.
173. Are Internet Casinos Honest? 'Don't Bet On It' Says Gambling Expert, PRNewswire, Feb.
4, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File [hereinafter Internet Casinos
Honest?].
174. Id.
175. See Janower, supra note 49.
176. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at ch. 3.
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rity of the games.' 77 Even so, when U.S. states initially sanctioned gam-
bling activities, they attempted to provide some regular standards-
although those standards generally deteriorated over time. 78 Nevada, for
example, implemented a certification requirement for all video gambling
machine service personnel, which included a background check. 79 Mon-
tana used security seals on the logic boards of all machines to prevent
and detect tampering. 80 Offshore Internet gambling operations, however,
did not employ these types of protections. "All of these [Internet gam-
bling] sites say they offer honest games, but in reality you'll never know
if that's true,"'' concluded Steve Bourie. Some sites tried self-regulation
to assuage public fear, using accounting firms to monitor their activi-
ties.' 8 2 Although good for public relations, this type of voluntary self-
regulation lacked the quasi-security of government regulation.
183
The honesty of the Web site operators themselves did not solely de-
termine the honesty of Internet gambling. Computer hackers could infil-
trate the systems and change the algorithm to boost payouts or even steal
the credit card numbers from other users' accounts. 84 Aware of this se-
curity problem, Web site administrators admonished users to guard their
passwords. 85 In the eventuality that a hacker illegally obtained another
person's credit card information, of course, the offshore sites claimed
that they could not be held responsible.'
86
The potential for fraud and other crimes latent in Internet gambling
operations may have seemed minimal upon initial consideration, but
closer examination revealed the vulnerability of the whole system.' 87 In
1996, Minnesota Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey LI summarized
these problems:
Same scams, different medium. That's what I thought as I pe-
rused the Internet on my home computer one sleepless night... and
found the same kind of phony cancer cures and get-rich-quick
schemes I have prosecuted for years under state consumer fraud laws.
177. See, e.g., id. at 3-7.
178. Id. at 3-1 to -2, 3-17 to -19.
179. Janower, supra note 49.
180. See id.
181. Internet Casinos Honest?, supra note 173.
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But nothing quite grabbed my attention like the Internet gam-
bling sites -- virtual casinos touting the convenience of gambling
right in the home or office.
188
"From the days of Bugsy Siegel, casinos worldwide have been ripe
grounds for money laundering,"' 8 9 concluded Charles Intriago, ex-federal
prosecutor and publisher of the Money Laundering Alert newsletter.
Looking to major problems in the future, he predicted that Native Ameri-
can casinos would become increasingly problematic and noted that
"[w]ith the proliferation of Indian casinos, there's more opportunity [for
money laundering]."'' 90 When comparing the less-regulated nature of the
offshore Internet sites to the scant regulation in American Indian gam-
bling operations, the possibilities for money laundering increased dra-
matically.
A 1996 Commodity Futures Trading Commission statement high-
lighted some commercial concerns by concluding that "[t]he Internet and
the Web enable unscrupulous operators to commit fraud or other viola-
tions of federal commodity futures laws with virtual anonymity, and then
disappear quickly into cyberspace, leaving behind little or no evidence of
wrongdoing."''9 By 1997, the Federal Trade Commission warned over
500 Web sites about the operation of "potentially illegal pyramid
schemes," and filed 15 separate lawsuits with allegations of online
scams.192 One particular lawsuit, filed by Attorney General Dennis
Vacco in the New York Supreme Court, charged that World Interactive
Gaming Corp. of Bohemia, N.Y. raised almost $2 million through "ille-
gal solicitations" of "unknowing investors by means of false representa-
tions, omissions of material facts, use of unregistered salespeople and
other fraudulent and deceptive practices.' 93
"Another big problem with Internet casinos [wa]s the risk of not
getting paid,"' 94 said one former casino executive. "A story about one of
the worst incidents was posted on a web site [in 1998] where an operator
188. Id.
189. Eric Schine, First Gambling, Then A Bank: California Has Reservations The Viejas
Band's Bid to Diversify Draws Flak From the State, Bus. WK., Sept. 9, 1996, at 47, available at
1996 WL 10770429.
190. Id.
191. Unregistered Advisers, supra note 46, at C8.
192. Carol Levin, Beware the Backlash: Is the Web Risky Business?, PC MAO., Feb. 18, 1997,
at 28.
193. Patrick McGeehan, New York Officials Act Against Operator Of Internet Gambling, WALL
ST. J., July 13, 1998, at C18, available at 1998 WL-WSJ 3501351 (noting that as of July 13, 1998 no
formal charges were filed against any officer of the company or against the company itself).
194. Internet Casinos Honest?, supra note 173.
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wouldn't pay off on a $25,000 roulette win because they said there was a
'glitch' in the software."' 195
Other concerns revolve around privacy issues and invasive "cook-
ies." Cookies are the equivalent of ID cards used by Web sites to identify
users and gather information about them such as their Web browsing
habits. 96 These cookie systems can store vast amounts of information on
a user's computer and also distribute the information to others without
the user's knowledge or consent. 97 Cookies can also learn the passwords
and credit card numbers of unsuspecting Internet users.' 98 This can create
a particular hazard when dealing with offshore Web sites such as gam-
bling sites, where both passwords and credit card numbers are used.
The first and most highly publicized U.S. prosecution of an Internet
gambling site was that of World Sports Exchange. 199 Jay Cohen, co-
owner of the company, was once a self-appointed spokesperson for the
industry, eager to discuss his offshore gambling enterprise based in Anti-
gua.200 He gave many interviews, submitted testimony to the U.S. Senate
Judiciary Committee on possible methods to regulate online casinos, and
even publicly debated the attorney general of Wisconsin on CNBC. 201 In
1998, the U.S. indicted Cohen and 21 co-defendants on charges alleging
their involvement in illegal offshore betting operations.2 °2 By August
2000, ten defendants pled guilty to conspiring to break wagering laws,
three defendants pled guilty to relating misdemeanors, and seven of those
indicted, including World Sports Exchange director of wagering and vice
president Steve Schillinger, remained fugitives from the law. 203 All of the
defendants were charged with violating the Federal Wire Act of 1961,2°4
which made using telephone lines for wagering purposes illegal.20 5
The defense planned to portray "Cohen and Schillinger as young en-
trepreneurs" who got their start working as traders on the Pacific Stock
Exchange when they first envisioned running an Internet gambling
site.206 They realized the potential for a lucrative Internet gambling ser-
195. Id.
196. See Richard P. Klau, Is a Cookie a Treat or a Threat? Is a Code Chip a Friend or a Foe?
Internet Privacy Issues are Complex, STUDENT LAW., May 1999, at 13.
197. Id. at 13-14.
198. See id. at 13.
199. Benjamin Weiser, Bookmaker Loses Federal Appeal in Internet Sports Betting Case, N.Y.
TIMEs, Aug. 1, 2001, at B5, available at www.osga.com/Cohen.htm.
200. Elliott Almond, Borderless Betting, SEATTLE TtMES, Jan. 24, 1999, at D1, available at
1999 WL 6253025.
201. Id.
202. Gail Appleson, Man Jailed in 1st U.S. Online Gambling Conviction (Aug. 11, 2000), at
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vice after Schillinger gained notoriety "by selling options on the verdict
of the O.J. Simpson trial. '207 In fact, Schillinger reportedly left the Ex-
change under threat of permanent "banishment in 1996 after exchange
officials" learned that he was "running a sports betting operation from
the floor., 20 8 The other defendants charged also planned to argue that
since the Internet did not exist in 1961, the Wire Act did not apply to
it.2°9 Despite these types of defensive arguments, Cohen was convicted
and sentenced to 21 months in prison plus a $5,000 fine. 210 Similarly, in
2000, the first case was filed "in Nevada for Internet gambling viola-
tions" against American Wagering, Inc., which "agreed to pay a fine" of
$10,000.211 Furthermore, the company agreed to sell its business based in
Australia that allegedly allowed users to place illegal sports bets.
21 2
D. The Interests of Nevada and the Gambling Industry Regarding Inter-
net Gambling
Since their inception in the mid 1990s, the number of Internet casi-
nos has skyrocketed. Only 15 such sites existed in 1996, burgeoning to
over 700 by 2000.213 According to gambling industry research, the
approximately 200 companies that owned and operated Internet
gambling sites generated revenues estimating almost $1.5 billion in
2000, and $3 billion by 2002.214 To put these amounts into perspective,
according to the gambling industry's lobbying group, the American
Gaming Association ("AGA"), the 450 commercial casinos in the United
States generated revenues of $20 billion in 1998, and the 160 Indian
casinos generated $7.2 billion in revenues.2 5
In 1998, the Nevada Resort Association publicly stated their official
position opposing the expansion of gambling on the Internet.216 Accord-
ing to Wayne Mehl, a representative in Washington, D.C. for the Nevada
Resort Association, Las Vegas casinos were not interested in the Internet,
and he was unaware of any casinos attempting to diversify into the world
207. Id.
208. Tom Somach, FBI Hunts Ex-S.F. Stockbroker, S.F. EXAM'R, May 4, 1998.
209. Id.
210. See Appleson, supra note 202.
211. Cy Ryan, LV Company Agrees to Fine, Will Sell Internet Gambling Subsidiary, LAS
VEGAS SUN, July 13, 2000, available at http://www.lasvegassun.consunbinlstories/text/2000l-
jul/1 3/510500492.html.
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213. See Associated Press, Net Gaming Scrutiny Affects State, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Mar. 13,
2000, available at http://www.lvrj.com/lvrjhome/2000/Mar-13-Mon-2000/business/13140760.html
[hereinafter Net Gaming Scrutiny].
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[Vol. 80:1
INTERNET GAMBLING
of online gambling. 217 He stated that "[o]ur board unanimously adopted a
resolution opposing the expansion of gaming on the Internet because
they don't feel it is appropriately regulated at this time. ' '218 Harrah's
president, Hector Mon, expressed similar sentiments when addressing the
issue of Internet gambling.2 9 He conveyed his uncertainty and reluctance
as a function of the lack of regulations employed to monitor Internet
gambling.220 "[T]here are so many issues related to the fact this industry
is unregulated, uncontrolled and illegal based on the regulatory frame-
work within which we are controlled," he said.221 Also in 1998, Frank
Fahrenkopf, the AGA's main lobbyist, testified before a U.S. Congres-
sional hearing and indicated that the gambling industry opposed the ex-
pansion of Internet gambling.222 He expressed concern that gambling-
oriented Web sites could easily get around federal and state laws that
constrain conventional gambling operations in the United States.
223
In 2000, U.S. Representative James A. Gibbons (R-Nev.) argued to
Congress that: "In states like Nevada, the gaming industry is well regu-
lated, and its activities are tightly monitored. However, allowing gam-
bling to be allowed on the Internet would open the floodgates for corrup-
tion, abuse and fraud., 224 Arguing on behalf of Nevada interests and the
AGA, Representative Gibbons pushed for a practical ban on Internet
gambling during the floor debate in the U.S. House of Representatives. 225
Internet gambling presented a difficult dilemma for U.S. casino op-
226erators.  They viewed the enormous profit potential of Internet gam-
bling, but worried that Internet gambling would cannibalize their pre-
22existing multi-million-dollar gambling operations. 27 During the late
1990s, U.S. casino operators almost uniformly favored banning Internet
gambling; however, by 2000, they became more divided between ban-
ning Internet gambling and rushing into their own Internet gambling op-
erations, with many gambling interests unsure of which approach to
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from invading their niche, but they also tried to hedge their bets by estab-
lishing a means to get in on the action and the Internet money them-
selves.229 "We'd be crazy not to view this as an opportunity for the com-
pany, ' '230 announced Phil Cooper, a vice-president of Caesars Palace in
Las Vegas.
This sort of reluctant acceptance after the initial opposition and
skepticism toward Internet gambling operations left many gambling offi-
cials in Nevada uncertain. Steve DuCharme, the Chairman of the Nevada
Gaming Control Board, said in 1999 that as long as gambling companies
based in Nevada restricted their Internet gambling services to jurisdic-
tions where it was legal, there would be no violations of the rules of the
Board.23 1 However, this equivocation resounded like a convenient chang-
ing of the rules to increase company profits at the expense of public
health, safety, and welfare. In any event, the Gaming Control Board un-
covered a troubling situation when evaluating the renewals of licensees
with interests in the online gambling industry. In 2000, the Board deter-
mined that some of the most powerful and prolific individuals and com-
panies involved in legal, licensed Nevada gambling were becoming in-
232volved in Internet gambling ventures. The biggest concern among the
Nevada Gaming Control Board was that federal action against an illegal
offshore Internet betting establishment maintained by an entity with a
Nevada state gambling license could seriously tarnish the state's reputa-
tion for upholding regulatory mechanisms.
233
In the mid-1990s, a magazine dedicated to Internet gambling, Roll-
ing Good Times On-Line, was established.234 Editor Sue Schneider be-
came involved in the attempts to legitimize Internet gambling. 235 She
contributed to the formation of the Interactive Gaming Council ("IGC"),
an informal organization of gambling Web site operators who claimed
that they could regulate and sanction themselves, in an effort to establish
credibility and trust with potential online bettors.23 6 These Internet opera-
tors lobbied for regulations to help maintain fairness and honesty among
the industry, instead of outright prohibition.23 7 Exemplifying the efforts
to espouse the virtues of Internet gambling, Schneider argued that
"[t]here are three casinos a mile from my (St. Louis) office, 2 38 adding,
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. John Wilen, IGT Joins Emerging Internet Gaming Industry, LAS VEGAS SUN, Jan. 28,
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"I can do a whole lot of damage on my bank account, and nobody would
be the wiser., 239 However, she justified, "[w]ith the Internet, [the flow of
money is] all traceable., 240 While this argument was an interesting exer-
cise in public relations, monies gambled on the Internet were obviously
less "traceable" than monies from U.S. bank accounts, which were sub-
ject to U.S. legal discovery procedures in the event of litigation.24 1 These
types of arguments and efforts to build consumer support for Internet
gambling operations led to questions involving what interests were fi-
nancing the start-up costs for Rolling Good Times Online and the IGC.242
E. The Interests of Opponents to Internet Gambling
There were as many different sorts of people interested in prevent-
ing the spread of Internet gambling, as there were reasons to do so. Reli-
gious organizations opposed gambling on social and moral grounds; ca-
sino, hotel, and restaurant owners, as well as others in the hospitality
industry, all worried about losing visitors to their establishments; con-
venience stores and gas stations feared that their lottery ticket customers
would begin purchasing their tickets from home; and athletic organiza-
tions, both professional and collegiate, opposed all betting in general
because of the potentially disastrous effects that it would have on the
integrity of sports.243
Anti-gambling groups and individuals worried that legitimate and
legal Internet gambling would allow addicted gamblers and children us-
ing their parents' credit cards to bankrupt themselves and their families
via home computers. 2" One authority on problem and pathological gam-
bling suggested that the "young, affluent males," who already composed
much of the Internet's population, comprised the demographic that "we
know from research are probably most likely to develop difficulties re-
lated to gambling.,
245
The gambling industry sometimes tried to draw parallels to devel-
oped countries such as Australia, England, Germany, New Zealand, and
South Africa, which, as of 2000, had either sanctioned Internet gambling
or were contemplating doing so. 246 Opponents countered that those coun-
tries were misled by industry public relations efforts and that invalid
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. See, e.g., NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-5 to -6, 5-12.
242. See generally id. at 5-3, 5-12.
243. See House Fails, supra note 224; see generally John W. Kindt & Thomas Asmar, College
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economics were still invalid, regardless of which countries were making
247the mistakes. In any event, the U.S. government deemed it important
to consider its own citizens' best interests when determining which
course of action to take, and in 1999 the National Gambling Impact
Study Commission recommended a de facto criminalization of all gam-
24bling via the Internet.  South Dakota Attorney General Mark Barnett
summarized the majority opinion of his colleagues when he concluded
that "[t]he fact is it's bad news from start to finish., 249 Barnett high-
lighted his colleagues' opinions and the National Association of Attor-
neys General opinion, stating, "In our view, there is not a single upside to
Internet gambling, and we think it's worth a [prosecutorial] chal-
lenge."
250
IV. TRENDS AND CONDITIONING FACTORS
A. Advertising and Marketing of lnternet Gambling
While 18 U.S.C. § 1084251 expressly prohibited the use of wire com-
munication facilities for the use of transmitting information relating to
wagering, 252 illegal bookmaking, according to the Nevada Gaming Com-
mission, was still approximately an $80 billion to $100 billion per year
business in the United States in 1999.253 Furthermore, law enforcement
agencies estimated that $2.5 billion was wagered on the NCAA
tournament championship game in 1995 alone.254 With these kinds of
numbers, it was obvious that U.S. illegal bookmaking was a widespread
and lucrative business. When coupled with the Internet's wide reach,
appeal, and accessibility, such gambling activities could easily spiral out
of the control of both the regulatory agencies and the gamblers them-
selves.
Internet gambling Web sites obviously generated more money for
themselves if they could successfully "hook in" inexperienced gamblers
and Web surfers.255 Accordingly, many Web sites were carefully and
subtly arranged to "make it look as though you're simply playing a
game. '256 Ohio Attorney General Betty Montgomery spent time investi-
gating some of the nearly 300 online casinos that her staff discovered on
247. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-10 to -12.
248. Id. at 5-12.
249. See Barnett Seeks Internet Gambling Ban, ARGUS LEADER (Sioux Falls, S.D.), Oct. 2,
1997, at DL.
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the Internet.257 "It all feels just like a video game," she complained, add-
ing that this marketing made it easy for the player to ignore the fact that
real money was at stake.258
In a related scenario, the president of dot com Entertainment Group,
Inc. optimistically hoped for a Web site that would allow players in
North America to play a bingo game online called CyberBingo (in Eng-
lish, French, or Spanish) linked with players from Germany, Japan, and
other countries around the world. 259 He hoped to replicate the amicable
atmosphere of bingo halls by allowing players to play and talk to one
another simultaneously in a chat room.
26 °
Although casino gambling was still illegal in Israel in 1999, another
company looking to profit from the international appeal of offshore
Internet gambling was Israel's PrincessNET Technologies and Software
Ltd., which its founders claimed was being heavily marketed toward
those Internet users fond of games, not big spenders. 261 PrincessNET's
online gambling site was called Bet&Chat, in the hope that the option of
chatting with other players while gambling would attract customers.262
Players were even offered the ability to register according to their na-
tionalities in order to "sit" together with other players at "tables" and
chat while gambling.263
Another marketing strategy that Internet gambling sites hoped to
employ successfully involved creating partnerships with prominent non-
gambling Internet-related companies. 64 Kerry Packer, Australia's
wealthiest man, envisioned one such attempt in 1999.265 He owned a
controlling share in Publishing & Broadcasting Ltd. ("PBL"), which op-
erated numerous Australian communications media outlets, including
television stations, broadcasting companies, newspapers, and magazines,
as well as the Australian Internet portal Web site, NineMSN
("ninemsn.com2"), in an equal partnership with U.S. based Microsoft.26 6
PBL also announced that it was going to acquire Crown Ltd., the parent
company of Melbourne's sole licensed casino. 67 This acquisition was
257. See Modified Net-Gambling, supra note 117.
258. Id.
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fostered in a reported attempt to comer the market for Internet gam-
bling.268 Although Microsoft spokespeople declined to comment on the
matter, Bill Gates had previously mentioned an interest in Internet gam-
bling in his book, The Road Ahead, published in 1995.269 Gates wrote
that "[g]ambling is a highly regulated industry, and we can't be sure
what kinds will be allowed on the Net, or what the rules will be."270 Yet
he concluded it was certain that "[t]he global interactive network [of the
future] will make gambling far more difficult to control than it is to-
day.,
2 7 1
B. The Impacts and Dangers of Internet Gambling on Children, Teenag-
ers, and College Students
One of the most pressing concerns regarding the development of
easily accessible Internet gambling involved the impossibility of Web
sites, even those Web sites acting in good faith, to verify that the user
was of legal age to gamble. This situation suggested dangerous possibili-
ties that children were going to begin gambling on the Internet. In an
effort to demonstrate the ease with which a child could access an online
casino, the 1996 president of CORE Capital Management, one of the
pioneers of the Internet gambling community, conducted a demonstration
for U.S. News and World Report.272 First, he easily accessed a British
Web site specializing in sports wagers, and then he easily completed a
form stating that he was 18 or older and was "not using the software to
encourage others to play., 273 After completing the form, he was issued a
user name and asked to select a password, at which point he was given a
list of upcoming wagering opportunities and it was "child's play" from
there.274
While a criminal justice professor at Illinois State University, Henry
Lesieur explained that since there were virtually no controls in place to
verify the age and competency of the user, anyone with a credit card and
a minimal amount of Internet savvy could gamble online. "There's no
,, 275way to stop teenagers, according to Professor Lesieur. "My God,
they're already hacking into the Pentagon. 276 The availability to children
posed a very serious problem, since experts believed that Internet gam-
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ment "already fond of video games as well as being especially prone to
becoming addicted. 277 These factors were of particular concern given
the results of a study by Dr. Howard Shaffer of Harvard Medical
School.278 One of his studies found a quickly increasing incidence of
problem gambling in adolescent populations,279 and he concluded that
during the 1990s gambling addiction was the "fastest growing" teenage
280addiction-surpassing drug addiction.
In addition, growing beyond adolescence was not a panacea for
avoiding gambling addictions. U.S. Census Statistics reported that people
between the ages of 18 and 24 also exhibited the most threatening form
of gambling disorders (i.e., pathological/addicted gambling) at a level
between two and three times greater than that of the remaining adult
population.28' Census Bureau statistics also revealed that between 8%
and 20% of all college students surveyed had previously dealt with a
gambling problem.282
When evaluating Internet gambling as it interfaces with these sober-
ing statistics of gambling problems among college students, the deleteri-
ous effects become even more obvious. By 1999, research indicated that
a majority of college students had ready access to computers and the
Internet and also owned credit cards.283 These components synergized to
provide all of the elements necessary for students to gamble on the Inter-
net via offshore casinos. Officials became concerned that the Internet
was cultivating deleterious gambling habits and problems in the secrecy
of dormitory rooms, where problems could develop rapidly without any-
one else knowing about them until it was too late.284 For example, 19-
year-old Jason Berg became addicted to regular casino-style gambling,
including electronic gambling devices, lost his tuition and savings
money, and committed suicide.285 Despondent over Jason's suicide, his
stepfather committed suicide two and a-half years later.286 Experts ex-
trapolated that if regular casino-style gambling was addictive to students,
277. LaTessa, supra note 89.
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afortiori Internet gambling was more addictive, particularly to the "Nin-
tendo generation.
' 287
According to one college student, the attraction to Internet gambling
was quite tempting to students and difficult to resist:
College students are often attracted to the convenience and numerous
gaming options that online gambling has to offer.... There is a great
variety of the different sports you could gamble on with online gam-
bling .... It also helps me with bills .... Once they are out of the
way, I am not going to do it anymore.
288
This potentially devastating influence was particularly frightening to
the parents of college students. "You send your daughter to college and
are aware of date rape and binge drinking," said Washington, D.C.
NCAA lobbyist Daniel Nestle in 1999.289 "Now there is another addic-
tion, but it doesn't seem to be on the radar screen., 290 The developing
trend of Internet gambling among college students also alarmed Michael
Frank, an expert on underage gambling and a psychologist at Richard
Stockton College in Pomona, New Jersey.29' He explained: "If I play
poker with friends and lose $100, my rent gets paid and my children still
have food. I'm not sure the same thing can be said of college stu-
dents." 292 One Harvard graduate student, in an interview with CNN,
summarized the fascination with Internet gambling: "You have this ex-
pectation of potentially making money, which is thrilling for someone
like me. 293 From inside the comforts of his dormitory room, this student
and his peers wagered up to $1,000 a day on various sporting events,
such as college basketball games.294
C. The Impact of Internet Gambling on Collegiate and Professional
Sports
Within their jurisdictions, the NCAA and the professional sporting
leagues outlawed betting on games throughout much of their histories in
efforts to preserve the integrity and honesty of the competitions. 295 Due
to betting and point-shaving scandals during the 1990s, for example, at
Arizona State, Northwestern University, and Boston College, athletic
287. NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-4 to -5.
288. Spinnato, supra note 28.
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officials were increasingly concerned that gambling interests were
296threatening sporting events.
Another threat involved the confusion among adolescents fueled by
the widespread but disingenuous gambling advertisements by state gov-
ernments. Most state governments utilize taxpayer dollars to market
various gambling activities as not just "acceptable," but "smart" and
even "patriotic."298
Every time Bill Saum, the director of agents and gambling for the
NCAA, testified under oath during the 1990s, he referred to a study of
684 men's football and basketball players in Division I competition con-
ducted by the University of Cincinnati. 299 The results of this study
showed that 25% of the athletes had wagered money on games other than
their own, 3.7% had admitted to placing bets on their own games, and
0.4% of those surveyed-three athletes-had admitted that they had pre-
viously received money from a gambler in return for not playing well.3°
Alan Kesner, the Assistant Attorney General of Wisconsin and the
chairman of the committee on Internet gambling for the National Asso-
ciation of Attorneys General ("NAAG"), expressed the concern of the
U.S. Attorney Generals with the development of Internet gambling,
pointing out that "[y]ou can keep the bookies out of the locker room, but
not off of e-mail.,
301
Dean Smith, the winningest coach in the history of college basket-
ball, who retired after 879 victories over thirty six seasons as the coach
of the University of North Carolina Tarheels, testified before Congress in
an attempt to outlaw any form of gambling on college sports.30 2 He was
joined by Tubby Smith, the University of Kentucky men's basketball
coach as well as Lou Holtz, the football coach for the University of
South Carolina, who all contended that their players were under a lot of
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D. Significant Lawsuits Stemming from Internet Gambling
Alerted by experts, by Congressional hearings during the 1990s, and
finally by the 1999 NGISC Executive Summary,304 savvy credit card
companies and financial institutions cut off their customers from gam-
bling Web sites.30 5 As predicted, Internet gambling debts were stinging
the uninformed companies in well-publicized cases at the close of the
twentieth century. In one lawsuit that could potentially cause the defacto
end of Internet gambling, Providian v. Haines,30 6 Ms. Haines accumu-
lated over $70,000 in debt on twelve credit cards used at Internet gam-
bling websites. °7 She filed suit to avoid paying the credit card debts,
claiming that since gambling over the Internet was illegal, the credit card
companies should not bind her to her debts.308 The fact that she could
win her case seriously jeopardizes the income and future of Internet
gambling Web sites. 30 9 Another significant suit was pending in 2000
against American Express Co., Visa International, and MasterCard Inter-
national, Ltd., filed by a number of people who lost money to Internet
gambling sites and used credit cards to pay off their debts.310 This suit
also had the potential of eventually becoming a class action, wherein
"hundreds of thousands" of online gamblers could join as parties to the
suit.311
In 2000, one plaintiff sued the West Virginia Music and Vending
Association for supporting the video poker industry, Derrick Music
Company the owner of the video poker machines in question, and the
convenience store that kept the video poker machines.31 2 The plaintiff
named these defendants for their role in allegedly leading a man to be-
come a pathological (addicted) gambler as a result of playing the identi-
fied video poker machines and losing a substantial amount of money.
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In addition, in December 1997, Florida Attorney General Robert
Butterworth pressured Western Union into refusing to service many off-
shore Internet gambling companies.31 4 This development could have se-
riously affected many of these gambling businesses because of their reli-
ance on Western Union as a conduit for many of their financial transac-
tions.31 5 When questioned about the effectiveness of the move, Internet
gambling Web site operators claimed that the ban constituted only an
inconvenience and that they would simply rely more heavily upon over-
night mail, cashier's checks, and bank wires. 3 16 However, after only a
week of the ban, Western Union re-established its business with the
Internet gambling Web sites, reportedly because they were so lucra-
tive.31 7
V. POLICY ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Policy Arguments
In 1996, Minnesota Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey I1 con-
cluded that government officials needed to demystify and debunk the
widely popularized notion of the Internet as the Wild West, where there
was no form of law enforcement. 31 8 He noted that just as the Wild West
ultimately required the rule of law to advance and prosper, the interna-
tional territory of the Internet needed the same type of regulation in order
to inspire total confidence from its users to reach its fullest social and
business potential.319
Opponents of regulating Internet gambling argued that as a practical
matter, a handful of government bureaucrats would not succeed in
regulating the Internet, which was designed to allow the computers of the
world to maintain communication with one another in the event of a
world-wide catastrophe such as nuclear war.320 However, Wisconsin As-
sistant Attorney General Alan Kesner concluded that just because the
task of Internet regulation was inherently difficult, did not automatically
mean that adopting a policy banning gambling from the Internet was
inappropriate.3 1 He emphasized that it was not a reasonable approach for
the government to allow activity on the Internet that it did not permit in
the real world.322 Jeremiah "Jay" Nixon, the Missouri Attorney General,
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paralleled this point of view in the context of responding to Native
American Internet gambling proponents in 1997 who suggested that their
supposedly illegal Internet gambling revenues could be taxed in order to
323generate funds for public use. 32 Attorney General Nixon asked: "Are
they saying that just because the proceeds from a bank robbery go to
some purported public purpose that we should allow it to occur? '3 24 The
Missouri Attorney General's office effectively suppressed this Native
325American Internet gambling operation.
Another argument often utilized by the Internet gambling interests
involved the invalid and pejorative comparison of gambling to the prohi-
bition of alcohol. The argument focused on the fact that prohibition only
pushed the taboo underground, where the same people who wanted the
substance or service in question would obtain it despite its illegality, just
without the benefit of governmental regulation.326 This logic was flawed
in several respects. Since gambling was legal in many forms in many
states, those who wished to engage in it could still do so, under some
degree of regulatory supervision. Furthermore, all that a ban on Internet
gambling would do was prevent people from gambling in their homes,
offices, and schools, as well as prevent minors from gambling illegally.
Additionally, it was argued that for the same reasons that there were laws
preventing minors from obtaining alcohol (while adults could still obtain
it), Internet gambling should be prohibited.
In summary, the only group that had a potentially valid interest in
preventing a ban on Internet gambling sites was the Internet service pro-
viders, who argued that they would be thrust into the role of a regulatory
force on the Internet by blocking objectionable sites.327 This role had
worked reasonably well during the 1990s in other countries. For exam-
ple, Germany effectively regulated pornographic and neo-Nazi Web
sites. 328 U.S. service providers, however, argued that they did not wish to
engage in blocking Internet gambling sites and were incapable of doing
so effectively.
329
323. See Lambrecht, supra note 107.
324. Id.
325. See Nixon v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 164 F.3d 1102, 1108-09 (8th Cir. 1999) (explaining
why the court procedurally rejected the Tribe's contention that the court lacked jurisdiction while
remanding for a determination as to whether the Tribe's Internet lottery was a gaming activity on
Indian land).
326. Pauly, supra note 314.
327. Id.
328. See Portals Under Fire for Offensive Material, GLOBAL NEWS WIRE, Aug. 30, 2000,
available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
329. See generally The Internet Gambling Prohibition Act: Hearing on H.R. 2380 Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (June 24, 1998), available at 1998 WL 344427
(F.D.C.H.) (testimony of David G. Jemmett, President, Winstar Goodnet, explaining in relevant part
why Internet Service Providers cannot and should not block Internet gambling sites).
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B. Legislative and Regulatory Efforts
The efforts of lawmakers during the late 1990s to enact legislation
rendering Internet gambling illegal met with much resistance. A House
bill sponsored by U.S. Representative Robert Goodlatte (R-Va.), which
would have banned many forms of gambling from the Internet, won a
majority of the House vote in 2000, but failed to attain the required pro-
cedural two-thirds vote necessary for passage. 330 Representative Good-
latte urged its passage by likening Internet gambling to child pornogra-
phy: "Just like child pornography has to be dealt with on the Internet, so
does unregulated, out-of-control, illegal gambling. '33' The Senate voted
in favor of similar legislation in 1999 with a bill sponsored by U.S. Sena-
tor Jon Kyl (R-Ariz.).332 The bill sought to modernize the 1961 Wire
Communication Act to apply to the Internet; however, it lapsed because
similar legislation failed in the House.333
Subsequent legislation in the 107th Congress included H.R. 3215,
the Combating Illegal Gambling Reform and Modernization Act, spon-
sored by U.S. Representative Bob Goodlatte (R-Va.).334 Even provisions
of H.R. 3004, the Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, sponsored by
U.S. Representative Michael Oxley (R-Ohio),335 were subsequently in-
corporated as Title III in H.R. 3162, the International Money Laundering
Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001 (contained in the
USA PATRIOT Act),336 in an effort to prevent Internet gambling from
being used as a device to launder money to terrorist organizations.
337
Congress enacted the USA PATRIOT Act immediately in response to the
events of September 11, 2001.338
330. See House Fails, supra note 224.
331. House Nixes Ban, supra note 92.
332. See The Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999, S. Res. 692, 106th Cong. (1999).
333. See House Nixes Ban, supra note 92.
334. See Combating Illegal Gambling Reform and Modernization Act, H.R. 3215, 107th Cong.
(2001) (expanding and modernizing the prohibition against interstate gambling). Similar and
complementary legislation included H.R. 556, the Unlawful Internet Gambling Funding Prohibition
Act, introduced by U.S. Representative James Leach (R-Iowa), and H.R. 2579, the Internet
Gambling Payments Prohibition Act, introduced by U.S. Representative John LaFalce (D-N.Y.).
Both bills aimed to prevent the use of various bank instruments for unlawful Internet gambling.
335. See Financial Anti-Terrorism Act of 2001, H.R. 3004, 107th Cong. (2001) (criminalizing
the smuggling of bulk cash while prescribing guidelines for determining the amount of property
subject to such forfeiture).
336. See International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing Act of 2001,
H.R. 3162, 107th Cong. (2001) (increasing the strength of the United States in preventing, detecting,
and prosecuting international money laundering and the financing of terrorism).
337. See Denise Couture, Muted Response to U.S. Law, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Oct. 31, 2001, at
21.
338. See U.S. Treasury's First Patriot Act Regulatory Salvo Covers Entire World, MONEY
LAUNDERING ALERT, Jan. 2002, at 4.
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C. Possible Solutions
In 1996, Minnesota Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey II sug-
gested that state computer crime laws could be strengthened in order to
combat fraud committed by Internet gambling sites by simply applying
existing criminal and consumer fraud statutes covering advertising in
other formats to the Internet. 339 Thus, the first possible solution would
have been to transfer law created for one medium to another and utilize
preexisting statutory resources.
A second possible method would have been to allow only Internet
gambling sites based in the United States to market and operate in for-
eign jurisdictions that permitted such activities. 40 In 1998, Gambling
Technologies Holdings Corp. ("G-TECH"), the largest lottery firm in the
world, planned to pursue this tactic with its Internet based lottery games,
via software that would prevent Americans from accessing its gambling
sites.3 4 1 However, demonstrating the general regulatory problems in any
gambling activity, in 2000 G-TECH was threatened with the loss of the
largest lottery contract, the U.K. lottery, when Britain's regulatory com-
mission revealed concerns over G-TECH's "secretive behavior," an-
nouncing that the commission "remains extremely concerned about the
behavior of G-[TECH]. 342 Even so, the company thereafter succeeded in
retaining the U.K. account.
343
A third policy would have been to attempt to forge an international
agreement regarding the rules and regulations of Internet gambling
worldwide.344 However, the net economic effect of such a treaty would
be to make poor countries poorer, destabilize their financial infrastruc-
ture, and create new governmental corruption.
345
The only workable solution appeared to be a total prohibition
against cyberspace gambling, including Internet gambling, via not only a
multilateral U.N. Treaty, but also bilateral treaties or amendments to
existing treaties of friendship, commerce, and navigation ("FCN" trea-
ties). 34
339. Humphrey, supra note 104.
340. See NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-1.
341. See Associated Press, GTECH Plans Internet-Based Lotteries, LAS VEGAS SUN, July 16,
1998, available at 1998 WL 6696471.
342. See Marc Champion, World's Biggest Lottery Put Up for Grabs, WALL ST. J., Aug. 24,
2000, at A17.
343. Sean Farrell, Camelot Beats Branson's Bid for U.K. Nat'l Lottery, BLOOMBERG NEWS,
Dec. 19, 2000, available at LEXIS, News Library, News Group File.
344. Trying to Outlaw Internet Gambling, supra note 87.
345. See generally U.S. and International Costs, supra note 15 (analyzing socio-economic costs
of gambling).
346. Compare id., with NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 2, at 5-12, recs. 5.1 to.4.
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Ironically, one final method to prevent the proliferation of Internet
gambling would have been to leave it completely unregulated.3 47 Accord-
ing to a consultant for Christiansen Cummings Associates, Inc., a New
York consulting firm for the gambling industry, "With on-line casino
games, you're never really sure if the game is rigged or not., 348 There-
fore, if Internet gambling Web sites developed a bad reputation for cheat-
ing their customers or reneged on their promised winnings, theoretically,
online gamblers would eventually realize that gambling on the Internet
was a losing proposition.349 However, such a libertarian self-learning
experience should be avoided in the nuclear interdependent world, be-
cause these interests would be outweighed by the extent of the socio-
economic trauma, which could and probably would occur to financial
systems and concomitant governmental national security interests.
CONCLUSION
Utilizing the basic McDougal/Lasswell methodology of policy-
oriented jurisprudence and applying these methods to the issues involv-
ing Internet gambling revealed that only a policy of "totally banning"
Internet gambling was practically feasible. Exceptions eventually led to
wide-open Internet gambling and an overwhelming litany of economic
ills and social consequences-increased addicted gamblers, bankruptcies,
and crime and corruption.
Accordingly, all cyberspace and Internet gambling needs to be
banned domestically in the United States and prohibited internationally
by a United Nations multinational treaty. Implementing this policy is
essential because of Internet gambling's very real potential to destabilize
regional, national, and even global financial systems and economies.
347. See Peter H. Lewis, Lawmakers Gear Up to Try to Control the Surging On-line Gambling





ETHICAL AND AGGRESSIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY: THE
"ETHICAL" ISSUE OF ISSUE SELECTION
J. THOMAS SULLIVAN'
INTRODUCTION
Briefs should be brief.1
The persistent,2 and perhaps overstated, message of judges,3 clerks,
experienced appellate lawyers, and law professors is that the secret to
effectiveness on appeal is producing a tightly-drafted, narrowly-focused
appellate brief that will not distract the reader with extraneous matters
and multiple issues not meriting relief.5 As former United States Su-
preme Court Justice Robert Jackson candidly admitted:
The mind of an appellate judge is habitually receptive to the sugges-
tion that a lower court committed an error. But receptiveness declines
t Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law; Editor, The
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process. This article is based on a presentation at the third annual
Eighth Circuit Appellate Practice Institute sponsored by The Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process at the UALR School of Law, May 2, 2002. The article has been revised and expanded to
include references to federal and state law more geographically reflecting the readership of the
Denver University Law Review.
1. See People v. Galimanis, 728 P.2d 761, 762 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986). The court observed:
"A cardinal rule governing an attorney in the preparation of an appellate brief is that the document
be as named-brief!" Galimanis, 728 P.2d at 762. *
2. The Ninth Circuit has cautioned: "Leave to file a fat brief 'will be granted only upon a
showing of diligence and substantial need."' United States v. Molina-Tarazon, 285 F.3d 807, 808
(9th Cir. 2002) (citing 9TH CIR. R. 32-2).
3. "Appellate judges repeatedly complain, with justification, that many briefs they must read
are prolix or incoherent." STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE COURTS § 3.31, cmt. (1977).
Webster's defines "prolix" as "wordy or long-winded." WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DicTIONARY 1814 (3d ed. 1986). In Molina-Tarazon, the Ninth Circuit observed:
The United States seeks leave to file a Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing en Banc that
is 19 pages and 5505 words long .... The government's proposed petition raises a single
issue, based on a straightforward and compact factual record; the applicable caselaw
involves a manageable handful of cases. The opinion the United States wants us to
reconsider is itself only about 3500 words, and in that space deals with two issues.
Molina-Tarazon, 285 F.3d at 808.
4. John W. Davis, The Argument of An Appeal, 26 A.B.A.J. 895, 897 (1940), reprinted in 3 J.
APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 745, 747 (2001) ("I shall assume that these briefs are models of
brevity....").
5. The Galimanis court discussed the number of issues presented in the opening brief and
noted the observations of J.M. PURVER & L.E. TAYLOR, HANDLING CRIMINAL APPEALS § 91, at 142
(1980): "One of the primary difficulties experienced by appellate counsel is the hesitance to limit the
number of issues presented .... Effective advocacy requires the recognition that if there are one or
two strong arguments for reversal, these should be presented forcefully and others of less merit
eliminated." Galimanis, 728 P.2d at 763.
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as the number of assigned errors increases. Multiplicity hints at lack
of confidence in any one .... [E]xperience on the bench convinces
me that multiplying assignments of error will dilute and weaken a
good case and will not save a bad one.
6
As the United States Supreme Court recognized in Jones v. Barnes,
7
there is no aspect of appellate representation so reflective of the exercise
of discretion by counsel as the determination of which issues should be
raised and argued in the appellate brief.
8
There can hardly be any question about the importance of hav-
ing the appellate advocate examine the record with a view to selecting
the most promising issues for review. This has assumed a greater im-
portance in an era when oral argument is strictly limited in most
courts--often to as little as 15 minutes-and when page limits on
briefs are widely imposed.
9
The Court proceeded to reinforce the desirability of limiting the number
of issues argued on appeal, citing leading authorities for the general
proposition that mixing weak issues with stronger ones will dilute the
overall strength of the appellant's position.10 The majority emphasized
the professional duty of counsel to present the most effective appellate
argument, rejecting the Second Circuit's conclusion that the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of effective assistance required counsel to argue
all non-frivolous claims on the direct appeal, as his indigent criminal
defendant client had directed. 1' In so holding, the majority effectively
concluded that the conduct of the appeal itself was a matter for counsel's
judgment, rather than the client's.
2
This approach was implicitly reaffirmed in Martinez v. California,
13
wherein the Court held that a criminal appellant does not have a right to
6. Robert Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court, 25 TEMPLE L.Q. 115,
119 (1951).
7. 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
8. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 752-53.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 753 (citing Davis, supra note 4, at 897, reprinted in 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
745, 747 (2001); John Godbold, Twenty Pages and Twenty Minutes-Effective Advocacy on Appeal,
30 Sw. L.J. 801, 809 (1976) ("[C]ounsel must select with dispassionate and detached mind the issues
that common sense and experience tell him are likely to be dispositive. He must reject other issues or
give them short treatment.")); see also R. STERN, APPELLATE PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES 266
(1981) ("The effect of adding weak arguments will be to dilute the force of the stronger ones.").
11. Barnes v. Jones, 665 F.2d 427, 433 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
12. In Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986), the Court reemphasized this approach to
narrowing the issues to be argued on appeal, noting that the "'process of winnowing out weaker
arguments on appeal and focusing on' those more likely to prevail, far from being evidence of
incompetence," reflects competent appellate advocacy. Smith, 477 U.S. at 536.
13. 528 U.S. 152 (2000). The Court previously held that a criminal defendant had a right to
self-representation at trial in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
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self-representation on appeal,' 4 effectively vesting all matters of strategy
in the conduct of the appeal in counsel. Furthermore, when a defendant is
accorded the option of self-representation on appeal, he relinquishes the
right to complain of ineffective assistance in the appeal, even if counsel
acts in an advisory capacity. The Colorado Court of Appeals addressed
this precise situation in People v. Downey.15 In Downey, the defendant
was appointed a public defender on appeal, but instead chose to proceed
pro se upon motion to the court. 16 On his pro se appeal, the defendant
paid a $3,000 retainer to a private attorney to draft the opening brief, but
the client himself filed the brief pro se.'7 The defendant's election to
proceed with hybrid representation was apparently motivated by negative
prior dealings with attorneys and his desire to determine what issues
would be included in the appeal.1 8 After the convictions were affirmed
on appeal, the defendant subsequently filed a motion for post-conviction
relief, alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.' 9 The court
found that "although defendant did delegate responsibility for the actual
drafting of the briefs, the record supports the trial court's conclusion that
defendant did not relinquish his right to self-representation., 20 Thus, the
defendant was denied the ability to assert a claim of ineffective assis-
tance of appellate counsel on collateral attack.2'
It is clear that the concepts of ethical and effective representation
are not synonymous. Yet, it is equally clear that both involve questions
of professionalism in the conduct of the appeal that merit reflection.
There are undoubtedly some instances in which the refusal of counsel to
comply with a client's directive regarding issue selection and presenta-
tion will raise ethical concerns, particularly if counsel deliberately mis-
represents her willingness to proceed in accord with the client's wishes.
This conduct arguably could result in the imposition of sanctions. How-
ever, most discussion of ethical representation on appeal focuses on
avoiding frivolous appeals, properly representing the facts and control-
22 2ling law, and disclosing adverse authority to the court.23 Issue determi-
14. Martinez, 528 U.S. at 163.
15. 994 P.2d 452 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
16. Downey, 994 P.2d at 453.
17. Id. at 454. Although it is not uncommon for lawyers to "ghostwrite" briefs and petitions
for criminal clients, the procedure in Downey might raise an interesting ethical question if the pro se
filing could be taken to suggest some fraud upon the court, particularly when the non-disclosure of
the attorney's involvement is essentially a term of the representation agreement with the client.
18. Id. at 454-55.
19. Id. at 453.
20. Id. at 455.
21. Id.
22. For a devastating critique of inadequate briefing that included misrepresentations and
allegations of misrepresentations by both sides, see Laitram Corp. v. Cambridge Wire Cloth Co.,
905 F.2d 386 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80:1
nation may impact each of these concerns, but it involves a broader ques-
tion of counsel's exercise of discretion that is not so easily pegged to
ethical norms expressed in the Rules of Professional Responsibility.
The conventional wisdom of the experts demands that counsel not
only write sparingly,24 but also that counsel not overburden the appellate
court with multiple questions to consider. 5 Today, appellate practitioners
face a regime of enforced brevity that focuses on word count
26 and font,27
irrespective of any assessment of the merits, even though appellate courts
retain the option of permitting expansion upon their word, line, and page
limits.
28
Given the preference for shorter, tighter briefs, appellate lawyers to-
day must develop strategies in order to address the pressures-from both
courts and colleagues alike-for brevity, while at the same time recog-
nizing the increasingly complex bodies of case law,29 statutes, and ad-
23. ABA MODEL R. PROF. CONDUCr 3.3(a)(3)(2001). The rule states: "A lawyer shall not
knowingly: fail to disclose to the tribunal legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction known to the
lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client and not disclosed by opposing counsel." Id.
24. See, e.g., Miriam Kass, The Ba Theory of Persuasive Writing, LITIG., Winter 1986, at 47,
47 reprinted in APPELLATE PRACTICE MANUAL 179, 179-80 (Priscilla Anne Schwab ed., 1992).
Think of the reader's mind as a small container. Do not fill it with dead words, bloated
sentences, or other garbage that makes reading feel like eating boney fish or fat meat.
Garbage hogs the space and wastes the mind's energies cleaning house. Adopt the
marketing strategy of Mark Twain: "I never write 'metropolis' for seven cents when I can
get the same price for 'city.'
Id. at 47, reprinted in APPELLATE PRACTICE MANUAL 179, 179-80 (Priscilla Anne Schwab ed.,
1992).
25. Former Louisiana Supreme Court Justice Albert Tate observed:
The questions should be few in number. Rare is that appeal with many reversible errors;
when a great number of questions are presented as serious issues, the judge's expectation
that most or all of them are insubstantial is rarely disappointed. It has sometimes seemed
to me that a large number of insubstantial issues raised might have been abandoned, and
the argument section more tightly concentrated on the arguable issues, if counsel had
attempted to articulate concisely the precise questions for the court to decide before
writing the brief.
Albert Tate, The Art of Brief Writing: What a Judge Wants to Read, in APPELLATE PRACTICE
MANUAL 197, 201 (Priscilla Anne Schwab ed., 1992)(emphasis in original).
26. For example, Rule 32(a)(7) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that a
"principal brief is acceptable if . . . it contains no more than 14,000 words; or . . . it uses a
monospaced face and contains no more than 1,300 lines of text... To see how enforcement of the
brief length rules may actually impact on counsel in the individual case, see Clifford S. Zimmerman,
A (Microsoft) Word to the Wise-Beware of Footnotes and Gray Areas: The Seventh Circuit
Continues to Count Words, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROcEss 205,206-10 (2000).
27. See, e.g., FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(5) (providing that a proportionally spaced typeface used in
a brief must include serifs and must appear in 14-point or larger size, while a monospaced typeface
may not contain more than 10 characters per inch); FED. R. APP. P. 32(a)(6) (requiring use of a
"plain, roman style" typeface, while noting that italics or boldface may be used for emphasis).
28. E.g., Galimanis, 728 P.2d at 762-63 (granting leave to file 80 page opening brief in
complex case, exceeding usual 30 page limit imposed by Rule 28(g) of the Colorado Appellate
Rules).
29. The classic example of the pressure created by the complexity of developed law and issues
arising in the course of complex trials may be illustrated by reference to capital litigation. In a
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ministrative rules that may impact appeal worthy issues in any single
case. Sacrificing analysis for the sake of brevity or simplicity is simply
not the option that it might have been half a century ago; in making the
sacrifice, counsel runs the risk of failing to thoroughly argue the case on
appeal. Nevertheless, counsel can ill afford to ignore the reiterations
from the appellate bench and wisdom of experienced advocates by rou-
tinely straining the limits of a court's patience with overly long, overly
complex briefs. Perhaps more than anything else, this realization sug-
gests the need to carefully consider which issues to brief and which to
orally argue.
I. THREE THOUGHTS ON THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON ISSUE
SELECTION
At the outset, the one clear ethical command driving the decision-
making process should be that appellate counsel competently represent
her client. This is, after all, the basic command of the Rules of Profes-
sional Responsibility: "A lawyer shall provide competent legal represen-
tation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge,
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the repre-
sentation., 30 Therefore, the conventional wisdom dictates careful selec-
tion of potential issues and refinement of the brief to include only those
issues most likely to be meritorious.31
But the conventional wisdom is fraught with problems.32 First, the
narrowing of issues may convenience the court, but it is unlikely to com-
fort the client, particularly the criminal defendant whose loss of liberty
may be difficult to accept. Second, the narrowing of issues theory pre-
supposes that counsel can always accurately assess precisely which is-
notorious capital case, the Colorado Supreme Court was critical of appellate counsel's conduct in the
litigation, which included the filing of a 138 page "so-called partial brief' and counsel's
representation that it was not possible to file a complete brief within the time limits imposed by the
court. People v. Rodriguez, 794 P.2d 965, 971 (Colo. 1990). The court noted that counsel had been
afforded four extensions of time for filing the opening brief, resulting in a two year delay from the
docketing of the case. Id. Nevertheless, despite this criticism, the court recognized that the defense
had raised a number of constitutional claims requiring it to address issues preserved for appeal "at
some length." Id.
30. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2001).
31. "A brief that raises every colorable issue runs the risk of burying good arguments-those
that, in the words of the great advocate John W. Davis, 'go for the jugular."' Jones, 463 U.S. at 753
(citing Davis, supra note 4, at 897, reprinted in 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 745, 747 (2001)).
32. Some problems are inherent in the context of the appeal itself. For example, the
conventional wisdom is directly challenged in the context of capital appeals by the recommendation
that appellate counsel raise "all arguably meritorious issues, including challenges to any overly
restrictive appellate rules." AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND
PERFORMANCE OF COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES § 11.9.2D (1989). This same approach is
reflected in the Supreme Court's admonition in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983): "Thus,
although not every imperfection in the deliberative process is sufficient, even in a capital case, to set
aside a state court judgment, the severity of the sentence mandates careful scrutiny in the review of
every colorable claim of error." Zant, 462 U.S. at 885 (emphasis added).
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
sues will not prove successful on appeal. And third, the narrowing of
issues often distorts, rather than illuminates, the nature of the trial on
which the claims of error are predicated.
A. Advocate or officer of the court?
The temptation for appellate counsel to be overly concerned with
the expectation of the appellate court in terms of brief length is under-
standable as courts have threatened and sanctioned appellate lawyers in
recent years for filing frivolous appeals. 33 The Supreme Court has ad-
dressed the proper approach to disposition of frivolous appeals and, of
necessity, frivolous issues, in criminal appeals, recognizing the conflict
inherent in counsel's duties, as both an officer of the court and as the
client's advocate, when the case presents no meritorious issues.34 How-
ever, the problem posed by the issue selection convention supported by
the Jones v. Barnes majority and other commentators does not arise in
the context of frivolous appeals. Instead, the question presented in Jones
addressed counsel's strategic decision to forego argument on potentially
meritorious claims, but only in the context of criminal appeals.35
The Sixth Amendment posture in which Jones v. Barnes was issued
does not address counsel's ethical or professional obligations with regard
to issue selection in civil appeals. Nevertheless, if the conventional wis-
dom that appellant's counsel should limit the number of issues raised and
argued on the direct appeal is sound, it should apply with equal or per-
haps greater force to civil appeals.36 Although similar tactical considera-
33. For an excellent treatment of one court's practices in this regard, see Brent E. Newton,
When Reasonable Jurists Could Disagree: The Fifth Circuit's Misapplication of the Frivolousness
Standard, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 157 (2001). Sanctions may be authorized where a lawyer is
found to have filed frivolous appeals, such as attempting to appeal non-appealable interlocutory
orders. See People v. Smith, 937 P.2d 724, 725-26 (Colo. 1997) (imposing sanctions for previous
frivolous filings in the interlocutory orders).
34. The Court has addressed this problem in a series of cases from Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), through, most recently, Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000). For a thorough
discussion of the Court's original and current views on the proper disposition of frivolous appeal
filings, see James E. Duggan & Andrew W. Moeller, Make Way for the ABA: Smith v. Robbins
Clears a Path for Anders Alternatives, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 65 (2001).
35. State courts may apply Jones to reject claims based on appellate counsel's failure or
refusal to raise colorable claims on behalf of the appellant in a criminal appeal. See, e.g., Howard v.
State, 727 S.W.2d 830, 835 (Ark. 1987) (denying post-conviction relief on claim that appellate
counsel raised regarding insufficient evidence on appeal; holding that ineffectiveness allegation
would presumably require showing that counsel failed to raise some possibly meritorious issue).
"An attorney need not advance every argument, regardless of merit, urged by his client." Id. (citing
Jones, 463 U.S. at 754.
36. The practical reality is, of course, that civil appellate lawyers will not face the prospect of
responding to claims of ineffectiveness in representation on direct appeal, often an avenue of some
hope for criminal defendants. For instance, in Bell v. Lockhart, 795 F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1986),
counsel's erroneous advice that led to the defendant waiving his right to appeal constituted
ineffective assistance. Bell, 795 F.2d at 656; accord Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480 (2000)
[Vol. 80:1
2002] ETHICAL AND AGGRESSIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY 161
tions may apply, a civil appeal may present counsel with different issues
for counseling the client on the approach to be taken on appeal.
In the civil appeal, of course, counsel is relatively free to discuss
with the client the omission of these issues from the appellate brief and
probably even encouraged to overrule a client's request that these issues
be raised. Often, the client is less likely than counsel to conclude that his
case will not be treated favorably on a claim of preserved error. Indeed, a
part of the attorney's professional judgment is predicated on the attor-
ney's more experienced understanding of the relative value of claims, as
well as evidence, alternative theories, and the entire realm of decisions
confronting litigators. Experienced attorneys learn, or may instinctively
sense, that some errors committed at trial will not result in reversal or
modification of a judgment on appeal. Clients may simply view error by
the trial judge as a flaw in the process invariably unfair to them as losers
in the lawsuit. Because the client retained counsel, and proceeds with at
least a hope of compensation, the will of the client may well influence an
appellate attorney in viewing issue selection as more a matter of the cli-
ent's determination than the majority's perspective in Jones v. Barnes
would admit.
Moreover, the potential for sanctions imposed by an appellate court
in civil cases is not complicated by the same constitutional concerns that
have governed Sixth Amendment claims of ineffectiveness of counsel in
criminal cases. Older Colorado decisions, for example, demonstrate that
the application of this remedy is not of recent origin. For instance, the
Colorado Supreme Court imposed a twenty percent penalty on a damage
award in a civil action in Florence Oil & Refining Company v. McRae,
37
based on the court's conclusion that the appeal, "entirely without merit,"
had been taken "solely for delay. 38 In an earlier case, Rohrig v. Pear-
son,39 the Colorado Supreme Court apparently considered imposing a
penalty upon the appellant for "trifling with [the] appellee's rights," but
proceeded to review the single claim presented, despite the fact that it
was supported by a one paragraph argument of less than half a page and
without citation to any authority.4 °
(ruling that even failure to advise of right of appeal following conviction on plea of guilty may result
in ineffectiveness determination that defendant was prejudicialy deprived of counsel on appeal).
37. 90 P. 507, 508 (Colo. 1907).
38. Florence Oil, 90 P. at 508. The same party, represented by the same attorney, had been
sanctioned the previous year in Florence Oil & Refining Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of Canon City, 88 P.
182 (Colo. 1906), when the supreme court complained that the appellant had "needlessly consumed
the time of this court with a question previously settled in this jurisdiction, and vexatiously delayed
and harassed appellee in the collection of a conceded debt... "Florence Oil, 88 P. at 183.
39. 24 P. 1083 (Colo. 1890).
40. Rohrig, 24 P. at 1083. The brief filed by appellant's counsel was, in this instance, too brief
in the eyes of the court, which noted that the trial record consisted of "more than 80 folios." Id.
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More recent Colorado decisions have addressed the standard by
which frivolousness determinations should be made. In Mission Denver
Co. v. Pierson,4' the Colorado Supreme Court reversed a decision by the
court of appeals imposing sanctions for the filing of a frivolous appeal.42
The supreme court addressed both the substantive grounds for imposing
sanctions, as well as the process by which the rights of the party or coun-
sel being sanctioned were to be protected.43 In reversing the court of ap-
peals' judgment awarding damages and double costs, an the supreme court
cautioned that sanctions authorized by the appellate rules45 should be
imposed only in "clear" cases. 46 The court held that a lawyer might ad-
vance a claim unrecognized by existing law if it could be supported "by a
good faith argument for an extension, modification, or reversal of exist-
ing law. ' 7 The supreme court reversed because the sanctioned party
presented a rational argument in the court of appeals, which was not
characterized as merely being brought for harassment or delay.48
Should counsel accede to the client's request that specific errors
committed by the trial court be targeted on appeal, despite counsel's best
judgment that they are not likely to result in reversal? This is a difficult
question because while lawyers do serve as officers of the court, most
are, after all, practicing law to earn a living. A client's perception of un-
fairness may be correct; the lawyer's pessimism a jaded product of un-
happy experience. And the appellate court may, in fact, agree with the
more idealistic expectations of the client. Or, the need to maintain a
healthy relationship with the client-particularly the institutional or
business client for whom long term representation is a factor in the rela-
41. 674 P.2d 363 (Colo. 1984).
42. Mission Denver, 674 P.2d at 364.
43. Id. at 365-66.
44. Id. at 364.
45. Rule 38(d) of the Colorado Appellate Rules authorizes the award of damages and "single
or double costs to the appellee." COLO. App. R. 38(d). The rule does not expressly provide a remedy
for impropriety in advancing a frivolous argument in the appellee's defense of a judgment, although
it is not unreasonable to assume that misconduct in use of authority or misrepresentation of the trial
record could warrant imposition of sanctions upon an appellee. Statutory authority for addressing
attorney misconduct appears to provide a basis for imposition of monetary sanctions upon an
offending party or their counsel regardless of which side commits the infraction in litigation at the
trial or appellate level. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-17-102 (West 2002).
46. Mission Denver, 674 P.2d at 366.
47. Id. at 365 (citing MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102, superceded by
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2001)).
48. Id. at 366. The "rational argument" test now governs frivolousness determinations under
Colorado law. See, e.g., Zivian v. Brooke-Hitching, 28 P.3d 970, 975 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (ruling
the appeal not frivolous where appellant a made rational argument that trial court erred); Bob Blake
Builders, Inc. v. Gramling, 18 P.3d 859, 867 (Colo. Ct. App. 2001) (ruling the appeal not frivolous
where appellant presented rational argument and obtained partial relief in remand on some claims);
Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. v. Younger, 856 P.2d 52, 53 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (ruling the appeal not
frivolous where HUD administrative regulations relied upon not previously held applicable to fact
pattern in deficiency action).
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tionship--may suggest the need to litigate more aggressively, even at the
cost of incurring the "wrath" suggested by the conventional wisdom.
This does not mean that counsel can afford to routinely advance merit-
less claims, even at the insistence of a client, because there is always the
possibility that an appellate court will take action to discipline counsel.49
On the other hand, almost all lawyers will run some risk of discipline if
the incentives are great enough.
Proponents of the conventional wisdom on issue selection may have
the benefit of speaking from the perspective of lifetime appointment to
an appellate bench, an unlimited client base or pipeline through success-
ful trial lawyers, or tenure-protected employment in law schools. What
they may lack is the very dynamic of interaction with clients who expect
aggressive litigation at the appellate level having already lost at trial.
This concern was not lost on the dissent in Jones v. Barnes,5° written by
Justice Brennan, which recognized the frustration of criminal defendants
whose appellate lawyers willingly sacrifice non-frivolous issues on the
theory that they can, with certainty, ensure that the appellate courts will
agree with their assessments of the merits of the issues briefed and ar-
gued.5 t Justice Brennan generally agreed with the majority's assessment
of the conventional wisdom, noting:
[T]he Court's advice is good. It ought to be taken to heart by every
lawyer called upon to argue an appeal in this or any other court, and
by his client. It should take little or no persuasion to get a wise client
to understand that, if staying out of prison is what he values most, he
should encourage his lawyer to raise only his two or three best argu-
ments on appeal, and he should defer to his lawyer's advice as to
which are the best arguments. The Constitution, however, does not
require clients to be wise, and other policies should be weighed in the
balance as well.
52
Justice Brennan continued, however:
It is no secret that indigent clients often mistrust the lawyers ap-
pointed to represent them .... A lawyer and his client do not always
share the same interests. Even with paying clients, a lawyer may have
a strong interest in having judges and prosecutors think well of him,
and, if he is working for a flat fee-a common arrangement for
criminal defense attorneys--or if his fees for court appointments are
lower than he would receive for other work, he has an obvious finan-
49. See, e.g., Fin. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Weedman, 968 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Ark. 1998)
(imposing sanction and award of fees for opposing party where counsel's arguments on appeal were
unsupported by facts). And, at the trial level, where a claim asserted in a complaint is wholly
unsupported by evidence, the claim may be characterized as frivolous. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Eason,
976 P.2d 271, 273 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
50. 463 U.S. 745, 755-64 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
51. Barnes, 463 U.S. at 761-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
52. Id. at 761 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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cial incentive to conclude cases on his criminal docket swiftly. Good
lawyers undoubtedly recognize these temptations and resist them, and
they endeavor to convince their clients that they will. It would be na-
ive, however, to suggest that they always succeed in either task.
53
Justice Brennan was thus able to articulate at least one source of the
problem posed when counsel attempts to justify not raising issues that
the client has requested she argue. He explained that a potential threat to
the attorney/client relationship lay in the majority's approach to Sixth
Amendment effectiveness on appeal, in which the client's autonomy is
accorded less value than counsel's expected exercise of sound profes-
sional judgment on the client's behalf. In the aggravated situation, the
relationship may suffer a breakdown as a result of the client's mistrust of
his counsel's motives. Justice Brennan concluded in this vein: "I cannot
accept the notion that lawyers are one of the punishments a person re-
ceives merely for being accused of a crime. 5 4
Justice Brennan's observations are correct in addressing the rela-
tionship of court-appointed counsel and their indigent clients. In fact, for
any criminal defendant, whether able to retain counsel or not, counsel's
explanation that the client's appeal is wholly lacking in merit will, in
most cases, jeopardize any faith the client has in the attorney as his advo-
cate as the client faces the prospect of not only losing the appeal, but
losing any hope for relief. 55 The advice that the appeal is wholly lacking
in merit represents a significantly less compelling problem for the rela-
tionship than the suggestion that certain claims should not be argued, at
least from the theoretical perspective enjoyed by counsel. But for the
client, criminal or civil, who is suspicious of the justice system and who,
having just lost at trial, may be concerned that he has suffered injustice in
the courts already, the message is often the same.
The problem of issue selection in criminal cases and its impact on
the interests of the client is suggested by the recent decision of the Texas
56Court of Criminal Appeals in Ex parte Graves. The court addressed the
issue of successor applications for post-conviction relief in which the
representation afforded by post-conviction counsel on the initial applica-
tion was allegedly constitutionally defective. The petitioner's first post-
conviction counsel failed to include a claim challenging suppression of
evidence by the prosecution-that the accomplice's wife might have
been present at the scene of the murder based on the accomplice's failure
53. Id. at 761-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
54. Id. at 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
55. For a discussion of the impact of frivolous appeal jurisprudence on the attorney-client
relationship in the context of criminal practice, see Randall L. Hodgkinson, No-Merit Briefs
Undermine the Adversary Process in Criminal Appeals, 3 J. APP. PRAc. & PROCEss 55 (2001).
56. 70 S.W.3d 103, 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
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of a polygraph question on this point-in the application for relief. 57 The
court rejected the argument that prior counsel's refusal to raise the issue
constituted constitutionally ineffective assistance,58 a relatively simple
resolution because the United States Supreme Court had already held that
the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel does
not apply to post-conviction proceedings. 59 But what is so clear is the
court's treatment of first counsel's decision not to raise the issue in the
petitioner's initial application attacking his conviction and death sen-
tence:
As noted above, this claim has already been rejected as an abuse of
the writ. The factual basis for it was known: 1) at the time of trial
when the prosecutor referred to her possible presence at the murder
scene during his closing argument, and 2) at the time of the filing of
the original writ because second habeas counsel states that he urged
the first habeas counsel to include it in the original writ. First habeas
counsel declined to do so. Perhaps he thought it lacked merit.
6
0
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the capital peti-
tioner had received his "full and fair opportunity to present [his] claims
in a single, comprehensive post-conviction writ of habeas corpus," de-
spite the fact that the petitioner's first post-conviction counsel had not
included the claim raised in the successor petition. 6' As the court's con-
clusion suggests, counsel's failure to raise the claim was not only unex-
plained, but his reasoning, if any, was ultimately irrelevant. The court
offered no explanation to the petitioner facing execution regarding the
rationale behind counsel's decision, except to hold that even deficient
reasoning on the part of counsel would not afford the petitioner a basis
for relief.
Many clients, as noted by Justice Brennan, will readily follow the
advice of counsel to narrow the issues for briefing, and the mere assur-
ances offered by a trusted attorney may be all that are required for both
the attorney and client to proceed without conflict. But for a number of
criminal and civil appellants, trust is impaired by failure at trial, or by the
many other factors that may stress fiduciary relationships in general. In
representing these clients, the conventional wisdom often ignores reality
and the faithful adherence of counsel to the promises made by those es-
pousing that wisdom might compromise the relationship, often leading to
irreparable breach.
57. Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 117.
58. Id.
59. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722; 752 (1991).
60. Graves, 70 S.W.3d at 117 (emphasis added).
61. Id.
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B. Assessing the likely success of issues
Often counsel must confront the question of issue selection from the
standpoint of the probability that more than one meritorious issue likely
warrants reversal. If the disposition of the various issues would produce
different outcomes, however, such as the situation in which both suffi-
ciency and trial error claims might require reversal, but reversal for trial
error will result in a new trial,62 counsel must consider whether to raise
both issues. In a criminal appeal, counsel should always raise insuffi-
ciency claims, even if potentially meritorious, because a favorable dispo-
sition will result in reversal and acquittal,63 practically ensuring applica-
bility of double jeopardy protections on retrial.64 The Supreme Court's
recent decision in Weisgram v. Marley Co.65 also demonstrates the poten-
tial value to the client of seeking complete relief on a reversal for insuffi-
cient evidence in a civil case. In Weisgram, the Court held that a review-
ing court might well determine that the plaintiff could never meet his
burden, and thus the reviewing court could order rendition of judgment
for the defendant. 66
Part of the problem inherent in the strategic approach implicit in the
conventional wisdom is that it is predicated on counsel being able to ac-
curately assess the merits of the issues that may be raised and argued on
appeal. This might appear an easy decision, but the problem is that coun-
sel's assessment of error and prejudice warranting relief is probably not
perfect, regardless of the weight of authority supporting counsel's posi-
tion.67 And when counsel misjudges the merits of the claims raised, those
62. Even appellate courts may err with regard to the proper disposition on reversal. See Crisco
v. State, 945 S.W.2d 383, 383-84 (Ark. 1997) (changing disposition from dismissal to remand for
possibility of new trial on reversal based on exclusion of evidence).
63. See King v. State, 916 S.W.2d 732, 733-34 (Ark. 1996) (ruling that the court will address
sufficiency challenge prior to considering trial error claims, disregarding claims of trial error to
preclude remand for new trial when dismissal appropriate).
64. See Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19, 24-25 (1978); Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 18
(1978).
65. 528 U.S. 440 (2000).
66. Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 456-57. For a thorough discussion of Weisgram and the context in
which it arose, see Robert A. Ragazzo, The Power of a Federal Appellate Court to Direct Entry of
Judgment As a Matter of Law: Reflections on Weisgram v. Marley Co., 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS
107 (2001).
67. This was the situation the author faced in Fugate v. New Mexico, 470 U.S. 904 (1985),
affg State v. Padilla, 678 P.2d 686 (N.M. 1984). The issue involved application of the Double
Jeopardy Clause to a state prosecution in which the defendant was convicted of driving while
intoxicated (DWI) and careless driving in municipal court, and then prosecuted for homicide by
vehicle in a subsequent proceeding in district court. Padilla, 678 P.2d at 687. Because the vehicular
manslaughter charge required as an element either reckless driving (careless driving identical for
statutory purposes) or DWI, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed on the basis of the United
States Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977), which involved a similar
factual scenario to the case in issue. See State v. Fugate, 678 P.2d 710, 711-12 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
The New Mexico Supreme Court reversed, however, holding that the State would continue to apply
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discarded claims may assume an unintended significance for both the
attorney and the client. But the discarded claims will typically not trouble
the appellate court because they simply have not been brought to the
court's attention for consideration.
This is not universally true, of course, as appellate courts do some-
times engage in sua sponte review of claims not raised by appellate
counsel. The exceptional case is, perhaps, Caldwell v. Mississippi.68 At
the defendant's capital trial, the prosecutor minimized the jury's role in
sentencing by arguing that any error made in the imposition of the death
penalty would be corrected on appeal. 69 Trial counsel preserved error by
objecting, but appellate counsel elected not to raise the issue on direct
appeal. 70 The Mississippi Supreme Court noted the claim, but dismissed
the argument as insufficiently prejudicial to require reversal. 71 The
United States Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari on the issue
and eventually reversed.72
Caldwell represents the exception, however, and neither counsel nor
the client can assume that an appellate court will review a claim not
raised on direct appeal, unless the rules of appellate procedure contem-
plate such review. Some jurisdictions do impose such rules for appellate
review, but these rules are typically limited to review in capital cases
imposing the death penalty.73 Otherwise, abandoned claims only present
the "jurisdictional exception" to double jeopardy recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
Diaz v. United States, 233 U.S. 442, 449 (1912). See Padilla, 678 P.2d at 687. In Diaz, the Court had
ruled that a prior judgment rendered would not bar reprosecution if the court initially rendering
judgment would lack jurisdiction over the later prosecution. Diaz, 233 U.S. at 449. Because Fugate's
convictions for DWI and careless driving had been obtained in a municipal court that did not have
jurisdiction over the prosecution of felonies under state law, the state supreme court applied Diaz in
rejecting Fugate's claim in a consolidated appeal. See Padilla, 678 P.2d at 687. Despite the Supreme
Court's reinforcement of Brown in a vehicular homicide/dangerous driving lesser-included charge
case in Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 415-21 (1980), the state supreme court persisted in its
application of the "jurisdictional exception." Padilla, 678 P.2d at 687. At the United States Supreme
Court, Fugate lost on a judgment affirmed by an equally divided Court. Fugate, 470 U.S. at 904.
Justice Powell, who had authored the Court's decision in Brown, did not participate because of his
absence from the Court while fighting cancer. Id. The overwhelming weight of authority, including
Brown and Vitale, as well as Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S. 387, 394-95 (1970), and Robinson v. Neil,
409 U.S. 505, 510-11 (1973), supported Fugate's position, but because there is no opinion issued in
a case affirmed by an equally divided Court, no Justice had to explain or defend their decision in
writing.
68. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
69. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 325-26.
70. Id. at 326.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 323.
73. For example, the Arkansas system of appellate review has two different sources of
authority for sua sponte review. First, Rule 4-3(h) of the Rules of the Arkansas Supreme Court has
traditionally required review of all claims of preserved error, whether or not briefed on appeal, in
cases reviewed on direct appeal by the Supreme Court involving sentences of life imprisonment or
death. ARK. S. CT. R. 4-3(h). Second, Rule 10 of the Arkansas Rules of Appellate Procedure-
Criminal now contemplates fundamental error of unpreserved claims in cases in which the death
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a problem for counsel when the appeal fails and the client does not un-
derstand why the claims were abandoned in favor of others that proved
unworthy of relief.
Abandonment of such claims by the appellate lawyer offers the cli-
ent the option of arguing ineffective assistance of counsel in the direct
appeal. In Neill v. Gibson,74 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified
its standard for reviewing ineffectiveness claims based on appellate
counsel's failure to raise a colorable issue on direct appeal.75 The circuit
previously had held that failure to assert a claim that could be character-
ized as a "dead bang winner" would establish ineffectiveness on the part
of appellate counsel. 76 In Neill, the court concluded that its earlier re-
quirement, that the petitioner demonstrate that he would necessarily have
prevailed on the abandoned claim, was contrary to the general rule estab-
lished by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington,77 requiring
only a showing of a "reasonable probability" of success but for counsel's
deficient performance in failing to raise the meritorious claim.78
Assuming that an appellate court will typically not reach out to re-
dress an error by counsel in deciding to abandon a meritorious claim
through the process of sua sponte review, counsel's judgment represents
the ultimate buck-stopping point in appellate brinksmanship. Few appel-
lant's counsel-with the exception of cross-appeals, it will be appellant's
counsel who establishes the issues to be reviewed in the brief on direct
appeal-are afforded the luxury of appealing cases in which reversal is
ever guaranteed by precedent.
The problem is compounded by the fact that even the soundest exer-
cise of discretion will not always permit an experienced appellate lawyer
to make an accurate assessment of the relative merits of the points that
might be asserted on appeal. This routinely happens when a court over-
rules the prior decisions on which the client's claim has been predicated.
For example, in Payne v. Arkansas,7 9 the Court held that the admission of
a coerced confession at trial could not be treated as harmless error.80 Fol-
penalty has been imposed, incorporating the categories of fundamental error recognized in Wicks v.
State, 606 S.W.2d 366 (Ark. 1980). ARK. R. APp. P. CRim. 10(b)(ii)-(v). To the extent that state
appellate systems contemplate such sua sponte review, the federal courts may review constitutional
claims raised on certiorari or in federal habeas to the extent that review can be presumed in light of
the applicable state law or policy. See Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 547-49 & n.7 (1992)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Joubert v. Hopkins, 75 F.3d 1232, 1241-42
(8th Cir. 1996).
74. 278 F.3d 1044 (10th Cir. 2001).
75. Neill, 278 F.3d at 1057.
76. Id. at 1057 n.5 (discussing United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1995)).
77. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
78. Neill, 278 F.3d at 1057 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-91).
79. 356 U.S. 18 (1958).
80. Payne, 356 U.S. at 568.
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lowing Payne, however, in Chapman v. California,81 the Court con-
cluded that all claims of constitutional error arising in the course of a
trial could be reviewed for harmless error.82 In so doing, however, the
Court noted that, "there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair
trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error., 83 In a
footnote following this statement, the Court set out three examples of
such basic rights to a fair trial-exclusion of coerced confessions, right to
counsel, and impartial judge.84 Subsequently, in Arizona v. Fulminante,85
the defendant, along with the Arizona Supreme Court below, relied on
the statement from Chapman for the proposition that harrless-error
analysis was inapplicable when faced with the admission of a coerced
confession and that the holding of Payne was still good law. 86 The Ful-
minante Court, however, noted that the admission of a coerced confes-
sion, unlike the right to counsel or an impartial judge, involved a "classic
'trial error' that could be addressed through a harmless-error analysis.
87
Thus, the Court held that the admission of a coerced confession by the
trial court was subject to harmless-error analysis.88 However, the Court
found that the coerced confession admitted in Fulminante was, in fact,
sufficiently prejudicial in light of the totality of evidence so as to require
reversal because the admission of the confession was not harmless be-
yond a reasonable doubt.89 Accordingly, while the defendant did not suf-
fer as a result of the change of law, the law nevertheless changed in a
manner not at all likely to have been foreseen by his attorney.
Often, however, the law does change in the process of appeal, or
precedent can be limited in its application. In either case, appellant's
counsel may find that even the best exercise of professional judgment did
not include the anticipation that a reviewing court would essentially yank
favorable law out from under the client's issues. For example, the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court changed the process for preservation of error for ap-
pellate review on challenges to the exercise of peremptory strikes
brought pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky9° in MacKintrush v. State.91 In
doing so, the court overruled a series of decisions in which the process
for preservation of Batson challenges had been established and adhered
81. 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
82. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24.
83. Id. at 23.
84. Id. at 24 n.8. In its list of basic rights to a fair trial, the Court cited to Payne and its holding
that the admission of coerced confessions should not be treated as harmless error. See id.
85. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
86. See Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 284.
87. Id. at 309-10.
88. Id. at 310.
89. Id. at 302.
90. 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986).
91. 978 S.W.2d 293, 296 (Ark. 1998).
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to by Arkansas appellate courts in criminal and civil cases.92 The court
rejected the defendant's Batson claims based on trial counsel's failure to
rebut the prosecutor's race neutral explanation for its use of its peremp-
tory challenges. 93 This requirement, apparently, had not previously been
imposed on Arkansas litigants, but it was consistent with the United
States Supreme Court's intervening holding in Purkett v. Elem.
94
The problem of changes in legal doctrine, moreover, is not confined
to criminal cases. In Shannon v. Wilson,95 for instance, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court overruled some twenty years of precedent in recognizing a
cause of action for dramshop liability.96 Even in his dissenting opinion in
Shannon, Justice Newbem observed:
It is indeed proper for an appellate court of last resort to overrule a
prior decision when that decision was made on the basis of a mistake
or when conditions have changed so as to make it outmoded. Stare
decisis does not require stagnation. The law develops through the ap-
plication of tried-and-true principles to changing times.
97
Justice Newbern was undoubtedly correct in his view of stare decisis, but
defense counsel relying on prior decisions as a basis for exercising pro-
fessional judgment in advising their clients would have likely preferred
that he had the votes to sustain a majority reaffirming the old rule.
Similarly, in Aka v. Jefferson Hospital Ass' n, 98 the Arkansas Su-
preme Court overruled its recent decision on the issue of whether a
wrongful death action would lie for medical malpractice resulting in the
death of a viable fetus.99 The prior decision was little more .than five
years old, but the shift represented a dramatic change in public policy,
paralleling action being taken in the General Assembly.' ° The result
might have correctly anticipated and served the ends of public policy, but
it probably complicated the ability of counsel to properly advise clients
engaged in litigation in which this issue and its disposition were critical.
Changing law not only impacts counsel's judgment with respect to
the recognition of causes of action or defenses in civil or criminal ac-
tions, but changing views on procedural and evidentiary matters may
92. See MacKintrush, 978 S.W.2d at 298.
93. Id.
94. 514 U.S. 765, 767-78 (1995).
95. 947 S.W.2d 349 (Ark. 1997).
96. Shannon, 947 S.W.2d at 358, overruling Carr v. Turner, 385 S.W.2d 656, 657-58 (Ark.
1965).
97. Id. at 359 (Newbem, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
98. 42 S.W.3d 508 (Ark. 2001).
99. Aka, 42 S.W.3d at 637-38, 641-42, overruling Chatelain v. Kelly, 910 S.W.2d 215, 219
(Ark. 1995).
100. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-1-102(13)(B) (Michie 2001); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-62-102(a)(1)-
(3) (Michie 2001).
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also complicate counsel's ability to anticipate the likely success of an
issue on appeal. For instance, in State v. Earnest,10 the New Mexico
Supreme Court reversed the defendant's capital murder conviction based
on the admission of a non-testifying accomplice's custodial statement
implicating himself and others in the commission of the murder. 02 Ap-
plying the United States Supreme Court's holding in Douglas v. Ala-
bama,10 3 the state supreme court concluded that admission of the state-
ment violated Earnest's right to confrontation under the Sixth Amend-
ment because he had never been afforded an opportunity for meaningful
cross-examination of the declarant.1 °4 The New Mexico Attorney Gen-
eral petitioned for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, arguing
that an intervening decision in Ohio v. Roberts'0 5 cast doubt on the con-
tinuing validity of Douglas.10 6 Following argument in Earnest and in
light of its recent decision in Lee v. Illinois,0 7 the United States Supreme
Court reversed the judgment of the state supreme court, remanding the
case for reconsideration. 0 8 This prompted Justice Rehnquist, in a concur-
ring opinion, to suggest that the statement of Earnest's accomplice might
bear sufficient indicia of reliability to warrant admission, even in the
absence of an opportunity for meaningful cross-examination. °9 On re-
mand, the New Mexico Supreme Court, having undergone a change in
composition, affirmed Earnest's conviction, concluding that the accom-
plice's custodial statement bore sufficient indicia of reliability, as a dec-
laration against his interest, to warrant admission, even in the absence of
cross-examination. "1
0
But Justice Rehnquist's opportunistic concurrence did not settle the
issue. The Court has continued to grapple with the problem of accom-
plice statements and the interplay between hearsay exceptions and the
dictates of the Confrontation Clause. Revisiting the issue in Lilly v. Vir-
ginia,' a plurality of the Court concluded that custodial statements
given by accomplices do not warrant admission as declarations against
penal interest when they tend to shift blame to others." 2 The statement
101. 703 P.2d 872 (N.M. 1985).
102. Earnest, 703 P.2d at 875-76.
103. 380 U.S. 415,418-20 (1965).
104. Earnest, 703 P.2d at 876.
105. 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
106. Earnest, 703 P.2d at 876. The Attorney General argued that the United States Supreme
Court had shifted from cross-examination to an indicia of reliability test as the basis for evaluating
confrontation violations in the admission of out-of-court statements. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
107. 476 U.S. 530 (1986).
108. New Mexico v. Earnest, 477 U.S. 648, 648 (1986).
109. Earnest, 477 U.S. at 649-50 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
110. State v. Earnest, 744 P.2d 539, 541 (N.M. 1986).
111. 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
112. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 133-34 (plurality opinion). The Court had previously limited the
admission of codefendant statements to those expressly self-incriminating and jointly inculpatory
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admitted against Earnest at his capital trial included the declarant's claim
that he had been forced to participate in the murder and never intended to
kill the victim."1
3
Despite Lilly, the New Mexico Supreme Court has persisted in hold-
ing that declarations against penal interest constitute a traditionally rec-
ognized exception to the hearsay rule under state law, as demonstrated in
State v. Martinez-Rodriguez. 114 The state supreme court declined to apply
Lilly to exclude evidence of an out-of court statement included in a letter
written by a non-testifying co-defendant, reiterating the court's prior
position that such statements are "firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay
rule." ' 15 Such a decision by the New Mexico Supreme Court directly
contravenes the Lilly plurality, which stated: "The decisive fact, which
we make explicit today, is that accomplices' confessions that inculpate a
criminal defendant are not within a firmly rooted exception to the hear-
say rule as that concept has been defined in our Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence."" 6
The Earnest litigation demonstrates that counsel's best professional
judgment may ultimately prove prophetic, but still not accurately assess
the prospect for success before any particular court at any given point in
time. Moreover, even assuming counsel makes a correct professional
judgment, no guarantee remains that the reviewing court will accurately
apply the law-requiring additional litigation.'
1 7
C. Presenting a complete picture of the client's case on appeal
Suppose the claim for relief presents both a narrow basis for grant-
ing relief and a far broader question of public policy. An example may be
found in the ongoing attack on the imposition of the death penalty on
mentally retarded capital defendants. In the initial post-Furman v. Geor-
gia' 8 challenge to executing the mentally retarded, Penry v. Lynaugh, 119
a majority of the Court rejected the claim that execution of the mentally
retarded violates the Eighth Amendment. 120 However, the Court also
concluded that the jury instructions given at Penry's trial were constitu-
under the Federal Rules, reserving ruling on the Confrontation Clause issue. See Williamson v.
United States, 512 U.S. 594, 600-01,605 (1994).
113. Earnest, 744 P.2d at 540.
114. 33P.3d267 (2001).
115. Martinez-Rodriguez, 33 P.3d at 278; see also State v. Reyes, 52 P.3d 948, 961 (N.M. 2002)
(continuing to reject Lilly plurality as controlling in New Mexico cases).
116. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 134 (plurality opinion).
117. New Mexico is apparently not the only jurisdiction to continue to rely on the declaration
against penal interest exception to justify admission of statements made by accomplices. See, e.g.,
Smith v. State, 24 P.3d 727, 732 (Kan.), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 668 (2001).
118. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
119. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
120. Penry, 492 U.S. at 339.
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tionally deficient because they did not properly guide the jury in its con-
sideration of the evidence of Penry's mental retardation as mitigating
circumstance possibly warranting imposition of a life sentence, rather
than death. 12 1 Penry returned to the Supreme Court again in 2001,122 suc-
cessfully arguing inadequacy of the jury instructions given in the pro-
ceedings on remand following his first reversal. 2 3 And finally, this past
term, the Court overruled its first decision in Penry, holding that execu-
tion of the mentally retarded does violate the Eighth Amendment. 24
Sound reasons exist for pursuing both broad policy issues and nar-
rower issues in an appeal, even though an appellate court might prefer
that the former be dropped if the other clearly affords a basis for reversal.
But, realistically, developing a strategy incorporating both broad policy
questions and narrower issues offers counsel a greater potential for assur-
ing success, while also preserving options for further review in the event
that success proves elusive on direct appeal.
Many appeals are resolved on narrow procedural issues, yet these
issues arise in the context of far broader issues of public concern. Coun-
sel may well elect to present multiple issues in which narrow procedural
grounds for relief may be argued in addition to the broader public policy
question. For instance, in any capital case in which the conviction rests
on testimony of interested accomplices, in whole or in part, or on ques-
tionable eyewitness identification,125 counsel might argue a preserved
claim in which the general issue of the reliability of the trial process is
called into question in light of recent executive, judicial, and prosecuto-
rial decisions resulting in release of convicted capital defendants. 126 The
broad question might be whether the death penalty should be imposed on
the basis of uncorroborated accomplice or eyewitness testimony. Un-
doubtedly, few judges will be inclined to accept the proposition that er-
rors in convictions in capital cases will warrant judicial abolition of the
legislatively authorized death penalty. 127 However, the presence of nar-
121. Id. at 328.
122. See Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782 (2001).
123. Penry, 532 U.S. at 803-04.
124. See Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2252 (2002).
125. A leading study documents the significant problems of conviction based upon faulty
eyewitness identification often later disproved by DNA testing. Walter F. Rowe, Commentary, in
CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE
TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL XV (Connors et al. eds., 1996); see also Peter Neufeld &
Barry C. Scheck, Commentary, in id. at xxviii (noting that DNA testing had exonerated an average
of twenty-five percent of arrested suspects annually from 1989 until the date of the study).
126. For example, the Death Penalty Information Center reports that during the period from
1973-2002, 102 death row inmates were freed as a result of "doubts about their guilt . . .
miscarriages of justice in potentially capital cases, . . . and '[i]n spite of innocence."' See Death
Penalty Information Center, Innocence: Freed From Death Row, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo-
.org/Innocentlist.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2002).
127. Judges have expressed reservations about the wisdom of capital punishment in terms of
public policy, even when concluding that the death penalty remains a constitutional alternative. See
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rower procedural grounds for reversal may influence those judges con-
cerned about the broader issues to view the alternative bases for relief
more favorably.1
28
Conventional wisdom might dictate that counsel abandon the broad
policy issue in favor of relying on those grounds more likely to result in
reversal. But if judges are not afforded the opportunity to debate broader
questions, or if they are not forced to consider policy consequences, the
chance that reform will be forced on the justice system from the appellate
courts is minimized, if not wholly negated. For example, it seems rea-
sonable that any opponent of legalized abortion should take the opportu-
nity to seek an overruling of Roe v. Wade,129 even when arguing a case
involving a parental notification rule. 130 Regardless of the disposition on
the narrower claim, the continuing viability of Roe likely depends, at
least in part, on lack of serious challenges to its underlying rationale.' 3' If
Singleton v. Norris, 108 F.3d 872, 876 (8th Cir. 1997) (Heaney, J., concurring) ("[A]lthough I am
compelled to adhere to the law, I nonetheless announce my personal view that this nation's
administration of capital punishment is simply irrational, arbitrary, and unfair. The problems are
inherent in the enterprise itself."); New Mexico v. Clark, 990 P.2d 793, 821 (N.M. 1990) (Franchini,
J., concurring). More recently, two federal district judges have held the Federal Death Penalty Act
unconstitutional, at least in part because of concerns that procedural protections afforded capital
defendants under the federal statute are insufficient to prevent wrongful convictions. See United
States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256, 267-68 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); United States v. Fell, 217 F.
Supp. 2d 469, 489-91 (D. Vt. 2002). However, the Second Circuit reversed the district court's ruling
in Quinones, finding that the Federal Death Penalty Act does not violate the accused's Fifth
Amendment right to due process. See United States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 52-53 (2d Cir. 2002).
128. Consider Judge Franchini's recent opinion in a 3-2 split decision reversing an imposed
death penalty because of trial court error in failing to properly admonish the defendant of his right to
jury sentencing upon his plea of guilty to capital murder. State v. Martinez, 43 P.3d 1042, 1044
(N.M. 2002). It seems unlikely that Judge Franchini's swing vote to reverse was unrelated to his
general reservations concerning the death penalty.
129. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 194 (1973) (holding Georgia
statutory scheme regulating abortion unconstitutional).
130. E.g., H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398,425 (1981) (upholding notification scheme); Bellotti
v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (rejecting notification scheme).
131. In fact, the post-Roe history of challenges is replete with consistent attacks on the
availability of abortion, in part, perhaps, explaining the significance of Roe as an issue in the judicial
confirmation process. See, e.g., Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 922 (2000) (finding a state statute
banning "partial birth abortion" unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 880-
901 (1992) (upholding some restrictions on abortion practice as not imposing undue burden on
patients seeking abortions); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991) (upholding prohibition on
abortion counseling by recipients of federal family planning funds); Webster v. Reprod. Health
Servs., Inc., 492 U.S. 490, 492 (1989) (upholding statutory ban on use of public funds for abortion);
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 493 n.20 (1983) (upholding parental
notification or alternative juvenile court consent as constitutional, while holding requirement for
performance of abortions in a hospital after 12 weeks of pregnancy unconstitutional); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 (1980) (upholding Congressional limitations on use of federal funds to
reimburse for costs of abortions); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 446-48 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464, 470-71, 474, 477, 480 (1977); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (non-funding of
abortion for indigent patient does not violate equal protection); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 65, 67, 71, 75, 79, 81, 83-84 (1976) (striking down certain regulations on abortion
procedures, while upholding statutory definition of "viability").
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the party ultimately seeks to overrule Roe, then counsel should likely
consider taking any reasonable opportunity to advance the client's ulti-
mate position, rather than restricting the appeal to the more narrow issue
on which a favorable ruling is far more likely.
II. TACTICAL GROUNDS FOR A POLICY OF ISSUE INCLUSION
There are two distinct tactical decisions confronting appellate coun-
sel in the issue selection process. The first decision concerns the question
of inclusion or rejection of issues likely to warrant reversal based on
counsel's judgment. The troubling aspect of this problem, in light of the
advice to eliminate issues, is that the advice-givers are essentially asking
counsel to reject claims that probably warrant relief. This is often a diffi-
cult decision to make since there is no guarantee that the appellate court
will agree with counsel's assessments that the trial court did err, or that
prejudice warrants relief even if error is demonstrated.
The second decision concerns counsel confronting a well-preserved
trial record involving the presence of preserved errors that are insufficiently
prejudicial to warrant reversal. These claims--colorable or at least poten-
tially meritorious, depending upon how one chooses to define "meritori-
ous"-are subject to being discarded in the issue selection process because
they do not offer serious prospects for relief.
There are, however, at least three valid reasons for including issues
which have little prospect for success on appeal despite an obvious or
arguable error on the part of the trial court and apart from the very real
value in simply pleasing the client as her advocate. First, there are often
issues that warrant review that will likely not benefit the client or the
client's interest in the immediate case. Second, there are issues that
should be raised to develop a theme of cumulative error, whether formal
or informal, and to demonstrate the unfairness of the trial, even if the
jurisdiction does not recognize a doctrine of cumulative error. And third,
often reversing courts will address other issues to resolve questions likely
to arise in the event of retrial.
With these thoughts in mind, it is possible to identify a number of
tactical arguments for considering issue inclusion, rather than exclusion,
as the underlying basis for appellate strategy.
A. Raise all issues truly meriting reversal to avoid the consequences of
mistake in judgment
Because counsel may fail to appreciate flaws in the case or overes-
timate the controlling power of prior decisions, the best approach is to
include all claims on which reversal can reasonably be expected in light
of precedent. This avoids the problem of affirmance by surprise when the
appellate court essentially disagrees with counsel's assessment of the
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strength of precedent, its application to the issue precisely before the
court, or the factual similarity of the immediate case to that underlying
the application of the rule in prior cases.
132
Even if prior decisions appear thoroughly persuasive and disposi-
tive, counsel cannot dismiss the possibility that even the most established
rule of law may be overruled by a court that is inclined to view it as out-
dated, in the event it is a long-standing rule, 133 or insufficiently grounded,
if it is relatively recent. A change in the composition of an appellate
court or the rising or diminishing influence of a key judge may lead to a
rejection of precedent. This happened in Booth v. Maryland134 with re-
spect to the issue of admission of "victim impact" evidence in capital
sentencing proceedings. In 1987, a majority of the United States Su-
preme Court rejected admission of such evidence as violative of the
Eighth Amendment and due process considerations. 135 Two years later,
in South Carolina v. Gathers,136 a majority reaffirmed Booth, rejecting
the admissibility of victim impact evidence. 37 Yet, a mere two years
later, a shift in the majority of the Court with the retirement of Justice
Brennan and appointment of Justice Souter resulted in an overruling of
Booth and Gathers in Payne v. Tennessee.138 In doing so, the Court noted
that the two prior holdings "were decided by the narrowest of margins,
132. The application of precedent is almost always governed by the factual similarities
underlying the prior disposition and those presented in a subsequent case before an appellate court.
In People v. Wilson, 838 P.2d 284 (Colo. 1992) (en banc), the issue before the Colorado Supreme
Court was whether a trial court's failure to give a statutorily-prescribed admonition concerning the
reliability of hearsay statements by children identified as victims of sexual assault would constitute
plain error justifying relief in the absence of preservation by objection at trial. Wilson, 838 P.2d at
284-85, 288-89. In prior decisions, the court had concluded that similar omissions did not constitute
plain error on the facts, but did warrant relief on the facts, like in People v. McClure, 779 P.2d 864,
867 (Colo. 1989) (en banc). See also People v. Wood, 743 P.2d 422, 428 (Colo. 1987) (en banc).
Shortly after issuing McClure, the court again held that plain error was not committed. See People v.
Diefenderfer, 784 P.2d 741, 751-52 (Colo. 1989). The Wilson court rejected the defendant's reliance
on McClure, noting that the factual differences presented by the prior decisions governed the court's
disposition in each case. Wilson, 838 P.2d at 290 ("the results of these cases turn on their particular
facts").
133. E.g., Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 2443 (2002), overruling Walton v. Arizona, 497
U.S. 639 (1990) (holding that imposition of death sentence by trial judge, rather than jury, after
determination of aggravating and mitigating circumstances violates federal constitutional
protections).
134. 482 U.S. 496 (1987).
135. Booth, 482 U.S. at 501-02.
136. 490 U.S. 805 (1989).
137. Gathers, 490 U.S. at 810. Justice White, who dissented in Booth, joined in the majority
opinion written by Justice Brennan in Gathers, noting in a separate concurrence that unless Booth
was going to be overruled by the Court, he would join with the majority. Id. at 812 (White, J.,
concurring). Justice Powell, who had written the majority opinion in Booth, had left the Court.
138. 501 U.S. 808, 811, 827-30 (1981). Justice Souter replaced Justice Brennan, who had
written the majority opinion in Gathers and joined Justice Powell in the majority in Booth. Justice
Souter joined the Payne majority in overruling the prior decisions of the Court.
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over spirited dissents challenging the basic underpinnings of those deci-
sions.139
A recent development in the Arkansas Supreme Court reinforces the
point that counsel cannot assume too much stability on the part of an
appellate court. In two fairly recent decisions, Brown v. State'40 and Hill
v. State,14 1 the court had rejected claims of error based on the trial court's
refusal to instruct on second-degree murder and manslaughter, respec-
tively, as lesser-included offenses of felony murder. 142 In McCoy v.
State,143 the court "receded" from those and other decisions that had lim-
ited lesser-included offense analysis to exclude lessers not predicated on
a strict elements analysis. 44 Both trial and appellate counsel might have
justly concluded that the recent decisions would have remained viable,
but, in fact, there were strong theoretical arguments countering the re-
striction on lessers under Arkansas law. McCoy's counsel preserved er-
ror and refused to give up on a potentially meritorious claim.
This point can hardly be stressed too vigorously. Counsel should
never feel assured of victory based on even the best assessment of the
merits of a claim or on the basis of the strength of the claim in terms of
precedent or supporting facts.
B. Always give the appellate court an "out" in the tough case
All constitutional lawyers are aware of the traditional tendency of
the United States Supreme Court to decline to consider broad issues of
policy when narrower grounds for reversal are available to the Court. A
classic example is presented by the Court's disposition of the claimed
right to treatment for involuntarily committed mental patients, a core
concern in the litigation in O'Connor v. Donaldson.145 The Fifth Circuit
addressed the issue directly, noting at the outset: "The question for deci-
sion, whether patients involuntarily civilly committed in state mental
hospitals have a constitutional right to treatment, has never been ad-
dressed by any of the federal courts of appeals."' 146 The court concluded
that the patient had a constitutionally protected interest in treatment.
47
139. Payne, 501 U.S. at 829.
140. 929 S.W.2d 146 (Ark. 1996).
141. 40 S.W.3d751 (Ark. 2001).
142. Brown, 929 S.W.2d at 148; Hill, 40 S.W.3d at 756. Capital felony murder is set out in
section 5-10-101(a)(1)-(2) of the Arkansas Code. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101(a)(1)-(2) (Michie
2001). First degree felony murder is defined in section 5-10-102(a)(1) of the Arkansas Code. ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-10-102(a)(1) (Michie 2001).
143. 69 S.W.3d 430 (Ark. 2002).
144. McCoy, 69 S.W.3d at 437, on State's petition for review from 49 S.W.3d 154 (Ark. App.
2002). The court of appeals had also reversed on direct appeal. Id. at 431.
145. 422 U.S. 563, 573 (1975).
146. Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 519 (5th Cir. 1974).
147. Donaldson, 493 F.2d at 520.
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On certiorari, the Supreme Court concluded that Donaldson's rights
had been violated, but did not adopt the Fifth Circuit's broad approach to
the issues presented. 148 Instead, the Court noted:
We have concluded that the difficult issues of constitutional law
dealt with by the Court of Appeals are not presented by this case in its
present posture. Specifically, there is no reason now to decide
whether mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or to others
have a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement by the State,
or whether the State may compulsorily confine a non-dangerous,
mentally ill individual for the purpose of treatment. As we view it,
this case raises a single, relatively simple, but nonetheless important
question concerning every man's constitutional right to liberty.
The jury found that Donaldson was neither dangerous to himself
nor dangerous to others, and also found that, if mentally ill, Donaldson
had not received treatment. That verdict, based on abundant evidence,
makes the issue before the Court a narrow one. We need not decide
whether, when, or by what procedures, a mentally ill person may be
confined by the State on any of the grounds which, under contemporary
statutes, are generally advanced to justify involuntary confinement of
such a person-to prevent injury to the public, to ensure his own sur-
vival or safety, or to alleviate or cure his illness. 
149
The Court concluded, on a narrow ground, that Donaldson had been de-
prived of his freedom by the continued confinement without a showing
of the necessity for institutionalization. 15 Instead of seizing the opportu-
nity to make a powerful constitutional statement on the proper role of
treatment in the involuntary commitment process, the Court narrowed the
issue to the question of whether O'Connor, the superintendent of the
state mental facility, could be held liable for monetary damages for his
role in depriving Donaldson of liberty in his continued confinement.1
5 '
The Court expressly directed the Fifth Circuit as follows:
Upon remand, the Court of Appeals is to consider only the ques-
tion whether O'Connor is to be held liable for monetary damages for
violating Donaldson's constitutional right to liberty. The jury found,
on substantial evidence and under adequate instructions, that O'Con-
nor deprived Donaldson, who was dangerous neither to himself nor to
others and was provided no treatment, of the constitutional right to
liberty. That finding needs no further consideration. If the Court of
148. O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 573.
149. Id. at 573-74.
150. Id. at 577 n.12 (basing its holding on the absence of any evidence demonstrating that
Donaldson presented a danger to himself or others).
151. Id.
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Appeals holds that a remand to the District Court is necessary, the
only issue to be determined in that court will be whether O'Connor is
immune from liability for monetary damages. 
152
The Supreme Court's approach in O'Connor illustrates the point
that appellate courts often avoid substantial issues and rule on narrow
grounds that may afford relief without establishing potentially troubling
precedent. 153 While the interest of law reform may well only be served
by attempting to force appellate courts to reach issues having broad pol-
icy implications, the individual client's interests may also only be served
by affording the appellate court an alternative basis for deciding the case
in the client's interest, even while avoiding the broader issues. Counsel,
therefore, should always consider giving the appellate court an alterna-
tive ground for relief or review in the event the bigger question is one the
reviewing court is not prepared to tackle.
154
Often, the cases in which reversal is most appropriate arise in the
context of flawed proceedings directly attributable to misconduct by the
trial judge. Just as courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
will search for ways to avoid overly broad rulings by choosing narrower
bases for deciding cases, courts will often avoid rulings that embarrass
lower court judges. For example, in Ruth v. State, 55 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed on the thirtieth issue raised by the appellant
on a point that even the authoring judge found unpersuasive, but con-
trolled by precedent. 156 The more significant points on appeal argued
egregious misconduct by the retired judge sitting as a visiting judge at
the defendant's trial. Many of those points attacked the trial judge's ag-
gressive assistance in prosecuting the case on behalf of the District At-
torney's Office, which otherwise had no difficulty in securing convic-
tions.
The importance of providing a reviewing court with legal maneu-
verability is suggested by the decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court in
Brockwell v. State,157 in which Dewey Brockwell was convicted of sec-
ond-degree murder in the shooting death of his son-in-law, Griffin.'
58
The circumstances suggested a justified homicide, as Griffin was a vio-
152. Id.
153. In O'Connor, the Court noted: "Of necessity our decision vacating the judgment of the
Court of Appeals deprives that court's opinion of precedential effect, leaving this Court's opinion
and judgment as the sole law of the case." Id.
154. E.g., Blecker v. Kofoed, 672 P.2d 526, 528 n.4 (Colo. 1983) ("Our disposition of this case
makes it unnecessary to ... consider the applicability of Converse v. Zinke, 635 P.2d 882 (Colo.
1981), relied on by petitioner as an alternative ground for relief.").
155. 653 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
156. Ruth, 653 S.W.2d at 438 & n.1; see Brief for Appellant at 48, Ruth v. State, 653 S.W.2d
437 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (F78-5812-NQ).
157. 545 S.W.2d 60,63-64 (Ark. 1976).
158. Brockwell, 545 S.W.2d at 60.
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lent neighbor who had been abusive and threatened Brockwell's daughter
and other family members. 59 Brockwell shot his son-in-law as he ap-
proached the front door of the Brockwell residence after making drunken
threats directed at the defendant.160 But Griffin was not armed and he had
not tried to enter the Brockwell house when he was shot. 16 1 There was
evidence that Brockwell warned another neighbor about possible vio-
lence, then prepared to defend himself by loading his shotgun with buck-
shot and warning his wife and daughter to go to the bedroom as Griffin
approached the house. 62 The supreme court held the evidence legally
sufficient to support conviction.1
63
However, a majority of the supreme court concluded that prejudicial
error occurred in the admission of a photograph depicting Griffin with
his shirttail tucked in after the shooting.' 64 Justice Fogelman found ad-
mission of the photo to be prejudicial in light of Brockwell's trial testi-
mony that he thought Griffin had a gun behind his back when he shot,
apparently suggesting that Brockwell was lying. 65 This drew a sharp
dissent from Chief Justice Harris. 16 6 He argued that there was no evi-
dence in the record to support any conclusion that Brockwell's ability to
observe a weapon had been obscured by the shirttail; whether it was out
or tucked in would have logically made no difference in the jury's per-
ception of the justification offered by the defendant. 67 Brockwell himself
had testified that he could not see Griffin's hands because they were be-
hind him, not because of Griffin's long shirttail.
68
The majority, interestingly, also listed a number of issues identified,
but not argued, in the appellant's brief that were deemed waived, as well
as rejecting unpreserved claims of error in closing argument.169 And the
Chief Judge, in dissent, opened his opinion: "I cannot agree that the case
should be reversed for the reason given by the majority."' 170
The tenor of the majority opinion suggests that the supreme court
was convinced that Brockwell should not have been convicted on the
facts of the case, probably because Griffin earned so little sympathy in
his treatment of his ailing wife and threats made against her family. 171 In
159. Id. at 63.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 67.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 60.
164. ld. at64.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 68 (Harris, C.J., dissenting).
167. Id. (Harris, C.J., dissenting).
168. Id. (Harris, C.J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 64.
170. Id. at 68 (Harris, C.J., dissenting).
171. Id. at 63.
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order to afford the defendant a second chance, the majority may have
simply grasped at an issue on which a reversal could be based in order to
avoid an unjust conviction. At least some of the issues waived due to
lack of briefing and argument might have suggested better grounds for
reversal or, at least, grounds that might have persuaded the dissenting
justices. Nonetheless, Brockwell did obtain a new trial because his appel-
late lawyer gave the reviewing court a way Out.
1 72
C. Preserve the opportunity to benefit from new law
Judicial doctrine governing retroactivity and prospective application
of new decisions offers another rationale for including issues in the direct
appeal and discretionary review process, rather than excluding them in
the absence of precedent clearly suggesting success. Typically, issues
may arise almost simultaneously in a number of cases as a result of new
developments, such as amendments to legislation, or emerging trends in
legal theory reflected in scholarly commentary, or appellate decisions
rendered in other jurisdictions. Particularly when counsel is aware of
these developments, it is important to realize the issues litigated at trial
do not exist in a vacuum. Inclusion of issues on direct appeal that may
offer the prospect for relief in the future may end up proving successful
in the case at hand. This is because courts typically apply judicial deci-
sions retroactively, but apply legislative enactments prospectively.
1 73
Criminal appellate lawyers are well aware of the "new rules" doc-
trine articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Teague v.
Lane.174 Teague is not particularly popular because it essentially limits
the retroactive application of new rules or principles of constitutional
criminal procedure for cases on collateral review-the overwhelming
majority of which will not be retroactive under the doctrine. 75 But the
Court left intact an important principle of retroactivity that had been ap-
plied in Griffith v. Kentucky.176 All litigants with preserved claims of
constitutional criminal procedure error are entitled to benefit from a new
rule announced by the Supreme Court, so long as their cases have not
been finalized in the direct review process by the denial of certiorari
prior to the announcement of the new rule.177 Thus, error preserved at
trial under an old regime may prove reversible if the Court announces a
new rule or interpretation of an existing law while the direct appeal or
172. Id. at 60.
173. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 111-12 (Colo. 1992).
174. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
175. See, e.g., Morris v. Reynolds, 264 F.3d 38, 46 (2d Cir. 2001) (superceded by statute); In re
Clemmons, 259 F.3d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 2001); see also Hanrahan v. Thieret, 933 F.2d 1328, 1337
n. 19 (7th Cir. 1991) ("[Wje explicitly considered and rejected the Teague argument .....
176. 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
177. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323.
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subsequent application for discretionary review remains pending in state
or federal court. 78
The practical benefits of Griffith are evident in major decisions of
the Court that impose significant changes in procedure. For example,
literally dozens of cases were affected by the Court's decision in Ap-
prendi v. New Jersey.179 The Court held that an element of the prosecu-
tion's sentencing case used to increase the sentencing range beyond the
presumptive sentence imposed by statute must be pleaded in the charging
instrument and proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 80 Not only
has Apprendi spawned additional litigation governing its scope, with
three cases being heard during the Court's current term, but clients'
counsel who included issues on point in their briefs while the case was
pending benefited from the application of the new rule in their cases.1
81
The principles governing retroactivity and prospective application in
civil litigation are not as strongly articulated as in the constitutional
criminal procedure context.'82 The Supreme Court has itself recognized
fundamental underlying policy differences in criminal and civil litiga-
tion, which explains the application of less rigorous principles of retroac-
tivity to pending civil cases than those applied in the criminal context of
178. Id. at 326-27.
179. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). For example, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Eleventh
Circuit cases in which Apprendi issues have been rejected by the circuit court and remanded for
reconsideration in light of it. See Tapia v. United States, 531 U.S. 1136 (2001), vacating United
States v. McGuire, 220 F.3d 589 (1lth Cir. 2000); Cloud v. United States, 531 U.S. 1062 (2001)
vacating United States v. Cloud, 211 F.3d 599 (11th Cir. 2000); Hayes v. United States, 531 U.S.
1062 (2001), vacating United States v. Hayes, 212 F.3d 598 (1 1th Cir. 2000); Ardley v. United
States, 531 U.S. 1063 (2001) vacating United States v. Ardley, 202 F.3d 287 (1 1th Cir. 1999); Dore
v. United States, 531 U.S. 1109 (2001), vacating United States v. Dore, 200 F.3d 819 (11th Cir.
1999); Griffiths v. United States, 531 U.S. 1109 (2001), vacating United States v. Walker, 194 F.3d
1322 (1 1th Cir. 1999); Ford v. United States, 532 U.S. 968 (2001), vacating United States v. Ford,
228 F.3d 417 (11th Cir. 2000); Bayona v. United States, 531 U.S. 1135 (2001), vacating United
States v. Bayona, 213 F.3d 646 (1 1th Cir. 2000); Phillips v. United States, 531 U.S. 1109 (2001),
vacating United States v. Phillips, 216 F.3d 1091 (11 th Cir. 2000); Ravelo v. United States, 532 U.S.
955 (2001), vacating United States v. Torres, 229 F.3d 1166 (11th Cir. 2000); Wims v. United
States, 531 U.S. 801 (2000), vacating United States v. Wims, 207 F.3d 661 (11 th Cir. 2000); Brown
v. United States, 531 U.S. 920 (2000), vacating United States v. Brown, 207 F.3d 662 (11th Cir.
2000); Curry v. United States, 531 U.S. 953 (2000), vacating United States v. Curry, 211 F.3d 129
(11 th Cir. 2000); Potts v. United States, 531 U.S. 1006 (2000), vacating United States v. Potts, 211
F.3d 598 (1 1th Cir. 2000).
180. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
181. United States v. Cotton, 122 S. Ct. 1781 (2002); Harris v. United States, 122 S. Ct. 2406
(2002); Ring, 122 S. Ct. 2428.
182. The Colorado Supreme Court noted that the United States Constitution:
neither prohibits nor requires retroactive application of a judicial decision, and the
question of retrospective or prospective application of a state judicial decision to civil
litigation in the state courts is a matter of state law when.., the rule in question involves
a matter of a common-law tort and is not based on federal constitutional or statutory law.
Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 112.
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Griffith.183 A majority of the Court formulated a multifactor approach in
determining retroactivity applicability in civil cases in Chevron Oil Co.
v. Huson.184 The Court followed Chevron in American Trucking Ass' ns,
Inc. v. Smith,185 and explained that the impact of applying new rules to
pending civil cases may unfairly penalize parties who relied on existing
law at the commencement of litigation or earlier, when the facts giving
rise to the litigation actually occurred. 186 The Court observed: "[W]hen
the Court concludes that a law-changing decision should not be applied
retroactively, its decision is usually based on its perception that such
application would have a harsh and disruptive effect on those who relied
on prior law.'
187
Although Griffith itself works some disadvantage for the prosecutor
who had relied on prior law, the Court drew a line favoring limited retro-
active application of new rules to benefit those defendants whose non-
final cases raised issues addressed by changes in law announced by the
Court during pendency of the appeal.188 According to the American
Trucking majority, the Griffith rule reflected a determination that it was
simply preferable to expand the procedural protections afforded criminal
defendants.1
8 9
Subsequently, in Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation,19° a
different alignment of the Court rejected the argument that new rules
applicable to civil litigation should be enforced differently than rules of
criminal procedure. 191 Overruling Chevron, and thus applying the Griffith
rationale to civil litigation, the Harper Court stated:
When this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it,
that rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be
given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on direct review and
as to all events, regardless of whether such events predate or postdate
our announcement of the rule. This rule extends Griffith's ban against
"selective application of new rules." Mindful of the "basic norms of
183. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323.
184. 404 U.S. 97 (1971). Chevron required consideration of three factors in determining
whether a new rule of civil law should be given retroactive effect: 1) Whether, in fact, a judicial
decision has established a new rule of law, constituting a break with prior law or overruling
precedent, or recognizing a new application of law not clearly foreshadowed by existing rules; 2)
Examination of the history of the rule in question to determine its purpose and effect and whether
retrospective application will further or retard the operation of the rule; and 3) Weighing the inequity
imposed by retroactive application of the rule against the benefits of retroactive application.
Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07.
185. 496 U.S. 167 (1990).
186. American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 191-94.
187. Id. at 191.
188. Id. at 198.
189. Id.
190. 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
191. Harper, 509 U.S. at 97.
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constitutional adjudication" that animated our view of retroactivity
in the criminal context, we now prohibit the erection of selective
temporal barriers to the application of federal law in non-criminal
cases .... Our approach to retroactivity heeds the admonition that
"the Court has no more constitutional authority in civil cases than in
criminal cases to disregard current law or to treat similarly situated
litigants differently."
92
The decision in Harper recognized a different value than American
Trucking. Rather than reflect concern for reliance on civil litigants to
existing law, the Harper majority focused on unfairness to litigants who
would be similarly situated in the litigation process, but suffer disparate
impact from the limited application of new rules. 93
Another way to view Griffith is that the limited retroactivity princi-
ples reward the creativity and diligence of counsel in preserving novel or
emerging claims for review. Specifically, it avoids penalizing those de-
fendants who might be unlucky enough not to have review granted in
their cases, as the American Trucking majority had conceded.' 4 Further,
even though Griffith has not been extended as a matter of constitutional
necessity to all civil litigation-being limited in Harper to issues of con-
stitutional construction-the limited retroactivity rule may nevertheless
favor civil litigants in state court proceedings.19
5
As might be expected, state courts are split with regard to their ap-
proaches to retroactivity of newly articulated principles of civil law.'
96
For example, in Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Services, Inc., 97 the
New Mexico Supreme Court considered retroactive application of a
cause of action in tort for conduct pre-dating its recognition in the state
courts. 198 The court of appeals had held that liability could not be im-
posed on conduct occurring prior to recognition of the tort of outrage. 199
The state supreme court framed the question: "This case involves one of
the great jurisprudential debates of the twentieth century: Whether an
appellate court decision announcing a new rule of law, or changing an
old one, should always be applied retroactively or may sometimes be
192. Id. (citations omitted).
193. Id.
194. American Trucking, 496 U.S. at 190-91 ("As a practical matter, of course, we cannot hear
each case pending on direct review and apply the new rule. But we fulfill our judicial responsibility
by instructing the lower courts to apply the new rule retroactively to cases not yet final." (quoting
Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323)).
195. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 322 (citing Chevron, 404 U.S. at 106-07).
196. See, e.g., Beavers v. Johnson Controls World Servs., Inc., 881 P.2d 1376, 1381 (N.M.
1994); Robbat v. Robbat, 643 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994); City of New Bem v. New
Bern-Craven County Bd. of Educ., 450 S.E.2d 735 (N.C. 1994).
197. 881 P.2d 1376.
198. Beavers, 881 P.2d at 1386-87.
199. 859 P.2d 497, 499-500 (N.M. Ct. App. 1994).
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applied only prospectively.' °° The New Mexico Supreme Court con-
cluded that the cause of action would apply retroactively, even to con-
duct occurring prior to recognition of the tort.20' It did not rely, however,
on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Harper in reaching that
result.20 2 Instead, Justice Montgomery rejected the position that as a court
of last resort it was forced to choose between a policy of "retroactivity
and prospectivity in civil cases," as the majority in Harper viewed the
limitation placed on the Supreme Court.20 3 Instead, the state supreme
court adopted a presumption favoring retroactivity in civil litigation and
applied it to Beavers' cause of action for tort of outrage.
204
Similarly, in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Lorenz,20 5 a leading Colorado
decision on retroactive application of newly announced wrongful dis-
charge law, the Colorado Supreme Court split on whether recognition of
a limitation on the traditional at will employment doctrine could apply to
a termination occurring in 1975,6 years before the court of appeals rec-
ognized a public policy exception to the doctrine of employment-at-will
in Cronk v. Intermountain Rural Electric Ass'n.20 7 Applying Chevron's
three-part analysis, 208 the majority concluded that the exception applied
in Cronk afforded Lorenz a cause of action for wrongful discharge. 2°
Justice Erickson, joined by Chief Justice Rovira and Justice Vollack,
dissented in part, arguing that the exception should be recognized, but
not applied retroactively because of unfairness in penalizing parties who
relied on prior law. 210
In contrast, the Arkansas Supreme Court engaged in prospective de-
cision-making in Aka v. Jefferson Hospital Ass'n,2 11 when it overruled its
prior decision in Chatelain v. Kelley.21 2 In Chatelain, the court held that
the plaintiff could not sustain a wrongful death action for an injury that
resulted in the death of a viable fetus.213 Subsequently, in Aka, the court
applied its determination that Chatelain should be overruled to benefit
the party who expended the "time, effort and money to raise an attack
200. Beavers, 881 P.2d at 1377 n..
201. Id. at 1383.
202. Id. at 1378.
203. Id. at 1381. For another interesting treatment of retroactivity analysis by a state court, see
In re Commitment of Thiel, 625 N.W.2d 321, 327 (Wis. Ct. App. 2001) (declining to follow Harper;
applying Chevron analysis).
204. Beavers, 881 P.2d at 1383.
205. 823 P.2d 100 (Colo. 1992).
206. Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 113.
207. 765 P.2d 619, 622-23 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
208. Martin Marietta, 823 P.2d at 112-14.
209. Id. at 114.
210. Id. at 117, 120 (Erickson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
211. 42 S.W.3d 508, 518 (Ark. 2001).
212. 910 S.W.2d 215 (Ark. 1995).
213. Chatelain, 910 S.W.2d at 219.
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upon existing unsound precedent[s], '21 4 while electing not to burden oth-
ers who had relied on existing law. The court explained:
When this court overrules a prior decision and states the rule to be
followed in the future, we also acknowledge the need to rely upon the
validity of actions taken in faith upon the old decision .... However,
given that the overruling of a decision relates back to the date of the
overruled decision, we have also observed that no matter how a new
rule of law is applied, the benefit of the new decision is denied to
some injured persons.
215
Thus, in sharp contrast to the positions taken by the Harper majority
and the New Mexico Supreme Court in Beavers, the Arkansas policy
appears to limit potential unfairness by adopting prospective applica-
tion.21 6 Nevertheless, Aka certainly reminds Arkansas lawyers of the po-
tential for benefit from overruling of adverse precedent applicable to
their clients' case, while reassuring counsel of a generally conservative
policy favoring stability in the application of state law. 217 Moreover,
practitioners litigating state and federal constitutional claims in the same
case need to remain cognizant of the differing standards for retroactive
application of new rules that may be applied in state and federal courts.
D. Preserving the cumulative error claim
One of the most compelling arguments against issue exclusion ap-
plies in those jurisdictions that recognize doctrines of cumulative error.
In order to prevail on a claim of cumulative error, counsel must comply
with preservation requirements for the presentation of the issue.218 In
some courts, combination of errors in a single issue relying on a cumula-
tive error doctrine will preserve the issue for appellate review. l 9 In oth-
ers, it will be necessary to advance each claim of error independently and
then argue a separate cumulative error claim.220 Regardless, exclusion of
preserved or even unpreserved, but cognizable, claims of error as part of
the "winnowing" process advocated by proponents of the conventional
wisdom may jeopardize the client's ability to seek relief based on com-
214. Aka, 42 S.W.3d at 519.
215. Id. (citations omitted),
216. Id. at 518.
217. Id. at 515.
218. People v. Blue, 724 N.E.2d 920, 940-41 (111. 2000).
219. See Blue, 724 N.E.2d at 941.
220. For example, Texas recognizes cumulative error, but also requires that claims of error be
presented and argued separately, and then reargued for cumulative error. See, e.g., Feldman v. State,
71 S.W.3d 738, 757 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ("Appellant asserts in his twentieth and twenty-first
points of error that the 'cumulative effect' of all of the above errors denied him due process under
the federal constitution and due course of law under the Texas constitution. A number of errors may
be found harmful in their cumulative effect." (citing Chamberlain v. State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999))).
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mission of multiple errors by the trial court that, independently, might
not warrant relief.22' Almost by definition, application of the cumulative
error rule requires argument of the very type of issues that counsel is
otherwise advised to discard in the issue selection process.
The Tenth Circuit explained the doctrine in United States v.
Rivera:222 "The cumulative effect of two or more individually harmless
errors has the potential to prejudice a defendant to the same extent as a
single reversible error. The purpose of a cumulative-error analysis is to
address that possibility., 223 The Colorado Supreme Court advanced a
similar explanation in Oaks v. People,224 in which the court reversed a
murder conviction despite convincing evidence of the accused's guilt.
225
In reversing, the court explained that the cumulation of technical, as op-
posed to substantial, errors at trial might warrant reversal even though
the technical errors would not individually justify relief from the convic-
226tion. This may be a particularly important consideration in a close
227case, according to the Oaks court, suggesting that counsel should al-
ways consider arguing cumulative error claims when a strong challenge
can be made to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the judgment.
Although the principle espoused in Oaks may seem dated,228 Colorado
still recognizes the doctrine of cumulative error and presumably, in the
proper case, the accumulation of non-reversible errors will still warrant
reversal.
229
Because the doctrine of cumulative error is designed to encompass
harmless error, counsel's determination of harmlessness does not fore-
close argument of the issue, although an attempt to include frivolous
issues or issues not demonstrating error will undoubtedly, in this in-
stance, jeopardize the credibility of the cumulative error claim.23°
221. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-52 (1983).
222. 900 F.2d 1462, 1469-71 (10th Cir. 1990).
223. Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1469, relying on United States v. Wallace, 848 F.2d 1464, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1988) and United States v. Canales, 744 F.2d 413, 430 (5th Cir. 1984).
224. 371 P.2d 443 (Colo. 1962).
225. Oaks, 371 P.2d at 445.
226. Id. at 446.
227. Id.
228. See id. at 451.
The Machiavellian doctrine-that the end justifies the means-is stranger to, and wholly
uncongenial with, our constitutional and common-law concepts. A wrong means to
achieve a deserved result finds no sanction in our law; only a right means affecting a
proper end finds justification in law. These are fundamental precepts which we affirm.
Id. at 446; cf. Burton v. Dormire, 295 F.3d 839, 849 (8th Cir. 2002) (noting substantial evidence
offered in support of death row petitioner's claim of actual innocence, but concluding that despite
being "trouble[d]" court must deny habeas relief because a showing of actual innocence does not
provide a basis for granting the writ under current law).
229. People v. Roy, 723 P.2d 1345, 1349 (Colo. 1986); People v. Caldwell, 43 P.3d 663, 673
(Colo. Ct. App. 2001); People v. Dore, 997 P.2d 1214, 1222-23 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999).
230. See Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1470.
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Interestingly, the Eighth Circuit has apparently rejected cumulative
error analysis, at least for claims of ineffective assistance of counsel
raised in the context of habeas corpus.23' In Girtman v. Lockhart,232 the
court overruled prior authority relied on by the petitioner in asserting his
claim of cumulative ineffectiveness of counsel.233 This circuit split sug-
gests a potentially "cert-worthy" issue as to whether the Supreme Court's
seminal statement on Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance234 contem-
plates cumulative error analysis of counsel's multiple flaws or permits
lower courts to employ harm analysis in examining each claimed in-
stance of deficient performance individually.
With respect to other claims, the Eighth Circuit has applied a cumu-
lative error approach to the prejudice determination. Thus, when allega-
tions of prosecutorial misconduct have been asserted on direct appeal,
the court has looked to the "cumulative effect of such misconduct" in
235considering whether to reverse. And it also appears that the circuit has
implicitly recognized the viability of cumulative error analysis in civil
236 237appeals, as well.236 In Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., the court addressed
an issue relating to allegedly improper admission of testimony concern-
ing availability of collateral sources for recovery.238 The court reviewed
the claims and concluded, "We recognize that, under South Dakota law,
the introduction of workers' compensation into a trial constitutes error.
Here, however, the three areas of testimony complained of simply do not
rise to the requisite level, individually or cumulatively. The breaches
were slight, in not downright obscure.
' 239
Arkansas practice appears to parallel that in the Eighth Circuit. The
state courts do not consider ineffective assistance claims cumulatively,
24°
but a criminal appellant may otherwise advance a cumulative error claim
on direct appeal. 24' The Arkansas Supreme Court reiterated its preserva-
tion rule for presentation of cumulative error claims not involving inef-
231. See Girtman v. Lockhart, 942 F.2d 468,475 (8th Cir. 1991).
232. 942 F.2d 468.
233. Id. at 475 ("cumulative error does not call for habeas relief, as each habeas claim must
stand or fall on its own" (quoting Scott v. Jones, 915 F.2d 1188, 1198 (8th Cir. 1990))).
234. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
235. United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 768, 771 (8th Cir. 1992); accord United States v.
Wadlington, 233 F.3d 1067, 1077 (8th Cir. 2000); United States v. Benitez-Meraz, 161 F.3d 1163,
1166 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that counsel argued that each error warranted reversal individually, and
cumulatively).
236. See Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377,379 (8th Cir. 1993).
237. 981 F.2d 377.
238. Id. at 382.
239. Id. (citation omitted, emphasis added).
240. State v. Hardin, 60 S.W.3d 397, 399-400 (Ark. 2001).
241. See Noel v. State, 960 S.W.2d 439, 442 (Ark. 1998), affd denial of post conviction relief,
26 S.W.3d 123 (Ark. 2000), and habeus corpus denied, Noel v. Norris, 194 F. Supp. 2d 893 (E.D.
Ark. 2002).
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fective assistance in the capital appeal in Noel v. State.242 The defense
must preserve error by objecting to each instance of error at trial, make a
separate cumulative error claim to the trial court, and obtain a ruling on
that claim. 243 In Noel's case, the defense also moved for mistrial on each
individual error and then preserved the cumulative error claim in the
motion for directed verdict that was properly renewed at the close of all
evidence. 244 Having obtained rulings on both motions, the court held the
cumulative error claim was properly preserved for appellate review.
245
Arkansas courts also recognize cumulative error claims raised in the
context of civil appeals. 246 In Edwards v. Stills, 247 the Arkansas Supreme
Court concluded that the appellant had failed to preserve her cumulative
error complaint because no cumulative error motion had been made to
the trial court for ruling.248 The court, however, did consider the individ-
ual claims of error that had been properly preserved.249
Noel and Edwards demonstrate the significance of preservation of
error for purposes of appellate review. Trial counsel's failure to recog-
nize and raise a claim of cumulative error forecloses appellate review in
250Arkansas state courts, a strong argument for communication between
trial and appellate counsel during the course of proceedings in the trial
court.
E. Obtaining directions for the trial court on remand
Often, an important reason for including issues in the appeal that
might otherwise be unnecessary for success in the case lies in the need to
assure that retrial will not be marred by errors that previously occurred.
In this sense, inclusion of these issues is not designed to ask the appellate
court to rule prospectively, but in light of the record before it, to ensure a
fair trial on remand.
For example, in Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Arkansas Sheriffs
Boys' Ranch,25' the Arkansas Supreme Court ordered remand on reversal
and proceeded to consider "the other points which are raised on this appeal
and will likely arise again upon retrial. 252 Further, the Arkansas Court of
242. 960 S.W.2d at 442-43.
243. Id. at 442.
244. Id. at 442-43.
245. Id.
246. See Edwards v. Stills, 984 S.W.2d 366, 389 (Ark. 1998).
247. 984 S.W.2d 366.
248. Id. at 389.
249. Id.
250. See Noel, 960 S.W.2d at 442; Edwards, 984 S.W.2d at 389.
251. 655 S.W.2d 389 (Ark. 1983).
252. Mo. Pac. RR. Co., 655 S.W.2d at 392.
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Appeals acted similarly in Jorden v. Arkansas Department of Human Ser-
vices:
253
Consequently, it is not necessary to address the remaining issues
raised by appellant except to the extent that such issues are likely to
arise in the retrial of this case. The only issue that we anticipate is
likely to arise again involves appellant's objection to hearsay testi-
mony by the attorney ad litem in the case. With respect to that issue
we simply remind the trial court that "[u]nless otherwise indicated,
the Arkansas Rules of Evidence shall apply" to juvenile proceed-
ings.
2 54
Similarly, in In re Casias,255 the Colorado Court of Appeals in-
structed the trial court in a divorce proceeding to make specific findings
regarding factors forming the basis for division of property, 256 particu-
larly with respect to the division of a 401(k) retirement account. 57 At
other times, reversing courts expressly decline to address other issues not
essential to the disposition of the case on appeal.258
F. The value of identification of error made by the trial court
In addition to those situations in which counsel should consider
inclusion of issues arguably meriting reversal, there are at least three
policy considerations that may dictate inclusion of issues in the appellate
brief for which there is no reasonable prospect for reversal. These are
claims that proponents of the conventional wisdom would certainly argue
should be excluded from the brief, yet there are sound reasons for inclu-
sion in special circumstances.
First, even when error does not merit reversal, the identification of er-
ror committed at trial by a trial court may prove important for a number of
reasons. Whether in terms of abuse of discretion in the admission or exclu-
sion of evidence, or in control of the trial process, or error that occurs in the
interpretation and application of law, trial court error warrants correction in
order to avoid future error on the part of the trial judge. The education of
the trial judge is often an important part of the appellate process. For exam-
ple, in People v. Horrocks,259 the Colorado Supreme Court considered the
use of hypothetical questions propounded to a psychologist through which
defense counsel sought to elicit potential explanations as to why the ac-
253. 38 S.W.3d 914 (Ark. Ct. App. 2001).
254. Jorden, 38 S.W.3d at 916 (citation omitted).
255. 962 P.2d 999 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998).
256. In re Casias, 962 P.2d at 1003.
257. Id. at 1002.
258. See, e.g., State v. Martinez, 43 P.3d 1042, 1044 (N.M. 2002) ("Because we reverse
Defendant's sentence on the basis of the trial court's failure to adequately advise him of his right to
be sentenced by a jury, we do not address any additional alleged errors.").
259. 549 P.2d 400 (Colo. 1976) (en banc).
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cused attempted to flee following a shooting claimed to have been done in
self-defense. 260 The victim had apparently attempted to withdraw from the
confrontation after the defendant fired a warning shot, but the defendant
fired again, killing the victim.261 While affirming its commitment to the
abuse of discretion standard, the court observed that the question posed was
"comprehensive enough for the expert witness to formulate a rational opin-
ion, and the court was overly restrictive in excluding it."'262 Nevertheless,
the trial court's error in precluding use of the question was deemed harm-
less. 263
The trial court in Horrocks had rejected the hypothetical question as
failing to include all material facts in the case, but the Colorado Supreme
Court pointed out that the trial court had not indicated in the record what
material facts had been omitted that justified its conclusion that the question
was objectionable. 264 The defendant was afforded relief on an alternate
ground;265 the trial court was educated on the propriety of developing de-
fensive evidence through hypothetical questions propounded to experts.
Second, for institutional clients likely to have continuing litigation in-
volving the same substantive issue or procedural claim, identification of
error may well serve to avoid commission of a similar error in the next
case. This is particularly true when a trial court demonstrates hostility to-
ward a class of claims, clients, or particular attorneys. One of the important
functions of appellate courts lies in the supervision of the trial courts, a
function often compromised by application of the abuse of discretion doc-
trine.266 For example, in People v. Reaud,2 67 the Colorado Court of Appeals
held that a trial court's restrictions on voir dire incorporated in its written
"rules for jury selection," while not demonstrating an abuse of discretion
requiring reversal on the facts of the case, improperly compromised coun-
268sel's right to voir dire prospective jurors. Although the defendant gained
no relief,269 the disposition on appeal likely served to prevent reoccurrence
of the trial court's improper restriction on voir dire in subsequent trials.
260. Horrocks, 549 P.2d at 401.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 403.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 402.
265. Id. at 403-04. The court agreed with the defendant that a statutory ambiguity rendered his
conviction for "reckless manslaughter" unfair because the language of the statutory provision
essentially duplicated that defining criminally negligent homicide. Id. The court reduced the offense
to the lesser crime and remanded for resentencing. Id. at 404.
266. For a discussion of the concept of "discretion," see Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review:
Judicial Review of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCEss 47, 48-61 (2000).
267. 821 P.2d 870 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991).
268. Reaud, 821 P.2d at 872 ("[T]he particular restriction to which objection was made was
improper.").
269. Id.
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Third, appellate counsel may need to raise issues designed to educate
an appellate court about a particular pattern of misconduct on the part of
trial counsel. For instance, prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument
may not warrant relief in the individual case, but repeated misconduct may
ultimately lead to corrective measures being taken directly by appellate
courts or trial courts acting on the directive of appellate courts.270 One study
of such misconduct noted the tendency of appellate courts to eventually
apply sanctions or order reversal after repeated instances of misconduct
were brought to their attention.27 Repeated misconduct by a single prose-
cutor or by a prosecutor's office may eventually require intervention by the
trial or appellate courts.272
People v. Rodriguez273 provides an example of prosecutorial miscon-
duct meriting appellate review. On direct appeal, the Colorado Supreme
Court addressed the defendant's claims that the prosecutor engaged in
twenty-three separate instances of misconduct in closing argument, even
though there were numerous instances in which no contemporaneous objec-
tion had been made by trial counsel.274 While the court did not reverse, the
court did hold that misconduct not requiring reversal had occurred with
respect to some of the claims .275 For example, the court concluded that the
prosecutor's suggestion that the General Assembly had determined that the
death penalty was appropriate for Rodriguez did not lead to a literal inter-
pretation by jurors; however, the court expressly discouraged this line of
276argument. The court then concluded that the prosecutor committed mis-
conduct not warranting reversal in improperly suggesting his evaluation of
the case as one of the "worst., 277 The court also condemned the prosecu-
tor's explicit argument that "it is cheaper to execute a defendant than to
keep him or her in prison for the rest of their life. '278 While none of the
arguments found improper by the majority warranted relief, the court's
decision offers important guidance for the conduct of capital trials in the
future.
270. See Paul Spiegelman, Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument: The Role of Intent
in Appellate Review, I J. App. PRAC. & PROCESS 115, 169-83 (1999).
271. See id. at 169-71.
272. Id. at 171-83 (reviewing history of misconduct claims in the First Circuit coming from the
United States Attorney's Office for the District of Puerto Rico).
273. 794 P.2d 965 (Colo. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1055 (1991), post conviction relief
granted, 914 P.2d 230 (Colo. 1996), habeus corpus denied, Rodriguez v. Zavaras, 42 F. Supp. 2d
1059 (D. Colo. 1999).
274. Rodriguez, 794 P.2d at 972.
275. Id. at 979.
276. Id. at 977.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 979.
[Vol. 80:1
2002] ETHICAL AND AGGRESSIVE APPELLATE ADVOCACY 193
G. Answering important questions of law not requiring reversal
The identification of error by the appellate court may be important
for the development of the law generally, even though the individual
litigant does not benefit from the appellate court's determination. For
example, in State v. Sinyard,279 the New Mexico Court of Appeals ruled
on an issue of first impression-whether sentencing error could be raised
as a matter of fundamental error.28° Often, appellant counsel are called
upon to assert claims not preserved by trial counsel, and the designation
of such matters as fundamental claims addresses the lack of preservation
problem. While Sinyard gained no relief from his sentence, 281 the court's
opinion represented a small development in New Mexico law of impor-
tance to counsel handling criminal appeals.
In the post-conviction litigation in People v. Rodriguez, the Colo-
rado Supreme Court considered 319 claims attacking the conviction and
sentence of death.282 The court refused to grant relief, but did find that
one of the petitioner's convictions, for first-degree sexual assault, had to
be vacated based on an incorrect jury instruction that permitted convic-
tion on less than the statutorily required evidence.
283
Similarly, in People v. Stewart,284 the Colorado Supreme Court re-
viewed a reversal ordered by the Colorado Court of Appeals 285 in a case
involving a conviction for reckless assault with a deadly weapon.28' The
court of appeals reversed the conviction, which specifically involved the
defendant's use of his automobile to seriously injure another person.287
One of the issues addressed by the intermediate court concerned the ad-
mission of testimony by an investigating officer as "expert testimony"
requiring qualification.288 It dealt with the issue based on its view that the
28evidence would likely be offered again at the retrial. 89 In reversing the
court of appeals, the Colorado Supreme Court also addressed the admis-
sibility of expert opinion offered through an investigating police offi-
cer. 29 The court engaged in an analysis of decisions from other jurisdic-
tions on point2 91 after generally reviewing Colorado evidentiary rules
279. 675 P.2d 426 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983).
280. See Sinyard, 675 P.2d at 427.
281. Id.
282. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d at 247.
283. id. at 272-73.
284. 55 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2002).
285. See People v. Stewart, 26 P.3d 17 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).
286. Stewart, 55 P.3d at 112.
287. Stewart, 26 P.3d at 19-20.
288. Id. at 25-26.
289. Id.
290. Stewart, 55 P.3d at 121-25.
291. Id. at 123-24.
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governing admissibility of lay292 and expert opinions.293 Ultimately, the
court concluded that officers testifying based on specialized training or
education must be properly qualified as experts prior to offering what
"amounts to expert testimony.,,294 But the court declined to find that the
error in admitting the testimony prejudiced the accused and thus af-
firmed.2 95
The Stewart litigation answered an important and continuing ques-
tion in Colorado criminal trials involving the proper use of police officer
expertise. While the disposition ultimately did not favor the accused,296
the decisions of the court of appeals and supreme court clarified the issue
for future litigants. Of course, it raised other issues as well, particularly
regarding the likelihood that the training afforded an officer is sufficient
to permit their qualification as an expert.297 Thus, while Stewart lost his
reversal in the court of appeals on the State's petition to the supreme
court, prosecutors now will be required to qualify their officer witnesses
as experts before developing their opinions in the guise of lay testi-
mony.
298
An analogous situation is sometimes presented in the appeal by the
prosecution on a point of law following the acquittal of the defendant.
For instance, after the defendant's acquittal on the defense of insanity,
the prosecution sought a clarification of Idaho law in State v. White.29
The prosecution was concerned that the trial court had improperly ex-
panded upon state law in instructing the jury on volitional insanity, or the
"irresistible impulse" test for insanity. 300 The Idaho Supreme Court took
the opportunity to announce its adoption of the ALI Model Penal Code
301
test for insanity, which includes a volitional component.3 °2 Relying on
state procedure permitting appeals by the prosecution even after acquit-
tal, the State obtained an advisory opinion clarifying a controlling rule of
law in Idaho criminal trials.303
292. COLO. R. EvlD. 701.
293. COLO. R. EviD. 702.
294. Stewart, 55 P.3d at 124.
295. Id. (pointing to Rule 35(e) of the Colorado Appellate Rules, which provides that error is
not reversible unless it prejudices a substantial right of the party suffering an adverse ruling).
296. Id. at 112.
297. Id. at 123-24.
298. Id. at 123 n.10.
299. 456 P.2d 797, 799 (Idaho 1969).
300. See White, 456 P.2d at 801-02.
301. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Official Draft 1962).
302. White, 456 P.2d at 802-03.
303. See IDAHO CODE §§ 19-2804(5), 19-2808 (repealed 1977). Such appeals are now
authorized by Rule 1 1(c)(9) of the Idaho Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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H. Reinforcing the client and trial counsel's confidence in appellate
counsel
Finally, the identification of error in the appellate court may en-
hance the relationship between appellate counsel and trial counsel when
different lawyers have represented the party at different stages of the
proceedings. If trial counsel is rightly concerned that the trial court has
erred, determination on appeal that the error in fact occurred, but was not
sufficient to warrant relief, may serve a number of purposes. It may reas-
sure counsel's perception of the proper disposition of the claim or motion
at trial. It may also serve to dispel any perception that appellate counsel
failed to acknowledge trial counsel's legitimate concern that the trial
court acted improperly. Moreover, it may reinforce the perception of
appellate counsel as a competent attorney in arguing the case on appeal,
perhaps ensuring repeat business from the trial attorney or client.
Often, clients believe that they have been treated unfairly in the trial
courts, and later, on appeal. Not infrequently, they are. The client's le-
gitimate interest in retaining faith that counsel has not compromised the
client's interests in the course of representation may, in such cases, be
paramount to reinforcing the attorney/client relationship. 304 In these
situations, counsel may well need to advance an argument at trial, or on
appeal, even knowing that the disposition will be unfavorable to the cli-
ent, if only to demonstrate loyalty to the client's position. °5 But counsel
304. Justice Brennan noted this problem in the context of representation of criminal defendants
in appointed appeals in his dissenting opinion in Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1983).
305. The author's experience in a recent case illustrates the point. In Buckley v. State, 76
S.W.3d 825 (Ark. 2002) [hereinafter Buckley II], the defendant, Buckley, insisted that trial counsel
object to empanelling a new jury for resentencing after his case had initially been reversed for
sentencing error in a prior appeal, see Buckley v. State, 20 S.W.3d 331, 337-39 (Ark. 2000). See
Buckley II, 76 S.W.3d at 829. When trial counsel refused to assert the claim, Buckley stated the
objection to the trial court personally, relying on a prior holding of the Eighth Circuit in which that
court had concluded that Arkansas did not recognize a process for empanelling a sentencing jury
after reversal for sentencing error, see Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375, 381 n.17 (8th Cir. 1991).
See Buckley 1H, 765 S.W.3d at 830. Trial counsel, however, concluded that Arkansas practice had
been altered by legislation establishing bifurcation of the trial process. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
97-101 (Michie 2001). Further, while no Arkansas decision had expressly upheld the practice of
limited remand before a jury charged solely on the issue of punishment, that conclusion was clearly
foreshadowed by the Arkansas Supreme Court's holding in Hill v. State, 887 S.W.2d 275 (Ark.
1994), in which the parties had apparently proceeded by agreement to sentencing by a jury upon a
plea of guilty, despite the absence of any statutory language authorizing this process. Hill, 887
S.W.2d at 277; see ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-97-101(5) (Michie 2001) (authorizing parties to waive
jury sentencing after verdict of guilty returned by jury). The Buckley II court inferred from the
change in sentencing procedure that the State now has a right to demand jury sentencing upon
remand for resentencing when the appellate court finds reversible error in the punishment phase of
the bifurcated trial. Buckley 11, 76 S.W.3d at 830.
Buckley's disagreement with counsel over raising the jury resentencing issue resulted in a
change of counsel for purposes of his appeal following his resentencing. On appeal, however,
Buckley's insistence that the issue be asserted was respected, even though the outcome appeared
clear to counsel. See id. at 829-31. The client's argument was certainly not frivolous and the opinion
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is cautioned that appellate courts occasionally display hostility to aggres-
sive litigation tactics.
An experienced appellate attorney was recently disciplined by the
Indiana Supreme Court for remarks made in his brief seeking to transfer
the appeal from the court of appeals to the state supreme Court.306 His
complaint was that the decision of the intermediate court suggested to
him that the court's decision-making was outcome driven and intellectu-
ally dishonest. 30 7 Following a disciplinary proceeding, the supreme court
ordered him suspended from practice for a period of one month,30 8 hav-
ing previously ordered his brief supporting transfer to that court stricken.
In its earlier action, the court had characterized the brief as a "scurrilous
and intemperate attack on the integrity of the Court of Appeals. 3 °9
The Indiana Supreme Court decision imposing the suspension came
on a 3-2 vote.310 Ironically, one of the judges voting to impose the sanc-
tion had served on the court of appeals, concurring in the result without
opinion.311 The sanctioned lawyer undoubtedly has earned his client's
belief that his loyalty has not been compromised. Of course, his effec-
tiveness on the client's behalf likely has been jeopardized.
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The ethical rules direct counsel to "abide by the client's decisions
concerning the objectives of representation" and to "consult with the
client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. 3 12 The thrust of
this directive makes excellent sense in terms of solidifying the attor-
ney/client relationship. Ironically, the concern appears to have been lost
on the Jones v. Barnes majority, which relegated control of the appeal to
counsel.3 13 Moreover, the Supreme Court's reliance on counsel's deci-
sion-making expertise seems somewhat peculiar in light of persistent
in Buckley H stands as authority for jury sentencing on remand in the discretion of the prosecution,
even over the objection of the defendant. See id. at 830-31.
306. In re Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d 714, 716-17 (Ind. 2002).
307. In the transfer petition, counsel stated:
The Court of Appeals' published opinion in this case is quite disturbing. It is replete with
misstatements of material facts, it misapplies controlling case law, and it does not even
bother to discuss relevant cases that are directly on point. Clearly, such a decision should
be reviewed by this Court. Not only does it work an injustice on appellant Michigan
Mutual Insurance Company, it establishes dangerous precedent in several areas of the
law. This will undoubtedly create additional problems in future cases.
Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d at 715. The attack was directed at the opinion issued in Michigan Mutual
Insurance Company v. Sports, Inc., 698 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
308. Wilkins, 777 N.E.2d at 719.
309. Mich. Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sports, Inc., 706 N.E.2d 555, 555 (Ind. 1999).
310. Mich. Mutual, 706 N.E.2d at 555.
311. Mich. Mutual, 698 N.E.2d at 845; see Gary Young, Footnote Gets a Lawyer Suspended,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 13, 2002.
312. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (1999).
313. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1983).
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complaints from appellate judges about the quality of representation by
lawyers practicing in their courts.
The motivation of proponents of the conventional wisdom should
also be challenged. Clearly, appellate judges and their law clerks must be
justly concerned about workloads. Overload in the judicial system is
likely to compromise the quality of decision-making and opinion writing.
Nevertheless, the explicit suggestion that fairness in disposition of pend-
ing appeals may be compromised by inclusion of colorable claims hardly
promotes confidence in the appellate process. Appellate strategy should
be dictated by reasonable considerations of accuracy and faithful adher-
ence to precedent and principles of sound argument and logic, not by fear
of page length and sanctions.
If the quality of appellate practice is truly compromised by the vol-
ume of work reaching the courts, it may be that remedial measures
should be considered. One obvious solution lies in the creation of more
314judgeships and filling current vacancies. Another may lie in the certifi-
cation of appellate specialists whose training and experience will ensure
a better product for the consideration of appellate courts." 5 What is true,
regardless of the measures taken, is that the quality of appellate decision-
making is, to some extent, dependent on the quality of appellate repre-
sentation. The quality of representation should not be compromised by
limitations on briefing that fail to recognize the incredible expansion of
legal doctrine, judicial opinions, and statutory provisions that may be
brought to bear on the argument and disposition of any single issue in an
appeal. The solution to mounting caseloads that looks to counsel to limit
the number of claims presented for review is simply shortsighted and
unfair. It threatens counsel's exercise of professional judgment by prom-
ising better decision-making based on the proposition that advancing
fewer claims will result in the appellate court giving better review to
those fewer claims presented. This can hardly be the solution that pro-
motes the highest quality of practice that judges and practitioners advo-
cate.
314. See, e.g., William M. Richman, An Argument on the Record for More Federal Judgeships,
I J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 37 (1999).
315. See Elliot L. Bien, Toward a Community of Professionalism, 3 J. APp. PRAC. & PROCESS
475 (2001).

TWENTY YEARS IN TAHOE-SiERRA - WHY IT'S RIGHT AND
WHY IT'S NOT A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION
INTRODUCTION'
Regulatory takings have troubled courts and stakeholders for years.
As environmental awareness grows, so does the complexity of regulation
involved in developing large tracts of land sensitive to environmental
damage. Take future home sites near Lake Tahoe. Literally.
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Plan-
ning Agency,2 the United States Supreme Court tried to settle the debate
raised by its recent pro-property rights decisions favoring categorical,
bright-line rules over ad hoc, factual inquiries.3 The Court's decision,
read in conjunction with the Ninth Circuit decision it affirmed, neatly fits
recent categorical rules into the ad hoc framework by viewing them as
exceptions to the ad hoc approach, which requires a balancing of gov-
ernment and private interests.4 The rationale behind the Court's recent
decisions employing categorical rules was that one factor weighed so
dominantly that further analysis under an ad hoc framework became un-
necessary.5 This approach is in the best interests of all stakeholders be-
cause it preserves the feasibility of the planning process, while still rec-
ognizing that some temporary regulatory actions result in takings. The
categorical approach averred by landowners would make planning too
expensive and encourage uncontrolled development at the expense of
priceless natural resources.
1. A few definitions may help the reader understand this discussion. A regulatory taking is
similar to physical taking of property by the government when it exercises eminent domain in
situations such as purchasing land to construct a highway. Steven J. Eagle, Just Compensation for
Permanent Takings of Temporal Interests, 10 FED. CIR. B.J. 485, 489-90 (2001). A regulatory taking
arises when governmental regulation so limits the owner's use that the property is effectively taken.
See id. The government must compensate the owner for a taking. See U.S. CONsT. amend. V. A per
se taking is a physical occupation of the property, while a categorical taking occurs when a property
owner is deprived of all economically beneficial use of the property. Wendie L. Kellington, New
Takes on Old Takes: A Takings Law Update, SG021 ALI-ABA 511,513 (2001). A facial taking is a
regulation so intrusive that its mere enactment creates a taking. Id. at 514. An as applied taking
arises when a regulation as applied creates a taking. Id. An as applied taking requires a factual
examination. Id. at 514-15. Afacial taking does not-the court analyzes the regulation "on its face."
Id. at 514.
2. 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
3. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that a categorical
taking will be found where a property owner is deprived of all economically beneficial use of the
property).
4. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1483; Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l
Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 772-73 (9th Cir. 2000); see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017, 1019.
5. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1483; Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 772-73; see Lucas, 505 U.S.
at 1017, 1019.
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Still, despite its doctrinal soundness, the result for the landowners
involved was hardly fair or just because the regulations at issue perma-
nently deprived some of them of the opportunity to build "on land upon
which ... construction was authorized when purchased."6 Furthermore,
the decision raises troubling issues for older or poorer landowners, who
are faced with government regulations that keep them, however tempo-
rarily, from using their land as they intended. The time and cost spent
litigating these disputes is draining for all stakeholders, and is a particu-
lar hardship for individual landowners, because the factual emphasis
required by the ad hoc approach is inherently more expensive. All in all,
the various stakeholders involved in land use controversies should strive
for more proactive, cost-effective solutions, if only for the sake of avoid-
ing the pain of litigation.
Part I of this comment looks at the pertinent facts of the case and the
various moratoria enacted over the years that eventually gave rise to the
taking claims presented by the Landowners. Part II discusses the Court's
regulatory takings jurisprudence and provides an in-depth look at the
cases relied upon by the district court, the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme
Court as Tahoe-Sierra worked its way up the appellate ladder. Part Il
surveys the intricate procedural history of the case, which spanned well
over a decade and a-half from the date of initial filing. Part IV of the
comment addresses the Court's decision in Tahoe-Sierra, and discusses
the reasoning promulgated by the majority for its holding. This section
also discusses the concerns raised by the two dissents filed in the case.
Finally, Part V analyzes the effects the decision will have at both ends of
the spectrum-for both landowners and government planners alike.
I. FACTS
The relevant facts of this case were undisputed.7 Lake Tahoe's wa-
ters have historically been among the world's clearest, exceeded only by
Crater Lake in Oregon and Lake Baikal in the former Soviet Union.8
Mark Twain said of Lake Tahoe: "So singularly clear was the water, that
where it was only twenty or thirty feet deep the bottom was so perfectly
distinct that the boat seemed floating in the air! Yes, where it was even
eighty feet deep." 9 The lack of algae-nourishing nitrogen and phospho-
rous in the water discouraged algae growth, which in turn created the
lake's historic clarity.10
6. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1496 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1471 n.2 (citing S. REP. No. 91-510, at 3-4 (1969)).
9. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226,
1230 (D. Nev. 1999) (quoting SAMUEL LONGHORNE CLEMENS, ROUGHING IT 174-75 (Hartford,
Americana Publ'g Co. 1891, available at http://www.digital.library.upenn.edu/books).
10. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1471.
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Unfortunately, as Justice Stevens observed, "[t]he lake's unsur-
passed beauty, it seems, is the wellspring of its undoing."' 1 The beauty of
the lake and its surroundings understandably attracted development, re-
sulting in rapid deterioration of the lake's waters from nutrient-rich run-
off that reduced water clarity and promoted algae growth.' 2 Development
has increasingly covered the area surrounding Lake Tahoe with impervi-
ous materials, such as buildings, asphalt, and concrete, which prevent
precipitation from being absorbed by soil.' 3 Water flowing from drive-
ways or roofs has more "erosive force" than rain or snow falling over a
wide area covered with vegetation.' 4 Accordingly, the resulting heavier
runoff carries more nutrient-rich topsoil into the lake.15
The dramatic decrease in Lake Tahoe's clarity first attracted notice
when serious development began in the 1950s and early 1960s. 16 And
today, algae growth decreases the lake's clarity by at least a foot per
year; and if the lake turns green, its blue clarity could take over 700 hun-
dred years to return, if ever.17 The obvious solution was to restrict devel-
opment. 18
Development-exacerbated erosion particularly affects "high hazard"
areas that include steeply sloped lands, as well as areas near streams and
wetlands that ordinarily filter out nutrient-rich topsoil before it reaches
the lake.19 Thus, development restrictions particularly targeted these
"high hazard" areas.
20
Following a surge in attention to "developing environmental prob-
lems at the lake" during the 1960s, the legislatures of California and Ne-
vada approved the bi-state Tahoe Regional Planning Compact in 1969
("1969 Compact"). 21 The 1969 Compact in turn led to the creation of the
Tahoe Regional Planning Authority ("TRPA"), an administrative agency
charged with coordinating the development and preservation of the area
around the lake, including land under the jurisdiction of California, Ne-
vada, and the U.S. Forest Service. 22 Unfortunately, the failure of the
1969 Compact to substantially limit residential development or abate
11. Id.
12. Id.









22. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1471-72.
2002]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
environmental decline led to dissatisfaction with the TRPA's efforts. 23
This dissatisfaction eventually prompted California and Nevada, with the
approval of Congress and the President, to adopt the 1980 Tahoe Re-
gional Planning Compact ("1980 Compact").
24
The 1980 Compact required the TRPA to create a comprehensive
regional development plan by June 19, 1983.5 Specifically, the 1980
Compact required the TRPA to adopt "environmental threshold carrying
capacities" by June 19, 1982, as a first stage, and a comprehensive de-
velopment plan twelve months later.26 Furthermore, the 1980 Compact
provided for temporary development restrictions until the enactment of
the regional plan.27 Accordingly, effective August 24, 1981, the TRPA
essentially prohibited development on high hazard areas until the TRPA
created a new plan.28
The TRPA failed to adopt carrying capacities until August 26, 1982,
two months past the scheduled deadline.29 "Under a liberal reading of the
Compact, TRPA then had one year from the adoption of the thresholds in
which to adopt a new regional plan - or until August 26, 1983. " "3 How-
ever, the TRPA failed to meet the August 26, 1983 deadline, and, wor-
ried that this failure deprived it of jurisdiction to issue permits, sus-
pended all permit issuance for ninety days.3' Unfortunately, on Novem-
ber 17, 1983, the TRPA still lacked a regional development plan, and
therefore extended the moratorium indefinitely until it finalized a plan.32
The TRPA finally adopted a new regional development plan on April 26,
1984 ("1984 Plan"). 33 Thus, the TRPA effectively prohibited all land-
owners from developing their holdings from August 26, 1983, through
April 26, 1984 (approximately eight months), and prohibited develop-
ment for owners of tracts in high hazard areas (the "Landowners") from
August 24, 1981, through April 26, 1984 (approximately thirty-two
months).34
23. Id. at 1472 (commenting that California became so dissatisfied, it withdrew its funding of
the TRPA and began its own regulatory efforts).
24. Id.; see Tahoe Regional Planning Compact of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233
(1980); Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, CAL. GOV'T CODE § 66801 (West 2002); NEV. REV.
STAT. 277.200 (1980).
25. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1472.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1233-34.
29. Id. at 1235.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 1235-36 (emphasis added).
31. Id.
33. Id. at 1236.
34. Id.
[Vol. 80:1
TWENTY YEARS IN TAHOE-SIERRA
Unfortunately, the story does not end here. The 1984 Plan extended
the moratorium on building in high hazard areas until the TRPA finalized
certain provisions of the plan.35 Furthermore, the TRPA failed to clarify
36whether the moratoria's continuance would be temporary or permanent.
Almost simultaneously, California filed suit to block implementation of
the long awaited plan on the very day of its enactment.37 An injunction
was issued against TRPA prohibiting the issuance of any permits, which
lasted until the July 1, 1987 implementation of yet another plan ("1987
Plan").38 Thus, as either a direct or indirect result of the TRPA's actions,
some Landowners could not build on their tracts for over six years.
Moreover, the 1987 Plan permanently banned development of some high
hazard areas.39
II. BACKGROUND: REGULATORY TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE
The Takings Clause of the Constitution has generated voluminous
litigation as the courts have struggled to determine just when a regulatory
taking requiring compensation arises. 4° In recent years, the United States
Supreme Court has adjudicated several regulatory takings claims that
have generated considerable controversy.41 Recent cases appeared to
have shifted the test from a fact-specific, ad hoc approach to categorical,
"bright-line" rules.
42
The right to compensation for governmental taking of property
originates in the Bill of Rights.43 The Fifth Amendment reads, in relevant
part, "nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation. '"44 Early cases originally focused on property appropria-
tion through physical seizure or through rendering it physically useless,
45





38. Id. at 1236-37.
39. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 729 (1997) (noting that the
1987 Plan's new development suitability evaluation system scored certain high hazard areas a
suitability score of zero).
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.; cases cited infra notes 47, 60, 67, 85, 91, 96.
41. See cases cited infra notes 47, 60,67, 85, 91,96.
42. Anthony Saul Alperin, The "Takings" Clause: When Does Regulation "Go Too Far"?, 31
S.W. U. L. REV. 169, 197-99 (2002).
43. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
44. Id.
45. Alperin, supra note 42, at 169.
46. Eagle, supra note 1, at 487.
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The concept of regulatory takings arose early this century in Penn-
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.47 In Pennsylvania Coal, Mahon owned a
home constructed upon land for which he held the surface rights.4 8 Penn-
sylvania Coal Company, however, held the mineral rights and wished to
extract the underground coal.49 Mahon opposed the coal removal, claim-
ing the extraction would cause his land and home to collapse.50 Mahon
argued, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court agreed, that a Pennsylvania
statute prohibiting the coal removal was a legitimate exercise of the
state's police power.51 The United States Supreme Court disagreed, hold-
ing that the statute was not a legitimate exercise of police power.5 2 The
Court stated that the statute made it "commercially impracticable" to
mine the coal under Mahon's property, effectively appropriating the coal
and Pennsylvania Coal Company's property rights.5 The Court reversed
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, finding in favor of Pennsylvania Coal
Company. 4 Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, reasoned:
The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a
certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak-
ing .... We are in danger of forgetting that a strong public desire to
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the
desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the
change.
55
Thus, the doctrine of regulatory takings was born.
Conversely, the Court also recognized the existence and validity of
situations justifying the diminution of property interests without
compensation:
Government could hardly go on if to some extent values incident to
property could not be diminished without paying for every such
change in the general law .... When [diminution] reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not all cases there must be an exercise of emi-
nent domain and compensation to sustain the act. So the question de-
pends upon the particular facts.
5 6
47. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (holding that "if a regulation goes too far, it will be recognized
as a taking").




52. Id. at 414.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 416 (requiring the State to compensate Pennsylvania Coal Co. for its inability to
exercise its property rights).
55. Id. at 415-16.
56. Id. at 413.
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These comments seemingly set the stage for the ad hoc rule ultimately
endorsed by the Court in Tahoe-Sierra.
57
Before turning to Tahoe-Sierra, however, it is necessary to examine
the major regulatory takings cases following Pennsylvania Coal. Penn-
sylvania Coal involved what was effectively a permanent regulatory tak-
ing of a mining company's entire interest in a given property." While the
Court recognized regulatory takings and implied an ad hoc approach to
determine whether a taking had occurred,59 it did not prescribe a test to
guide future regulatory takings cases. Such practical guidance did not
come until 1978, in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York.6°
In Penn Central, the Court held that New York City's Landmarks
Preservation Law, which prevented construction of a building atop Grand
Central Station, did not affect a taking.6' The Court outlined three factors
to weigh in determining whether a regulatory taking occurs: (1) the eco-
nomic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to which
regulation has interfered with the claimant's investment-backed expecta-
tions;62 and (3) the character of the government's action. 63 While the first
factor is relatively self-explanatory, the other two require further exami-
nation.
The Court defined the second factor-a regulation's interference
with a landowner's investment-backed expectations-as economic harm
to the landowner's interests to the extent that those interests no longer
constitute "property" for Fifth Amendment purposes, taking into account
the foreseeable limitations on the landowner's use.64 Restated, the in-
quiry turns on the landowner's reasonable expectations, including limita-
tions, for using the property at the time of investment.65 As for the third
factor-the character of government actions-the Court noted that regu-
lations promoting "health, safety, morals or general welfare" generally
do not constitute takings.66
Two years later in Agins v. City of Tiburon,67 the Court again fa-
vored an ad hoc approach over a categorical rule for deciding what con-
stituted a regulatory taking.68 In Agins, the purchasers of unimproved
57. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1483
(2002).
58. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 414.
59. Id. at 413.
60. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
61. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 116-17, 119, 138.
62. Id. at 124 (citing Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594 (1962)).
63. Id. (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)).
64. Id. at 124-25.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 125 (quoting Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928)).
67. 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
68. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-61 (citing Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
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tracts, intending to use them for residential development, claimed that the
city effectively took their property when it rezoned the area to restrict use
to primarily single-family homes and open space.69 Relying on Penn
Central, the Court found that the rezoning substantially advanced legiti-
mate state interests,70 which pertains to the third Penn Central factor-
the character of the government regulation. 71 The Court, addressing the
first Penn Central factor-the economic impact on the landowner 7E- -
said that to qualify as a taking, the owner must lose all economic use of
the land.73 The Court noted that the rezoning still allowed the landowners
to build as many as five single-family residences on the tract, implying
that only total elimination, rather than mere diminution, of value consti-
tuted a taking.74 Finally, the Court found that the landowners were "free
to pursue their reasonable investment expectations by submitting a de-
velopment plan to local officials.
' 75
Agins introduced several issues that the Tahoe-Sierra Court faced.
First, Agins involved a challenge to the mere enactment of a regulation,
or a facial challenge, rather than an as applied challenge, because the
landowners' failure to seek a development permit prevented the Court
from evaluating whether the rezoning, as applied, worked a taking.76
Second, the Court appeared to apply a strict, complete-elimination-of-
value threshold to the economic impact factor.77 Third, the Court implied
that to effect a taking, the interference with an owner's reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations must be total and permanent.78 Fourth,
Agins reintroduced the concept of "reciprocity of advantage, ' 79 first
found in Pennsylvania Coal,80 on which the Tahoe-Sierra Court would
rely in justifying a fact based inquiry.81 "Reciprocity of advantage" oc-
curs when all property owners affected by a regulation suffer the same ill
82effects, a fact weighing against finding a taking of a single property.
69. Id. at 257-58, 262.
70. Id. at 261.
71. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (citing Causby, 328 U.S. 256).
72. Id. (citing Goldblatt, 369 U.S. at 594).
73. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262-63.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 262.
76. Id. at 259-60 (citing Socialist Labor Party v. Gillian, 406 U.S. 583, 588 (1972); Goldwater
v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)).
77. See id. at 260, 262.
78. See id. at 262-63.
79. See id. at 262.
80. Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415.
81. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1489.
82. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 262.
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Finally, the Agins Court cited the "justice and fairness" principles 83 that
served as a basis for the Tahoe-Sierra Court's decision.84
Whereas Agins involved a facial challenge to a permanent regula-
tion resulting in diminution of land value, the Court's decision in First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles85 ad-
dressed the question of whether a subsequently invalidated permanent
land use prohibition required compensation to landowners who were
totally deprived of usage while the regulation was in force. In First Eng-
lish, Los Angeles County permanently prohibited a church from rebuild-
ing its children's camp after a flood.86 The church challenged the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court's earlier decision in Agins, which limited the regu-
latory taking remedy to mere invalidation of the regulation.87 The First
English Court held that if the regulation deprived the landowner of all
use of its property, resulting in a taking, mere invalidation of the regula-
tion provided a constitutionally insufficient remedy-just compensation
88must be paid for the taking. Justice Stevens' dissent challenged, among
other things, the Court's conclusion that regulations "which would con-
stitute takings if allowed to remain in effect permanently, necessarily
also constitute takings if they are in effect for only a limited period of
time.
'89
The Court, having implied in First English that a permanent devel-
opment moratorium effects a taking only if it totally deprives a land-
owner of all economic use,90 formalized this rule in Lucas v. South Caro-
lina Coastal Council.91 The landowner, Lucas, paid $925,000 for two
residential lots on the South Carolina coast, only to have South Carolina
permanently ban construction of any structure on coastal land two years
later.92 During the appeals process, South Carolina authorized exceptions
to the ban, which would have effectively removed any regulatory bar to
Lucas' development plans, had he applied for a permit.93 The Court held
that when a state enacts a regulation permanently depriving the land-
owner of all economically beneficial use, the state only avoids compen-
83. Id. at 262-63.
84. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1486 (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 633
(2001) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
85. 482 U.S. 304, 306-07 (1987).
86. First English, 482 U.S. at 306-07.
87. Id.; see Agins v. City of Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25, 31 (Cal. 1979), affd on other grounds, 447
U.S. 255, 258-59, 263 (1980) (finding no taking on the merits and therefore declining to reach the
remedial question).
88. First English, 482 U.S. at 321-22.
89. Id. at 322, 328-33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 321.
91. 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992).
92. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1006-07.
93. Id. at 1010-11.
20021
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
sation if the landowner's title does not encompass the proscribed use.94
This ruling implicated the investment-backed expectation factor by refer-
ring to limitations on the owner's title.95
In 2001, the Court delivered a complex decision in Palazzolo v.
Rhode Island.9 6 Palazzolo owned property composed largely of coastal
wetlands, to which he acquired title when the corporation that owned the
property had its charter revoked in 1978.97 Palazzolo happened to be the
corporation's sole shareholder.98 Unfortunately for Palazzolo, Rhode
Island proscribed development in coastal wetlands in 1971. 99 Palazzolo
did not begin his unsuccessful attempts to gain approval to develop the
property until 1983.1 0
The Court held that Palazzolo's claim was not precluded, even
though he gained title after Rhode Island passed the regulations and thus
had constructive notice of the regulations. 01 However, reasoning that the
entire parcel of land was admittedly worth $200,000, the Court rejected
Palazzolo's claim that he had lost all economic use of his property and
that his investment-backed expectations were frustrated. 0 2 Thus, because
a regulatory takings claim considers the parcel as a whole, the remaining
usage and value of the uplands portion of the tract negated the diminu-
tion of value caused by the loss of economic use of the wetlands por-
tion. 10 3 Palazzolo asserted that the uplands and wetlands portions were
distinct, arguing that he should be allowed to pursue a total deprivation
claim of the wetlands portion. 1°4 The Court, however, rejected this argu-
ment because Palazzolo did not present it in prior proceedings. 10 5
Against this checkerboard of cases came the Tahoe-Sierra case.106
Previously, the Court had distinguished regulatory takings from "normal
delays" in the planning and governmental decision making process. 0 7 In
94. Id. at 1027.
95. Id.
96. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).




101. Id. at 628.
102. Id. at 630-31.
103. Id. at 631.
104. Id. Palazzolo's argument foreshadows the segmentation argument discussed later in this
comment.
105. Id. at 631-32.
106. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
107. See, e.g., First English, 482 U.S. at 321 ("We limit our holding to the facts presented, and
of course do not deal with the quite different questions that would arise in the case of normal delays
in obtaining building permits ... ").
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Tahoe-Sierra, however, the Court faced a thirty-two month delay result-
ing from the governmental decision making process.10 8
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF TAHOE-SIERRA °9
This section of the comment highlights only the procedural history
of Tahoe-Sierra leading directly to the certified question addressed by
the United States Supreme Court, though the case has a long and com-
plex procedural history.' 10 One commentator remarked: "The full proce-
dural history is more than any mortal can bear. If you study it, I recom-
mend you do not attempt to operate any heavy machinery or drive a mo-
tor vehicle thereafter-it is too numbing. '
In 1984, the Landowners filed multiple suits in federal district
courts in California and Nevada, with the United States District Court for
the District of Nevada ultimately consolidating the cases. 12 The lead
plaintiff, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, along with 448 other plain-
tiffs, 113 asserted various claims, including violations of the Takings
Clause, against numerous defendants, including the TRPA, California,
and Nevada.ll4 After over fourteen years of litigation and several district
court and Ninth Circuit opinions, 1 5 the case finally went to trial in De-
108. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1470.
109. Id.
110. In addition to the district court ruling and the Ninth Circuit decision leading to the
Supreme Court's review, the following decisions emerged from this case: Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 611 F. Supp. 110 (D. Nev. 1985); Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 638 F. Supp. 126 (D. Nev. 1986)
(dismissing all Nevada landowners' claims); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency, No. Civ. S-84-816 EJG (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1985) (mem.); Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, No. Civ. S-84-816 EJG (E.D. Cal.
Mar. 27, 1987) (mem.) (granting summary judgment and disposing of all California landowners'
claims); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 911 F.2d
1331 (9th Cir. 1990) (affirming and reversing in part Nevada landowners' claims); Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 938 F.2d 153 (9th Cir. 1991)
(affirming in part and reversing in part California landowners' claims); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 808 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Nev. 1992) (dismissing all
Nevada landowners' claims); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 34 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 1994), amended by 42 F.3d 1306 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming in part and
reversing in part); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 992
F. Supp. 1218 (D. Nev. 1998) (barring 1987 Plan claims under Nevada and California statutes of
limitations).
111. Dwight Merriam, Tahoe-Sierra: A Takings Time Warp?, ZONING & PLAN. L. REP. 41, 44
(2002).
112. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 34 F. Supp. 2d 1226,
1236 (D. Nev. 1999), aff d in part, rev'd in part, 216 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2000), and aff d, 122 S. Ct.
1465 (2002).
113. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1229. The lead plaintiff, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc., is itself made up of over 2,000 separate landowners. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1473.
114. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1236-37.
115. See cases cited supra note 110.
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cember 1998 on the narrow claim that the mere enactment of the TRPA
ordinances under the 1984 Plan effected a taking."
16
At trial, the district court analyzed the case primarily against three
United States Supreme Court precedents: Agins, 1 7 Penn Central," 8 and
Lucas.119 The district court found that the TRPA's actions substantially
advanced a legitimate state interest, and thus did not constitute a taking
under the first Agins test. 12 With respect to the second Agins test,
whether the TRPA's actions denied the Landowners economically viable
use of their property, the district court said that either the Lucas or Penn
Central test would apply, depending on the extent of the deprivation.1
2
1
That is, if the TRPA deprived the Landowners of all use, the Lucas test
applied; conversely, if the TRPA deprived the Landowners of partial use,
the Penn Central test applied. 1
22
The district court concluded that no taking took place under the
Penn Central test. 23 The Landowners' failure to introduce evidence sup-
porting diminution of value of individual tracts weighed against finding a
partial taking on the basis of economic impact. 24 The district court also
found no unreasonable interference with the Landowners' reasonable
investment-backed expectations. 25 Specifically, since the Landowners
presented no evidence of the moratoria's impact on individual Landown-
ers, the district court evaluated only the impact on the Landowners as a
group, finding that the average Landowner held a plot for twenty-five
years before development and was aware of impending development
restrictions at acquisition.' 26 Thus, a six-year delay in building could not
unreasonably interfere with the reasonable investment-backed expecta-
tions of the Landowners as a group, though the district court noted that
some individual Landowners might have held their land for almost
twenty-five years when the government imposed the moratoria. 27 With
respect to the character of the regulation, because the Landowners re-
tained some property rights, such as exclusion of others, the district court
found the moratoria unequal to the virtual physical invasion necessary to
work a taking.
128
116. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1229.
117. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980).
118. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
119. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
120. Tahoe-Sierra, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 1239-40.
121. Id. at 1240.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1241.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1240-41.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1241-42.
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The district court, however, did find that the Landowners suffered a
categorical taking under the Lucas from the interim moratoria; 129 though
not from the three-year injunction imposed after approval of the 1984
Plan.' 30 The district court found that, despite the retention of limited ac-
tual use and value, as well as a few individual sales at greatly reduced
prices, the Landowners as a group lost all economically viable use of
their properties during the 1981-1984 moratoria.131 With respect to the
loss of use after the 1984 Plan took effect, the district court found that,
even if the new plan had allowed development of high hazard areas, the
temporary restraining order and subsequent injunction still prevented
development; thus, the TRPA's actions were neither the factual nor
proximate cause of loss of use from 1984 through 1987.132 Furthermore,
the district court rejected the TRPA's affirmative defense that the mora-
toria fell under the rule set forth in First English, excepting temporary
planning moratoria as takings, because they lacked fixed termination
dates.1
33
Both parties appealed.134 The Landowners appealed the district
court's rejection of a taking for the period after the adoption of the 1984
Plan, 135 but not the district court's rejection of a partial taking under its
Penn Central analysis; in fact, the Landowners expressly disavowed that
argument on appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 136 In addition, the Landowners
appealed the district court's pre-trial order dismissing their claims under
the 1987 Plan as barred by relevant California and Nevada statutes of
limitation. 137 For its part, the TRPA appealed the district court's finding
of a categorical taking under the Lucas test.
38
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in
part and reversed in part. 139 The Ninth Circuit remarked that the absence
of evidence concerning the impact of the moratoria on individual Land-
owners, stemming from the parties' stipulation that no such evidence
would be presented in this facial challenge, 140 limited its examination to
the narrow issue of whether the mere enactment of the 1980 Compact
and its accompanying moratoria effected a taking.141 Consequently, the
129. Id. at 1245.
130. Id. at 1236, 1247.
131. Id. at 1243-45.
132. Id. at 1247.
133. Id. at 1250.
134. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 771 (9th
Cir. 2000).
135. Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 771.
136. Id. at 773.
137. Id. at 771; see Tahoe-Sierra, 992 F. Supp. at 1229.
138. Tahoe-Sierra, 216 F.3d at 773.
139. Id. at 789.
140. Id. at 781 n.24.
141. Id. at 773.
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Ninth Circuit limited its evaluation to the moratoria's "general scope and
dominant features," rather than its actual effects on the Landowners. 
42
The Ninth Circuit held that regulatory takings should be decided in
an ad hoc fashion, balancing the public and private interests involved
according to the Penn Central criteria. 143 The Ninth Circuit implied that
the Lucas categorical rule, requiring compensation when regulation
eliminates all beneficial use, was a variation of the Penn Central analysis
in which ad hoc balancing is unnecessary because one factor becomes
dispositive.144
Because the Landowners disavowed any arguments under a Penn
Central analysis, the Ninth Circuit focused on the contention that the
TRPA's moratoria deprived the Landowners of all economically viable
use of their land. 145 In support of this contention, the Landowners pro-
posed analyzing this alleged categorical taking by conceptually dividing
the Landowners' interests into three slices-physical, functional, and
temporal-and considering only the portion of the temporal slice falling
within the moratoria period. 146 Restated, the Landowners' argued that a
temporary development moratorium inhibits the temporal segment, effec-
tively eliminating all economic use of the property for that period."47 The
Ninth Circuit rejected this argument, stating that a regulatory takings
claim requires analysis of the regulation's impact on the parcel as a
whole, compared to a physical takings analysis, which allows conceptual
severance." 48 The Ninth Circuit commented that accepting temporal seg-
mentation risked "converting every temporary planning moratorium into
a categorical taking" and depriving governments of "an important land
use planning tool."'
149
The Ninth Circuit further rejected the Landowners' assertion that
the Court's holding in First English required temporal segmentation.
50
The Ninth Circuit held that First English decided only a remedial ques-
tion-whether invalidation of the moratorium, absent compensation, was
a sufficient remedy for a regulatory taking-not whether a temporary
moratorium, in and of itself, constitutes a regulatory taking.' 5' The Ninth
Circuit further commented that the temporary taking in First English
reflected not a temporary regulation or moratorium, but a permanent
142. Id. (quoting Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 397 (1926)).
143. Id. at 772.
144. Id. at 773.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 774.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 774-77.
149. Id. at 777.
150. Id. at 777-78.
151. Id. at 778.
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moratorium made temporary only because it was later invalidated. 5 2 The
Ninth Circuit concluded that First English did not apply to temporary
moratoria because such moratoria are intended to be impermanent from
the beginning. 5 3 Finally, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Landowners'
reliance on cases requiring compensation for temporary governmental
condemnation of leasehold interests as supporting conceptual temporal
severance. 154 It held that leaseholds involved physical occupation of
property by the government, and thus were inapplicable to regulatory
takings cases.
155
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's holding that the
Landowners were due compensation because the moratoria effected
categorical takings under Lucas.156 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the
mere adoption of the temporary moratoria did not deprive the Landown-
ers of all value or use of their land. 157 It distinguished Lucas, stating that
the temporary nature of the moratoria preserved the present value of the
future use of the land, precluding the moratoria's interference from rising
to the level of a total deprivation of economic use under Lucas. 58 How-
ever, the Ninth Circuit conceded that a temporary moratorium, lengthy
enough to eliminate the present value of the future use of a property,
could result in a categorical taking.
59
With respect to the Landowners' assertion that the additional mora-
toria from 1984 to 1987 resulted from the 1984 Plan, and not the injunc-
tion issued by the District Court for the Eastern District of California, the
Ninth Circuit found that the injunction prevented the implementation of
the 1984 Plan, and thus the Plan could not have caused the Landowners'
damages. 60 Finally, the Ninth Circuit aff'mned the district court's dis-
missal of the Landowners' claims concerning the 1987 Plan.' 6 ' And, over
the dissent of five judges, the Ninth Circuit denied a petition for rehear-
ing en banc.
162
152. Id. (citing First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304,
310 (1987)).
153. Id. at 778.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 779.
156. Id. at 782.
157. Id. at 780-81.
158. Id. at 781.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 784.
161. Id. at 789.
162. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 228 F.3d 998, 998-99
(9th Cir. 2000), affd, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN TAHOE-SIERRA
The Supreme Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's judgment. 163 The
Court certified the narrow question of "[w]hether the Court of Appeals
properly determined that a temporary moratorium on land development
does not constitute a taking of property requiring compensation under the
Takings Clause of the United States Constitution."' 64 Justice Stevens
delivered the opinion, with Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Gins-
burg, and Breyer joining. 65 Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
Scalia and Thomas, dissented. 66 Justice Thomas filed a separate dissent,
in which Justice Scalia joined.
1 67
At the Supreme Court, the Landowners again cited Lucas and First
English as support for their argument for a per se, categorical rule.' 61 In
addition, they relied on the Armstrong principle that the intent of the
Takings Clause was "to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the
public as a whole."
' 69
Early on, the Court referred to the principle underlying its differen-
tial treatment of physical and regulatory takings cases, namely that
physical takings involve property acquisition for public use, while regu-
latory takings involve prohibition of certain private uses of property.
70
The Court noted that most land use regulations impact property values in
some way, and that "[tireating them all as per se takings would transform
government regulation into a luxury few governments could afford."'
171
The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit's finding that First English
addressed only the question of how to remedy a temporary regulatory
taking. 72 The Court stated that the limited remedial issue and holding of
First English was "unambiguous,' 73 and pointed out that the California
state courts decided the remedial issue after assuming a taking had been
claimed. 74 In support of this conclusion, the Court noted that, on re-
163. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'I Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1490
(2002).
164. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 533 U.S. 948, 948-49
(2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 1465 (2002).
165. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. 1465.
166. Id. at 1490.
167. Id. at 1496.
168. Id. at 1478.
169. Id. (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40,49 (1960)).
170. Id. at 1479.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1482.
173. Id.
174. Id. (quoting First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304,
312-13 (1987)) ("We reject appellee's suggestion that ... we must independently evaluate the
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mand, the California Court of Appeals found no taking occurred, 175 a
finding the Court declined to review.' 76 Finally, the Court said its First
English decision "implicitly rejected" the categorical approach the Land-
owners proposed. 1
77
The Court then distinguished Lucas, stating, "Certainly, our holding
that the permanent 'obliteration of the value' of a fee simple estate con-
stitutes a categorical taking does not answer the question whether a regu-
lation prohibiting any economic use of land for a 32-month period has
the same legal effect."'' 78 The Court upheld the Ninth Circuit's rejection
of temporal segmentation as a means of bringing the moratoria within the
Lucas rule:
[T]he District Court erred when it disaggregated petitioners' property
into temporal segments corresponding to the regulations at issue and
then analyzed whether petitioners were deprived of all economically
viable use during each period .... The starting point for the court's
analysis should have been to ask whether there was a total taking of
the entire parcel; if not, then Penn Central was the proper frame-
work. 179
The Court went on to say, "Logically, a fee simple estate cannot be ren-
dered valueless by a temporary prohibition on economic use, because the
property will recover value as soon as the prohibition is lifted.'
80
Turning to the Landowners' Armstrong "justice and fairness" argu-
ment that the public, not the Landowners, should bear the burden of the
moratoria, the Court addressed seven different theories under which it
might have found a categorical taking.1 8' First, compensation is required
whenever government temporarily deprives an owner of all economic
use. 82 Second, land use restrictions beyond normal permitting and zon-
ing delays are compensable. 83 Third, delays beyond a fixed time limit
should be compensable. 184 Fourth, TRPA's actions constituted a "series
of rolling moratoria" functionally equivalent to a permanent taking.
185
adequacy of the complaint and resolve the takings claim on the merits before we can reach the
remedial question.").
175. Id. (citing First English Evangelical Church v. County of L.A., 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353
(1989)).
176. Id. (citing First English Evangelical Church v. County of L.A., 493 U.S. 1056, 1056
(1990)).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1483 (emphasis added).
179. Id. at 1483-84.
180. Id. at 1484.




185. Id. at 1484-85.
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Fifth, TRPA acted in bad faith in intentionally delaying the plan devel-
opment.1 86 Sixth, TRPA's moratoria did not "substantially advance a
legitimate state interest."'' 87 And seventh, some Landowners might have
prevailed under a Penn Central analysis had they made individual chal-
lenges to the application of the moratoria to their properties.
188
The Court rejected the first three theories because they were per se
theories already encompassed in the certified question. 189 The Court
found the last four theories unavailable for various reasons. 90 The "roll-
ing moratoria" theory was not within the Court's review order. 191 The
district court's findings of TRPA's good faith barred the bad faith the-
ory. 192 Similarly, the district court found that the moratoria advanced
legitimate state interests. 93 Finally, the Landowners specifically dis-
avowed all Penn Central arguments. 1
94
The Court also took into account the costs and effects that a cate-
gorical rule would impose on planning: "A rule that required compensa-
tion for every delay in the use of property would render routine govern-
ment processes prohibitively expensive or encourage hasty decisionmak-
ing [sic]. Such an important change in the law should be the product of
legislative rulemaking rather than adjudication.' ' 95 Furthermore, the
Court stated that the "interest in facilitating informed decisionmaking
[sic] by regulatory agencies"'' 96 weighed against a per se rule because
"the financial constraints of compensating property owners during a
moratorium may force officials to rush through the planning process or
to abandon the practice altogether."'' 97 The Court reasoned that a reduc-
tion in planning would cause landowners to hurriedly develop their prop-
erty before a final plan was ready, "thereby fostering inefficient and ill-
conceived growth.'
198
Though the Court rejected a per se rule, it expressly stated that it
was not the temporary nature of the moratoria that gravitated against a
186. Id. at 1485.
187. Id.








196. Id. at 1487.
197. Id. at 1487-88.
198. Id. at 1488.
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per se rule. 199 Rather, the Court concluded that the Penn Central ad hoc
approach best served the interests of "fairness and justice.
'200
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, joined by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, took issue with several assumptions and conclusions by the
majority. First, the dissent believed that the 32-month period considered
by the Court was inaccurate; the correct period was approximately six
years, including the 1984-1987 injunction.20' Second, the dissent chal-
lenged the Court's distinguishing of Lucas, stating that in Lucas, the
"permanent" ban lasted nearly two years, while the instant case involved
a "temporary" ban of nearly six years.20 2 Third, the dissent worried that
government would be tempted to enact "temporary" moratoria and ex-
tend them indefinitely without having to compensate landowners.20 3 Fi-
nally, the dissent argued that the six-year moratoria clearly exceeded the
normal delays inherent in zoning decisions, and required compensation
as takings.2°
In a separate dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, ar-
gued that First English precluded the Court's apparent conclusion that
the temporary moratoria were not takings because they did not take the
parcel as a whole.20 5 Justice Thomas argued that First English settled this
matter by holding that a total deprivation of a "temporal slice" of the
property was a taking.206 Citing the Landowners' desire to build homes
for permanent, vacation, or retirement use, Justice Thomas stated that the
land's recovery of value after the moratoria were lifted was "cold com-
fort" to property owners. 20 7 Diminution of value, in his opinion, should
not determine whether a taking has occurred; it should simply determine
208the extent of compensation.
In summary, the Court's limited holding is that a fact based, ad hoc
Penn Central analysis is the appropriate measure for regulatory takings
claims involving temporary development moratoria. Because applying
this test to the Landowners claims required evidence not presented at
trial, the Landowners effectively lost for procedural reasons. Notwith-
standing the dissent, the effect of the Court's decision in Tahoe-Sierra is
to preserve the ad hoc approach to regulatory takings actions laid down
in Penn Central. In declining to create a categorical rule in favor of or
199. Id. at 1486.
200. Id. at 1489.
201. Id. at 1490-91.
202. Id. at 1492.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1494-96.
205. Id. at 1496.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1496-97.
208. Id. at 1497.
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against temporary development moratoria, the Court left open the possi-
bility that, at least in some cases, such moratoria constitute takings.
V. ANALYSIS
While the decision is arguably a victory for environmentalists and
government planners, this author-torn between environmentalist lean-
ings and his own interests as a property owner-finds the injustice to the
Landowners indirectly wrought by the opinion appalling. Yet, despite its
effects on the Landowners, the decision should cause government plan-
ners to take caution because it does not say that temporary moratoria are
never takings. From a regulatory takings jurisprudential standpoint, the
decision is consistent with the Court's early decisions, as well as its re-
cent pro-property decisions. The decision is probably the correct one, in
that it safeguards the broader practical interests of environmental protec-
tion and effective planning. However, it raises two serious concerns.
First, it raises troubling cost and time issues for landowners faced with
potential regulatory takings, particularly older or poorer landowners.
Second, given the uncertain outcomes and high cost of regulatory takings
litigation for landowners, environmentalists, and government planners
alike, the stakeholders would be wise to seek more proactive and effi-
cient means of resolving land use disputes.
Some commentators assert that the case is an "important victory"
for environmentalists, putting the brakes on a "pro-property rights jug-
gernaut.' '2°9 Clearly, protecting Lake Tahoe's water clarity was a preva-
lent concern throughout the case. It would be easy, from one perspective,
to cheer for environmental groups pitted against wealthy Lake Tahoe
Landowners, whose greed and gluttonous desire to hoard the Lake's
beauty for their exclusive enjoyment may someday ruin it. However, as
demonstrated later in this analysis, this would be a simplistic view.
Others have characterized the case as a triumph for governmental
planning. John Marshall, general counsel for TRPA in the case, said that
the decision "validates sensible regional planning by implicitly rejecting
the hyperbolic rhetoric of property rights advocates .... [It] elevates the
planner's prize-community's interests-over the demands of develop-
ers to realize quick profits.",2 '0 Even the Landowners acknowledged the
necessity of good planning; they only challenged the distribution of the
costs involved.2 '
209. See David G. Savage, Hitting the Brakes-A Pro-Property Rights Juggernaut Stalls on the
Shores of Lake Tahoe, 88 A.B.A. J. 32 (2002).
210. John L. Marshall, Sweet Affirmation, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., June 2002, at 17, 17-
18.
211. Michael M. Berger, The Shame of Planners, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG., June 2002, at
6,7.
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For the Landowners involved, the decision forever crushed any
hope of justice because the decision to pursue a facial instead of an as
applied approach procedurally eliminated any chance of success.212 At-
torney Michael Berger, counsel for the Landowners (and the landowners
in First English) criticized the Court's decision, saying, "I dissent - and
so should you. You could be the next target, as no one is safe so long as
the Court insists on dealing with abstract propositions rather than flesh
and blood human beings. 213
If the Tahoe-Sierra Landowners were indeed everyday folks with
small tracts of land as Mr. Berger claims,214 the continued building of
huge lakeside homes by celebrities such as Michael Milken and Mike
Love of the Beach Boys,215 as well as commercial development such as
hotels,216 makes Mr. Berger's ire at the lack of compensation for Tahoe-
Sierra's purported taking understandable.
Nothing in the opinion explains how people whose land has been de
facto confiscated for more than two decades, while the Milkens of
this world get to build palatial waterfront mansions, obtained any
benefit whatever. For a decision by the so-called liberal, or progres-
sive, wing of the Court, the opinion is curiously devoid of any con-
cern for individuals. It is a lifeless, soulless bureaucratic screed, cal-
lously nullifying cherished constitutional rights of individuals who
have done nothing wrong.
217
One might say that some of the Landowners died fighting for jus-
tice. Since filing of the original suit in 1984, more than 55 Landowners
218have died.2 8 Others, especially elderly Landowners who had already
held their tracts for many years before TRPA imposed the moratoria,
found their investment-backed expectations obliterated by the Court's
decision and "will never see justice in the form of either compensation or
the construction of the[ir] long-sought homes.1219 For these Landowners,
the 1987 Plan made the moratoria permanent,22° and the district court
212. Thomas E. Roberts, A Takings Blockbuster and a Triumph for Planning, LAND USE L. &
ZONING DIG., June 2002, at 4.5 ("The fact that Tahoe-Sierra was a facial, as opposed to an as-
applied, claim determined the outcome.").
213. Berger, supra note 211, at 7.
214. Id. ("There were no major developers, either, just moms and pops who wanted a home for
vacation and retirement.").
215. Eric Bailey, Lake Stays Blue but Critics of Panel See Red, L.A. TIMES, May 13, 2002, at
B5.
216. Id.
217. Berger, supra note 211, at 8.
218. Merriam, supra note 11, at41.
219. Id. at 48 (quoting David Breemer of the Pacific Legal Foundation).
220. Berger, supra note 211, at 7. While TRPA's 1987 Plan created "transferable development
rights" to enable such affected Landowners to trade their property for developable property, there is
suggestion that this attempted solution is lacking. See, e.g., Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
520 U.S. 725, 728-32 (1997).
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dismissed their claims pertaining to the 1987 Plan.22 These Landowners
surely take "cold comfort" in the Court's comment that, had they as-
serted an as applied rather than a facial challenge, they might have pre-
vailed under a Penn Central analysis.
222
Despite the apparent injustice to the Landowners and Mr. Berger's
dire warning to other landowners, governmental planners should sit up
and take note because the decision does not immunize them from paying
compensation in temporary moratoria cases. The Court left open the door
for as applied challenges to temporary moratoria under Penn Central. In
a footnote, Justice Stevens wrote, "It may be true that under a Penn Cen-
tral analysis petitioners' land was taken and compensation would be
due., 223 While the Tahoe-Sierra Landowners fared poorly in this case,
government planners should be aware that property rights advocates are
unlikely to simply lick their wounds and go away. Thus, the ruling af-
fords governments no room to be slothful in creating and implementing
land use plans.
With respect to the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence, the
case can be viewed as a clarification consistent with earlier precedent.
For example, the categorical approach suggested by First English, Lucas,
and Palazzolo can now be more easily characterized as mere applications
of the Penn Central balancing test. Loss of all use or all economic use of
a property is arguably economic impact on the claimant or interference
with the claimant's investment-backed expectations. 224 Similarly, the
Agins criterion of substantially advancing state interests-never an issue
in Tahoe-Sierra2 5----defines the character of the regulation relevant to a
Penn Central analysis. Thus, Tahoe-Sierra reinforces and clarifies prior
decisions in this area.
Moreover, and notwithstanding the apparent injustice done to the
Landowners, the decision is probably doctrinally correct. As the Court
commented, without the ability to temporarily suspend development,
governments could not protect us from ourselves when we build without
regard to what we destroy.226 A categorical rule making any moratorium
221. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 992 F. Supp. 1218,
1229 (D. Nev. 1998).
222. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1485
(2002).
223. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1478 n.16.
224. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 216 F.3d 764, 773 (9th
Cit. 2000) ("[Olne factor of the Penn Central test becomes dispositive.").
225. Berger, supra note 211, at 7.
226. Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1488.
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outside of normal zoning-type delays a taking would harm all of us far
too much both economically and environmentally.
227
For example, assume the government enacts a six-month morato-
rium on rebuilding homes destroyed by wildfires until it can develop an
effective fire and erosion control plan. Should the government be re-
quired to compensate the homeowners for this delay? Would the gov-
ernment's extension of the delay to six years effect a taking, or did the
homeowners' investment-backed expectations necessarily include the
risk of fire and resulting safety-related rebuilding delays? There are
countless scenarios wherein a government imposes development delays
beyond the normal zoning and permitting delays. Justice Holmes' impli-
cation that compensating every regulatory delay endangers effective gov-
ernment is a valid concern strongly weighing against a categorical
rule.228
Temporary moratoria, regardless of actual length, should rise to
extraordinary invasiveness before they effect a taking. For that reason,
the ad hoc analysis endorsed in Tahoe-Sierra is probably the best meas-
ure because it allows the courts to distinguish reasonable from unreason-
able delays by analyzing specific facts.
Despite its apparent practical and doctrinal soundness, however,
Tahoe-Sierra illustrates a problem older landowners face in pursuing
regulatory takings litigation: the litigation can take so long and its out-
come can be so uncertain that, by the time the dust settles, so do they-in
their graves. In addition, landowners of any age may now face greater
difficulty and expense in litigating regulatory takings claims because an
ad hoc approach, with its emphasis on facts, discourages facial chal-
lenges.
The Tahoe-Sierra Landowners chose to mount a facial attack for
simplicity because it alleviated the need to show the effects of the mora-
toria as applied and thus simplified their task by eliminating ripeness
229
issues. In addition, given the large number of Landowners involved,
this approach avoided the difficulty of proving many similar claims un-
der the complex Penn Central test.230 Future landowners will have to
prove facts and thus incur more expense. One commentator suggests that
individual landowners suffering similar moratoria are now essentially
deprived of due process and access to the courts:
227. Id. at 1487 ("The interest in facilitating informed decisionmaking [sic] by regulatory
agencies counsels against adopting a per se rule that would impose such severe costs on their
deliberations.").
228. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
229. Merriam, supra note 111, at 44.
230. Id. at 48.
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More important is the immediate problem of hampering recourse to
effective judicial procedures that are so costly, complex, burdensome,
and time-consuming as to de facto deny the victims of constitutional
violations any judicial relief at all. If an aggrieved land owner must
first go through a decade of administrative proceedings, and then liti-
gation in hostile state courts, before being able to assert a ripe federal
constitutional compensation claim in federal court, then how many
land owners will be able to carry the burdens of doing so? I am hardly
the first one to suggest it, but there comes a point beyond which due
process of law is denied, not by being curtailed, but rather by forcing
plaintiffs to partake in too much of it.
23 1
Nor are landowners alone in facing high litigation costs. During all
the years of litigation, the governments involved obviously expended
substantial resources defending themselves. Given the relative closeness
of the Court's 6-3 decision, the uncertainties involved transform these
costs into an enormous gamble. Is this really the best way to resolve such
disputes? Given that some Landowners, in reality, had their property
taken from them permanently without compensation, the answer seems
clear: the stakeholders need to explore more proactive, effective, coop-
erative, and cost-efficient planning dispute resolution approaches.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Court's decision provides the correct test for
weighing regulatory takings claims because it preserves the govern-
ment's ability to effectively and efficiently plan, while providing com-
pensation for extraordinary planning delays. It is also a doctrinally sound
decision that should cheer environmentalists somewhat. Nevertheless,
the decision slams the door on the Landowners involved, and raises trou-
bling questions for other landowners, especially older and poorer ones.
Landowners and government planners alike need to give serious thought
about how they deal with complex planning dilemmas. Given the poten-
tial time and money involved in litigating these cases, stakeholders
would be wise to find more creative and cost-effective ways to balance
their competing interests, if only .to avoid the kind of protracted and ex-
pensive litigation that gave birth to this decision.
Damian Arguello*
231. Gideon Kanner, Rolling the Dice with Ambrose Bierce, LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG.,
June 2002, at 12, 13.
* The author is a JD candidate at the University of Denver College of Law. The author
would like to express appreciation to Thomas J. Ragonetti, Adjunct Professor of Law at the
University of Denver College of Law and partner at the law firm of Otten, Johnson, Robinson, Neff
& Ragonetti; Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., Professor of Law at the University of Denver College of Law;
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and J. Thomas MacDonald, partner at the law firm of Otten, Johnson, Robinson, Neff & Ragonetti,
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CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC. V. ADAMS: THE DEBATE OVER
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS IN THE EMPLOYMENT
CONTEXT RAGES ON
INTRODUCTION
Fueling the already fiercely debated issue of arbitration agreements
in the employment context, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed
an "emphatic federal policy"1 favoring arbitration with its March 2001
decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams.2 The subject of much de-
bate, this issue has divided the courts and scholars alike. Over the past
few decades, the Supreme Court has clearly favored arbitration outside
the employment context.3 Yet, until Circuit City, the law was unclear as
to whether businesses could require their employees to resolve legal dis-
putes through arbitration and forego the opportunity to seek redress in
court.
Using a textual analysis to narrowly interpret the statutory language
at issue, the Circuit City Court ruled on this unresolved, and frequently
litigated, issue.4 The Court held that only a narrow category of employ-
ees, interstate transportation workers, are exempt from the Federal Arbi-
tration Act ("FAA").5 As such, all other employment contracts contain-
ing agreements to arbitrate are enforceable and fall within the scope of
the FAA.6 This decision raises concern among critics who argue that
arbitration agreements are inherently unfair and inappropriate for resolv-
ing employment disputes.
1. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985).
2. 532 U.S. 105, 119 (2001).
3. See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 82 (2000) (holding that an
arbitration agreement's silence with respect to arbitration fees and costs does not render it
unenforceable); Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541 (1995)
(holding that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8), does not invalidate foreign
arbitration clauses in bills of lading); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23
(1991) (holding that claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act can be the subject of
compulsory arbitration clauses in securities registration applications); Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989) (holding that claims under the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2), are arbitrable via pre-dispute arbitration agreements and overruling
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953)); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 234
(1987) (holding that claims under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(b), are
arbitrable via pre-dispute arbitration agreements); Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636 (holding that
international antitrust claims are arbitrable via pre-dispute arbitration agreements); Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (holding that state law purporting to invalidate arbitration
agreements in franchise contracts violated the Supremacy Clause).
4. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 111.
5. Id. at 119.
6. Id.
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This comment begins by outlining the facts and procedural history
of Circuit City, including the arguments raised by the respondent em-
ployee and the Court's short-order treatment of those challenges. Part II
discusses the history of the Federal Arbitration Act, key Supreme Court
decisions that shaped the current pro-arbitration climate, and arguments
for and against arbitration of employment disputes. Part I contains an
analysis of the Circuit City holding, specifically addressing the Court's
justification for its decision and the methods of interpretation the Court
employed. Part IV considers the practical effects of the Circuit City rul-
ing and provides an in-depth look at some of the criticisms flowing from
it.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In October 1995, Saint Clair Adams applied for a job at Circuit
City, Inc. ("Circuit City"), a nationwide electronics retail chain.7 The
employment application Adams signed contained an arbitration provision
which bound Adams to "settle any and all previously unasserted claims,
disputes or controversies arising out of or relating to [his] application or
candidacy for employment, employment and/or cessation of employment
with Circuit City, exclusively by final and binding arbitration before a
neutral Arbitrator."'8
Circuit City's Santa Rosa, California store hired Adams as a sales
counselor.9 Two years later, Adams sued Circuit City in state court for
employment discrimination "stemming from harassment based on his
sexual orientation."'10 The company responded with a suit in federal dis-
trict court to compel arbitration.1 The district court concluded that Ad-
ams was obligated to submit his claims against Circuit City to binding
arbitration pursuant to the arbitration agreement.' 2 Adams then appealed
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which found
in his favor.' 3 The Ninth Circuit ruled that all employment contracts were
beyond the reach of the FAA, and, since "the arbitration agreement in
this case was an employment contract," the FAA was inapplicable.' 4 This
decision, while not surprising considering the Ninth Circuit's distaste for
7. Id. at 109.
8. Idat 109-10.
9. Id. at 110.
10. The Supreme Court, 2000 Term-Leading Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 507, 509 (2001)
[hereinafter Leading Cases].
11. Circuit City, 532 U:S. at 110.
12. Id.
13. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070, 1071 (9th Cir. 1999).
14. Circuit City, 194 F.3d at 1071.
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arbitration, 5 was noteworthy because it "conflict[ed] with every other
Court of Appeals to have addressed the question.'
' 6
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to con-
clusively resolve the question of whether the FAA was applicable in the
employment context. 17 Rejecting the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the
FAA, as well as Adams' arguments about the inappropriateness of arbi-
tration for resolving employment disputes, 18 the Supreme Court held that
the FAA does apply to employment contracts, and, furthermore, that it
would not tolerate the notion "that the advantages of the arbitration proc-
ess somehow disappear when transferred to the employment context.'"'
9
II. BACKGROUND
A. History of the Federal Arbitration Act and Key Supreme Court Deci-
sions
Despite initial skepticism, the United States Supreme Court has
"rigorously upheld the enforceability of arbitration clauses" over the past
decade.20 Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act2' ("FAA" or the
"Act") in 1925, and in it the United States Supreme Court found "an
'emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute resolution,,, 22 giving
arbitration agreements practical enforceability.23
The FAA makes agreements to arbitrate enforceable for both exist-
ing controversies and future disputes. 24 The primary substantive provi-
15. This case provided the Ninth Circuit with an opportunity to reiterate its anti-arbitration
stance, expressing again its preference for broadly interpreting § 1 to exclude all employment
contracts from the scope of the FAA. See Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1094 (9th Cir.
1999) (holding, in a decision issued while the Circuit City appeal was pending, that the FAA is
inapplicable to labor or employment contracts).
16. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 111 (citing cases from the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuit).
17. Id.atilO-11.
18. Adams argued that the FAA does not apply because, according to language in § 2 of the
FAA, the Act is limited to commercial contracts involving interstate commerce. He contended that
an employment contract, such as his, was not a contract within the scope of the FAA. Id. at 113.
19. Id. at 119, 123.
20. David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and
Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 33, 54, 73-74.
Original skepticism can be traced back to English common law courts' opposition to anything that
threatened to deprive them of jurisdiction. American courts initially adopted this attitude. Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265,270 (1995).
21. Pub. L. No. 68-401, Chap. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (reenacted July 30, 1947, chap. 392, 61 Stat.
670, codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2000)).
22. Christopher R. Drahozal, "Unfair" Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 696
(citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 631).
23. See Jeremiah A. Byme, Note, "Another Day" Has Come and Gone: Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, Application of the Federal Arbitration Act to Employment Disputes, 40 BRANDEIS
L.J. 163, 170-71 (2001).
24. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2000).
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sion that authorizes this enforcement is found in § 2 of the FAA, which
states:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or contract evidenc-
ing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a con-
troversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction ... shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds exist
at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.
25
The Supreme Court has interpreted this section broadly to uphold
enforcement of arbitration for federal statutory claims, 26 and also to pre-
empt state laws attempting to invalidate or restrict arbitration. 27 Accord-
ing to the Court, § 2 evidences a "congressional declaration of a liberal
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any
state's substantive or procedural policies to the contrary. 28
In recent years, the Supreme Court has issued a series of landmark
decisions favoring enforceability of arbitration agreements. 29 These deci-
sions, culminating last year with Circuit City, have effectively turned the
tide on the "longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements" that
Congress sought to overcome with the FAA. 30 So powerful has its en-
dorsement been, that the Court has been criticized by some observers as
31
being too extreme in its enthusiasm for arbitration. Yet, while the
Court's pro-arbitration stance does provoke some concern, particularly
regarding the implications of arbitration in the employment context, it is
safe to say that in recent years, the Court has been unwavering in its
preference for "resolving difficult questions in favor of arbitration."
32
In 1984, the Court issued one of its earliest pro-arbitration deci-
sions.33 In Southland Corp. v. Keating,3 4 the Court established the FAA's
25. Id.
26. Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 89 (2000) ("[Wje have recognized
that federal statutory claims can be appropriately resolved through arbitration, and we have enforced
agreements to arbitrate that involve such claims.").
27. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 272 ("[S]tate courts cannot apply state statutes that
invalidate arbitration agreements.").
28. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 86.
29. See, e.g., Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 82; Vimar Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky
Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 541 (1995); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991);
Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989); Shearson/Am.
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 234 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636 (1985); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).
30. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 24.
31. The Court's favorable treatment of arbitration has been characterized as "creat[ing] a
monster" and exalting arbitration agreements to "a privileged place in the contractual hierarchy,
trumping both federal and state statutory rights and, in some circuits, even curtailing the powers of
federal agencies to enforce civil rights." Schwartz, supra note 20, at 36; Leading Cases, supra note
10, at 508.
32. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 82.
33. Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16.
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preemptive effect on state law, holding that § 2 of the Act strips states of
the authority to "require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims
which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration. 35 For the
first time, the Court held that the FAA applies not only in federal courts,
but in state courts as well.36 As a result, the FAA now preempts all state
laws that are hostile to arbitration or that attempt to impose conditions on
the enforceability of these agreements.
37
Relying on Southland, the Court in Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc.
v. Dobson38 broadly interpreted the FAA's language as proof of intent by
Congress to exercise its commerce power to the fullest, thereby invali-
dating any state law contrary to the enforcement of arbitration.39 The
Court reaffirmed its pro-arbitration stance by applying the FAA to "an
intrastate contract to provide termite extermination services to an Ala-
bama homeowner, thereby preempting an Alabama statute making pre-
dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable." 40 This decision made it
clear that few contracts would escape the expansive reach of the FAA.4'
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,42 the Court issued a
powerful endorsement of arbitration.43 The Court rejected a number of
arguments about arbitration's intrinsic unfairness, calling these com-
plaints "far out of step with [the Court's] current strong endorsement of
the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes." 4 Reject-
ing the suggestion that arbitration was inferior to a judicial remedy, the
Court stated that, "by agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to
their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.
4 5
These influential Supreme Court pro-arbitration decisions sanc-
tioned the use of arbitration and made it clear that the Court would not
34. 465 U.S. 1.
35. Id. at 10.
36. Id. at 16.
37. Id.
38. 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
39. Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 277. The Court noted that there was no reason to
overrule its decision in Southland because "[niothing significant has changed in the 10 years
subsequent to Southland; no later cases have eroded Southland's authority; and no unforeseen
practical problems have arisen. Moreover, in the interim, private parties have likely written contracts
relying on Southland ... and we find it inappropriate to reconsider what is by now well-established
law." Id. at 272.
40. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 88 (referring to Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 628 So.
2d 354, 355 (Ala. 1993)).
41. Id. at 274.
42. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
43. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30
44. Id. (citing Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 481).
45. Id. at 26 (citing Mitsubishi 473 U.S. at 628).
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entertain generalized attacks on the adequacy or applicability of arbitra-
tion.46
B. Benefits of Arbitration in the Workplace
These key Supreme Court decisions have sparked intense debate
among the courts and commentators alike. Like Southland, Allied-Bruce,
and Gilmer before it, Circuit City has been divisive, specifically concern-
ing the merits of arbitration in the workplace.
Arbitration is frequently praised for offering advantages to both
sides of any claim.47 Even in the employment arena, where parties tend
to be on unequal footing, the Supreme Court has rejected the notion that
the advantages of arbitration somehow cease to exist.48 Generally recog-
nized as being less expensive and faster than the judicial system, arbitra-
tion is also praised for its private nature and its ability to "maintain good-
will between the parties." 9
Corporate defendants too find arbitration particularly attractive for
several reasons. 50 First, since corporations are particularly vulnerable to
unfavorable publicity, they probably benefit most from the private nature
of arbitration.51 Second, the nature of corporations' disputes against mi-
nor players-such as employees, customers, and smaller businesses-
generally involve small sums of money and tend to be patterned and re-
petitive. 52 Such disputes are especially well suited to the "informality of
arbitration," which limits discovery and thus requires less preparation
time "for hearing and presenting evidence."53 This allows corporate de-
fendants to avoid the generally higher costs associated with litigation.
54
Attorneys' fees on the plaintiff's side are typically lower for the same
reasons. 55 In arbitration, where a prevailing plaintiff may be entitled to
46. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 104.
47. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 122-23 (2001); see also Byrne,
supra note 23, at 164 (explaining the benefits provided by the enactment of the FAA, namely less
expense to both parties involved and a speedier resolution to the issue at hand).
48. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 123; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 32-33 (upholding the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, despite "unequal bargaining power between employers and
employees," so long as there is no indication that the employee was "coerced or defrauded into
agreeing" to arbitration).
49. Byrne, supra note 23, at 182.
50. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 60.
51. See Byrne, supra note 23, at 183 ("Arbitration proceedings are mostly conducted in
private, and no opinion is released to the public.").






recover attorneys' fees, the corporate defendant benefits by limiting ex-
penses in the event an unfavorable judgment is rendered.56
Additionally, while statistics indicate that employees are more likely
to recover damages in arbitration than in a judicial forum, 57 "there is a
,,58
general perception that arbitrators give smaller awards than juries.
Because arbitrators typically come from the business community, corpo-
rate defendants may feel they have a better chance of gaining sympathy,
"if not downright bias," from arbitrators. 59 The Supreme Court, however,
stated in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.60 that
it refused "to indulge the presumption that the parties and arbitral body
conducting a proceeding [would] be unable or unwilling to retain compe-
tent, conscientious, and impartial arbitrators.' Yet, critics point out that
it is no secret "individual arbitrators have an economic stake in being
selected again, and their judgment may well be shaded by a desire to
build a 'track record' of decisions that corporate repeat-users will view
approvingly."62
C. Criticisms of Arbitration in the Workplace
Despite a strong pro-arbitration climate, not everyone endorses this
dispute resolution mechanism. 63 In particular, concern is mounting over
the increased usage of arbitration agreements in the employment con-
text.64 Critics insist that employees "are particularly deserving of protec-
tion from compelled arbitration" and that, in the employment context, the
potential for an unjust result is heightened. 65 These criticisms stem from
the notion that, for a variety of reasons, arbitration is an unfair and inap-




57. See Byrne, supra note 23, at 182 (citing Rosenberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 170 F.3d 1, 7 n.4 (1st Cir. 1999)).
58. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 60. Schwartz discusses findings that suggest that virtually all
employment defense firms counsel employers to adopt arbitration policies as a means of reducing
exposure and controlling risk. He cites a survey of sixty-two arbitration awards in securities industry
employment cases which confirmed the 'intuitive' assumption that arbitrating employment disputes
'before a panel of arbitrators . would generally provide a more favorable forum for employers."'
Id. at 63 nn.89-92.
59. Id. (noting, for example, that arbitrators for security industry disputes are drawn from the
securities industry itself).
60. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
61. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 634.
62. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 60-61.
63. See Drahozal, supra note 22, at 705.
64. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 38.
65. Id.
66. See Drahozal, supra note 22, at 705.
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Critics frequently contend that because the vast majority of arbitra-
tion clauses are in adhesion contracts, employees do not really consent to
arbitration.67 Adhesion contracts are typically standard form agreements
between parties with unequal bargaining power.68 One party typically
drafts the agreement and presents it to the other "party on a take-it-or-
leave-it basis."69 Critics argue that when an employee agrees to arbitra-
tion, she is either unaware of what she is agreeing to,70 or she has no
choice but to agree to the mandatory arbitration language because it is a
condition of employment.7 t
Other attacks on the fairness of arbitration revolve around arbitra-
tion's practical operation. Opponents argue that the procedures are biased
in favor of employers. 72 The take-it-or-leave-it nature of arbitration, crit-
ics argue, puts employees in a vulnerable position.7 3 Steep costs to plain-
tiffs, the potential for biased arbitrators, limited discovery, "lack of an
appeal," and "the unavailability of class relief" are common arguments
asserted by those who oppose arbitration.74
Pointing to behavioral evidence, opponents argue that the benefits
of arbitration do not run both ways-that arbitration clearly favors em-
ployers.75 As proof, empirical data shows that when workplace disputes
arise, employers usually seek to compel arbitration, while employees
prefer to litigate.7 6
It has also been suggested that the Circuit City ruling effectively
diminishes the "regulatory impact of statutory and common law doc-
trines. ' 77 Pointing out that corporate defendants have been most eager to
embrace mandatory arbitration, critics object to the deregulatory impact
67. See id.
68. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 55.
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See Drahozal, supra note 22, at 706.
72. See id. at 705 (noting "typical characteristics of an arbitration proceeding ... uniformly
disadvantage individuals").
73. See Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute
Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203,
1234-35 (2002).
74. Drahozal, supra note 22, at 705. Critics of arbitration point to the behavior of the parties
involved in employment disputes and suggest that, unlike employers, individuals who are compelled
to sign arbitration agreements typically prefer to take their claims to court once a dispute arises. Id.
at 748. But see Byrne, supra note 23, at 168 (explaining that, ironically, it is many of these exact
features of arbitration that are advocated as benefits by proponents).
75. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 62.
76. See id. at 62. The author's survey of forty published federal cases involving arbitration of
employment disputes over a two-year period revealed that the employer moved to compel arbitration
in forty out of forty cases. See id. n.88.
77. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 55.
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of these agreements in the employment context. 78 Applying arbitration to
important federal regulatory statutes, such as those that establish dis-
crimination claims, makes arbitration attractive to the corporate defen-
dant looking to limit costs and negative public exposure, and has the
dangerous effect of "self-deregulation. 79
Despite vocal concern from critics of arbitration, however, human
resource departments utilize arbitration agreements with increasing fre-
quency. 80 This widespread use, along with strong backing from the Su-
preme Court, has "established the [FAA] as a major piece of legislation
affecting the careers of many Americans.
81
III. CIRCUIT CITY STORES, INC. V. ADAMS
82
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Supreme Court decided
whether the FAA applied to agreements to arbitrate employment dis-
putes, or whether an exclusionary provision in the Act required deference
to judicial resolution of these matters. 83 The Court determined that the
critical issue was to what extent § 1 of the FAA intended to cover the
arbitrability of employment disputes.84 Section 1 provides, in pertinent
part, that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employ-
ment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce. 85 The language of this provi-
sion leaves room for interpretation as to whether it exempts all employ-
ment contracts from the Act's coverage, or only employment contracts of
interstate transportation workers. 86 With the exception of the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, however, every Circuit to address the issue
had limited the § 1 exclusion to transportation workers. 87 The Supreme
Court approached this issue in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp.,88 but stopped short of resolving it since the dispute in Gilmer
stemmed from a securities registration application held not to be an em-
ployment contract.89 Leaving the issue unresolved in Gilmer, the Court in
Circuit City interpreted § 1 and ruled on its applicability to employment
matters. 90
78. Id. at 62.
79. Id.
80. See Byrne, supra note 23, at 167.
81. Id. at 164.
82. 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
83. See Leading Cases, supra note 10, at 508.
84. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109.
85. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000).
86. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109.
87. See id.
88. 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
89. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25 n.2.
90. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 113 ("Concluding that the application [in Gilmer] was not a
'contract of employment' at all, we found it unnecessary to reach the meaning of § 1.").
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In its holding, the Court limited the § 1 exemption to transportation
workers. 9' In arriving at this decision, the Court rejected the Ninth Cir-
cuit's position that "all employment contracts are excluded from the
FAA '92 and embraced a narrow reading of the statutory language.93 The
Court justified its interpretation utilizing both a textual analysis of the
language of § 1, as well as an examination of congressional intent. 94 In-
terpreting the phrase "any other class of workers engaged in commerce,"
the Court applied "the maxim ejusdem generis," which means "where
general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the gen-
eral words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to
those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words." 95 This logic
supports the Court's reasoning that the general clause "any other class of
workers" should be defined by reference to the specific categories of
"seamen" and "railroad employees" mentioned before it.96
Justice Souter's dissent, in which Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and
Breyer joined, found fault with the rule of statutory interpretation
adopted by the majority, insisting instead that the better maxim was "ex
abundanti cautela," meaning "abundance of caution." 97 The dissent con-
tended that by applying ejusdem generis, the majority ignored the idea
that "a whole may differ from the sum of its parts. 98 The dissent argued
that § 1 should be read to exclude all employment contracts from the
reach of the FAA, and that the words "any other class of workers" should
be read as a catchall phrase encompassing workers of all kinds.99
While the decision in Circuit City focused primarily on interpretive
issues surrounding the meaning of § 1, the Court also undertook an
analysis of the basic coverage authorized under § 2, the primary substan-
tive provision of the FAA.1°° Rejecting the argument that the term
"transaction" in § 2 is limited to commercial contracts, the Court rea-
soned that if § 2 did not apply to employment contracts, there would be
no reason to specify certain types of employment in the § 1 exclusion
provision.' 0' The Court went on to explain that the words "involving
commerce" evidenced Congress' intent to "exercise its full commerce
power in the coverage provision of the FAA., 10 2 In short, the Court rea-
91. Seeid. at 109.
92. Id. at 110-11.
93. See id. at 18.
94. See id. at 114.
95. Id. at 114-15.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 140 (Souter, J., dissenting).
98. Leading Cases, supra note 10, at 513.
99. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 138-39 (Souter, J., dissenting).
100. See id. at 113-16.
101. Id. at 113.
102. Byrne, supra note 23, at 173.
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soned that a narrow reading of § 1, together with a broad reading of § 2,
places employment contracts squarely within the scope of the FAA.' 03
IV. ANALYSIS
The Court's statutory interpretation of § I in Circuit City resolved
the question left unanswered in Gilmer.' 4 The ruling made it clear that,
with the narrow exception of interstate transportation workers, the FAA
could be invoked to completely enforce arbitration agreements in the
employment context.'0 5 Circuit City has been described as "the case that
would define the future of arbitration in the American workplace."',0 6 An
article in the Wall Street Journal, following this decision, described Cir-
cuit City as the Court's "biggest pro-business decision," signaling "a
very good year for big corporations."'10 7 With the backing of the Supreme
Court, arbitration has become the "cornerstone of dispute resolution pro-
grams." 108 To be sure, Circuit City has secured a place for arbitration in
the employment arena, and the effects, not surprisingly, have prompted
concern among those who oppose its use in this context.
A. The practical effects of Circuit City
The Court's endorsement of the broad enforcement powers of the
FAA has paved the way for increased usage of arbitration agreements in
employment contracts. °9 These agreements "have become increasingly
commonplace in a number of fields of commerce."" 0 From the financial
industry to the health care and insurance industries, binding arbitration
often is a condition of service or employment."
1
Before the enactment of the FAA, arbitration was "the sole province
of trade association members" or "limited to contracts between large
corporations."1 2 Shipping and railroad workers, the class of employees
enumerated in § 1 of the FAA, constituted a relatively small number of
employees who operated under established arbitration procedures.
13
Today, however, experts estimate that binding arbitration agreements
103. See id. at 174-75.
104. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 113; see also Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 25.
105. See Byrne, supra note 23, at 167.
106. Id.
107. Robert S. Greenberger, Businesses See Gains in High-Court Term, WALL ST. J., June 29,
2001, at B4.
108. Byrne, supra note 23, at 166.
109. See Schwartz, supra note 20, at 53.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 53-54.
112. Drahozal, supra note 22, at 704.
113. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 121. The Shipping Commissioners Act of 1872, the
Transportation Act of 1920, and the Railway Labor Act of 1926 established procedures for resolving
employment disputes between seamen and railroad employees and their employers. Id.
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cover as many as five million nonunion workers nationwide. 14 And, in
the wake of Circuit City, commentators predict that "use [of these agree-
ments] will only increase as corporate drafters of form contracts catch on
to its advantages."'
1 5
Numerous employment organizations have issued statements re-
garding arbitration agreements in the employment context. The Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), for example, issued
an official policy statement against pre-dispute arbitration agreements for
employment discrimination disputes. 1 6 Staunchly opposed to mandatory
arbitration in the employment context, the EEOC's position stems from
concern over agreements that require employees, as a condition of em-
ployment, to "give up their right to pursue employment discrimination
claims in court." ' 1 7 The EEOC maintains that "the courts play an essen-
tial role in enforcing the civil rights laws," and that if employees are
forced to resolve their claims in an arbitral forum, "there is no public
accountability for decisions that are made or for employers who violate
the law."' '
18
The EEOC claimed a recent victory in its battle against mandatory
arbitration in the employment context. In January 2002, the Supreme
Court ruled in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.119 that the EEOC was not
barred from pursuing legal relief on behalf of an employee who had
agreed to arbitrate employment disputes with his employer.12 0 The Court
held that "the EEOC does not stand in the employee's shoes,1.21 and that
federal statutory authority permits the EEOC to "pursue victim-specific
relief regardless of the forum that the employer and employee have cho-
sen to resolve their disputes.'
122
The EEOC is not the only organization with a very public stance on
the issue of workplace arbitration. The National Employment Law Asso-
ciation ("NELA") has also responded by pressuring arbitration providers
114. Robert S. Greenberger, Justices Back Arbitration Use In Work Arena, WALL ST. J., Mar.
22, 2001, at A3 (citing data from the American Arbitration Association, the largest provider of
dispute resolution services).
115. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 54.
116. See EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (July 10, 1997), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/mandarb.html [hereinafter EEOC Notice]; see also Press Release, EEOC,
EEOC Releases Policy Statement on Mandatory Binding Arbitration (July 10, 1997), available at
http:/www.eeoc.gov/press/7-10-97.html (describing the policy statement and the basic purpose of the
EEOC). The EEOC is the federal agency responsible for interpreting and defending the public's
interest in fair employment practices.
117. EEOC Notice, supra note 116.
118. Press Release, supra note 116.
119. 122 S. Ct. 754 (2002).
120. Waffle House, 122 S. Ct. at 765.
121. Id. at 766.
122. Id. at 765.
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into refusing to take part in compulsory pre-dispute arbitration.123 Hoping
to discourage employers from utilizing these agreements, NELA threat-
ened "to not appoint arbitrators (when its own members had the ability to
choose arbitrators) from those services that were willing to be written
into such employment contracts."
'124
Even pro-arbitration groups, like the National Academy of Arbitra-
tors ("NAA"),125 have responded to the growing popularity of arbitration
agreements in the workplace. These groups recognize that "the vitality of
arbitration is contingent upon a continued confidence in the inherent
fairness of the institution."1 26 A task force assembled by NAA issued a
protocol setting forth recommendations to ensure fair arbitration
proceedings. 127 Members of NELA, the American Bar Association, the
American Arbitration Association, and the American Civil Liberties Un-
ion signed this protocol. 28 Furthermore, the Commission on the Future
of Worker-Management Relations (the "Dunlop Commission") has also
endorsed arbitration, while at the same time cautioning against issues of
potential unfairness. 129 In fact, the Dunlop Commission developed its
own recommendations designed to alleviate concerns about the fairness
of the arbitration process. 130
While these assorted recommendations, protocols, and guidelines
earnestly strive to ensure basic fairness for arbitration in the workplace,
they are merely advisory.' 3' Courts do not require employers "to abide by
these market-spawned rules of the fairer road," and their practical effect
on the arbitration process "remains to be seen."'' 32 The Federal Arbitra-
tion Act itself, however, includes an enumerated list of grounds for
123. Edward A. Dauer, Judicial Policing of Consumer Arbitration, 1 PEPP. DIsP. RESOL. L.J.
91, 102 (2000); see http://www.nela.orglabout/about mission.htm (describing NELA as an
organization of more than 3,400 plaintiffs' attorneys who "represent individual employees in cases
involving employment discrimination, wrongful termination, employee benefits, and other
employment related matters") (last visited Jan. 5, 2002).
124. Dauer, supra note 123, at 102.
125. A non-profit professional organization of arbitrators founded in 1947 with approximately
625 members. See http://www.naarb.org/whatis.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2002).
126. Byme, supra note 23, at 185.
127. A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising out of
the Employment Relationship (May 9, 1995), at http://www.naarb.org/protocol.html.
128. Id.
129. Byme, supra note 23, at 185. The Dunlop Commission is appointed by the U.S. Secretary
of Labor and has championed arbitration as "an efficient way to resolve employment disputes." Id.
130. Id.
131. Dauer, supra note 123, at 102.
132. Id.
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which a fundamentally unfair arbitration award can be overturned.
133
These grounds include:
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitra-
tors, or either of them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refus-
ing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy;
or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceed their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the
subject matter submitted was not made. 134
These "built-in invalidation mechanisms,, 135 in the FAA address many of
the very same concerns that arbitration and employment groups are seek-
ing to resolve with their aspirational protocols and standards.
B. Historical and Policy Implications
The Circuit City majority relied on the significance of the FAA's
language to arrive at its decision.' 36 Critics have disapproved of the
analysis in Circuit City, arguing that the Court relied too heavily on a
textual analysis and ignored policy considerations and legislative his-
tory. 137 With respect to this issue, the Court justified its approach by cit-
ing the limited amount of available legislative history.1 38 The Court also
noted that it would "not resort to legislative history to cloud a statutory
text that is clear.,
139
The Court's approach has raised problems, sparking much debate
over what legislative history is available and the implications this infor-
mation would have had on the outcome of Circuit City. One critic's arti-
cle suggests "the Court's well-known predilection for textual analysis
may take precedence over what are almost certainly its policy prefer-
ences."
140
133. See 9 U.S.C. §§ 10(a)(1)-(4) (2000).
134. Id.
135. Byme, supra note 23, at 186.
136. See Leading Cases, supra note 10, at 514; Byrne, supra note 23, at 179.
137. Leading Cases, supra note 10, at 514-17.
138. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 119.
139. Id.
140. Leading Cases, supra note 10, at 508.
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The dissenting opinions in Circuit City, authored by Justice Stevens
and Justice Souter respectively, argued that the appropriate way to de-
termine congressional intent is to examine the legislative history at the
time the FAA was enacted.141 For example, Justice Stevens argued:
[Nleither the history of the drafting of the original bill by the ABA,
nor the records of the deliberations in Congress during the years pre-
ceding the ultimate enactment of the Act in 1925, contains any evi-
dence that the proponents of the legislation intended it to apply to
agreements affecting employment.14
2
Others argue that "the historical roots of arbitration and of the FAA" fail
to support a rule that would enforce arbitration agreements in contracts
"marked by disparities in bargaining power, knowledge and interests."' 43
Although a textual analysis controlled the result of the majority
opinion in Circuit City, limited legislative history does support the
Court's decision to apply the FAA to employment contracts.144 Counter-
ing arguments to the contrary, commentators note that "[n]othing in leg-
islative history conclusively lends itself to a broad reading of § 1 .
They argue that "when considered in conjunction with the plain meaning
of the statutory language and the FAA's underlying purpose, the limited
legislative history indicates Congress' intent to cover employment con-
tracts of all workers except seamen, railroad employees, and those work-
ers engaged in the actual movement of goods in interstate commerce.
', 46
The Court reasoned that employment disputes for these specific catego-
ries of workers were already governed by grievance procedures under
federal law. 14 7 Justifying its reasons for limiting the § 1 exclusion to in-
terstate transportation workers, the Court offered that it "is reasonable to
assume that Congress excluded 'seamen' and 'railroad employees' from
the FAA for the simple reason that it did not wish to unsettle established
or developing statutory dispute resolution schemes covering specific
workers."' 148 Still, some insist that if the Court had focused more on legis-
lative history, and less on statutory syntax, the Court may have reached a
different outcome in Circuit City.
149
141. See Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 125-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 133-35 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
142. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Schwartz, supra note 20, at 39.
144. Byrne, supra note 23, at 179.
145. Id. at 181.
146. Id.
147. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 121.
148. Id.
149. See Leading Cases, supra note 10, at 515.
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CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams
is consistent with an already strong federal policy favoring arbitration.
50
Holding that the FAA applies to employment contracts, the Supreme
Court sanctioned the use of pre-dispute arbitration as a valid mechanism
for dealing with employment disputes. Because of the strength of this
endorsement, and the advantages arbitration provides to corporate defen-
dants, Circuit City concerns critics who insist the FAA was not intended
to resolve employment disputes. 15' Critics object to the nature of arbitra-
tion agreements, and the fact that, typically, employers include arbitra-
tion clauses in adhesion contracts offered to employees on a "take it or
leave it" basis. Some argue that "employees, as a class, are particularly
deserving of protection from compelled arbitration,' 52 and that, for
many reasons, arbitration agreements are overreaching. Yet, despite the
many concerns it raises, arbitration has found a big supporter in the Su-
preme Court, and the Circuit City decision has secured a place for arbi-
tration in the employment field.
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150. See Byrne, supra note 23, at 181.
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